Ex Parte Blohm et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Jul 26, 2012

10607233 (B.P.A.I. Jul. 26, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte ERIC E. BLOHM, PAUL VOLZ, and
KEN FROHMADER
____________

Appeal 2010-000640
Application 10/607,233
Technology Center 3700
____________

Before STEFAN STAICOVICI, GAY ANN SPAHN, and
HYUN J. JUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.

STAICOVICI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Eric E. Blohm et al. (Appellants) appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from
the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-26 and 28-31. Claim 27 has been
canceled. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6.

THE INVENTION
Appellants’ invention relates to “the replacement of rejected printed
media.” Spec. 1, ll. 4-5 and fig. 2.
Claims 1, 9, and 24 are illustrative of the claimed invention and read
as follows:
1. A binding method comprising:
generating a pre-personalized book on a binding line for a
specific individual;
rejecting selective pre-personalized books; and
generating an alternate piece, of an alternate medium compared
to the pre-personalized book, in place of each rejected pre-
personalized book to be delivered to the specific individual.

9. A binding method comprising:
generating a mailing list of recipients;
generating a pre-personalized book for each recipient on a
binding line;
rejecting one of the pre-personalized books;
identifying the recipient of the rejected pre-personalized book;
and
generating an alternate piece that replaces the rejected pre-
personalized book, wherein the alternate piece includes a notification
to the recipient regarding the status of their pre-personalized book.

24. A binding method comprising:
generating a pre-personalized book on a binding line for a
plurality of specific individuals, each pre-personalized book having
therein a pre-personalized signature;
rejecting selective pre-personalized books;
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reprinting the pre-personalized signature of one of the rejected
pre-personalized books; and
regenerating the rejected pre-personalized book on the binding
line for the specific individual to include the reprinted pre-
personalized signature.

THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of
unpatentability:
Anderson US 3,819,173 Jun. 25, 1974
Gruber US 4,395,031 Jul. 26, 1983
Graushar1 US 6,347,260 B1 Feb. 12, 2002
Graushar2 US 6,694,219 B2 Feb. 17, 2004

The following rejections are before us for review:
The Examiner rejected claims 14 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, for failing to comply with the written description requirement.
The Examiner rejected claims 25 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph, for failing to comply with the indefiniteness requirement.
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 21-23 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Graushar ′260.
The Examiner rejected claims 24 and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated by Gruber.
The Examiner rejected claims 1-25 and 28-31 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as anticipated by Graushar ′219.
The Examiner rejected claims 2, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, and 29 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Graushar ′260 and Graushar ′219.

1 Hereafter “Graushar ′260.”
2 Hereafter “Graushar ′219.”
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The Examiner rejected claims 24 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Gruber and Anderson.3

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

ANALYSIS
The written description rejection
Each of claims 14 and 20 recite that “the alternate piece is in
electronic format.” Br., Claims Appendix.
The Examiner found that “neither the [Specification] nor the drawings
contain any indication on how the alternate piece will be generated on the
binding line and sent to the recipient in electronic format.” Ans. 3.
According to the Examiner, “the written description only presents doing an
offline electronic format.” Ans. 3-4.
Pointing to various portions of the Specification, Appellants argue that
Appellants’ Specification reasonably supports the limitation that, “the
alternate piece is in electronic format,” as called for by claims 14 and 20.
Br. 9 and 12.
The fundamental factual inquiry is whether the specification conveys
with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date
sought, applicant was in possession of the invention as now claimed. See,
e.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

3 Although the rejection merely notes claim 26, both Appellants and the
Examiner agree that the omission of claim 24 was a typographical error and
hence, the rejection should include both claims 24 and 26. See Ans. 30 and
35. See also, Br. 35.
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In this case, Appellants’ Specification describes the alternate media as being
“in the form of electronic media such as CD, e-mail message, magnetic tape,
or the like.” Br. 9 (citing to Spec. 5, ll. 17-20). Appellants’ Specification
further describes the alternate media as being “generated on the same
binding line, on a different binding line or in an off-line process.” Br. 12
(citing to Spec. 5, ll. 10-12). Although we appreciate the Examiner’s
position that the Specification does not explicitly describe how “other
electronic formats will be provided on the binding line” (Ans. 4),
nonetheless, we agree with Appellants that, “[t]he knowledge of how to
print/record data to a compact disc or send an e-mail message, for example
was well within the knowledge of one of skill in the art at the time of the
invention.” Br. 10.
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellants’ Specification reasonably
conveys to those skilled in the art that Appellants had possession of the
subject matter of claims 14 and 20 as of the filing date of the present
application. Therefore, we shall not sustain the rejection of claims 14 and 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failing to comply with the written
description requirement.

The indefiniteness rejection
Each of claims 25 and 26 recites “the step of reprinting the portion.”
Br., Claims Appendix. Emphasis added.
The Examiner found that the limitation “the portion” in claims 25 and
26 lacks antecedent basis. Ans. 4.
The test for definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, is
whether “those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the
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claim is read in light of the specification.” Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety
Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations
omitted). In this case, we agree with Appellants that since each of claims 25
and 26 depend from independent claim 24, and claim 24 recites a single step
of “reprinting the pre-personalized signature of one of the rejected pre-
personalized books,” the limitation “the portion” of claims 25 and 26 refers
to the “pre-personalized signature” of claim 24. Br. 14. See also, Claims
Appendix. Emphasis added.
Thus, we conclude that the claim language is not indefinite.
Accordingly, we shall not sustain the indefiniteness rejection of claims 25
and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.

The anticipation rejection based upon Graushar ′260
Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 21-23
Independent claim 1 requires “generating an alternate piece, of an
alternate medium4 compared to the pre-personalized book.” Br., Claims
Appendix.
The Examiner found that the generic book of Graushar ′260
constitutes an “alternate piece of an alternate medium.” Ans. 5. See also,
Graushar ′260, col. 3, ll. 1-4. According to the Examiner, because a generic
book does not contain the same information as a pre-personalized book, the
generic book of Graushar ′260 constitutes an “alternate” medium. Ans. 32-
33.

4 An ordinary and customary meaning of the term “medium” is
“something (as a magnetic disk) on which information may be stored.”
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th Ed. 1997).
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In response, Appellants argue that, “the Examiner has confused the
concept of varying content with that of varying the actual medium by which
informational content is conveyed.” Br. 15-16. According to Appellants, “if
the pre-personalized book was a magazine, the alternate piece must be a
medium other than a magazine.” Br. 15. Thus, Appellants contend that,
“[t]he alternate piece could be a different type of printed media or any type
of electronic media.” Id. Emphasis added.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments because independent
claim 1 requires an “alternate” medium, not a “different” medium, as
Appellants argue. Claims are to be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech.
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). An ordinary and customary
meaning of the term “alternate” is “constituting an alternative.” MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th Ed. 1997). In this case, we agree
with the Examiner that the generic book of Graushar ′260 constitute an
alternative (alternate) medium to the rejected pre-personalized book. See
Ans. 5. Moreover, we note that Appellants’ Specification describes
replacing a “book” rejected from binding line 10 by an alternate piece 40
that may be in the form of a “book.” Spec. 4, ll. 26-29 and Spec. 5, ll. 17-
18.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth supra, we shall sustain the
rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by
Graushar ′260.
With respect to the rejection of claims 3, 4, and 6, Appellants do not
set forth any other substantive arguments separate from the arguments
presented with respect to the rejection of independent claim 1. Br. 16.
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Accordingly, we shall also sustain the rejection of claims 3, 4, and 6 as
anticipated by Graushar ′260.
However, in contrast to independent claim 1, independent claim 21
requires “generating an alternate piece . . . the alternate piece being of a
different medium than the pre-personalized printed product.” Br., Claims
Appendix. Emphasis added. An ordinary and customary meaning of the
term “different” is “partly or totally unlike in nature, form, or quality.”
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th Ed. 1997). Thus,
because the generic book of Graushar ′260 is a book, we agree with
Appellants that compared to the rejected book, the generic book does not
constitute a “different medium,” that is a medium that is unlike in nature,
form, or quality from the rejected book. See Br. 18-19. One book is not
unlike in nature, form, or quality from another book.
Therefore, the rejection of independent claim 21 and its dependent
claims 22 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Graushar ′260
cannot be sustained.

