Ex Parte Bruce et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 17, 2013

11263224 (P.T.A.B. May. 17, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte TIMOTHY R. BRUCE, JOHN M. CASEY, and
WILLIAM R. EVANS

________________

Appeal 2010-009691
Application 11/263,224
Technology Center 2100
________________

Before DAVID M. KOHUT, JASON V. MORGAN, and JOHN G. NEW,
Administrative Patent Judges.

NEW, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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SUMMARY
Appellants file this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1-52. Specifically, claims 1-2, 4-11,
14-17, 19-26, 29-32, 34-41, 44-46, and 49 stand rejected as unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Bart
(US 6,691,116 B1, February 10, 2004) (“Bart”), Ainsbury et al. (US
6,078,924, June 20, 2000) (“Ainsbury”), and Stahl (US 6,574,640 B1, June
3, 2003) (“Stahl”).
Claims 12-13, 27-28, and 42-43 stand rejected as unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over the combination of Bart,
Ainsbury, Stahl, and Midgely et al. (US 6,460,055 B1, October 1, 2002)
(“Midgely”).
Claim 47 stands rejected as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being obvious over the combination of Bart, Ainsbury, Stahl, and
Muecklich et al. (US 2004/0083244 A1, April 29, 2004) (“Muecklich”).
Claim 48 stands rejected as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being obvious over the combination of Bart, Ainsbury, Stahl, and LaRue et
al. (US 6,401,104 B1, June 4, 2002) (“LaRue”).
Claim 51 stands rejected as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being obvious over the combination of Bart, Ainsbury, Stahl, and Perinet et
al. (US 2002/0169792 A1, November 14, 2002) (“Perinet”).
Claim 52 stands rejected as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being obvious over the combination of Bart, Ainsbury, Stahl, and Beeler,
JR. (US 2004/0083245 A1, April 29, 2004) (“Beeler”).
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
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NATURE OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellants’ invention is directed to a method for managing backup
information. The method includes collecting backup information from a
plurality of backup products and converting the collected backup
information into a common format. The collected backup information is
stored in a centralized catalog, and access to the backup information stored
in the centralized catalog is provided. Abstract.

GROUPING OF CLAIMS

Since Appellants argue that the Examiner erred for substantially the
same reasons with respect to claims, 1-2, 4-11, 14-17, 19-26, 29-32, 34-41,
44-46, and 49 we select claim 1 as representative. App. Br. 20, 24-28.
Claim 1 recites:
1. A method for managing backup information,
comprising:

using an automatic discovery service running on a
centralized system to automatically find each of a plurality of
disparately located backup products using a plurality of backup
platforms;

collecting backup information from the plurality of
backup products;

receiving the backup information from the plurality of
backup products at the centralized system, the backup
information received in a plurality of formats;

converting, at the centralized system, the backup
information collected from the plurality of backup products in
the plurality of formats into a common format;
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storing the collected backup information in a centralized
catalog; and

providing access to the backup information stored in the
centralized catalog.

App. Br. 30.

Appellants argue that the Examiner erred for substantially the same
additional reasons with respect to claims 3, 18, and 33; we therefore select
claim 3 as representative of this group. App. Br. 24. Claim 3 recites:
3. The method of Claim 1, wherein the backup
information comprises information associated with a plurality
of backup volumes.

App. Br. 30.
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred for substantially the same
additional reasons with respect to claims 8, 23, and 38; we therefore select
claim 8 as representative of this group. App. Br. 25. Claim 8 recites:
8. The method of Claim 1, wherein collecting the
backup information from the plurality of backup products
comprises requesting the backup information from a plurality of
catalogs, each catalog associated with a selected one of the
backup products.

App. Br. 31.
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred for substantially the same
additional reasons with respect to claims 12-13, 27-28, and 42-43; we
therefore select claim 12 as representative of this group. App. Br. 26.
Claim 12 recites:
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12. The method of Claim 1, wherein collecting the
backup information comprises receiving backup information
that is pushed up from the plurality of backup products.

App. Br. 31.
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred for an additional reason
with respect to claim 46. App. Br. 27. Claim 46 recites:
46. The method of Claim 1, wherein the backup
information comprises at least one backup volume and at least
one description of the backup volume.

App. Br. 37.
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred for an additional reason
with respect to claim 51. App. Br. 28. Claim 51 recites:
51. The method of Claim 1, wherein collecting backup
information comprises receiving the backup information in
XML [extensible markup language].

App. Br. 37.

ISSUES AND ANALYSES
We address each of Appellants’ arguments seriatim, as presented in
Appellants’ Brief.

Claims 1-2, 4-17, 19-32, 34-46, 47-49, and 52
Issue 1
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in finding that the cited
prior art references teach or suggest the limitation of claim 1 reciting “using
an automatic discovery service running on a centralized system to
automatically find each of a plurality of disparately located backup products
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using a plurality of backup platforms.” App. Br. 21. We therefore address
the issue of whether the Examiner so erred.

Analysis
Appellants argue that Stahl teaches “[a]n address catalogue provides
at all times an overview of the external archiving systems logged on within
a central archive system” and that the external archiving systems must log
in to the central archive system before address information for such external
archiving systems can be added to the address catalogue. App. Br. 21
(citing Stahl, col. 5, ll. 11-14; claim 7). Appellants argue that, with respect
to the import of the index to the central archive system, Stahl teaches only
that the “index data is loaded into the central archive system” and that “[a]n
address catalogue provides at all times an overview of the external
archiving systems logged on within a central archive system.” App. Br. 21-
22 (citing Stahl, col. 4, ll. 20-25; col. 5, ll. 11-15). According to
Appellants, Stahl teaches or suggests, at most, that an external archiving
system must be “logged on” before the index is imported to the central
archive system and that, therefore, the centralized system of Stahl does not
include “an automatic discovery service,” as recited in claim 1. App. Br.
22. Rather, contend Appellants, Stahl teaches or suggests maintaining a
catalogue of logged on systems and does not teach or suggest
“automatically discover[ing]” or “automatically find[ing]” disparately
located products. Id.
Appellants argue further that claims 8 and 9 recite merely that an
“address catalogue is supplied automatically to the front-end server by the
central archive system” and/or that “a new address catalogue is
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automatically supplied to the front-end server or the user system when there
are any changes to the address catalogue in the central archive.” App. Br.
22 (quoting Stahl, claims 8, 9). According to Appellants, the cited portions
discuss when an address catalogue (i.e., index) is supplied by the central
archive system to the front end server. Id. Appellants contend that the
cited portions do not relate to “an automatic discovery service” and/or
finding “heterogeneous external archiving systems” that are coupled to the
central archive system, and are therefore not analogous to the limitation of
claim 1 reciting “automatically discover[ing] an address for each of a
plurality of disparately located backup products using a plurality of backup
platforms.” Id.
The Examiner responds that the login process of Stahl is analogous to
the automatic discovery service on a centralized system automatically
finding the backup products as recited in claim 1, because the login process
on the Stahl centralized system is the automatic discovery service. Ans. 24.
The Examiner finds that this service allows the centralized system to
automatically find, or automatically become aware of, the backup products
when they log into the system. Id. Therefore, finds the Examiner, when a
backup product comes online and logs into the centralized system, the login
process, or automatic discovery service, on the centralized system
automatically finds, or makes the centralized system automatically become
aware of, the backup product. Id.
We agree with the Examiner. Stahl teaches that “[a]n address
catalogue provides at all times an overview of the external archiving
systems logged on within a central archive system, of these system[s]’
defined backup systems and of the primary server which is current at the
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time. Changes cause a new catalogue to be produced and stored.” Stahl,
col. 5, ll. 11-16; see Ans. 24. We interpret this to mean that the address
catalogue oversees all of the defined backup systems of the external
archiving (backup) systems connected to the central archiving, and that
changes (in the defined backup systems) cause a new (updated) catalogue to
be produced and stored. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument
that Stahl teaches or suggests, at most, that an external archiving system
must be “logged on” before the index is imported to the central archive
system and that, therefore, the centralized system of Stahl does not include
“an automatic discovery service.” App. Br. 22. On the contrary, we find
that Stahl teaches that changes in the defined backup systems cause the
(automatic) generation of a new catalog. Stahl, col. 2, ll. 16; see Ans. 24.
We are similarly not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that claims
7 and 8 teach merely that an “address catalogue is supplied automatically to
the front-end server by the central archive system” and/or that “a new
address catalogue is automatically supplied to the front-end server or the
user system when there are any changes to the address catalogue in the
central archive” and do not relate to “an automatic discovery service.”
App. Br. 22. Stahl teaches or suggests that changes are broadcast to the
defined backup systems, but Stahl also teaches or suggests that changes in
the address catalogue (automatically generated during the login process) are
then distributed to the peripheral backup devices. Stahl, col. 2, ll. 11-16;
see Ans. 24.
We therefore agree with the Examiner that the cited prior art
references teach or suggest the limitation of claim 1 reciting “using an
automatic discovery service running on a centralized system to
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automatically find each of a plurality of disparately located backup products
using a plurality of backup platforms” and conclude that the Examiner did
not err in so finding.

