Ex Parte BasirDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 11, 201713274940 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 11, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/274,940 10/17/2011 Otman A. Basir 60449-228 PUS1 1977 26096 7590 12/18/2017 CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C. 400 WEST MAPLE ROAD SUITE 350 BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009 EXAMINER ADESANYA, OLUJIMI A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2658 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/18/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ptodocket @ cgolaw. com cgolaw@yahoo.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte OTMAN A. BASIR Appeal 2017-002257 Application 13/274,9401 Technology Center 2600 Before ERIC S. FRAHM, JOYCE CRAIG, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-6 and 9-22, which are all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is INTELLIGENT MECHATRONIC SYSTEMS INC. App. Br. 1. Appeal 2017-002257 Application 13/274,940 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellant’s application relates to voice interaction systems that understand the context of the user’s voice commands. Spec. ^2-3. Claim 1 illustrates the appealed subject matter and reads as follows: 1. A method for operating a computer based upon human input including the steps of: a) receiving at the computer an input from a human; b) recognizing the input as a first object; c) associating at least one attribute with the first object in the computer based upon said step b); d) recognizing a second input from the human as a second object; e) storing the first object and the second object in a stack; f) receiving a command at the computer; and g) the computer performing the command on one of the first object and the second object based upon the first or second object being stored in the stack. The Examiner’s Rejections Claims 1-6 and 9-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 5-6. Claims 1-3, 5, 6, 9, 13, 14, 16-19, 21, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Baldwin (US 2008/0091406 Al; Apr. 17,2008). Final Act. 7-15. Claims 4, 10-12, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Baldwin and Basir (US 2009/0164110 Al; June 25, 2009). Final Act. 16-19. 2 Appeal 2017-002257 Application 13/274,940 Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Baldwin and Zhang (US 2007/0005206 Al; Jan. 4, 2007). Final Act. 19-20. Claims 21 and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Baldwin and Mihai Surdeanu et al., Named Entity Recognition from Spontaneous Open-Domain Speech (“Surdeanu”). Final Act. 20-22. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellant’s contentions. Except as noted below, we adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Final Action from which this appeal is taken; and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur with the Examiner’s conclusions. We highlight the following additional points. Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter Alice identifies a two-step framework for determining whether claimed subject matter is judicially-excepted from patent eligibility under §101. In Alice, the Supreme Court reiterated the framework set out in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012), for “distinguishing patents that claim . . . abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp. v. CLSBanklnt’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). Assuming that a claim nominally falls within one of the statutory categories of machine, manufacture, process, or composition of matter, the first step in the analysis 3 Appeal 2017-002257 Application 13/274,940 is to determine if the claim is directed to a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea (judicial exceptions). If so, the second step is to determine whether any element or combination of elements in the claim is sufficient to transform the nature of the claim into a patent eligible application, that is, to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception. Appellant argues the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-6 and 9-20 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter because the claims do not recite a mathematical algorithm or a fundamental economic or longstanding commercial practice. App. Br. 3. Appellant further argues the claims are necessarily rooted in computer technology, specifically human-computer interfaces. Id. According to Appellant, the claimed invention is not simply an existing practice implemented on a computer with no pre-computer corollary. Id. Instead, Appellant contends the claimed method relates to a problem specifically arising in the realm of user-machine interfaces. Reply Br. 2. Appellant argues the claims are limited to a novel computer interface using objects and stacks and the claims, therefore, do not preempt all techniques for operating a computer interface. Id. Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-6 and 9-20 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Claim 1 recites “[a] method for operating a computer based upon human input” comprising seven steps. These steps include two steps directed to receiving input and commands (“receiving . . . input from a human” and “receiving a command at the computer”). The method further includes four steps directed to processing the input (“recognizing the input as a first object,” “associating at 4 Appeal 2017-002257 Application 13/274,940 least one attribute” based upon the recognizing step, “recognizing a second input from the human as a second object,” and “storing the first object and the second object in a stack”). Finally, the method includes a step directed to using the stored objects to execute the received command (“the computer performing the command” step). Our reviewing court has concluded that abstract ideas include the concepts of collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and storing the data in memory. Content Extraction & Transmission LLCv. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Additionally, the collection of information and analysis of information (e.g., recognizing certain data within the dataset) are also abstract ideas. Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1353. Similarly, “collecting, displaying, and manipulating data” is an abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures ILLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Also, the gathering and combining of data that does not require input from a physical device is an abstract idea. Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elec, for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Recently, our reviewing court has also concluded that “creating an index and using that index to search for and retrieve data” is an abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures I LLCv. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). All of these cases are similar to the present claims, which do nothing more than collect, analyze, and act upon data and commands received from a user using an unspecified device. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that the claims are directed to an abstract idea. Regarding the “inventive concept” step, Appellant’s argument that the claims are necessarily rooted in computer technology is also unpersuasive. 5 Appeal 2017-002257 Application 13/274,940 The computer functions recited in the present claims include receiving input and commands, analyzing the input, storing the analyzed input, and performing a command based on the analyzed input. As in Alice, “these computer functions are ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activities],’ previously known to the industry.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294); see also buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355 (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (a computer “employed only for its most basic function . . . does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims”). The broadly recited computer implementation limitations of the claims do little to limit their scope. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that the claims do not recite an “inventive concept” sufficient to transform the claims from an abstract idea to a patent eligible application. Moreover, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that the claims do not preempt every application of some abstract idea and are, therefore, patentable. Reply Br. 3. Lack of preemption does not make the claims any less abstract. See buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (collecting cases); Accenture Glob. Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility”). For these reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-6 and 9-20 as directed to patent-ineligible subject 6 Appeal 2017-002257 Application 13/274,940 matter. We, therefore, sustain the patent-ineligible subject matter rejection of claims 1-6 and 9-20. Anticipation Appellant argues the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as anticipated by Baldwin because Baldwin does not disclose recognizing any human input as an “object,” as claimed. App. Br. 3. According to Appellant, Baldwin may instead achieve similar results relying on the inference of context instead of using objects in the sense of object-oriented programming. Id. at 3—4; Reply Br. 3—4. Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred. As a matter of claim construction, we apply the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim terms, consistent with the specification, as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad, of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Claim 1 recites “recognizing the input [received from a human] as a first object.” Claim 1 does not further limit the term “object” to the context of object-oriented programming or in any other way. Nor has Appellant argued that the Specification limits the term “object” to the object-oriented context. See App. Br. 3—4; Reply Br. 3- 4. We agree with the Examiner that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “object” as recited in claim 1 is not restricted to object-oriented programming and includes Baldwin’s use of context to recognize objects such as “condition,” “place,” and “entity.” See Ans. 23 (citing Baldwin 29, 37, 54, 58). Accordingly, Appellant’s argument that Baldwin fails to disclose the claimed “object” is unpersuasive. For these reasons, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as anticipated by Baldwin. We also sustain the rejection 7 Appeal 2017-002257 Application 13/274,940 of independent claims 16 and 18 and dependent claims 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 13, 14, 17, 19, 21, and 22, for which Appellant does not offer separate arguments (App. Br. 3—4). Obviousness - Claim 20 Appellant argues the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 20 as obvious over Baldwin and Zhang because Zhang discloses entering contacts by voice, but these contacts are not treated as “objects.” App. Br. 4. Thus, Appellant argues Zhang does not remedy the alleged deficiencies of Baldwin. Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because we find Baldwin discloses “objects” as recited in claim 1, from which claim 20 depends, for the reasons set forth above. We, therefore, sustain the rejection of claim 20 as obvious over Baldwin and Zhang. Obviousness - Claims 4, 10-12, 15, 21, and 22 Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of claims 4, 10- 12, and 15, which stand rejected as obvious over Baldwin and Basir. Appellant also does not separately argue the patentability of claims 21 and 22, which stand rejected as obvious over Baldwin and Surdeanu. For the reasons set forth above, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred in rejecting independent claims 1,16, and 18 as anticipated by Baldwin. The same rationale applies to the obviousness rejection of these dependent claims. We, therefore, sustain the obviousness rejections of claims 4, 10-12, 15, 21, and 22. 8 Appeal 2017-002257 Application 13/274,940 DECISION We affirm the decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1-6 and 9- 22. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED 9 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation