Ex Parte Burbeck

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 14, 2013

10859283 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 14, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
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Ex parte STEPHEN LEE BURBECK

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Appeal 2010-008102
Application 10/859,283
Technology Center 2100
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Before ERIC B. CHEN, HUNG H. BUI, and
GEORGIANNA W. BRADEN, Administrative Patent Judges.

BRADEN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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This is an appeal1 under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the non-final
rejection of claims 1, 3-7, and 10-27. Claims 2, 8, 9, and 28 have been
cancelled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention relates to a data sharing system in a peer-to-peer
computer network for sharing ontology information. The system allows
clients in the network to access files and ontology information from others in
the peer-to-peer network. (Abstract.)
Claim 1 is exemplary, with disputed limitation in italics:
1. A peer-to-peer file sharing system that is implemented by
a plurality of clients within a network, wherein each client
includes:
a file sharing system that allows each client to directly
access files stored on a computer of at least one other client in
the network; and
an ontology sharing system that allows each client to
access current and historical ontology information from other
clients in the network, wherein the ontology information
includes a directory structure identifying where a located file
resides on a client computer;
wherein the ontology sharing system includes a system
for reorganizing the directory structure, and wherein the
ontology sharing system includes a system for promulgating
proposed directory structures to other clients in the network.

1 Real Party in Interest is International Business Machines Corp.
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Claims 1, 3-7, and 10-27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Kuno (U.S. Patent No. 7,117,201 B2; Oct. 3, 2006),
Davies (John Davies et al., OntoShare – An Ontology-based Knowledge
Sharing System for Virtual Communities of Practice, J. UNIVERSAL
COMPUTER SCI. vol. 10(3):262-283 (2004)), and OWL (Michael K. Smith et
al., “Web Ontology Language (OWL) Guide Version 1.0” (2003),
http://www.w3.org/TR/2003/WD-owl-guide-20030210/ ).