Issue 2
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in finding that the cited
prior art references teach or suggest the limitation of claim 1 reciting
“converting, at the centralized system, the backup information collected
from the plurality of backup products in the plurality of formats into a
common format.” App. Br. 23. We therefore address the issue of whether
the Examiner so erred.

Analysis
Appellants argue that, although Ainsbury (upon which they allege the
Examiner relies in this instance) relates to an information platform that is “a
client/server implementation,” and that Ainsbury teaches that “[t]he
information platform provides users with multiple ways for collecting vast
amounts and varied types of information.” App. Br. 23 (citing Ainsbury,
Abstract, col. 2, ll. 59-67). Appellants contend that Ainsbury teaches that
the “control center for the information collection is the catalog” and that
“[t]he catalog is built upon an object-oriented database, referred to as a
‘store’ … used in conjunction with a rich set of classifications for each
information source.” App. Br. 23 (citing Ainsbury, col. 3, ll. 27-28; col. 3,
ll. 53-56). Thus, according to Appellants, Ainsbury actually indicates that
the catalog stores classifications for each type of information source. App.
Br. 23. Specifically, Appellants argue, metadata is stored that includes
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“[b]ase information 26 about the specific information element (from where
it was obtained, the data format)” and that “[u]sers can find an information
source using a variety of different navigation paths.” App. Br. 23 (citing
Ainsbury, col. 8, ll. 18-24; col. 3, ll. 57-58). Appellants contend that
therefore, to the extent that the server of Ainsbury is a centralized location,
the server does not perform conversion of the information into a common
format, but rather stores information specifying the format of the
information and instructions for how such information is retrieved. App.
Br. 23.
Appellants argue further that, to the extent that Ainsbury discloses
any sort of conversion, Ainsbury discloses that “the information platform
exports data to these standard applications to these standard applications for
ease of use.” App. Br. 23 (citing Ainsbury, col. 5, ll. 44-47). Appellants
argue that Ainsbury teaches that “[t]he information platform takes
information from a wide variety of formats (HTML [hypertext markup
protocol], text, spreadsheet) and combines them all into a single format
(HTML, text, spreadsheet).” App. Br. 23-24 (citing Ainsbury, col. 5, ll. 47-
50). Therefore, argue Appellants, Ainsbury actually indicates that the
conversion is performed at the user desktop (i.e., the client) rather than the
server. App. Br. 24.
The Examiner responds that the information platform taught by
Ainsbury is actually a combination of desktop and server technologies.
Ans. 24 (citing Ainsbury col. 2, ll. 47-49). The Examiner finds that, since
the information platform includes both desktop and server technologies, the
portion of Ainsbury cited by Appellant does not specifically teach that the
client or desktop portion of the information platform does the conversion.
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Ans. 24-25. Moreover, finds the Examiner, other portions of Ainsbury
