Ex Parte Clark et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

May 25, 2007

10689465 (B.P.A.I. May. 25, 2007)

The opinion in support of the decision being entered today was not written
for publication and is not binding precedent of the Board.

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
__________________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
__________________

Ex parte REUBEN CLARK and
GARY WEISE

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,4651
Technology Center 2800
__________

Decided: May 25, 2007
__________

Before JAMESON LEE, ADRIENE LEPIANE HANLON, and SALLY C.
MEDLEY, Administrative Patent Judges.

LEE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

A. Statement of the Case 1
2
3
4
5
6

This is a decision on appeal by an applicant under 35 U.S.C. ' 134(a) from a
rejection of claims 9, and 11-27 of Application 10/689,465. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 The real party in interest is Consolidated Manufacturing International, LLC.

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,465

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Reference Relied on by the Examiner
Bondeson US Patent 2,116,776 May 10, 1938
Mooney US Patent 3,988,052 Oct. 26, 1976
Shemtov US patent 4,159,859 Jul. 3, 1979
Reichman US Patent 4,189,198 Feb. 19, 1980
Churla US Patent 4,210,374 Jul. 1, 1980
Meinhardt US Patent 4,806,108 Feb. 21, 1989
Perera US Patent 5,816,844 Oct. 6, 1998

The Rejections on Appeal11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

The Examiner rejected claims 9, 11-13, 17, 18-22, 24, 26, and 27 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Mooney in view of Reichman, Churla, and
Meinhardt.
The Examiner rejected claims 14 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Mooney in view of Reichman, Meinhardt, Churla, and
Bondeson.
The Examiner rejected claims 16 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Mooney in view of Reichman, Meinhardt, Churla, and Semtov.
The Examiner rejected claims 15 and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Mooney in view of Reichman, Meinhardt, Churla and Perera.

B. Issues
Have the applicants shown error in the rejections of claims 9, and 11-27?
C. Summary of the Decision
The applicants have not shown error in the rejections of claims 9, and 11-27.
2

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,465

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
D Findings of Fact (Referenced as FF. ¶ No.)
1. The invention relates to an electrical grounding apparatus which
connects electrical devices to ground. (Specification, 1, ll. 10-12).
2. It has been known to ground an electrical device by connecting the
device electrically to a grounding member such as rebar, pipe, and ground rods.
(Specification, 1, ll. 13-15).
3. It has been known to use a grounding clamp to electrically connect a
ground wire from an electrical device to a grounding member. (Specification, 1, ll.
13-14).
4. Many different grounding clamps have been disclosed in the prior art.
(Specification, 1, ll. 23-24).
5. According to the applicants’ specification, the prior art grounding
clamps are inadequate because the grounding wire from the electrical device is
attached through a hole on the body of the clamp and thus an installer must pull the
ground wire through the hole in the clamp, which task is both cumbersome and
time consuming. (Specification, 1, ll. 24-29).
6. The Examiner has cited many prior art references each disclosing a
grounding clamp which does not receive the grounding wire through a hole on the
clamp. Those references include Mooney, Reichman, Shemtov, Meinhardt,
Churla, and Bondeson.
7. Independent claims 9 and 18 are reproduced below:
9. A clamping apparatus for electrically connecting at least
a first ground wire to a grounding member, the clamping apparatus
comprising:

a bottom clamping member comprising a bottom medial
portion and first and second threaded holes on first and second sides
of the bottom medial portion for accepting first and second screws,
3

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,465

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
respectively, the first and second threaded holes disposed along first
and second longitudinal axes, respectively;

a top clamping member discrete with respect to and for
cooperation with the bottom clamping member and comprising a top
medial portion for cooperation with the bottom medial portion to
define a grounding member axis, the top clamping member
comprising first and second holes on first and second sides,
respectively, of the top clamping member for alignment with the first
and second threaded holes of the bottom clamping member; and

trough comprising a base wall and opposing first and second
side walls, the trough being integral with the top clamping member
opposite the bottom clamping member, the first side wall defining a
threaded hole for receiving a set screw in threaded engagement
therewith, the threaded hole extending along a third longitudinal axis
through the first side wall and toward the second side wall, the third
longitudinal axis intersecting at least substantially perpendicularly
with at least one of the first and second longitudinal axes, the trough
defining an opening between the first and second side walls for
receiving a first ground wire, the opening further defining a ground
wire axis parallel to the grounding member axis, whereby the first
ground wire can be secured in the trough against the second side wall
by the set screw.

