Ex Parte Basir

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 11, 2017

13274940 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 11, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/274,940 10/17/2011 Otman A. Basir 60449-228 PUS1 1977
26096 7590 12/18/2017
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C.
400 WEST MAPLE ROAD
SUITE 350
BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009
EXAMINER
ADESANYA, OLUJIMI A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2658
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/18/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ptodocket @ cgolaw. com
cgolaw@yahoo.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte OTMAN A. BASIR
Appeal 2017-002257
Application 13/274,9401
Technology Center 2600
Before ERIC S. FRAHM, JOYCE CRAIG, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL,
Administrative Patent Judges.
McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1-6 and 9-22, which are all the claims pending in this
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is
INTELLIGENT MECHATRONIC SYSTEMS INC. App. Br. 1.
Appeal 2017-002257
Application 13/274,940
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s application relates to voice interaction systems that
understand the context of the user’s voice commands. Spec. ^2-3. Claim
1 illustrates the appealed subject matter and reads as follows:
1. A method for operating a computer based upon human
input including the steps of:
a) receiving at the computer an input from a human;
b) recognizing the input as a first object;
c) associating at least one attribute with the first object in
the computer based upon said step b);
d) recognizing a second input from the human as a second
object;
e) storing the first object and the second object in a stack;
f) receiving a command at the computer; and
g) the computer performing the command on one of the
first object and the second object based upon the first or second
object being stored in the stack.
The Examiner’s Rejections
Claims 1-6 and 9-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 5-6.
Claims 1-3, 5, 6, 9, 13, 14, 16-19, 21, and 22 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Baldwin (US 2008/0091406 Al; Apr.
17,2008). Final Act. 7-15.
Claims 4, 10-12, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Baldwin and Basir (US 2009/0164110 Al; June 25,
2009). Final Act. 16-19.
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Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Baldwin and Zhang (US 2007/0005206 Al; Jan. 4, 2007). Final Act.
19-20.
Claims 21 and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Baldwin and Mihai Surdeanu et al., Named Entity
Recognition from Spontaneous Open-Domain Speech (“Surdeanu”). Final
Act. 20-22.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
contentions that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellant’s
contentions. Except as noted below, we adopt as our own: (1) the findings
and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Final Action from which this
appeal is taken; and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the
Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur
with the Examiner’s conclusions. We highlight the following additional
points.
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
Alice identifies a two-step framework for determining whether
claimed subject matter is judicially-excepted from patent eligibility under
§101. In Alice, the Supreme Court reiterated the framework set out in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289
(2012), for “distinguishing patents that claim . . . abstract ideas from those
that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp. v.
CLSBanklnt’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). Assuming that a claim
nominally falls within one of the statutory categories of machine,
manufacture, process, or composition of matter, the first step in the analysis
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is to determine if the claim is directed to a law of nature, a natural
phenomenon, or an abstract idea (judicial exceptions). If so, the second step
is to determine whether any element or combination of elements in the claim
is sufficient to transform the nature of the claim into a patent eligible
application, that is, to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more
than the judicial exception.
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-6 and 9-20
as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter because the claims do not
recite a mathematical algorithm or a fundamental economic or longstanding
commercial practice. App. Br. 3.
Appellant further argues the claims are necessarily rooted in computer
technology, specifically human-computer interfaces. Id. According to
Appellant, the claimed invention is not simply an existing practice
implemented on a computer with no pre-computer corollary. Id. Instead,
Appellant contends the claimed method relates to a problem specifically
arising in the realm of user-machine interfaces. Reply Br. 2. Appellant
argues the claims are limited to a novel computer interface using objects and
stacks and the claims, therefore, do not preempt all techniques for operating
a computer interface. Id.
Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
1-6 and 9-20 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Claim 1 recites
“[a] method for operating a computer based upon human input” comprising
seven steps. These steps include two steps directed to receiving input and
commands (“receiving . . . input from a human” and “receiving a command
at the computer”). The method further includes four steps directed to
processing the input (“recognizing the input as a first object,” “associating at
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least one attribute” based upon the recognizing step, “recognizing a second
input from the human as a second object,” and “storing the first object and
the second object in a stack”). Finally, the method includes a step directed
to using the stored objects to execute the received command (“the computer
performing the command” step).
Our reviewing court has concluded that abstract ideas include the
concepts of collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected data
set, and storing the data in memory. Content Extraction & Transmission
LLCv. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Additionally, the collection of information and analysis of information (e.g.,
recognizing certain data within the dataset) are also abstract ideas. Elec.
Power, 830 F.3d at 1353. Similarly, “collecting, displaying, and
manipulating data” is an abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures ILLC v.
Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Also, the
gathering and combining of data that does not require input from a physical
device is an abstract idea. Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elec, for Imaging,
Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Recently, our reviewing court
has also concluded that “creating an index and using that index to search for
and retrieve data” is an abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures I LLCv. Erie
Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). All of these cases are
similar to the present claims, which do nothing more than collect, analyze,
and act upon data and commands received from a user using an unspecified
device. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that the claims are
directed to an abstract idea.
Regarding the “inventive concept” step, Appellant’s argument that the
claims are necessarily rooted in computer technology is also unpersuasive.
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The computer functions recited in the present claims include receiving input
and commands, analyzing the input, storing the analyzed input, and
performing a command based on the analyzed input. As in Alice, “these
computer functions are ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activities],’
previously known to the industry.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (quoting Mayo,
132 S. Ct. at 1294); see also buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355 (“That a computer
receives and sends the information over a network—with no further
specification—is not even arguably inventive.”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v.
Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (a
computer “employed only for its most basic function . . . does not impose
meaningful limits on the scope of those claims”). The broadly recited
computer implementation limitations of the claims do little to limit their
scope. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that the claims do not
recite an “inventive concept” sufficient to transform the claims from an
abstract idea to a patent eligible application.
Moreover, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that the
claims do not preempt every application of some abstract idea and are,
therefore, patentable. Reply Br. 3. Lack of preemption does not make the
claims any less abstract. See buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (collecting cases); Accenture Glob. Servs., GmbH v.
Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence
of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility”).
For these reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred
in rejecting claims 1-6 and 9-20 as directed to patent-ineligible subject
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matter. We, therefore, sustain the patent-ineligible subject matter rejection
of claims 1-6 and 9-20.
Anticipation
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as
anticipated by Baldwin because Baldwin does not disclose recognizing any
human input as an “object,” as claimed. App. Br. 3. According to
Appellant, Baldwin may instead achieve similar results relying on the
inference of context instead of using objects in the sense of object-oriented
programming. Id. at 3—4; Reply Br. 3—4.
Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred. As a matter of
claim construction, we apply the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim
terms, consistent with the specification, as would be understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad, of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Claim 1 recites “recognizing the
input [received from a human] as a first object.” Claim 1 does not further
limit the term “object” to the context of object-oriented programming or in
any other way. Nor has Appellant argued that the Specification limits the
term “object” to the object-oriented context. See App. Br. 3—4; Reply Br. 3-
4. We agree with the Examiner that the broadest reasonable interpretation of
“object” as recited in claim 1 is not restricted to object-oriented
programming and includes Baldwin’s use of context to recognize objects
such as “condition,” “place,” and “entity.” See Ans. 23 (citing Baldwin
29, 37, 54, 58). Accordingly, Appellant’s argument that Baldwin fails to
disclose the claimed “object” is unpersuasive.
For these reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred
in rejecting claim 1 as anticipated by Baldwin. We also sustain the rejection
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of independent claims 16 and 18 and dependent claims 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 13, 14,
17, 19, 21, and 22, for which Appellant does not offer separate arguments
(App. Br. 3—4).
Obviousness - Claim 20
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 20 as obvious
over Baldwin and Zhang because Zhang discloses entering contacts by
voice, but these contacts are not treated as “objects.” App. Br. 4. Thus,
Appellant argues Zhang does not remedy the alleged deficiencies of
Baldwin. Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because we find Baldwin
discloses “objects” as recited in claim 1, from which claim 20 depends, for
the reasons set forth above. We, therefore, sustain the rejection of claim 20
as obvious over Baldwin and Zhang.
Obviousness - Claims 4, 10-12, 15, 21, and 22
Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of claims 4, 10-
12, and 15, which stand rejected as obvious over Baldwin and Basir.
Appellant also does not separately argue the patentability of claims 21 and
22, which stand rejected as obvious over Baldwin and Surdeanu. For the
reasons set forth above, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred
in rejecting independent claims 1,16, and 18 as anticipated by Baldwin.
The same rationale applies to the obviousness rejection of these dependent
claims. We, therefore, sustain the obviousness rejections of claims 4, 10-12,
15, 21, and 22.
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DECISION
We affirm the decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1-6 and 9-
22.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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