teach or suggest that conversions and other slow, lengthy, or resource
intensive tasks are assigned to the centralized server for completion.
Ans. 25 (citing Ainsbury, col. 16, ll. 15-30). The Examiner finds further
that Ainsbury teaches that the centralized server distributes data to the
clients in a single HTTP [hypertext transfer protocol]/HTML compliant
format rather than in a plurality of formats as Appellant has suggested.
Ans. 25 (citing Ainsbury, col. 16, ll. 27-30).
Appellants reply that, although Ainsbury teaches that the centralized
server performs slow, lengthy or resource intensive tasks, there is no
disclosure in Ainsbury that conversion of the information into a common
format is such a task that may be performed by the server. Reply Br. 4.
Appellants argue to the contrary that, to the extent that Ainsbury discloses
any sort of conversion, Ainsbury discloses that “the information platform
exports data to these standard applications to these standard applications for
ease of use.” Id. (citing Ainsbury, col. 5, ll. 44-47). Appellants argue that
Ainsbury discloses that “[w]hen a user wants to view a particular item, they
select an item from the list view and the information it is displayed in a
browser window” and that “[c]ase items are displayed using OLE
automation as .doc, xls, .pdf and .htm files depending on the individual
Case item.” Reply Br. 4-5 (citing Ainsbury, col. 14, ll. 17-20; col. 14, ll. 20-
22).
We agree with the Examiner. Appellants admit that Ainsbury teaches
that the “control center for the information collection … catalog is built
upon an object-oriented database, referred to as a ‘store’ … used in
conjunction with a rich set of classifications for each information source.”
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(Ainsbury, col. 3, lines 27-56); see App. Br. 23. We find that, as an object-
oriented database, the catalog taught by Ainsbury is in a common format,
and that the stored metadata that includes “[b]ase information 26 about the
specific information element (from where it was obtained, the data format)”
provides information regarding format and location of the original stored
item, but does not necessitate that the information in the catalog be stored in
different formats, as Appellants imply. Ainsbury, col. 8, lines 18-24; see
App. Br. 23.
Furthermore, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Ainsbury
teaches or suggests that conversions and other slow, lengthy, or resource
intensive tasks are assigned to the centralized server for completion, and
that the centralized server distributes data to the clients in a single
HTTP/HTML compliant format rather than in a plurality of formats. (col.
16 lines 15-30); see Ans. 25.
Moreover, we agree with the Examiner that Bart teaches this same
limitation. Bart teaches that:
[T]he central query agent 24 converges the encrypted data
streams from the multiple remote query agents 20 into a single
data stream. It then forwards the data stream to a database
aggregator 26, which is another daemon installed on a computer
at the central collection site 12. The database aggregator 26
receives the data stream and inserts the data contained therein
into the database 10 in a common format, i.e., a vendor
independent data model.

Bart, col. 3, ll. 20-28 (emphasis added); see Final Rej. 3; Ans. 5.
Appellants not only do not address this finding of the Examiner, but we find
it additionally persuasive. We therefore conclude that the Examiner did not
err in finding that the combination of the prior art references teaches or
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suggests the limitation of claim 1 reciting “converting, at the centralized
system, the backup information collected from the plurality of backup
products in the plurality of formats into a common format.”

Claims 3, 18 and 33
Issue
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in finding that the
combination of Bart, Ainsbury, and Stahl teaches or suggests the limitation
of claim 3 reciting “the backup information comprises information
associated with a plurality of backup volumes.” App. Br. 24. We therefore
address the issue of whether the Examiner so erred.

Analysis
Appellants argue that Bart teaches that “[t]hese data sources 14 can
include, e.g., computer systems, storage arrays, fiber channel switches, tape
archival units, databases and software applications.” App. Br. 24 (quoting
Bart, col. 2, ll. 37-40). Appellants contend that there is no disclosure in
Bart of “volumes” or a “plurality of backup volumes.” App. Br. 24.
The Examiner disagrees. Bart was cited by the Examiner to teach a
plurality of volumes because backups were already described by references
regarding claim 1 from which claim 3 depends. Ans. 25. The Examiner
finds further that most of the cited data sources of Bart would have or are at
least one volume and a thus a plurality of data sources would mean a
plurality of volumes. Id.
Appellants argue in reply that Bart teaches the collection of data from
“multiple data sources” but contend that the Examiner provides no basis for
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the statement that each data source of Bart comprises at least one volume,
because Bart does not mention “volumes.” Reply Br. 5.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. Appellants’
Specification explains that “data may be backed up to multiple units of
removable media known as volumes.” Spec. 2. Appellants thus define
“volume” as a “unit of removable media” upon which data is backed up.
Bart teaches that “data is collected in a collection database 10 at a central
collection site 12 from multiple data sources 14 at a remote collection site
16. These data sources 14 can include, e.g., computer systems, storage
arrays, fiber channel switches, tape archival units, databases and software
applications.” Bart, col. 2, ll. 35-40; see Ans. 8. We find that an artisan of
ordinary skill would recognize that the “storage arrays” and “tape archival
units” taught by Bart are examples of “removable media,” upon which data
may be backed up, that correspond to the “volumes” disclosed in
Appellants’ Specification. Nor, as Appellants seem to suggest, must Bart
explicitly use the term “volume” to satisfy the obviousness test. “While …
elements must be ‘arranged or combined in the same way as in the claim,’
the reference need not satisfy an ipsissimis verbis test.” In re Gleave, 560
F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
We agree with the Examiner’s findings that the combined prior art
references teach or suggest the limitation of claim 3 reciting “the backup
information comprises information associated with a plurality of backup
volumes” and consequently conclude that the Examiner did not err in so
finding.

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Claims 8, 23, and 28
Issue
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in finding that the cited
prior art references do not teach or suggest the limitation of claim 8 reciting
“collecting the backup information from the plurality of backup products
comprises requesting the backup information from a plurality of catalogs,
each catalog associated with a selected one of the backup products.” App.
Br. 25. We therefore address the issue of whether the Examiner so erred.

Analysis
Appellants argue that Bart teaches that “[t]hese data sources 14
can include, e.g., computer systems, storage arrays, fiber channel switches,
tape archival units, databases and software applications” and that there is no
disclosure in Bart of “catalogs” or a “plurality of catalogs.” App. Br. 25
(quoting Bart, col. 2, ll. 37-40).
The Examiner responds that Bart teaches that Smart Agents 18
retrieve data from Data Sources 14 (which the Examiner has interpreted to
be equivalent to catalogs because a data source can be a database or
software application), which are on one or more computers (or backup
products), at a remote collection site. Ans. 26 (citing Bart, col. 2 ll. 39-44,
Figs, 1, 2).
We agree with the Examiner. Appellants admit that it is well-known
in the prior art that “[s]ome backup technologies maintain catalogs that
automatically record onto each volume of removable media, key
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characteristics about data that is backed up.” Spec. 2. We have explained
supra why we agree with the Examiner that Bart teaches storage arrays and
tape archival units that correspond to Appellants’ “volumes” and we agree
with Appellants that it was well-known in the contemporaneous art that
such backup technologies may maintain catalogs. Ans. 26. We therefore
conclude that the Examiner did not err in finding that the combined prior art
references teach the limitation of claim 8 reciting “collecting the backup
information from the plurality of backup products comprises requesting the
backup information from a plurality of catalogs, each catalog associated
with a selected one of the backup products.”

Claim 46
Issue
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in finding that the
combination of Bart, Ainsbury, and Stahl teaches or suggests the limitation
of claim 46 reciting “the backup information comprises at least one backup
volume and at least one description of the backup volume.” App. Br. 27.
We therefore address the issue of whether the Examiner so erred.

