Ex Parte Blohm et alDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesJul 26, 201210607233 (B.P.A.I. Jul. 26, 2012) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES ____________ Ex parte ERIC E. BLOHM, PAUL VOLZ, and KEN FROHMADER ____________ Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 Technology Center 3700 ____________ Before STEFAN STAICOVICI, GAY ANN SPAHN, and HYUN J. JUNG, Administrative Patent Judges. STAICOVICI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Eric E. Blohm et al. (Appellants) appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-26 and 28-31. Claim 27 has been canceled. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6. THE INVENTION Appellants’ invention relates to “the replacement of rejected printed media.” Spec. 1, ll. 4-5 and fig. 2. Claims 1, 9, and 24 are illustrative of the claimed invention and read as follows: 1. A binding method comprising: generating a pre-personalized book on a binding line for a specific individual; rejecting selective pre-personalized books; and generating an alternate piece, of an alternate medium compared to the pre-personalized book, in place of each rejected pre- personalized book to be delivered to the specific individual. 9. A binding method comprising: generating a mailing list of recipients; generating a pre-personalized book for each recipient on a binding line; rejecting one of the pre-personalized books; identifying the recipient of the rejected pre-personalized book; and generating an alternate piece that replaces the rejected pre- personalized book, wherein the alternate piece includes a notification to the recipient regarding the status of their pre-personalized book. 24. A binding method comprising: generating a pre-personalized book on a binding line for a plurality of specific individuals, each pre-personalized book having therein a pre-personalized signature; rejecting selective pre-personalized books; Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 3 reprinting the pre-personalized signature of one of the rejected pre-personalized books; and regenerating the rejected pre-personalized book on the binding line for the specific individual to include the reprinted pre- personalized signature. THE REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence of unpatentability: Anderson US 3,819,173 Jun. 25, 1974 Gruber US 4,395,031 Jul. 26, 1983 Graushar1 US 6,347,260 B1 Feb. 12, 2002 Graushar2 US 6,694,219 B2 Feb. 17, 2004 The following rejections are before us for review: The Examiner rejected claims 14 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failing to comply with the written description requirement. The Examiner rejected claims 25 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for failing to comply with the indefiniteness requirement. The Examiner rejected claims 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 21-23 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Graushar ′260. The Examiner rejected claims 24 and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Gruber. The Examiner rejected claims 1-25 and 28-31 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Graushar ′219. The Examiner rejected claims 2, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, and 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Graushar ′260 and Graushar ′219. 1 Hereafter “Graushar ′260.” 2 Hereafter “Graushar ′219.” Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 4 The Examiner rejected claims 24 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Gruber and Anderson.3 SUMMARY OF DECISION We AFFIRM-IN-PART. ANALYSIS The written description rejection Each of claims 14 and 20 recite that “the alternate piece is in electronic format.” Br., Claims Appendix. The Examiner found that “neither the [Specification] nor the drawings contain any indication on how the alternate piece will be generated on the binding line and sent to the recipient in electronic format.” Ans. 3. According to the Examiner, “the written description only presents doing an offline electronic format.” Ans. 3-4. Pointing to various portions of the Specification, Appellants argue that Appellants’ Specification reasonably supports the limitation that, “the alternate piece is in electronic format,” as called for by claims 14 and 20. Br. 9 and 12. The fundamental factual inquiry is whether the specification conveys with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, applicant was in possession of the invention as now claimed. See, e.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 3 Although the rejection merely notes claim 26, both Appellants and the Examiner agree that the omission of claim 24 was a typographical error and hence, the rejection should include both claims 24 and 26. See Ans. 30 and 35. See also, Br. 35. Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 5 In this case, Appellants’ Specification describes the alternate media as being “in the form of electronic media such as CD, e-mail message, magnetic tape, or the like.” Br. 9 (citing to Spec. 5, ll. 17-20). Appellants’ Specification further describes the alternate media as being “generated on the same binding line, on a different binding line or in an off-line process.” Br. 12 (citing to Spec. 5, ll. 10-12). Although we appreciate the Examiner’s position that the Specification does not explicitly describe how “other electronic formats will be provided on the binding line” (Ans. 4), nonetheless, we agree with Appellants that, “[t]he knowledge of how to print/record data to a compact disc or send an e-mail message, for example was well within the knowledge of one of skill in the art at the time of the invention.” Br. 10. Accordingly, we conclude that Appellants’ Specification reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that Appellants had possession of the subject matter of claims 14 and 20 as of the filing date of the present application. Therefore, we shall not sustain the rejection of claims 14 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failing to comply with the written description requirement. The indefiniteness rejection Each of claims 25 and 26 recites “the step of reprinting the portion.” Br., Claims Appendix. Emphasis added. The Examiner found that the limitation “the portion” in claims 25 and 26 lacks antecedent basis. Ans. 4. The test for definiteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, is whether “those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 6 claim is read in light of the specification.” Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). In this case, we agree with Appellants that since each of claims 25 and 26 depend from independent claim 24, and claim 24 recites a single step of “reprinting the pre-personalized signature of one of the rejected pre- personalized books,” the limitation “the portion” of claims 25 and 26 refers to the “pre-personalized signature” of claim 24. Br. 14. See also, Claims Appendix. Emphasis added. Thus, we conclude that the claim language is not indefinite. Accordingly, we shall not sustain the indefiniteness rejection of claims 25 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. The anticipation rejection based upon Graushar ′260 Claims 1, 3, 4, 6, and 21-23 Independent claim 1 requires “generating an alternate piece, of an alternate medium4 compared to the pre-personalized book.” Br., Claims Appendix. The Examiner found that the generic book of Graushar ′260 constitutes an “alternate piece of an alternate medium.” Ans. 5. See also, Graushar ′260, col. 3, ll. 1-4. According to the Examiner, because a generic book does not contain the same information as a pre-personalized book, the generic book of Graushar ′260 constitutes an “alternate” medium. Ans. 32- 33. 4 An ordinary and customary meaning of the term “medium” is “something (as a magnetic disk) on which information may be stored.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th Ed. 1997). Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 7 In response, Appellants argue that, “the Examiner has confused the concept of varying content with that of varying the actual medium by which informational content is conveyed.” Br. 15-16. According to Appellants, “if the pre-personalized book was a magazine, the alternate piece must be a medium other than a magazine.” Br. 15. Thus, Appellants contend that, “[t]he alternate piece could be a different type of printed media or any type of electronic media.” Id. Emphasis added. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments because independent claim 1 requires an “alternate” medium, not a “different” medium, as Appellants argue. Claims are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). An ordinary and customary meaning of the term “alternate” is “constituting an alternative.” MERRIAM- WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th Ed. 1997). In this case, we agree with the Examiner that the generic book of Graushar ′260 constitute an alternative (alternate) medium to the rejected pre-personalized book. See Ans. 5. Moreover, we note that Appellants’ Specification describes replacing a “book” rejected from binding line 10 by an alternate piece 40 that may be in the form of a “book.” Spec. 4, ll. 26-29 and Spec. 5, ll. 17- 18. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth supra, we shall sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Graushar ′260. With respect to the rejection of claims 3, 4, and 6, Appellants do not set forth any other substantive arguments separate from the arguments presented with respect to the rejection of independent claim 1. Br. 16. Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 8 Accordingly, we shall also sustain the rejection of claims 3, 4, and 6 as anticipated by Graushar ′260. However, in contrast to independent claim 1, independent claim 21 requires “generating an alternate piece . . . the alternate piece being of a different medium than the pre-personalized printed product.” Br., Claims Appendix. Emphasis added. An ordinary and customary meaning of the term “different” is “partly or totally unlike in nature, form, or quality.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th Ed. 1997). Thus, because the generic book of Graushar ′260 is a book, we agree with Appellants that compared to the rejected book, the generic book does not constitute a “different medium,” that is a medium that is unlike in nature, form, or quality from the rejected book. See Br. 18-19. One book is not unlike in nature, form, or quality from another book. Therefore, the rejection of independent claim 21 and its dependent claims 22 and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Graushar ′260 cannot be sustained. Claims 9-11 and 13 Independent claim 9 requires an alternate piece that “includes a notification to the recipient regarding the status of their pre-personalized book.” Br., Claims Appendix. The Examiner found that receiving the generic book of Graushar ′260 rather than a pre-personalized book constitutes a “notification.” Ans. 33. According to the Examiner, “[a] notification as claimed can be anything that is not an actual expected product, it does not have to be certain printed indicia.” Id. Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 9 Appellants argue that in contrast to the Examiner’s interpretation, independent claim 9 “is very clear that an actual notification is included with the alternate piece.” Br. 17. We agree. The Examiner’s interpretation of independent claim 9 in effect renders meaningless, or superfluous, the term “includes5.” Claims are construed with an eye toward giving effect to all terms in the claim. Bicon Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2006). See Stumbo v. Eastman Outdoors, Inc., 508 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (denouncing claim constructions which render phrases in claims superfluous). In this case, the Examiner has used the same element or structure in Graushar ′260, i.e., the generic book, to satisfy two different limitations from the claimed subject matter, i.e., “an alternate piece” and a “notification.” See Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1404-05 (Fed. Cir. 1996)(construing separate claim terms as reciting separate structures). Thus, we do not agree that the generic book of Graushar ′260 constitutes itself a notification, as called for by independent claim 9. Accordingly, the rejection of independent claim 9 and its dependent claims 10, 11, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Graushar ′260 cannot be sustained. The anticipation rejection based upon Gruber Independent claim 24 requires a step of “rejecting selective pre- personalized books.” Br., Claims Appendix. Pointing to column 5, lines 27- 5 An ordinary and customary meaning of the term “include” is “to take or comprise as a part of a whole or a group.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th Ed. 1997). Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 10 33 of Gruber, the Examiner found that Gruber teaches a binding method including a step of “rejecting selective pre-personalized books.” Ans. 9. Appellants argue that in contrast to claim 24, in Gruber, printing of a rejected book is prevented. Br. 20. Although we appreciate the Examiner’s position that column 5, lines 27-33 of Gruber first describes printing customized information at printing station 16 (see col. 5, ll. 20-24) followed by a description of transferring rejected books (see col. 5, ll. 29-33), nonetheless, we find the Examiner’s interpretation of Gruber’s disclosure to be unreasonably narrow. On several occasions, Gruber teaches a control system that specifically inhibits printing of faulty books, i.e., books that have an improper number of pages. See Gruber, col. 11, ll. 6-8; col. 17, ll. 17-19; col. 18, ll. 42-45 and 54-59. We find that the passage cited by the Examiner merely describes the conveyance of books that have the proper number of pages. Thus, we do not agree that Gruber teaches a step of “rejecting selective pre-personalized books,” as called for by independent claim 24. Accordingly, the rejection of independent claim 24 and its dependent claim 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Gruber cannot be sustained. The anticipation rejection based upon Graushar ′219 Claims 1-8 Independent claim 1 requires the limitations of: (1) “generating a pre- personalized book on a binding line” and (2) “generating an alternate piece, of an alternate medium compared to the pre-personalized book.” Br., Claims Appendix. Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 11 With respect to the first limitation, Appellants argue that because “something that is pre-personalized contains and/or is created from pieces that include personalized information or indicia prior to being fed onto a binding line” and in Graushar ′219 personalization occurs “at a printing area 35 that is downstream of a stitcher 30 and a trimmer 34,” Graushar ′219 “does not contemplate generating pre-personalized books.” Br. 21. In response, the Examiner takes the position that because “selective hoppers are used to customize/personalize the magazines,” the sheets have been pre-personalized offline “as they have been provided in the hoppers for specific books for particular individuals.” Ans. 34-35. See also, Graushar ′219, col. 4, ll. 9-18. At the outset, we note that Appellants’ Specification describes signatures that can be “pre-personalized” in a “separate or off-line printing process [] prior to being fed onto the binding line.” Spec. 1, ll. 26-30. Like the Examiner, we find that Graushar ′219 specifically teaches printing personalized indicia onto preprinted non-personalized signatures using a printer located at a different facility (offline) and then feeding the newly personalized forms, i.e., pre-personalized, to multiple hoppers on the bindery line to be assembled into a printed product. See Graushar ′219, col. 2, ll. 48- 55. Thus, in contrast to Appellants’ position, we find that Graushar ′219 does teach “generating a pre-personalized book on a binding line,” as called for by independent claim 1. Regarding the second limitation, Appellants argue that the replacement magazine of Graushar ′219 does not constitute an “alternate medium compared to the pre-personalized book” because an alternate Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 12 medium should be “a different type of printed media or any type of electronic media.” Br. 22. Emphasis added. According to Appellants, “if the pre-personalized book was a magazine, the alternate piece must be a medium other than a magazine.” Id. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments because independent claim 1 requires an “alternate” medium, not a “different” medium, as Appellants argue. In this case, the replacement magazine of Graushar ′219 constitutes an alternative (alternate) medium to the rejected magazine. See Ans. 11. Moreover, as noted supra, Appellants’ Specification describes replacing a “book” rejected from binding line 10 by an alternate piece 40 that may be in the form of a “book.” Spec. 4, ll. 26-29 and Spec. 5, ll. 17- 18. In conclusion, for the reasons set forth supra, we shall sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Graushar ′219. With respect to the rejection of claims 2-8, Appellants do not set forth any other substantive arguments separate from the arguments presented with respect to the rejection of independent claim 1. Br. 23. Accordingly, we shall also sustain the rejection of claims 2-8 as anticipated by Graushar ′219. Claims 9-14 Independent claim 9 requires an alternate piece that “includes a notification to the recipient regarding the status of their pre-personalized book.” Br., Claims Appendix. Pointing to column 5, lines 27-32 of Graushar ′219, the Examiner found that because in Graushar ′219 the replacement magazine can be Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 13 standard (generic), customized, personalized or customized/personalized, the information contained therein “can easily be notification information.” Ans. 13 and 33. We do not agree with the Examiner’s position because as described above, the Examiner’s interpretation of independent claim 9 in effect renders meaningless, or superfluous, the term “includes.” Furthermore, the Examiner has used the same element or structure in Graushar ′219, i.e., the replacement magazine, to satisfy two different limitations from the claimed subject matter, i.e., “an alternate piece” and a “notification.” Thus, we do not agree that the replacement magazine of Graushar ′219 constitutes a notification, as called for by independent claim 9. Accordingly, the rejection of independent claim 9 and its dependent claims 10-14 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Graushar ′219 cannot be sustained. Claim 15-20 Independent claim 15 requires a step of “generating an alternate piece . . . the alternate piece being of a format different from the rejected pre- personalized book.” Br., Claims Appendix. Emphasis added. The Examiner found that because the replacement magazine can be standard (generic), customized, personalized or customized/personalized, the replacement magazine has a different format. Ans. 14, 16, 18, 19, 33, and 34. Appellants argue that although the content of the replacement magazine of Graushar ′219 may be different from that of the rejected magazine, the format is the same. According to Appellants, “if the pre- Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 14 personalized book was a magazine, the alternate piece must be of a format other than a magazine.” Br. 25. The Examiner appears to use the terms “format” and “medium” interchangeably. However, in contrast to the term “medium,” which describes the substrate on which information is conveyed (see footnote [4]), the term “format6” describes the size, shape, and general makeup of a printed product. Although the claims are interpreted in light of the Specification, limitations from the Specification are not read into the claims. See E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Limitations appearing in the specification but not recited in the claim are not read into the claim). In this case, because the replacement magazine of Graushar ′219 can be standard (generic), customized, personalized or customized/personalized, we find that the replacement magazine has a different general makeup from the rejected magazine, and thus, has a different format. Lastly, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that “Graushar ′219 does not contemplate assembling pre-personalized books,” (see Br. 24) for the reasons set forth supra with respect to the rejection of claims 1-8 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Graushar ′219. In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, we shall sustain the rejection of independent claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Graushar ′219. Since Appellants do not set forth any other substantive arguments separate from the arguments presented with respect to the 6 An ordinary and customary meaning of the term “format” is “shape, size, and general makeup (as of something printed).” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th Ed. 1997). Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 15 rejection of independent claim 15 (see Br. 26), we shall also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 16-20 as anticipated by Graushar ′219. Claims 21-23 and 28-31 Independent claim 21 requires a step of “generating an alternate piece . . . the alternate piece being of a different medium than the pre-personalized printed product.” Similarly, independent claim 28 requires a step of “generating an alternate pre-personalized piece . . . the alternate pre- personalized piece being of a different medium than the pre-personalized printed product.” Br., Claims Appendix. Emphasis added. Claim 31 likewise requires a step of “replacing a third rejected book with a different medium.” Emphasis added. The Examiner found that because the replacement magazine can be standard (generic), customized, personalized or customized/personalized, the replacement magazine constitutes a different medium. Ans. 16, 18, 19, and 33. Since the replacement magazine of Graushar ′219 is a magazine, we agree with Appellants that compared to the rejected magazine, the replacement magazine does not constitute a “different medium,” that is a medium that is unlike in nature, form, or quality from the rejected magazine (see footnote [4]). One magazine is not unlike in nature, form, or quality from another magazine. Therefore, the rejection of independent claims 21, 28 and 31 and their respective dependent claims 22, 23, 29, and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Graushar ′219 cannot be sustained. Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 16 Claims 24 and 25 Appellants once more argue that because “something that is pre- personalized contains and/or is created from pieces that include personalized information or indicia prior to being fed onto a binding line” (see Br. 28) and in Graushar ′219 personalization “is added after assembly of the magazine” (see Br. 29), Graushar ′219 does not teach “generating a pre-personalized book . . . each pre-personalized book having therein a pre-personalized signature,” as called for by independent claim 24. Br. 29. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments, because as noted by the Examiner, “selective hoppers are used to customize/personalize the magazines.” Ans. 35. Thus, the sheets have been pre-personalized offline “as they have been provided in the hoppers for specific books for particular individuals.” Ans. 34-35. As noted above, Graushar ′219 specifically teaches printing personalized indicia onto preprinted non-personalized signatures using a printer located at a different facility (offline) and then feeding the newly personalized forms, i.e., pre-personalized, to multiple hoppers on the bindery line to be assembled into a printed product. See Graushar ′219, col. 2, ll. 48-55. Thus, in contrast to Appellants’ position, we find that Graushar ′219 does teach “generating a pre-personalized book . . . each pre-personalized book having therein a pre-personalized signature,” as called for by independent claim 24. Accordingly, we shall sustain the rejection of independent claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Graushar ′219. Since Appellants do not set forth any other substantive arguments separate from the arguments presented with respect to the rejection of Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 17 independent claim 24 (see Br. 29), we shall also sustain the rejection of dependent claim 25 as anticipated by Graushar ′219. The obviousness rejection over Graushar ′260 and Graushar ′219 With respect to the rejection of claims 2, 5, 7, and 8, Appellants merely recite additional claim limitations and do not set forth any other substantive arguments separate from the arguments presented with respect to the rejection of independent claim 1. Br. 33-34. Accordingly, we shall sustain the rejection of claims 2, 5, 7, and 8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Graushar ′260 and Graushar ′219. Regarding claims 12 and 14, the addition of the teachings of Graushar ′219 does not remedy the deficiencies of Graushar ′260. Therefore, we shall not sustain the rejection of claims 12 and 14 over the combined teachings of Graushar ′260 and Graushar ′219. Finally, we note that claim 29 depends from independent claim 28, which as shown above, requires an “alternate pre-personalized piece being of a different medium than the pre-personalized printed product.” Br., Claims Appendix. As described supra, neither Graushar ′260 nor Graushar ′219 discloses such a limitation. Therefore, the rejection of claim 29, which depends from independent claim 28, likewise cannot be sustained. The obviousness rejection over Gruber and Anderson For the reasons described supra, we do not agree with the Examiner that Gruber teaches a step of “rejecting selective pre-personalized books,” as called for by independent claim 24. See Ans. 9. The addition of the teachings of Anderson does not remedy the deficiencies of Gruber. Ans. 31- Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 18 32. Therefore, we shall not sustain the rejection of independent claim 24, and its dependent claim 26, over the combined teachings of Gruber and Anderson. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (If an independent claim is nonobvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, then any claim dependent therefrom is nonobvious). SUMMARY The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 14 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failing to comply with the written description requirement is reversed. The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 25 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, for failing to comply with the indefiniteness requirement is reversed. The Examiner’s decision to reject under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Graushar ′260 is affirmed as to claims 1, 3, 4, and 6 and reversed as to claims 9-11, 13, and 21-23. The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 24 and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Gruber is reversed. The Examiner’s decision to reject under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Graushar ′219 is affirmed as to claims 1-8, 15-20, 24, and 25 and reversed as to claims 9-14, 21-23, and 28-31. The Examiner’s decision to reject under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Graushar ′260 and Graushar ′219 is affirmed as to claims 2, 5, 7, and 8 and reversed as to claims 12, 14, and 29. The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 24 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Gruber and Anderson is reversed. Appeal 2010-000640 Application 10/607,233 19 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART mls Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation