Ex Parte Chamorro et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 7, 2017

12694447 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 7, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/694,447 01/27/2010 Carlos O. Chamorro P090032 6037
116992 7590 08/09/2017
T p.nnoY International Tne
EXAMINER
c/o Hubbard Johnston, PLLC COMINGS, DANIEL C
4849 Greenville Ave., Suite 1490
Dallas, TX 75206 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3744
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/09/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket-rj @hubbardjohnston.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CARLOS O. CHAMORRO,
RANDALL L. LISBONA, and RICK A. MAUK
Appeal 2015-004394
Application 12/694,447
Technology Center 3700
Before CHARLES N. GREENHUT, JILL D. HILL, and LISA M. GUIJT,
Administrative Patent Judges.
GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
decision2 rejecting claims 1-24. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We REVERSE.
1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Lennox Industries Inc.
Appeal Br. 3.
2 Appeal is taken from the Final Office Action dated April 21, 2014 (“Final
Act.”), as supplemented by the Advisory Action dated July 10, 2014 (“Adv.
Act.”).
Appeal 2015-004394
Application 12/694,447
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claims 1, 8, and 16 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claims on appeal, with a disputed claim limitation
italicized for emphasis.
1. A wiring connector housing, comprising:
a housing body having first and second ends, opposing
sides, each of which intersects said first and second ends and
spaced apart channels located through said housing body and
extending from said first end to said second end, each of said
spaced apart channels being configured to receive a quick
connector through said first end;
each of said spaced apart channels being configured to
register with and receive a corresponding quick connect terminal
through said second end; and
at least one interference tab extending outwardly from one
of said sides proximate said second end, said at least one
interference tab configured to contact an isolation ridge of an
electrical relay and thereby prevent said second ends of said
spaced apart channels from being improperly registered with said
corresponding quick connect terminal.
REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1-15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by
Li (US 6,976,870 Bl; issued Dec. 20, 2005).
II. Claims 16-24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Li and Hessey (US 4,787,212; issued Nov. 29, 1988).
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Application 12/694,447
ANALYSIS
Rejection I
The Examiner finds, inter alia, that Li’s connector 31 corresponds to
the claimed housing body having first and second ends, and opposing sides,
according to the Examiner’s Annotated Figure 2x of Li, reproduced below.
Final Act. 3.
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Application 12/694,447
The version of Figure 2x of Li shown above depicts an assembly view of a
connector assembly with Examiner annotations. See Li 2:37-38. The
Examiner also finds that “the upper and lower channels of each connector 31
are shown in [Figures 2 and 3] of Li.” Final Act. 3—4. Figure 3 of Li is
reproduced below.
FIG. 3
Figure 3 of Li also depicts an assembly view of the connector 31. See id.
2:37—40. The Examiner further finds that the claim limitation that requires
each of the spaced apart channels to be “configured to receive a quick
connector through said first end” reads on Li’s “contacts shown by [Figure]
3 within the first end of each channel.” Final Act. 4.
Appellants argue, inter alia, that Li “does not teach that the alleged
spaced apart channels extend ‘through said housing body . . . from the first
end to said second,’” as required by claim 1. Appeal Br. 6.
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Appeal 2015-004394
Application 12/694,447
The Examiner responds that “[cjlaim 1 does not require the presence
of openings into the spaced-apart channels at both ends of the housing body
or any other recitation or limitations that would require that ‘extending to
said first end’ include extending all the way to the face of that end.” Ans. 12
(emphasis added). The Examiner determines that the claim term “end” is
“commonly recognized as . . . the portion of something that is near the
extreme boundary and not... the boundary itself.” Id.
Appellants reply that “[cjlaim 1 does not recite that each of the spaced
apart channels goes partially through the housing body,” but rather, that
“each of the channels . . . completely extends from the first and the second
end.” Reply Br. 7. Appellants submit that
[ejven if one were to accept the Examiner’s Answer that an ‘end’
of something is not the ‘extreme end’ of something, which
Appellants do not agree with, Fig. 3 of Li, . . . teaches that its
spaced apart channels, at best, extend to a middle of the housing
body, but certainly not to the vaguely described ‘end’ of the
housing body.
Id. at 8.
During patent examination, claims are to be given their broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, with claim
language being read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by
one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. ofSci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d
1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Specification discloses that “spaced apart
channels 121-123 extend through the entire length of the housing body.”
Spec. 18 (emphasis added). The language of claim 1, however, is broader
than this disclosure in the Specification, because claim 1 does not use the
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Application 12/694,447
language “extend through the entire length of the housing body,” but only
recites that the channels are “located through said housing body and
extending from said first end to said second end [of the housing body],” as
set forth supra. Nor does claim 1 recite that each of the channels completely
extends from the first to the second ends, as argued by Appellants.
An ordinary meaning of the claim term “through,” consistent with the
Specification, is “a function word [used] to indicate penetration of or
passage within, along, or across an object, substance or space usufally] from
one side or surface to the opposite one.” Webster’s Third New Int’l
Dictionary 2384 (1993) (emphasis added, noting that usually does not
mean necessarily). Further, the claims do not require the channels to extend
from the first end surface to the second end surface of the housing body, but
only from the first end to the second end. Thus, we agree with the
Examiner’s interpretation of claim 1 that the channels must be located within
the housing body and extend from the first end to the second end of the
housing body, but from the first end surface to the second end surface of the
housing body. Thus the “ends” identified by the Examiner in Li may be
understood as the opposing halves of housing body 31, and we are not
apprised of error in the Examiner’s finding that spaced apart channels are
located through (or within) Li’s housing body 31 and extending from the
first end (i.e., the first half of Li’s housing body, including the channels) to
the second end (i.e., the second half of Li’s housing body, where the
channels terminate).
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Application 12/694,447
Appellants also argue that Li “does not teach that the spaced apart
channels are ‘configured to receive a quick connector through said first
end.’” Appeal Br. 7. Appellants correctly point out that the Examiner has
not made clear what structure, if any, in Li is regarded as the recited “quick
connect terminal.” Reply Br. 10. To the extent the Examiner is relying on
Li’s terminals 33 as the claimed quick connector, Appellants submit that “Li
does not teach that connector 31 is ‘configured to receive’ terminals 33.”
Reply Br. 11 (citing Li 2:45-51, Lig. 2).
We agree with Appellants’ argument that the Examiner erred in
determining that Li discloses that each of the spaced apart channels, as
identified by the Examiner supra, are configured to receive a quick
connector through the first end of Li’s connector 31, as identified by the
Examiner supra, because such channels terminate at such first end, as
discussed supra and as depicted in Li’s figure 3. Thus, the channels are
unable to receive anything through the first end.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Li, and claims 2-7 depending
therefrom. Similar to claim 1, independent claim 8 requires “spaced apart
channels located through said housing body and extending from said first
end to said second end, each of said spaced apart channels being configured
to receive a quick connector through said fire end,” and the Examiner relies
on the same findings in the rejection of claim 8 as relied upon in the
rejection of claim 1. See final Act. 6. Therefore, we also do not sustain the
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Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 8 and claims 9-16 depending
therefrom.
Rejection II
Similar to claim 1, independent claim 16 requires “a first channel
located through said housing body, said first through channel configured to
receive a quick connector through said first end,” and the Examiner relies on
the same findings in the rejection of claim 16 as relied upon in the rejection
of claim 1. See Final Act. 7. The Examiner’s reliance on Hessey for
disclosing an air conditioning installation does not cure the deficiency in the
Examiner’s finding with respect to Li, as set forth supra. Therefore, for the
reasons set forth supra, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
independent claim 16 and claims 17-24 depending therefrom.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-15 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated by Li is reversed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 16-24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Li and Hessey is reversed.
REVERSED
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