18. A clamping apparatus for electrically connecting at least
a first ground wire to a grounding member, the clamping apparatus
comprising:

a bottom clamping member comprising a bottom medial
portion and first and second threaded holes on first and second sides
of the bottom medial portion receiving first and second screws,
respectively, the first and second screws disposed along first and
second longitudinal axes, respectively;

a top clamping member discrete with respect to and for
cooperation with the bottom clamping member and comprising a top
medial portion for cooperation with the bottom medial portion to
define a grounding member axis, the top clamping member
4

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,465

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
comprising first and second holes on first and second sides,
respectively, of the top clamping member receiving the first and
second screws;

trough comprising a base wall and opposing first and second
side walls, the trough being integral with the top clamping member
opposite the bottom clamping member, the though defining an
opening between the first and second side walls, the opening further
defining a ground wire axis parallel to the grounding member axis;
and

a threaded hole defined by the first side wall for threadedly
engaging a set screw disposed along a third longitudinal axis, the third
longitudinal axis intersecting at least one of the first and second
longitudinal axes above the first or second screw.

8. It is not in dispute that the claimed invention requires the claimed
clamping apparatus to be composed of a top portion and a bottom portion each
with a first and a second screw hole which align with corresponding screw holes
on the other portion and that the screw holes are disposed along a first and second
longitudinal axis.
9. Mooney discloses a grounding clamp comprising a top portion and a
bottom portion each with a first and a second screw hole which align with
corresponding screw holes on the other portion, and the screw holes are disposed
along a first and second longitudinal axis. The applicants do not dispute this fact.
10. It is not in dispute that the claimed invention requires a trough integral
with the top portion of the grounding clamp, that the trough has a base wall and
opposing side walls wherein the first side wall has a threaded hole for receiving a
set screw extending in a third longitudinal axis from the first side wall to the
second side wall, that the third longitudinal axis intersects the first or the second
5

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,465

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
longitudinal axis substantially perpendicularly, and that the trough defines a
ground wire axis parallel to the ground member axis.
11. Mooney discloses a trough integral with the top portion of its
grounding clamp, and a set screw extending into the space within the trough
through a top plate to secure the ground wire received within the trough. The
applicants do not dispute this fact.
12. Mooney’s integral trough structure, however, is oriented in such a
manner that the set screw enters the trough from a hole in a top plate rather than
from a hole on the side wall and that the axis of extension of the set screw, the
third longitudinal axis, is parallel rather than perpendicular to at least one of the
first and second longitudinal axis defined by the screw holes on the top and bottom
portions of the clamp as is recited in the applicants’ claims. (Mooney, Figs. 1 and
2).
13. Nonetheless, Mooney’s trough defines a ground wire axis parallel to
the ground member axis, as is recited in the applicants’ claims.
14. The Examiner determined that the only difference between the
claimed invention of the applicants’ independent claims 9 and 18 and the
grounding clamp disclosed in Mooney is that as noted above in FF. 12. The
applicants have not identified any other difference.
15. The Examiner has identified several prior art references each
disclosing a grounding clamp having a trough which defines an opening for
receiving a grounding wire and having a set screw extending either through a top
plate or through a side wall of the trough to secure the grounding wire. Those
references include Mooney, Reichman, Shemtov, and Meinhardt, Churla, and
Bondeson.
6

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,465

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
16. At least in Meinhardt and Bondeson the set screw enters the trough
through a side wall, and in Bondeson the axis of extension of the set screw is
perpendicular to the axis defined by aligned screw holes on the top and bottom
portions of the grounding clamp.
17. In Shemtov and Reichman, the trough can be selectably positioned at
a desired angle relative to the rest of the grounding clamp (Shemtov Fig. 6; col. 3,
ll. 42-50) (Reichman Fig. 1; col. 4, ll. 1-7). Therefore, what is perceived as a top
plate entrance for the set screw in one orientation becomes a side wall entry in
another orientation.
18. In Churla, the trough opening in the grounding clamp defines a
ground wire axis which is perpendicular to the axis of the grounding member.
(Churla, Fig. 1).
19. In Meinhardt, the trough opening in the grounding clamp defines a
ground wire axis which is perpendicular to the axis of the grounding member.
(Meinhardt, Fig. 6).
20. In Bondeson, the trough opening in the grounding clamp defines a
ground wire axis which is parallel to the axis of the grounding member.
(Bondeson, Fig. 6).
21. In Mooney, the trough opening in the grounding clamp defines a
ground wire axis which is parallel to the axis of the grounding member. (Mooney,
Figs. 1 and 2).
22. In Shemtov, the trough opening in the grounding clamp defines a
ground wire axis which is parallel to the axis of the grounding member. (Shemtov,
Fig. 1).
23. In Reichman, the trough opening in the grounding clamp defines a
ground wire axis which may be positioned at any one of four different angles
7

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,465

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
relative to the axis of the grounding member including the zero angle. (Reichman,
4:3-5; Fig. 1).
24. In Reichman, the trough can be rotated into a number of different
positions relative to a coupling collar 11. (Reichman, 4:3-5; Fig. 1).
25. Reichman describes the position of the clamp or trough as reflecting a
“preselected or desired angular relationship” between the clamp and the coupling
collar. (Reichman, 4:2-4).
26. In Reichman, the variable angular relationship between the clamp and
the coupling collar includes a perpendicular relationship between the ground wire
axis and the axis of the grounding member as well as a parallel relationship
between the ground wire axis and the axis of the grounding member. (Reichman,
4:2-5; Fig. 1).
E. Principles of law
Obviousness is a legal determination made on the basis of underlying factual
inquiries including (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the differences
between the claimed invention and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in
the art; and (4) any objective evidence of unobviousness, Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 USPQ 459, 467 (1966). The level of ordinary skill in the
art is evidenced by the applied references. See In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91,
198 USPQ 210, 214 (CCPA 1978); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579,
35 USPQ2d 1116, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
While motivation is necessary to combine teachings, the motivation need not
be expressly stated in any prior art reference. In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 989, 78
USPQ2d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2006). There need only be an articulated reasoning
with rational underpinnings to support a motivation to combine teachings. In re
Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988, 78 USPQ2d at 1337. One with ordinary skill in the art is
8

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,465

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
presumed to have skills apart from what the prior art references explicitly say. See
In re Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 743, 226 USPQ 771, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1985). A person of
ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton. KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1397
(2007). Rigid rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense are neither
necessary nor consistent with case law. Id. In considering suggestion from the
prior art for determining obviousness, the proper approach is quite flexible and
requires consideration of common knowledge and common sense. DyStar
Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C. H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356,
1367, 80 USPQ2d 1641, 1651 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
An invention may be obvious for reasons the inventor did not contemplate,
because applicable prior art need not address the same problem as that faced by an
applicant for patent. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 693, 16 USPQ2d 1897, 1901-02
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1682. A prior art reference is
from an analogous art and proper for consideration if it is reasonably pertinent to
the particular problem with which the inventor is involved. In re Deminski, 796
F.2d 436, 442, 230 USPQ 313, 315 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
F. Analysis
While the applicants’ brief cites extensively to the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure for substantive law on obviousness, the manual does not
have the force and effect of law. The applicable law comes from statutes,
precedents of our reviewing court, and decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.
The applicants argue that for reaching a conclusion for obviousness the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has consistently required a specific
teaching, motivation, or suggestion to combine the teachings of individual items of
prior art. That is a true statement. But even more enlightening is the Supreme
9

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,465

Court’s decision in KSR International Co., supra, which explained that the Federal
Circuit has been applying the “teaching, suggestion, and motivation” inquiry,
otherwise known as the “TSM test,” too rigidly and not in a manner consistent
with the expansive and flexible approach for determining obviousness as was set
forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966). The
applicants’ arguments reflect the same rigid and inflexible approach to considering
teaching, suggestion, and motivation, that the Supreme Court explained in KSR
International Co. as improper. The following discussion by the Supreme Court, in
KSR International Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1741-43, 82 USPQ2d at 1397 is instructive:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
The flaws in the analysis of the Court of Appeals relate for the
most part to the court’s narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry
reflected in its application of the TSM test. In determining whether
the subject matter of a patent claim is obvious, neither the particular
motivation nor the avowed purpose of the patentee [here the
applicants] controls. What matters is the objective reach of the claim.
If the claim extends to what is obvious, it is invalid under § 103. . . .

