Ex Parte Burkhard

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 25, 2013

11961759 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 25, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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Ex parte ALAN WAYNE BURKHARD
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Appeal 2012-002380
Application 11/961,759
Technology Center 3600
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Before HUBERT C. LORIN, MICHAEL W. KIM, and
GEORGE R. HOSKINS, Administrative Patent Judges.

HOSKINS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Alan Wayne Burkhard (“Appellant”) appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134
from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1 and 3-20. We have
jurisdiction over this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A vibratory separator, comprising:
a basket comprising a first magnetic component disposed
on the basket; and
a motor comprising a motor shaft and a second magnetic
component coupled to the motor shaft, wherein the motor is
disposed on a base;
wherein the first magnetic component and the second
magnetic component are arranged to magnetically interact; and
wherein the interaction between the first magnetic
component and the second magnetic component imparts a
vibratory motion to the basket.
See App. Br. Clms. Appx.
REJECTIONS
Appellant requests our review of the following rejections (App. Br. 6).
Claims 1, 3, 5-8, and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Keenan (US 1,620,213, iss. Mar. 8, 1927) in view of
Scholin (US 4,011,477, iss. Mar. 8, 1977).
Claims 4 and 9-11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Keenan in view of Scholin and Suter (US 2002/0153288
A1, pub. Oct. 24, 2002).
Claims 13-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Keenan in view of Scholin and Scott (US 2005/0242003 A1, pub. Nov.
3, 2005).
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ANALYSIS
Rejection of Claims 1, 3, 5-8, and 12 as Unpatentable over
Keenan and Scholin
Appellant argues this rejection is improper because Keenan and
Scholin fail to disclose a motor “disposed on a base” as recited in claim 1.
See App. Br. 7-9 and 11. Appellant asserts mounting the motor on the
“base” provides advantages over mounting the motor on the “basket.” See
id. 8. However, as the Examiner notes (see Ans. 13), claim 1 does not
define the “base” as being a separate component from the “basket” or in any
other way further define or place the “base” within the vibratory separator.
Moreover, the Examiner relies on Scholin for its disclosure of a motor, and
Scholin indicates its motor 3 is “appropriately mounted to rotatably drive the
shaft 9 through a belt and pulley arrangement 10.” Scholin, col. 1, l. 68 to
col. 2, l. 5 (emphasis added). We sustain the Examiner’s finding that
Scholin thereby inherently discloses its motor 3 is “disposed on a base,”
because some sort of support is necessary for the motor 3 to work as
intended. See Ans. 13. We are therefore not persuaded by Appellant’s
argument that Scholin fails to disclose its motor 3 is disposed on a base.
Appellant also argues this rejection is improper because Keenan and
Scholin fail to disclose “a basket comprising a first magnetic component
disposed on the basket” as recited in claim 1. See App. Br. 9-11. Appellant
asserts the first magnetic component 40, 41, 42 of Keenan is disposed on the
screen 23 of Keenan rather than on a basket, and moreover that Keenan fails
to disclose a basket in any event. See id. However, as the Examiner notes
(see Ans. 13-15), claim 1 does not define any sort of “screen” as being a
separate component from the “basket” or in any other way further define or
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place the “basket” within the vibratory separator. We sustain the
Examiner’s finding that Keenan discloses a “basket” as claimed, wherein the
Keenan basket includes the screen 23, the screen frame 19, and various
support members 39, 28, 29, 30, 31, 13, 15, and 10. See Ans. 14-15. We are
therefore not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Keenan fails to
disclose a basket comprising a first magnetic component disposed on the
basket.
Appellant argues the rejection of dependent claim 7 is improper
because Keenan and Scholin fail to disclose “wherein the motor imparts a
directional motion to the basket.” See App. Br. 11-12. In particular,
Appellant notes the motor 3 of Keenan is attached to the screen 23 to vibrate
the screen 23, and asserts: “Because screen 23 is not equivalent to a basket,
the motor assembly of Keenan does not impart directional motion to a
basket.” See id. at 12. We are not persuaded by this argument. As noted
above, the Examiner properly found that Keenan discloses a basket, and the
screen 23 of Keenan is part of that basket. Imparting a directional motion to
a component of the basket, as is performed by first magnetic component 40,
41, 42 on the screen 23, satisfies the requirement in claim 7 of imparting a
directional motion to the basket. We therefore sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 7 as unpatentable over Keenan and Scholin.
Appellant does not argue for the patentability of dependent claims 3,
5, 6, 8, and 12 separately from their parent claim 1. See App. Br. 6.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1, 3, 5-8, and 12 as unpatentable over Keenan and Scholin.
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Rejection of Claims 4 and 9-11 as Unpatentable over
Keenan, Scholin, and Suter
Appellant argues this rejection is improper because, in Appellant’s
view, Suter teaches away from these claims. See App. Br. 13-15 and 19. In
particular, Appellant asserts the present Specification (para. [0015])
discourages placing actuators or motors on a screen or frame, and the
actuators and motors of Suter are disposed on a support member 24 of a
