Ex Parte Carmi et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 14, 2017

13528339 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 14, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/528,339 06/20/2012 Eitan Carmi 2011P13690US01 7153
45113 7590 08/16/2017
Siemens Corporation
Intellectual Property Department
3501 Quadrangle Blvd Ste 230
Orlando, EL 32817
EXAMINER
THANGAVELU, KANDASAMY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2123
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/16/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
IPDadmin.us@siemens.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte EITAN CARMI, RAFI BLUMENFELD, and TALI SEGALL
Appeal 2017-004303
Application 13/528,339
Technology Center 2100
Before JOHN A. JEFFERY, ERIC S. FRAHM, and JOHN D. HAMANN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1—23.1 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b). We affirm-in-part.
1 Although Appellants’ Replacement Claims Appendix filed September 30,
2016 omits claims 22 and 23, these claims are nevertheless presented in the
Appeal Brief’s original Claims Appendix filed July 21, 2016 and the Claims
Appendix accompanying the Reply Brief filed January 10, 2017. The
Examiner likewise acknowledges that claims 22 and 23 are pending in this
appeal. See Ans. 3. Therefore, we presume that claims 22 and 23 are
pending in this appeal, and treat Appellants’ omission of these claims in the
Replacement Claims Appendix as a harmless typographical error.
Appeal 2017-004303
Application 13/528,339
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention produces an access-controlled three-
dimensional (3D) environment of a facility and its assets. After an
environment management system (EMS) validates received user credentials,
3D environment data is transmitted to a client system based on those
credentials and user-specific data. Upon receiving a request for additional
information corresponding to an associated asset, the EMS transmits a
reference to the additional information on an enterprise server system (ESS).
The client then uses this reference to retrieve the additional information from
the ESS for display. See generally Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below
with our emphasis, is illustrative:
1. A method performed by an environment management system
(EMS), comprising:
receiving, from a client system, user credentials;
validating the user credentials;
retrieving user-specific data corresponding to the
validated user credentials;
transmitting three-dimensional (3D) environment data to
the client system based on the validated user credentials and the
user-specific data;
receiving a request for information regarding an asset of
the 3D environment data;
determining, based on the validated user credentials,
additional information corresponding to the asset of the 3D
environment data, the additional information located on an
enterprise server system (ESS); and
transmitting, to the client system, a reference to the
additional information on the ESS, wherein the reference can be
used by the client system to retrieve the additional information
from the ESS for display on the client system.
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Application 13/528,339
THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 1—3, 5—11, 13—19, and 21—23 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Omansky (US 2012/0066178 Al; Mar.
15, 2012), Trenciansky (US 2012/0281095 Al; Nov. 8, 2012), and Reichard
(US 2007/0075995 Al; Apr. 5, 2007). Final Act. 3-12.2
The Examiner rejected claims 4, 12, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Omansky, Trenciansky, Reichard, and Rappaport (US
6,971,063 Bl; Nov. 29, 2005). Final Act. 12-13.
THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER OMANSKY,
TRENCIANSKY, AND REICHARD
Regarding claim l,3 the Examiner finds that Omansky discloses,
among other things, an EMS that (1) retrieves user-specific data; (2) receives
a request for information regarding an asset of 3D environment data; (3)
determines, based on validated user credentials, additional information
corresponding to the asset; and (4) transmits a reference to the additional
information on an ESS. Final Act. 3—5. Although the Examiner
acknowledges that Omansky does not receive user credentials from a client
system nor validate those credentials, the Examiner cites Trenciansky as
teaching these elements, and that additional information can be located on an
2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Rejection mailed
February 17, 2016 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed July 21, 2016
(supplemented September 30, 2016) (“App. Br.”); (3) the Examiner’s
Answer mailed November 22, 2016 (“Ans.”); and (4) the Reply Brief filed
January 10, 2017 (“Reply Br.”).
3 Although the Examiner’s findings and conclusions on pages 3 to 8 of the
Final Rejection pertain to independent claim 9, these findings and
conclusions also pertain to independent claim 1 that recites commensurate
limitations. See Final Act. 12.
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Application 13/528,339
ESS. Final Act. 6, 8. The Examiner also cites Reichard for teaching
transmitting 3D environment data to a client system based on validated user
credentials and user-specific data. Final Act. 7—8. Based on these collective
teachings, the Examiner concludes that claim 1 would have been obvious.
Final Act. 3—8.
Appellants argue that the cited references do not teach or suggest an
EMS that (1) transmits 3D environment data to a client system based on
validated user credentials and user-specific data, and (2) determines the
recited additional information based on the validated user credentials, where
this information is located on a different system, namely an ESS. App. Br.
16—21; Reply Br. 9—17. Appellants add that the Examiner’s proposed
combination is based on impermissible hindsight. App. Br. 22—23.
Appellants also argue other recited limitations summarized below.
ISSUES
I. Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding that Omansky,
Trenciansky, and Reichard collectively would have taught or suggested:
(1) (a) transmitting 3D environment data to a client system based on
validated user credentials and user-specific data, and (b) determining, based
on the validated user credentials, additional information corresponding to an
asset of the 3D environment data, where the additional information is
located on an ESS, as recited in claim 1?
(2) the client system combining the 3D environment data with data
from a graphic mapping server to produce a simulated 3D environment
display, as recited in claim 2?
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(3) the client system displaying additional information that has an
associated effective date corresponding to a user-specified date, as recited in
claim 8?
II. Is the Examiner’s proposed combination of the cited references
supported by articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
justify the Examiner’s obviousness conclusion?
ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 3, 5—7, 9, 11, 13—15, 17, 19, and 21—23
On this record, we find no error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim
1. In the rejection, the Examiner cites Omansky for teaching an EMS that
(1) retrieves user-specific data, namely particular data structures and data
sets that are relevant to a person associated with a construction project, and
(2) transmits 3D environment data to a client system. Final Act. 3—4, 7
(citing Omansky Abstract; H 3, 6, 27, 50).
Although the Examiner acknowledges that Omansky does not retrieve
user-specific data corresponding to validated user credentials, we see no
error in the Examiner’s reliance on Trenciansky merely to show that
retrieving data corresponding to validated user credentials via a login
procedure in paragraph 51 is known in the art, and that it would have been
obvious to require users in Omansky to validate their credentials to obtain
data—a predictable result. See Final Act. 6—8. Given these teachings in
view of Reichard’s additional teachings of providing 3D environment data
noted by the Examiner (Final Act. 7—8), we agree with the Examiner that
transmitting 3D environment data to a client system based on validated user
credentials and user-specific data would have been obvious.
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Nor do we find error in the Examiner’s reliance on Omansky for
determining additional information corresponding to an asset of the 3D
environment data, where that additional information is located on an ESS.
As Omansky’s Abstract explains, after selected data structures and data sets
are transmitted to a user terminal, they are updated based on inputs received
from the user. Notably, this updated information corresponds to the recited
“additional information” as noted in the Examiner’s rejection. See Final
Act. 4—5.
Given this functionality considered in light of Trenciansky, not only
would retrieved user-specific data correspond to validated user credentials,
but also the additional updated information that, notably, is based on user
inputs—users whose credentials can be verified via login as suggested by
Trenciansky’s paragraph 51. Therefore, this additional information would
be based at least partly on validated user credentials in view of these
collective teachings, particularly given Omansky’s ability to enable updates
using a permissions configurator in paragraph 43 as the Examiner indicates.
See Ans. 5. Appellants’ contentions regarding Omansky’s individual
shortcomings in this regard (App. Br. 17—18; Reply Br. 10—11) do not show
nonobviousness where, as here, the rejection is based on the cited
references’ collective teachings. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091,
1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In short, the Examiner’s proposed combination uses
prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an
obvious improvement. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417
(2007).