The first error of the Court of Appeals in this case was to
foreclose this reasoning by holding that courts and patent examiners
should look only to the problem the patentee [here the applicants] was
trying to solve. . . .

The second error of the Court of Appeals lay in its assumption
that a person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be
led only to those elements of prior art designed to solve the same
problem. . . . Common sense teaches, however, that familiar items
may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many
cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of
multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle. . . .

The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to
conclude, in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious
merely by showing that the combination of elements was “obvious to
try.” Id., at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted). When there is a
10

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,465

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a
finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary
skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her
technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the
product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. . . .

The Court of Appeals, finally, drew the wrong conclusion from
the risk of courts and patent examiners falling prey to hindsight bias. .
. . A factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by
hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post
reasoning. See Graham, 383 U.S., at 36 (warning against a
“temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in
issue” and instructing courts to “guard against slipping into the use of
hindsight” (quoting Monroe Auto Equipment Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg.
& Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 412 (CA6 1964))). Rigid preventive
rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are
neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.

The applicants’ arguments suffer from each one of the above-noted errors
discussed by the Supreme Court. Foremost is the complete disregard of basic skill
and common sense in piecing together teachings from multiple references. The
applicants note the differences between the claimed invention and each prior art
reference by itself and assert that that is properly considering the reference as a
whole. But that erroneously ignores the usefulness of component parts for
application in related structures, which would have been recognized by one with
ordinary skill in the art. The applicants argue that because “one of the bases of the
Reichman ‘198 patent is the concept of a selectively oriented wire clamping
member,” Reichman is not pertinent. That patently ignores the teaching that the
ground wire axis in a grounding clamp can be set to whatever orientation, as
desired. An applicable prior art reference need not address the same problem as
that addressed by the applicant for patent. In re Dillon, 919 F.2d at 693, 16
USPQ2d at 1901-02. Also, a prior art reference is from an analogous art and
11

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,465

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
proper for consideration if it is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with
which the applicant for patent is involved. In re Deminski, 796 F.2d at 442, 230
USPQ at 315.
While the ground plug of Meinhardt is not integral to the bushing, that does
not detract from or undermine Meinhardt’s teaching that the set screw penetrates
the trough from a side wall and does not render Meinhardt impertinent. While the
grounding wire in Churla is received in a perpendicular orientation relative to the
axis of the grounding member, that does not detract from or undermine its teaching
about the orientation of the set screw or about a trough which is integral with the
grounding clamp. Neither does the fact that Churla is not concerned with the
problem of orienting the grounding clamp with respect to the screws joining the
separate portions of the clamp together detract from or undermine its teaching
about the orientation and positioning of the set screw. The notion that the presence
of any different feature or objective in a prior art reference renders the prior art
reference inapplicable as a teaching source as to another disclosed feature is
wrong, defies logic and common sense, and has no basis in law.
The applicants argue that because the clamping member of Meinhardt and
Reichman is nonintegral, movable, and also detachable from a monolithic bushing
and because the clamping member of Mooney is integral and fixed in orientation,
one with ordinary skill in the art could not combine the teachings of the three
references. The argument is without merit. The teachings have not been used in
an inconsistent manner as in requiring the clamping member to be both fixed and
detachable from a bushing, or both fixed and rotatable relative to a bushing, or
both integral and nonintegral at the same time. All the teachings of each prior art
reference are available to one with ordinary skill in the art, as far as they can be put
together by reliance on logic and common sense. See, e.g., DyStar Textilfarben
12