Analysis
Appellants repeat their argument supra that Bart does not disclose a
“backup volume.” App. Br. 26. Appellants also argue that Bart discloses
only that data is collected “from some particular vendor hardware and
software applications” and that smart agents “translate vendor specific data
representations to a vendor-neutral data representation or model, i.e., a
common format.” App. Br. 27 (citing Bart, col. 2, ll. 46-50). As such,
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Appellants contend, abstracted data “looks the same as the data provided
form a competing vendor storage array.” Id. Therefore, argue Appellants,
Bart merely indicates that the format of the data is changed so that all data
is similarly formatted, but does not teach or suggest that “the backup
information comprises at least one backup volume and at least one
description of the backup volume,” as recited in claim 46. Id.
The Examiner repeats his findings supra that Bart teaches or suggests
the claim term “backup volume” and finds further that Bart teaches or
suggests “at least one description of the backup volume, [finding that] since
the data is aggregated for transmission, some description of each of the
volumes would be necessary to differentiate them at the central collection
site.” Ans. 17 (citing Bart, col. 1 ll. 48-65; col. 2 ll. 45-60).
We agree with the Examiner. We have explained supra why we find
that Bart’s storage arrays and archival tape units correspond to the claim
term “volume” as removable media upon which data may be backed up.
We consequently find that Bart’s “storage arrays” “archival tape unit”
teaches or suggests the claim term “backup volume.” Moreover,
Appellants’ Specification admits backup volumes are well known in the art.
See Spec. 2 (“During the performance of backup processes, multiple tapes
and/or disks may be used to store a single backup. Additionally, multiple
backups may be made of the same data. For this reason, data may be
backed up to multiple units of removable media known as volumes.”).
Moreover, as we have explained supra, Appellants’ Specification
admits that catalogs of backup data are equally well-known in the art. See
Spec. 2 (“Some backup technologies maintain catalogs that automatically
record onto each volume of removable media, key characteristics about data
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that is backed up.”). Consequently, we find that an artisan of ordinary skill
in the contemporaneous art would have recognized that Bart teaches or
suggests obtaining data from backup volumes, and would have also known
that the art teaches that such backup volumes frequently possess catalogs
describing the data contained therein. We therefore conclude that the
Examiner did not err in finding that the limitation of claim 46 reciting “the
backup information comprises at least one backup volume and at least one
description of the backup volume” would have been obvious over the cited
prior art references to a person of ordinary skill in the contemporaneous
prior art.

Claim 51
Issue
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in finding that the
combination of Bart, Ainsbury, Stahl, and Perinet teaches or suggests the
limitation of claim 51 reciting “collecting backup information comprises
receiving the backup information in XML.” App. Br. 28. We therefore
address the issue of whether the Examiner so erred.

Analysis
Appellants argue that Perinet does not disclose collecting backup
information in XML. App. Br. 28. Rather, contend Appellants, Perinet
discloses that an archiver reads data and then “convert[s] [the data] to a
predefined archive format” that “is preferably either binary or XML.” Id.
(citing Perinet, ¶ [0036]). Appellants argue that, rather than disclosing that
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data is collected in XML, Perinet discloses that data is collected and then
converted to XML.
The Examiner responds that Perinet describes converting the backup
information into XML. Ans. 29 (citing Perinet, Fig. 2, block 66; ¶ [0036]).
The Examiner finds that Perinet teaches that, after conversion, the backup
information is stored on (i.e., received or collected by) the storage device
Ans. 29 (citing Fig. 2, block 70, 72; ¶ [0036]). The Examiner therefore
finds that Perinet teaches or suggests “receiving the backup information in
XML.” Ans. 29.
We are persuaded by the Examiner’s reasoning and adopt it as our
own. Perinet teaches that:
The archiver continues reading the data for each data set from
the list (block 64) until a next data set is no longer available in
the list (block 62). Once all the data has been read for every
data set in the list (block 62), the read data is converted to a
predefined archive format (block 66). The preferred archive
format is preferably either binary or XML.

Perinet, ¶ [0036]; see Ans. 29. Perinet then teaches that “[b]efore the
converted data is saved locally on the archiver, it is first determined
whether there is already the maximum number of files allowed (Block 68).”
Perinet, ¶ [0037]; see Ans. 29. We find that a plain reading of the language
of Perinet thus indicates that the data is converted to XML format before it
is saved locally (i.e., collected) on the archiver, which we find corresponds
to the recitation of claim 1 (from which claim 51 depends) of a “centralized
system” “receiving the backup information.” We therefore conclude that
the Examiner did not err in finding that the combination of Bart, Ainsbury,
Stahl, and Perinet teaches or suggests the limitation of claim 51 reciting
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“collecting backup information comprises receiving the backup information
in XML.”

DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-49, 51, and 52 as unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) (1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

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