Claims 9-11 and 13
Independent claim 9 requires an alternate piece that “includes a
notification to the recipient regarding the status of their pre-personalized
book.” Br., Claims Appendix.
The Examiner found that receiving the generic book of Graushar ′260
rather than a pre-personalized book constitutes a “notification.” Ans. 33.
According to the Examiner, “[a] notification as claimed can be anything that
is not an actual expected product, it does not have to be certain printed
indicia.” Id.
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Appellants argue that in contrast to the Examiner’s interpretation,
independent claim 9 “is very clear that an actual notification is included with
the alternate piece.” Br. 17. We agree.
The Examiner’s interpretation of independent claim 9 in effect renders
meaningless, or superfluous, the term “includes5.” Claims are construed
with an eye toward giving effect to all terms in the claim. Bicon Inc. v.
Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2006). See Stumbo v. Eastman
Outdoors, Inc., 508 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (denouncing claim
constructions which render phrases in claims superfluous). In this case, the
Examiner has used the same element or structure in Graushar ′260, i.e., the
generic book, to satisfy two different limitations from the claimed subject
matter, i.e., “an alternate piece” and a “notification.” See Engel Indus., Inc.
v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1404-05 (Fed. Cir. 1996)(construing
separate claim terms as reciting separate structures).
Thus, we do not agree that the generic book of Graushar ′260
constitutes itself a notification, as called for by independent claim 9.
Accordingly, the rejection of independent claim 9 and its dependent claims
10, 11, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Graushar ′260
cannot be sustained.

The anticipation rejection based upon Gruber
Independent claim 24 requires a step of “rejecting selective pre-
personalized books.” Br., Claims Appendix. Pointing to column 5, lines 27-

5 An ordinary and customary meaning of the term “include” is “to take
or comprise as a part of a whole or a group.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th Ed. 1997).
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33 of Gruber, the Examiner found that Gruber teaches a binding method
including a step of “rejecting selective pre-personalized books.” Ans. 9.
Appellants argue that in contrast to claim 24, in Gruber, printing of a
rejected book is prevented. Br. 20.
Although we appreciate the Examiner’s position that column 5, lines
27-33 of Gruber first describes printing customized information at printing
station 16 (see col. 5, ll. 20-24) followed by a description of transferring
rejected books (see col. 5, ll. 29-33), nonetheless, we find the Examiner’s
interpretation of Gruber’s disclosure to be unreasonably narrow. On several
occasions, Gruber teaches a control system that specifically inhibits printing
of faulty books, i.e., books that have an improper number of pages. See
Gruber, col. 11, ll. 6-8; col. 17, ll. 17-19; col. 18, ll. 42-45 and 54-59. We
find that the passage cited by the Examiner merely describes the conveyance
of books that have the proper number of pages. Thus, we do not agree that
Gruber teaches a step of “rejecting selective pre-personalized books,” as
called for by independent claim 24.
Accordingly, the rejection of independent claim 24 and its dependent
claim 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Gruber cannot be
sustained.

The anticipation rejection based upon Graushar ′219
Claims 1-8
Independent claim 1 requires the limitations of: (1) “generating a pre-
personalized book on a binding line” and (2) “generating an alternate piece,
of an alternate medium compared to the pre-personalized book.” Br.,
Claims Appendix.
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With respect to the first limitation, Appellants argue that because
“something that is pre-personalized contains and/or is created from pieces
that include personalized information or indicia prior to being fed onto a
binding line” and in Graushar ′219 personalization occurs “at a printing area
35 that is downstream of a stitcher 30 and a trimmer 34,” Graushar ′219
“does not contemplate generating pre-personalized books.” Br. 21.
In response, the Examiner takes the position that because “selective
hoppers are used to customize/personalize the magazines,” the sheets have
been pre-personalized offline “as they have been provided in the hoppers for
specific books for particular individuals.” Ans. 34-35. See also, Graushar
′219, col. 4, ll. 9-18.
At the outset, we note that Appellants’ Specification describes
signatures that can be “pre-personalized” in a “separate or off-line printing
process [] prior to being fed onto the binding line.” Spec. 1, ll. 26-30. Like
the Examiner, we find that Graushar ′219 specifically teaches printing
personalized indicia onto preprinted non-personalized signatures using a
printer located at a different facility (offline) and then feeding the newly
personalized forms, i.e., pre-personalized, to multiple hoppers on the bindery
line to be assembled into a printed product. See Graushar ′219, col. 2, ll. 48-
55.
Thus, in contrast to Appellants’ position, we find that Graushar ′219
does teach “generating a pre-personalized book on a binding line,” as called
for by independent claim 1.
Regarding the second limitation, Appellants argue that the
replacement magazine of Graushar ′219 does not constitute an “alternate
medium compared to the pre-personalized book” because an alternate
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medium should be “a different type of printed media or any type of
electronic media.” Br. 22. Emphasis added. According to Appellants, “if
the pre-personalized book was a magazine, the alternate piece must be a
medium other than a magazine.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments because independent
claim 1 requires an “alternate” medium, not a “different” medium, as
Appellants argue. In this case, the replacement magazine of Graushar ′219
constitutes an alternative (alternate) medium to the rejected magazine. See
Ans. 11. Moreover, as noted supra, Appellants’ Specification describes
replacing a “book” rejected from binding line 10 by an alternate piece 40
that may be in the form of a “book.” Spec. 4, ll. 26-29 and Spec. 5, ll. 17-
18.
In conclusion, for the reasons set forth supra, we shall sustain the
rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by
Graushar ′219.
With respect to the rejection of claims 2-8, Appellants do not set forth
any other substantive arguments separate from the arguments presented with
respect to the rejection of independent claim 1. Br. 23. Accordingly, we
shall also sustain the rejection of claims 2-8 as anticipated by Graushar ′219.

Claims 9-14
Independent claim 9 requires an alternate piece that “includes a
notification to the recipient regarding the status of their pre-personalized
book.” Br., Claims Appendix.
Pointing to column 5, lines 27-32 of Graushar ′219, the Examiner
found that because in Graushar ′219 the replacement magazine can be
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standard (generic), customized, personalized or customized/personalized, the
information contained therein “can easily be notification information.” Ans.
13 and 33.
We do not agree with the Examiner’s position because as described
above, the Examiner’s interpretation of independent claim 9 in effect renders
meaningless, or superfluous, the term “includes.” Furthermore, the
Examiner has used the same element or structure in Graushar ′219, i.e., the
replacement magazine, to satisfy two different limitations from the claimed
subject matter, i.e., “an alternate piece” and a “notification.”
Thus, we do not agree that the replacement magazine of Graushar ′219
constitutes a notification, as called for by independent claim 9.
Accordingly, the rejection of independent claim 9 and its dependent
claims 10-14 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Graushar ′219
cannot be sustained.

Claim 15-20
Independent claim 15 requires a step of “generating an alternate piece
. . . the alternate piece being of a format different from the rejected pre-
personalized book.” Br., Claims Appendix. Emphasis added.
The Examiner found that because the replacement magazine can be
standard (generic), customized, personalized or customized/personalized, the
replacement magazine has a different format. Ans. 14, 16, 18, 19, 33, and
34.
Appellants argue that although the content of the replacement
magazine of Graushar ′219 may be different from that of the rejected
magazine, the format is the same. According to Appellants, “if the pre-
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personalized book was a magazine, the alternate piece must be of a format
other than a magazine.” Br. 25.
The Examiner appears to use the terms “format” and “medium”
interchangeably. However, in contrast to the term “medium,” which
describes the substrate on which information is conveyed (see footnote [4]),
the term “format6” describes the size, shape, and general makeup of a
printed product. Although the claims are interpreted in light of the
Specification, limitations from the Specification are not read into the claims.
See E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (Limitations appearing in the specification but not recited in the claim
are not read into the claim). In this case, because the replacement magazine
of Graushar ′219 can be standard (generic), customized, personalized or
customized/personalized, we find that the replacement magazine has a
different general makeup from the rejected magazine, and thus, has a
different format.
Lastly, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that “Graushar
′219 does not contemplate assembling pre-personalized books,” (see Br. 24)
for the reasons set forth supra with respect to the rejection of claims 1-8
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Graushar ′219.
In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, we shall sustain the rejection
of independent claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by
Graushar ′219. Since Appellants do not set forth any other substantive
arguments separate from the arguments presented with respect to the

6 An ordinary and customary meaning of the term “format” is “shape,
size, and general makeup (as of something printed).” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th Ed. 1997).
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rejection of independent claim 15 (see Br. 26), we shall also sustain the
rejection of dependent claims 16-20 as anticipated by Graushar ′219.

Claims 21-23 and 28-31
Independent claim 21 requires a step of “generating an alternate piece
. . . the alternate piece being of a different medium than the pre-personalized
printed product.” Similarly, independent claim 28 requires a step of
“generating an alternate pre-personalized piece . . . the alternate pre-
personalized piece being of a different medium than the pre-personalized
printed product.” Br., Claims Appendix. Emphasis added. Claim 31
likewise requires a step of “replacing a third rejected book with a different
medium.” Emphasis added.
The Examiner found that because the replacement magazine can be
standard (generic), customized, personalized or customized/personalized, the
replacement magazine constitutes a different medium. Ans. 16, 18, 19, and
33.
Since the replacement magazine of Graushar ′219 is a magazine, we
agree with Appellants that compared to the rejected magazine, the
replacement magazine does not constitute a “different medium,” that is a
medium that is unlike in nature, form, or quality from the rejected magazine
(see footnote [4]). One magazine is not unlike in nature, form, or quality
from another magazine.
Therefore, the rejection of independent claims 21, 28 and 31 and their
respective dependent claims 22, 23, 29, and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as
anticipated by Graushar ′219 cannot be sustained.

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Claims 24 and 25
Appellants once more argue that because “something that is pre-
personalized contains and/or is created from pieces that include personalized
information or indicia prior to being fed onto a binding line” (see Br. 28) and
in Graushar ′219 personalization “is added after assembly of the magazine”
(see Br. 29), Graushar ′219 does not teach “generating a pre-personalized
book . . . each pre-personalized book having therein a pre-personalized
signature,” as called for by independent claim 24. Br. 29.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments, because as noted by
the Examiner, “selective hoppers are used to customize/personalize the
magazines.” Ans. 35. Thus, the sheets have been pre-personalized offline
“as they have been provided in the hoppers for specific books for particular
individuals.” Ans. 34-35. As noted above, Graushar ′219 specifically
teaches printing personalized indicia onto preprinted non-personalized
signatures using a printer located at a different facility (offline) and then
feeding the newly personalized forms, i.e., pre-personalized, to multiple
hoppers on the bindery line to be assembled into a printed product. See
Graushar ′219, col. 2, ll. 48-55.
Thus, in contrast to Appellants’ position, we find that Graushar ′219
does teach “generating a pre-personalized book . . . each pre-personalized
book having therein a pre-personalized signature,” as called for by
independent claim 24. Accordingly, we shall sustain the rejection of
independent claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Graushar
′219. Since Appellants do not set forth any other substantive arguments
separate from the arguments presented with respect to the rejection of
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independent claim 24 (see Br. 29), we shall also sustain the rejection of
dependent claim 25 as anticipated by Graushar ′219.

The obviousness rejection over Graushar ′260 and Graushar ′219
With respect to the rejection of claims 2, 5, 7, and 8, Appellants
merely recite additional claim limitations and do not set forth any other
substantive arguments separate from the arguments presented with respect to
the rejection of independent claim 1. Br. 33-34. Accordingly, we shall
sustain the rejection of claims 2, 5, 7, and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Graushar ′260 and Graushar ′219.
Regarding claims 12 and 14, the addition of the teachings of Graushar
′219 does not remedy the deficiencies of Graushar ′260. Therefore, we shall
not sustain the rejection of claims 12 and 14 over the combined teachings of
Graushar ′260 and Graushar ′219.
Finally, we note that claim 29 depends from independent claim 28,
which as shown above, requires an “alternate pre-personalized piece being
of a different medium than the pre-personalized printed product.” Br.,
Claims Appendix. As described supra, neither Graushar ′260 nor Graushar
′219 discloses such a limitation. Therefore, the rejection of claim 29, which
depends from independent claim 28, likewise cannot be sustained.

The obviousness rejection over Gruber and Anderson
For the reasons described supra, we do not agree with the Examiner
that Gruber teaches a step of “rejecting selective pre-personalized books,” as
called for by independent claim 24. See Ans. 9. The addition of the
teachings of Anderson does not remedy the deficiencies of Gruber. Ans. 31-
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32. Therefore, we shall not sustain the rejection of independent claim 24,
and its dependent claim 26, over the combined teachings of Gruber and
Anderson. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (If an
independent claim is nonobvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, then any claim
dependent therefrom is nonobvious).

SUMMARY
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 14 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. §
112, first paragraph, for failing to comply with the written description
requirement is reversed.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 25 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. §
112, second paragraph, for failing to comply with the indefiniteness
requirement is reversed.
The Examiner’s decision to reject under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated by Graushar ′260 is affirmed as to claims 1, 3, 4, and 6 and
reversed as to claims 9-11, 13, and 21-23.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 24 and 25 under 35 U.S.C. §
102(b) as anticipated by Gruber is reversed.
The Examiner’s decision to reject under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as
anticipated by Graushar ′219 is affirmed as to claims 1-8, 15-20, 24, and 25
and reversed as to claims 9-14, 21-23, and 28-31.
The Examiner’s decision to reject under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Graushar ′260 and Graushar ′219 is affirmed as to claims
2, 5, 7, and 8 and reversed as to claims 12, 14, and 29.
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 24 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) as unpatentable over Gruber and Anderson is reversed.
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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