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,465

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
GmbH & Co., 464 F.3d at 1367, 80 USPQ2d at 1651; In re Sovish, 769 F.2d at
743, 226 USPQ at 774 (Fed. Cir. 1985)(“The [applicants’] argument presumes
stupidity rather than skill.”).
It is true that merely finding that each claim feature is present in some prior
art reference is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of obviousness. But
that is not what the Examiner has done. There has to be an articulated rational for
putting together the combination. For the rejection of independent claims 9 and
18, the Examiner located and discussed four prior art references -- Mooney,
Meinhardt, Reichman, and Churla, each specifically directed to an electrical
grounding clamp apparatus that receives a ground wire. The level of ordinary skill
in the art is reflected in these references. These references are both within the field
of the inventor’s endeavor as well as reasonably pertinent to the problem the
applicants intend to solve, i.e., cumbersome and laborious task of threading a
grounding wire through a hole in the wall of a grounding clamp. The Examiner’s
stated rationale is that these prior art references illustrate a variety of orientations
for the trough structure and set screw in the grounding clamp relative to the
grounding member and one with ordinary skill in the art would have had all of
these alternative orientations at his or her disposal for selection in a routine task.
In other words, one with ordinary skill in the art would know to pick from pre-
existing orientations of the trough and set screw, in the absence of anything
unpredictable which in this case there is not. We agree. The applicants have not
demonstrated why the determination of the Examiner, ostensibly a reasonable one
based on the collection of prior art, and plain logic and common sense, is wrong.
A grounding clamp does not belong to an unpredictable art. The Examiner
is correct that logic and common sense dictates that the selection of various
features in the cited prior art references, used for their disclosed purposes and for
13

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,465

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
predictable results, is but an application of ordinary skill. As was stated by the
Supreme Court in KSR International Co., slip. op. at 17: “A person of ordinary
skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” The applicants
erroneously assert that the level of ordinary skill in the art cannot be relied upon to
provide a suggestion to combine reference teachings. It can, as it should, since
obviousness is determined from the perspective of one with ordinary skill in the
art. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has also stated that the test for
suggestion from the prior art is a flexible one and requires the consideration of
common knowledge and common sense. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co., 464
F.3d at 1367, 80 USPQ2d at 1651.
The Examiner is correct that the applicants have improperly attacked the
prior art references individually rather than as a combination. See In re Keller, 642
F.2d 413, 426, 208 USPQ 871, 872 (CCPA 1981). The applicants’ insistence on
finding every claim feature in each prior art reference as a precondition to applying
a teaching from that reference is insensible and renders useless a rejection based on
the combined teachings of multiple references. According to the applicants’
contention, any single reference in the combination would have already had to
disclose every claimed feature before any of its teachings can apply.
All of the applicants’ arguments have been addressed. They do not
demonstrate any error in the rejections on appeal. According to the applicants’
approach, no teaching from any one reference may be selected or applied by one
with ordinary skill in the art unless every other feature disclosed by the reference is
the same as that claimed by the applicants. That is incorrect and ignores the skill,
intelligence, and common sense possessed by one with ordinary skill.
As can be seen from Mooney’s Figure 1, if the trough structure were
oriented differently as is shown in Meinhardt, such that the set screw can be
14

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,465

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
regarded as entering the trough through a side wall rather than a top plate, there
would be no other identified difference between the claimed invention of claims 9
and 18 and the disclosed grounding clamp of Mooney. One with ordinary skill in
the art would have possessed sufficient skill to use in Mooney’s grounding clamp
the trough and set screw orientation as disclosed in Meinhardt and expect success.
The trough and set screw orientation disclosed by Meinhardt would have been
available for use and selection by one with ordinary skill in the art, as would be
those disclosed by Reichman and Churla.
The applicants have not argued the merits of any dependent claim separate
from that of the independent claim on which it depends. Accordingly, all of the
claims stand or fall together.
For the foregoing reasons, the applicants have not met their burden of proof
in demonstrating error in any rejection on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The rejection of claims 9, 11-13, 17, 18-22, 24, 26, and 27 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Mooney, Reichman, Churla, and Meinhardt is
affirmed. 17
18 The rejection of claims 14 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Mooney, Reichman, Meinhardt, Churla, and Bondeson is affirmed. 19
20 The rejection of claims 16 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Mooney, Reichman, Meinhardt, Churla, and Semtov is affirmed. 21
22 The rejection of claims 15 and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Mooney, Reichman, Meinhardt, Churla, and Perera is affirmed. 23
15

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,465

1
2
No Time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).

AFFIRMED

sd
16

Appeal 2007-0561
Application 10/689,465

By First Class Mail

Attorney for the applicants:

ALSTON & BIRD LLP
Bank of America Plaza
101 South Tryon Street, Suite 4000
Charlotte, North Carolina 28280-4000
17