Ex Parte Beers et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 19, 2018

13443667 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/443,667 04/10/2012
87521 7590 12/21/2018
Cantor Colburn LLP - Hamilton Sundstrand
20 Church Street, 22nd Floor
Hartford, CT 06103
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Craig M. Beers
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
61346US01 7925
EXAMINER
KRUPICKA, ADAM C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
1784
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/21/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usptopatentmail @cantorcolburn.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte CRAIG M. BEERS and VICTORIA S. RICHARDSON
Appeal2018-001385
Application 13/443,667
Technology Center 1700
Before ADRIENE LEPIANE HANLON, KAREN M. HASTINGS, and
MICHAEL G. MCMANUS, Administrative Patent Judges.
HASTINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 request review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner's final decision rejecting claims 1, 4--7, 10-13, and 15 under pre-
AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Bell (US 1,993,430, issued March
5, 1935), and claims 4, 5, 8, and 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Bell in view of Wipasuramonton (US 4,938,501, issued
July 3, 1990). We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 The Real Party in Interest is stated to be Hamilton Sundstrand (Br. 2).
Appeal2018-001385
Application 13/443,667
Claim 1 is representative of the claimed invention ( emphasis added to
highlight key limitations in dispute):
1. An article, comprising:
a first part having a first edge defined at an intersection of
first and second surfaces where the first and second surfaces
form a right first angle;
a second part having a second edge defined at an
intersection of third and fourth surfaces where the third and
fourth surfaces form a second angle which is different from and
larger than the first angle, the second annular part including a
planar section and an annular end section having a curvilinear
cross-section, the third surface and the fourth surface disposed
at a first end of the annular end section and the annular end
section connected to the planar section at a second end of the
annular end section opposite the first end; and
a weld joint formed at locations where the first surface
contacts the third surface such that the second and fourth
surfaces form an obtuse angle and the weld joint is disposed at
a junction of the first and second edges to extend along the first
and third surfaces from the obtuse angle,
the weld joint and the first and second parts being
annular and having a common central longitudinal axis,
the first and third surfaces respectively being annular,
radially outwardly and inwardly facing surfaces that
respectively face away from and toward the common central
longitudinal axis.
At the outset, we note that independent claims 1 and 7 are not argued
separately, nor are any arguments directed to any dependent claims.
Accordingly, claims 1 and 7 and all their dependent claims, including those
separately rejected, stand or fall together.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed Appellants' argument for patentability. However,
we determine that a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's
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Appeal2018-001385
Application 13/443,667
finding that the claimed subject matter of representative claim 1 (as well as
claim 7) is anticipated within the meaning of§ 102 in view of the applied
prior art of Bell. Accordingly, we will sustain the Examiner's rejections for
essentially those reasons expressed in the Examiner's Response to Argument
section in the Answer, and we add the following primarily for emphasis.
Appellants' arguments are that Bell does not describe, within the
meaning of§ 102, "where the first and second surfaces form a right first
angle" as recited in claims 1 and 7 (Br. 5), or "the second part including a
planar section and an annular end section having a curvilinear cross-section"
as recited in claims 1 and 7 (Br. 6).
However, the Examiner points out in the Answer how Bell indeed
discloses these features (Ans. 7-9). Appellants' mere assertions to the
contrary (Br. 5, 6) are not persuasive of reversible error in the Examiner's
anticipation rejection. Rather, a preponderance of the evidence supports the
Examiner's position that one of ordinary skill in the art would have readily
recognized/inferred that the article described in Bell is indeed encompassed
by the claim language in dispute (Ans. 7 (the Examiner explains that since
Bell describes that the edges of the relevant surfaces may, or may not be,
beveled, an artisan would have immediately appreciated that a right angle
may be formed)) Ans. 4, 8; see the Examiner's annotated Figure 3 from
Bell); In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826 (CCPA 1968) (In determining
whether a reference anticipates the subject matter recited in a claim, "it is
proper to take into account not only specific teachings of the reference but
also the inferences which one skilled in the art would reasonably be
expected to draw therefrom."). Cf In re Schaumann, 572 F.2d 312, 317
(CCPA 1978) (In order to anticipate, a reference must identify something
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Appeal2018-001385
Application 13/443,667
falling within the claimed subject matter with sufficient specificity to
constitute a description thereof within the purview of§ 102.).
Notably, Appellants have not presented any cogent arguments
sufficient to address the Examiner's position (Br. 5, 6 (merely asserting
without sufficient analysis that Bell does not disclose certain claim
limitations)). Cf In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("[W]e
hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more
substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim
elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not
found in the prior art. Because Lovin did not provide such arguments, the
Board did not err in refusing to separately address claims 2-15, 17-24, and
31-34.").
Thus, a preponderance of the evidence supports the Examiner's
position that one of ordinary skill in the art would have at once envisaged or
inferred from Bell's disclosure the disputed features recited in each of claims
1 and 7 (Ans. generally; no responsive brief has been filed by Appellants).
Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner's anticipation rejection. No
further substantive arguments were made regarding the§ 103 rejections.
Thus, we also affirm the § 103 rejections.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136.
ORDER
AFFIRMED
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