frame 12. See id. at 13-14. We are not persuaded. As the Examiner notes
(see Ans. 16-17), regardless of what the present Specification provides, the
rejected claims do not require any sort of placement of the motor as being
separate from a screen or frame. Therefore Suter does not teach away from
the claimed invention.
Appellant also argues this rejection improperly combines Keenan and
Suter, because Keenan uses magnetic interaction to impart a linear motion
vibration to a screen, while Suter uses rotation of unbalanced weights to
impart circular or round vibration to a screen. See App. Br. 15-16 and 19.
Appellant urges that, due to those differences, the combination would render
each reference inoperable and unsatisfactory for its intended purpose. See
id. at 15-16. We are not persuaded by these arguments, because they are
inapposite to the Examiner’s rejection. The Examiner cites Suter for its
disclosure of a second motor supplying a motion in a direction substantially
opposite the first motor (claim 4), and a programmable logic controller to
vary the vibratory motion imparted to the basket (claims 9-11). See Ans. 7-8
and 17-18. One of ordinary skill would appreciate those features can be
incorporated into the Keenan separator without also incorporating the
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unbalanced weights of Suter, such that the result is two motors attached to
separate portions of the screen 23.
Appellant further argues this rejection improperly combines Scholin
and Suter, because Scholin converts motion between two magnets into a
reciprocating linear motion, while Suter uses rotation of unbalanced weights
to impart circular or round vibration to a screen. See App. Br. 16 and 19-20.
This argument is not persuasive because it is inapposite to the Examiner’s
rejection, as already discussed in connection with Keenan and Suter.
Appellant next argues the rejection of dependent claim 11 is improper
because Keenan, Scholin, and Suter fail to disclose a programmable logic
controller operably coupled to a variable frequency drive, as recited in that
claim. See App. Br. 20-21. Appellant asserts Keenan and Scholin are
“silent with respect to a variable frequency drive.” See App. Br. 20. We,
however, sustain the Examiner’s finding that both Keenan and Scholin
disclose variable frequency drives. See Ans. 24-25 (citing Keenan at p. 2, ll.
59-67) and 25 (quoting Scholin at col. 3, ll. 3-9). Appellant additionally
asserts the controller 210 of Suter does not vary the frequency of the motors
30, 46, or 48. See App. Br. 20 (citing para. [0023] of Suter, describing fig.
5). The Examiner, however, did not find that the controller 210 of Suter is
coupled to a variable frequency drive. Rather, the Examiner cites Suter as
disclosing “a programmable logic controller in a vibratory separator,” which
Suter describes as being useful for “implementing a motion control program
enabling a selection of different modes.” See Ans. 25-26 (citing Suter,
paras. [0030]-[0031]). We sustain those findings regarding the Suter
disclosure. As we are not persuaded by Appellant’s objections to the
respective disclosures of Keenan, Scholin, and Suter, and Appellant does not
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otherwise challenge the Examiner’s combination of those references, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11 as unpatentable over Keenan,
Scholin, and Suter.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 4 and 9-11 as unpatentable over Keenan, Scholin, and Suter.
Rejection of Claims 13-20 as Unpatentable over
Keenan, Scholin, and Scott
Appellant argues this rejection is improper because, in Appellant’s
view, Scott teaches away from these claims. See App. Br. 21-23 and 26. In
particular, Appellant asserts the present Specification (para. [0016])
discourages basket-mounted motors, and the vibration apparatus 504 of
Scott is mounted on a basket 506. See id. at 21-22. We are not persuaded.
As the Examiner notes (see Ans. 26-27), regardless of what the present
Specification provides, the rejected claims do not require any sort of
placement of the motor as being separate from a basket. Therefore, Scott
does not teach away from the claimed invention.
Appellant also argues this rejection improperly combines Keenan and
Scott, because Keenan is constrained to linear motion, while Scott allows
linear, elliptical, and circular motions. See App. Br. 23 and 26. Appellant
urges that, due to those differences, there is no suggestion or motivation to
combine the references. See id. We are not persuaded by these arguments,
because they are inapposite to the Examiner’s rejection. The Examiner cites
Scott for its disclosure of adjusting a separatory profile in response to a
change in a property of injected drilling material. See Ans. 11 (citing Scott,
paras. [0143]-[0145]); see also id. at 27. One of ordinary skill would
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appreciate that feature can be incorporated into the Keenan separator without
also incorporating the various drive motions of Scott.
Appellant further argues this rejection improperly combines Scholin
and Scott, because Scholin produces linear reciprocating motion, while Scott
allows linear, elliptical, and circular motions. See App. Br. 23 and 27. This
argument is not persuasive because it is inapposite to the Examiner’s
rejection, as already discussed in connection with Keenan and Scott.
Appellant does not argue for the patentability of dependent claims 14-
19 separately from their parent claim 13. See App. Br. 6 and 21-25.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 13-20 as unpatentable over Keenan, Scholin, and Scott.
DECISION
We AFFIRM the rejections of claims 1 and 3-20 as unpatentable over
the prior art.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED

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