ANALYSIS
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments (Br. 5-7) that the
combination of Kuno, Davies, and OWL would not have rendered obvious
independent claim 1, which includes the limitation “an ontology sharing
system that allows each client to access current and historical ontology
information from other clients in the network.”
The Examiner found that the “OntoShare” of Davies corresponds to
the limitation “an ontology sharing system that allows each client to access
current and historical ontology information from other clients in the
network.” (Ans. 5, 22-23; Davies, § 2.)
Under the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the
Specification, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Kuno,
Davies, and OWL teaches “an ontology sharing system that allows each
client to access current and historical ontology information from other
clients in the network.” Appellant’s Specification explains that an ontology
information exporting system 36 packages path information. (Spec. 10:12-
16.) Path information is defined as “any information that could be of use,
e.g., it may include a metadata file describing in more detail the path’s role
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in the ontology.” (Spec. 10:16-18.) Appellant’s Specification further
explains that:
In one illustrative embodiment, ontology information received
when a file is initially retrieved can be cached with the file.
The cached information can then be passed along to requesters
of the file as additional ontology information. This
acknowledges that the present ontology may not be the same as
that of the original provider of the file. Thus, a history of the
ontologies is maintained. This historical information could
speed the flow of ontological information since, in the process
of retrieving one file, the user obtains perhaps many ontological
paths.
(Spec. 13:5-12.) Accordingly, we interpret “ontology information” as
including metadata and cached information passed along with requested files
and all directory paths in which the file was found.
Davies relates to “[a]n ontology-based knowledge sharing system
OntoShare” (Abstract), which contains an ontology that “specifies a
hierarchy of concepts (ontology classes) to which users can assign
information. In this process, important metadata is extracted and associated
with the community information resource using RDF annotations.” (§ 1.)
OntoShare has the capability to summarize and extract key words from
WWW pages and other sources of information shared by a user and it then
shares this information with other users in the community of practice whose
profiles predict interest in the information. (§ 2.) Moreover, OntoShare is
used to store, retrieve, summarize and inform other users about information
considered in some sense valuable by an OntoShare user. (§ 2.)
Similar to Appellant’s “ontology information,” Davies teaches
extracting sources of information shared by a user and then sharing this
information with other users in the network. Metadata and cached
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information about a file are examples of “other sources of information”
extracted and shared by OntoShare. Based on the above claim construction,
the claim term “ontology information” is broad enough to encompass the
“other sources of information” specified in Davies.
First, Appellant contends Davies fails to teach or suggest sharing
ontology information. (Br. 5.) In particular, Appellant argues that “the
information shared in Davies is organized into ‘ontological classes’” and
“the information shared in Davies is not this ontological structure.” (Br. 6.)
Appellant further argues:
the sharing of knowledge does not clearly indicate access to
current and historical ontology information. Simply sharing
knowledge in general does not automatically imply access to
both current and historical information or to ontology
information. Further, as mentioned above, the information
shared in Davies is not even ontology information.
(Br. 6.) However, as discussed previously, when the claim term “ontology
sharing system” is properly construed, Davies teaches the claim limitation
“an ontology sharing system that allows each client to access current and
historical ontology information from other clients in the network.”
Furthermore, “ontology information” is not limited to only directory
structures or file path names, but can include miscellaneous information
such as community names, etc. or metadata. (Spec. 10:7-9.)
Second, Appellant argues “[a]s best understood by Appellant, the
Examiner appears to interpret the property information disclosed by OWL to
allegedly teach or suggest the current and historical ontology information of
claim 1.” (Br. 6.) However, the Examiner also cited Davies for teaching the
limitation “an ontology sharing system that allows each client to access
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current and historical ontology information from other clients in the
network.” (Ans. 5, 22-23; Davies, § 2.)
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Kuno,
Davies, and OWL teaches the limitation “an ontology sharing system that
allows each client to access current and historical ontology information from
other clients in the network.”
We are also unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument (Br. 7) that the
combination of Kuno, Davies, and OWL would not have rendered obvious
independent claim 1, which includes the limitation “wherein the ontology
sharing system includes a system for promulgating proposed directory
structures to other clients in the network.”
The Examiner found that the “OntoShare” of Davies, which is used to
store information and share such information with other users, corresponds
to the limitation “wherein the ontology sharing system includes a system for
promulgating proposed directory structures to other clients in the network.”
(Ans. 5-6, 23; Davies, § 2.) We agree with the Examiner.
Davies explains that “OntoShare is used to store, retrieve, summarize,
and inform other users about information considered in some sense
valuable.” (§ 2). Therefore, such information of OntoShare corresponds to
the claimed “directory structures.” Davies further explains that “this
information with other users in the community of practice.” Accordingly,
Davies teaches the claim limitation “wherein the ontology sharing system
includes a system for promulgating proposed directory structures to other
clients in the network.”
Appellant argues that “the sharing of information with other users in
Davies is not the same as the ‘system for promulgating proposed directory
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structures to other clients in the network’” because “[t]he information shared
in Davies is information that a user thinks there is sufficient interest in to
share with other people.” (Br. 7.) Contrary to Appellant’s argument, as
discussed previously, the information being shared by the OntoShare in
Davies is key words extracted from the WWW pages, as well as other
sources of information such as metadata, cached information, and directory
structures. Appellant’s conclusory statements fail to distinguish the
information shared in Davies from the “system for promulgating proposed
directory structures to other clients in the network.”
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Kuno,
Davies, and OWL teaches the limitation “wherein the ontology sharing
system includes a system for promulgating proposed directory structures to
other clients in the network.”
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Claims 3-7 depend from claim 1, and Appellant has not
presented any substantive arguments with respect to these claims.
Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 3-7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a),
for the same reasons discussed with respect to independent claim 1.
Independent claims 10 and 19 recite limitations similar to those
discussed with respect to independent claim 1, and Appellant has not
presented any additional substantive arguments with respect to these claims.
We sustain the rejection of claims 10 and 19, as well as claims 11-18 and
20-27, which depend from claims 10 and 19, for the same reasons discussed
with respect to claim 1.

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DECISION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3-7, and 10-27 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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