We also find unavailing Appellants’ contention that because
Omansky’s additional information is on the server itself (i.e., the EMS), this
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information is ostensibly not located on the ESS as claimed. App. Br. 18—
21; Reply Br. 10—12. This argument, however, ignores the Examiner’s
reliance on Omansky’s third computing device in paragraph 27, namely a
database, as corresponding to the recited ESS. See Final Act. 8 (mapping
the third computing device to the ESS). This database not only
communicates with the server (i.e., the second computing device), but also
can be a separate server. See Omansky || 27, 30. Therefore, Omansky at
least suggests storing the additional information in a separate server-based
location, such as a database or ESS, under the Examiner’s mapping.
Appellants’ arguments do not squarely address—let alone
persuasively rebut—the Examiner’s findings in this regard. In short,
Appellants’ arguments—including those alleging that the Examiner
officially noticed facts improperly (Reply Br. 15—16)—are not germane to
the Examiner’s above-noted reliance on Omansky’s separate database as
corresponding to the recited ESS.
To the extent that Appellants contend that Omansky’s separate
database somehow cannot constitute—or at least suggest—an ESS (see App.
Br. 16—21; Reply Br. 9-17), there is no persuasive evidence on this record to
substantiate such an assertion. Rather, the weight of the evidence favors the
Examiner’s findings and conclusions in this regard, particularly given the
scope and breadth of the term “ESS” and its data storage function described
in Appellants’ Specification. See, e.g., Spec. 130 (noting that ESS 240 can
maintain user-specific and environmental data). That the term “ESS” is not
defined in the Specification, unlike other terms whose explicit definitions
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leave no doubt as to their meaning,4 only bolsters the propriety of the
Examiner’s equating Omansky’s separate database to the recited ESS given
the term’s scope and breadth.
Lastly, we see no error in the Examiner’s rationale to combine the
cited references on pages 5, 6, and 8 of the Final Office Action. Nor do we
find the Examiner rejection is based on impermissible hindsight
reconstruction as Appellants allege. App. Br. 22—23; Reply Br. 17—19.
To be sure, “[a]ny judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a
reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning . . . .” In re McLaughlin, 443
F.2d 1392, 1395 (CCPA 1971). But it is well settled that the reason to
combine references need not be found in the combined references, but rather
may be found in any number of sources, including common knowledge, the
prior art as a whole, or the nature of the problem itself. DyStar Textilfarben
GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Where, as here, the record tends to
suggest that the Examiner’s rationale to combine the references stems from
common knowledge in the art and the teachings of the cited references, and
is not based solely on knowledge gleaned from Appellants’ disclosure, the
Examiner’s proposed combination is proper. See id. On this record, then,
we find the Examiner’s proposed combination is supported by articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning to justify the Examiner’s
obviousness conclusion.
4 See, e.g., Spec. 8, 26, 28 (defining various terms explicitly).
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Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 1, and claims 3, 5—7, 9, 11, 13—15, 17, 19, and 21—23 not argued
separately with particularity.
Claims 2, 10, and 18
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 2 reciting that the
client system combines the 3D environment data with data from a graphic
mapping server to produce a simulated 3D environment display. Final Act.
9, 12.5 Although the term “graphic mapping server” is not defined explicitly
in the Specification, the Specification’s paragraph 29 nevertheless explains
that geographic mapping server 230 can store, generate, and transmit
geographic information to the client, and can be implemented using a system
such as the “Google Earth” geographic mapping system. Although this
description is exemplary and non-limiting, it nevertheless informs our
constmction of the term “graphic mapping server” in claim 2 as providing
geographic mapping data that, when combined with the 3D environment
data, produces a simulated 3D environment display.
Despite Appellants’ arguments to the contrary (App. Br. 23—25; Reply
Br. 20—21), we see no error in the Examiner reliance on Omansky’s
paragraphs 3 and 6 in this regard, particularly in light of Omansky’s data
updating capabilities in the Abstract, and Reichard’s teaching that multiple
servers 920 can be used to serve one or more clients in Figure 9. Final Act.
9 (citing Omansky || 3, 6); Ans. 12—13 (citing Omansky, Abstract; Reichard
5 Although the Examiner’s rejection identifies claim 10, claim 2 recites
commensurate limitations and is, therefore, rejected on the same basis. See
Final Act. 9, 12.
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Application 13/528,339
65—66). Given Omansky’s acknowledged use of geographic information
in building modeling systems in paragraph 3, and that data structures and
data sets for such modeling systems are updated after transmission to a user
terminal as noted in Omansky’s Abstract, we see no reason why geographic
data associated with such an update could not be received from a separate
graphic mapping server and combined with other 3D environment data at the
client, particularly in light of the multiple servers shown in Reichard’s
Figure 9. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably
according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). Appellants’ arguments
regarding the cited references’ individual shortcomings in this regard (App.
Br. 23—25; Reply Br. 20-21) do not show nonobviousness where, as here,
the rejection is based on the cited references’ collective teachings. See
Merck, 800 F.2d at 1097.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 2, and claims 10 and 18 not argued separately with particularity.6
Claims 8 and 16
We will not, however, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8
reciting, in pertinent part, the client system displaying additional information
that has an associated effective date corresponding to a user-specified date.
6 Although Appellants nominally argue claims 10 and 18 separately (App.
Br. 33—35, 42-43), Appellants reiterate arguments made for claim 2. We,
therefore, group these claims accordingly. We treat other nominally-argued
claims similarly, and group those claims accordingly.
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Final Act. 11—12.7 Our emphasis underscores that the additional information
itself has an effective date as claimed.
The Examiner’s rejection, however, falls short in this regard. As
Appellants indicate (App. Br. 25—27; Reply Br. 22—23), the times and dates
in Omansky’s Figure 8 and associated paragraph 54, on which the Examiner
relies, merely pertain to particular systems: they are not the effective dates of
the information itself, much less information-specific dates that correspond
to a user-specified date. That the Examiner failed to respond to Appellants’
arguments in this regard in the Answer is telling. Accord Reply Br. 23
(noting this omission). In short, the Examiner simply does not explain how
or why these dates in Omansky are effective dates of the additional
information itself let alone explain why these dates correspond to a user-
specified date. Nor will we speculate in that regard here in the first instance
on appeal.
The Examiner’s reliance on lines 15 to 18 of Omansky’s paragraph 40
(Final Act. 11) is likewise unavailing. Here again, apart from merely citing
this passage, the Examiner does not explain how or why this disclosed
functionality teaches or suggests effective dates of the additional
information itself let alone explain why these dates correspond to a user-
specified date. To the extent that the Examiner finds that Omansky’s
synchronization rules in paragraph 40 are somehow relevant in this regard,
we cannot say on this record. Nor will we speculate in that regard here in
the first instance on appeal.
7 Although the Examiner’s rejection identifies claim 16, claim 8 recites
commensurate limitations and is, therefore, rejected on the same basis. See
Final Act. 11—12.
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Therefore, we are persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 8, and claim 16 that recites commensurate limitations.8
THE OTHER OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION
We do, however, sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
claims 4, 12, and 20. Final Act. 12—13. Despite nominally arguing these
claims separately, Appellants reiterate similar arguments made in connection
with claim 1, and allege that Rappaport fails to cure those purported
deficiencies. App. Br. 12—13. We are not persuaded by these arguments for
the reasons previously discussed.
CONCLUSION
Under § 103, the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1—7, 9—15,
and 17—23, but erred in rejecting claims 8 and 16.
DECISION
We affirm-in-part the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—23.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
8 Although Appellants include claim 23 in connection with their arguments
made for claims 8 and 16 (Reply Br. 22), claim 23 does not recite limitations
commensurate with those recited in claims 8 and 16. Accordingly, we group
claim 23 with claim 1—not claim 8.
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