Ex Parte BANKOWSKI et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 19, 2018

14559582 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 19, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/559,582 12/03/2014
28395 7590 09/21/2018
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FG1L
1000 TOWN CENTER
22NDFLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Stefan BANKOWSKI
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
83474189 5632
EXAMINER
P ALIW AL, YOGESH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2435
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/21/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEP AN BANKOWSKI, MICHAEL RAYMOND WESTRA,
DAVID CHASE MITCHELL, WLIUS MARCHWICKI, and
ELIZABETH HALASH 1
Appeal2018---003868
Application 14/559,582
Technology Center 2400
Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, MICHAEL M. BARRY, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.
BARRY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1 and 3-21, which are all the pending claims (see Final Act. 1 and
App. Br., Claims App'x). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
1 The Appeal Brief identifies the Applicant, Ford Global Technologies, LLC
as the real party in interest (i.e., the Appellant). App. Br. 1.
Appeal2018---003868
Application 14/559,582
Introduction
Appellant's disclosure and claimed invention "relate to control and
monitoring of application permissions for vehicle applications." Spec. ,r 1.
Claims 1 and 10 are illustrative of the claims on appeal, reproduced
here with disputed limitations in italics:
1. A system comprising:
a memory storing a local policy table; and
a processor device of a vehicle configured to
identify an application identifier of a mobile
application registering from a mobile device paired with the
vehicle and a mobile device identifier of the mobile device;
query the local policy table for application
permissions associated with the application identifier of the
registering mobile application and the mobile device identifier,
the application permissions defining which user interface
features, vehicle information elements, and vehicle functions
are accessible to the mobile application; and
responsive to the registering, provide the mobile
application with mobile device-specific vehicle access in
accordance with the application permissions.
10. A system comprising:
a mobile device, paired with a vehicle, configured to
send, to the vehicle, an update received from a
server and including a local policy table including application
permissions specific to a unique identifier of the mobile device
and defining which user interface features, information
elements, and functions of the vehicle are accessible to a mobile
application; and
register the mobile application in accordance with
the application permissions for the mobile device.
App. Br., Claims App'x pp. A-1, A-2.
2
Appeal2018---003868
Application 14/559,582
Re} ections & References
Claims 1, 3-15, and 19-21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Esselink (US 2013/0031604 Al; Jan. 31, 2013) and Guba
(US 2011/0009107 Al; Jan. 13, 2011). Final Act. 7-15.
Claims 16-18 stand rejected under§ 103 over Esselink, Guba, and
Addepalli (US 8,848,608 Bl; Sept. 30, 2014). Final Act. 15-16.
ANALYSIS
The Board "reviews the obviousness rejection[s] for error based upon
the issues identified by appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence
produced thereon," and treats arguments not made as waived. Ex parte
Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 107 5 (BP AI 2010) (precedential) ( cited with
approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)); see also
37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellant's
contentions of reversible error. We disagree with Appellant's conclusions.
Instead, as consistent with our discussion below, we adopt the Examiner's
findings and reasons as set forth in the Final Office Action from which this
appeal is taken and as set forth in the Answer. We highlight the following
for emphasis.
Claim 1
In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner finds Esselink teaches a vehicle
processor configured to "query a local policy table for application
permissions associated with [an] application identifier of [a] registering
mobile application," but that Esselink does not disclose querying the local
policy table with a mobile device identifier. See Final Act. 7 ( citing Esselink
3
Appeal2018---003868
Application 14/559,582
,r,r 53-54, 57, Fib. 2B). The Examiner then finds Guba discloses "a system
in which a processor identifies a mobile device identifier of a mobile device
and query policy table for application permissions associated with the
mobile device identifier and providing a mobile application with mobile
device-specific vehicle access." See Final Act. 8 (citing Guba ,r,r 7, 30, 70,
7 6, and 116). The Examiner concludes that the disputed requirement for a
vehicle processor configured to "query the local policy table for application
permissions associated with the application identifier of the registering
mobile application and the mobile device identifier," as recited in claim 1,
would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan from the combined
teachings of Esselink and Guba. Id. (citing Guba ,r 70).
Appellant argues the Examiner errs because "neither cited reference
includes any disclosure or suggestion related to how 'a processor device of a
vehicle' considers [an] 'application identifier' in combination with [a]
'mobile device identifier' with respect to vehicle permissions." App. Br. 6.
Specifically, Appellant contends:
the Guba reference relates to [a] policy "distributed to a
plurality of mobile devices," not to policies distributed to
vehicles themselves. . . . Thus, as Guba does not disclose
distribution of [a] policy to vehicles, Guba cannot cure the
deficiencies of Esselink relating to "a processor device of a
vehicle" configured to "query the local policy table for
application permissions associated with the application
identifier of the registering mobile application and the mobile
device identifier," as recited.
App. Br. 6 (citing Guba ,r 30, claim 1). Appellant's argument does not
persuade us of Examiner error.
As the Examiner responds, and we agree, it is the combined teachings
of Esselink and Guba that teach or suggest the disputed limitations. Ans. 3.
4
Appeal2018---003868
Application 14/559,582
We specifically disagree with Appellant that because "Guba does not
disclose distribution of [a] policy to vehicles, Guba cannot cure the
deficiencies of Esselink" (App. Br. 6). "The test for obviousness is not
whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated
into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather, the test is what the
combined teachings of those references would have suggested to those of
ordinary skill in the art." In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,425 (CCPA 1981)
(citations omitted); see also In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968 (CCPA 1973)
("Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to
combine their specific structures.").
As the Examiner responds, and we agree, the proposed combination of
teachings from Esselink and Guba does "not chang[ e] the location of the
local policy storage but [is] only relying on Guba to disclose device specific
policy[,] and it is obvious when the teaching of device specific policies [as
taught by Guba] are applied to the [ teachings of] Esselink, they will be
stored and fetched by the mechanism already disclosed by the Esselink."
Ans. 5. Appellant replies that "[t]here is no articulated reason why one
would combine the references, nor evidentiary basis for that finding, nor
satisfactory explanation for the motivation." Reply Br. 2. We disagree.
We are mindful that "rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be
sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some
articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness." In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir.
2006); see also KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,418 (2007)
( quoting Kahn). "The pertinence of each reference, if not apparent, must be
clearly explained." 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c)(2).
5
Appeal2018---003868
Application 14/559,582
Here, the Examiner specifically explains that an ordinarily skilled
artisan would have been motivated to modify Esselink with Guba to query
the local policy table with both an application identifier and a mobile device
identifier
to provide [a] mobile application with mobile device-specific
vehicle access as taught by Guba so that "the system allows an
administrator to define customized policies for individuals or
for larger groups of people ( e.g. all family members, all kids in
the family, employees of a division, specific types of
employees, or all employees of the company, and the like)."
Final Act. 8 ( citing and quoting Guba ,r 70).
We acknowledge that Guba differs from Esselink and Appellant's
disclosed embodiments in that Guba does not disclose an application policy
table in the vehicle. Nevertheless, Appellant does not persuade us the
Examiner errs in finding Guba provides a motivation for incorporating its
use of a mobile device identifier as a query parameter for determining
application permissions into the design of Esselink, as discussed above. "As
long as some motivation or suggestion to combine the references is provided
by the prior art taken as a whole, the law does not require that the references
be combined for the reasons contemplated by the inventor." In re Beattie,
974 F.2d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Appellant has not asserted that the proposed modification would have
been beyond the capabilities of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Absent
such an assertion, we "take account of the inferences and creative steps that
a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ," and find a person of
ordinary skill in the art would overcome those difficulties within their level
of skill. KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007); see also id.
6
Appeal2018---003868
Application 14/559,582
at 421 ("A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not
an automaton.").
Accordingly, we sustain the§ 103 rejection of claim 1. We also,
accordingly, sustain the rejection of its dependent claims 2-9 and 21, which
Appellant does not argue separately.
Claims 10 and 15
In the Answer, the Examiner notes "that claim 1 only recites 'a
memory storing a local policy table' and does not establish which
component of the system comprises a memory that stores a local policy
table." Ans. 4. Appellant responds that this claim interpretation is
inapplicable to claims 10 and 15, because those claims "specifically require
the sending of the local policy table 'including application permissions
specific to a unique identifier of the mobile device' to the vehicle." Reply
Br. 3 (quoting claim 10 (claim 15 includes an analogous requirement)).
Appellant contends this is an additional reason for why "Guba does not cure
the acknowledged deficiencies of Esselink with respect to independent
claims 10 and 15." Id.
We agree with Appellant that claim 10 recites limitations that, unlike
claim 1, specifically require a mobile device be configured to send a local
policy table to the vehicle. We disagree, however, that this provides a basis
for finding the Examiner errs in the rejection of claims 10 and 15. The
Examiner relies on Esselink for teaching a mobile device configured to send
the local policy table to the vehicle in the rejection of claim 10. See Final
Act. 10 ( citing Esselink ,r,r 65---66). We agree with this finding. Esselink
discloses that "[t]he wireless device [e.g., a mobile phone (see ,r 39)] will
relay the application policy table to the VCS [ vehicle computing system] for
7
Appeal2018---003868
Application 14/559,582
further processing." See Esselink ,r 66 (reference numbers omitted). As
discussed supra for claim 1, Appellant does not persuade us the Examiner
errs in determining it would have been obvious to modify Esselink's local
policy table to include the recited mobile device identifier. Accordingly,
Appellant does not persuade us of error in the rejection of claim 10.
Although we note the analogous recited requirements in claim 15
differ from those in claim 10, Appellant presents no specific argument
beyond contending the Examiner errs similarly in its rejection and,
accordingly, for the reasons discussed supra, Appellant also does not
persuade us of error in the rejection of claim 15.
Accordingly, we sustain the§ 103 rejection of claims 10 and 15. We
likewise sustain the§ 103 rejections of their dependent claims 11-14 and
16-20, for which Appellant offers no substantive separate arguments.
DECISION
We affirm the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejections of claims 1 and 3-21.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
8