Ex Parte Arsenault et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMay 25, 201713142249 (P.T.A.B. May. 25, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/142,249 09/13/2011 Jonathan Allan Arsenault 08929119US 1721 21028 7590 05/30/2017 Cowling WLG (Canada) LLP 160 ELGIN STREET SUITE 2600 OTTAWA, ON KIP 1C3 CANADA EXAMINER MERED, HABTE ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2474 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/30/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Patprosec @ gowlingwlg.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte JONATHAN ALLAN ARSENAULT and DAVID WILLIAM CLARK Appeal 2016-008152 Application 13/142,249 Technology Center 2400 Before IRVIN E. BRANCH, NABEEL U. KHAN, and KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judges. SZPONDOWSKI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—3, 5—7, 9-28, 30-36, 71, 72, 74—76, 86, and 87. Claims 4, 8, 29, 37—70, 73, and 77—85 have been cancelled. App. Br., Claims App’x 20-29. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. Appeal 2016-008152 Application 13/142,249 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ invention is directed to methods and systems for notifying a party at an end-user premise when a particular event occurs at another end- user premise. Spec. 1. Claim 1, reproduced below with the disputed limitations in italics, is representative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for notifying a party of a particular event at a first end-user premise, comprising: obtaining an indication of the particular event; retrieving access information for use in granting access to end-user equipment at a second end-user premise in a neighborhood of the first end-user premise', establishing a wireless communication link between end- user equipment at the first end-user premise and the end-user equipment at the second end-user premise upon the indication of the particular event being obtained', and causing the end-user equipment at the first end-user premise to transmit information to the end-user equipment at the second end-user premise via the wireless communication link to direct the end-user equipment at the second end-user premise to issue a notification concerning the particular event; wherein said establishing comprises causing the end-user equipment at the first end-user premise to use the access information to establish the wireless communication link with the end-user equipment at the second end-user premise. REJECTIONS Claims 1—3 10-13, 18—28, 30—32, 34—36, 71, 72, 76, and 86 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the 2 Appeal 2016-008152 Application 13/142,249 combination of Du Breuil (US 2007/0090944 Al; published Apr. 26, 2007) and Lu et al. (US 2008/0219452 Al; published Sept. 11, 2008) (“Lu”). Claims 5—7, 14—17, 33, 75, and 87 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Du Breuil, Lu, and Asoh et al. (US 2008/0310403 Al; published Dec. 18, 2008) (“Asoh”). Claims 9 and 74 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over the combination of Du Breuil, Asoh, and Dawes et al. (US 2009/0070681 Al; published Mar. 12, 2009) (“Dawes”). ANALYSIS Issue 1: Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of DuBreuil and Lu teaches or suggests “retrieving access information for use in granting access to end-user equipment at a second end-user premise in a neighborhood of a first end-user premise,” as recited in independent claim 1 and commensurately recited in independent claims 36, 71, 72, and 76? Appellants contend “Du Breuil does not teach or suggest retrieving access information for use in granting access to end-user equipment at a second end-user premise. At best, Du Breuil teaches determining a network address associated with a particular physical location, i.e. a house.” App. Br. 12; see also id. at 18—19. Appellants argue “[t]he alleged access information taught by Du Breuil is not used to establish a wireless communication link. Rather, the information that is retrieved by Du Breuil allows the data to be transmitted to a proper recipient.” Id. at 12. Appellants’ arguments are not persuasive. Appellants’ argument that “[t]he alleged access information taught by Du Breuil is not used to establish 3 Appeal 2016-008152 Application 13/142,249 a wireless communication link” does not persuasively address the combination of references as relied upon by the Examiner. Specifically, the Examiner relies on Lu, not Du Breuil, to teach or suggest the limitation “wherein said establishing comprises causing the end-user equipment at the first end-user premise to use the access information to establish the wireless communication link with the end-user equipment at the second end-user premise.” Final Act. 8—9, emphasis added; see also Ans. 6—8; Ans. 20—21. One cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Du Breuil describes use of a wireless FAN to “establish and maintain communications between the houses” in a neighborhood cluster. Du Breuil 12, 14, 15. Specifically, “[a] data collection device, e.g., a camera or sensor, . . . views a scene within the house [(monitored premise)].” Id. 116. “A controller 59 in the monitored premise receives and formats the data from the camera or sensor.” Id. The controller “is connected to a wireless antenna 44 which broadcasts the signal to the neighborhood.” Id. Du Breuil describes “the signal may be encrypted and encoded such that only one or a subset of houses within the wireless FAN receive and are able to decrypt the signal; such are termed here the recipient or recipients of the signal.” Id.', see also Du Breuil 126. Du Breuil further describes “the wireless FAN itself may be secured, so that only houses in the neighborhood cluster can log onto the same.” Id. 126. In addition, “[a] controller with a look-up table or other database may be provided within the system to determine who the proper recipient is.” Id. 121. “The monitoring premise 26 receives the 4 Appeal 2016-008152 Application 13/142,249 signal via a wireless antenna.” Id. 118. In one embodiment, “a signal may be transmitted from the monitored premise to the monitoring premise only upon the occurrence of a triggering event.” Id. 124, Figs. 3, 4. Lu generally describes wireless key exchange between two access points. Lu 119. Lu further describes wired equivalent privacy (WEP) keys and Wi-Fi- protected access pre-shared keys. Id. 132. Lu states “the first access point 10 automatically and securely exchanges a key and establishes a wireless distributed system (WDS) connection with the second access point 20.” Id. 119. The Examiner modifies Du Brueil, as taught by Lu to “exchange . . . access information each time a connection is established.” Final Act. 3, 9; Ans. 7. We agree with the Examiner that the combination of Du Breuil and Lu teaches, or at least suggests, the disputed limitation. Initially, we do not agree with the Examiner that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the term “access information” includes an “identifier of the second user equipment.” See Ans. 5. Rather, Appellants’ Specification establishes an “identifier” and “access information” are not the same thing. See, e.g., Spec. 18, 19, 26. We, therefore, do not rely on that finding. Du Breuil’s look-up table is used to determine the proper “recipient” of the signal. Du Breuil 121. The “recipient” or “recipients” in Lu are the one or a subset of houses within the wireless LAN that receive and are able to decrypt the signal, when the signal has been encrypted. Du Breuil 116; see also Du Breuil 126. As the Examiner points out (Ans. 6, 12, 20-21, 24), Du Breuil teaches the wireless network may be secured, and also describes the use of security keys and passphrases. Du Breuil 126. Moreover, the Examiner also finds the WEP or WPA keys in Lu teach or suggest the 5 Appeal 2016-008152 Application 13/142,249 “access information” and “retrieving access information.” Final Act. 8—9; Ans. 6—8, 13—15, 20, 24.1 Given these teachings, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of Du Breuil and Lu teaches, or at least suggests, “retrieving access information for use in granting access to end- user equipment at a second end-user premise in a neighborhood of a first end-user premise.” Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. Issue 2\ Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of DuBreuil and Lu teaches or suggests “establishing a wireless communication link between end-user equipment at the first end-user premise and the end-user equipment at the second end-user premise upon the indication of the particular event being obtained,” as recited in claim 1 and commensurately recited in independent claims 36, 71, 72, and 76? Appellants contend “Du Breuil teaches transmitting data over an existing communication link.” App. Br. 13. According to Appellants, “it is clear that the WLAN is established and the connection is maintained so that it does not need to be re-established.” Id. at 19. Appellants further argue “even if Du Breuil is modified such that access information is exchanged each time a connection is established, Du Breuil still teaches that a connection is established once and then maintained.” Id. at 17; see also id. at 18-19. We note the Examiner relies on Du Brueil to teach or suggest the disputed limitation and relies on Lu to teach or suggest the limitation 1 Appellants’ Specification states “the access information for the given piece of equipment may comprise a code, such as a password or a wireless network key (e.g., a Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) key).” Spec. 18—19. 6 Appeal 2016-008152 Application 13/142,249 “wherein said establishing comprises causing the end-user equipment at the first end-user premise to use the access information to establish the wireless communication link with the end-user equipment at the second end-user premise,” which further defines the “establishing” limitation. Final Act. 8— 9; see also Ans. 9—11. As such, the Examiner relies on the combination of Du Breuil and Lu to teach or suggest the “establishing . . limitation. See Ans. 9-11. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments and agree with the Examiner that the combination of Du Breuil and Lu teach or suggest the disputed limitation. See Ans. 9-11. Initially, Appellants’ arguments again address Du Breuil individually, rather than as combined with Lu, as relied upon by the Examiner. As described above, Lu teaches establishing a wireless connection between a first and second access point. Lu 119; see also Ans. 11 (“Lu show[s] different scenarios where an existing connection can change access keys and be a new connection”). Du Breuil teaches transmitting a signal from a monitored premises to a monitored premises upon the occurrence of a triggering event. Du Breuil 124, Fig. 3, 4. In addition, Appellants’ argument is premised on a “physical” or “bodily” incorporation of Lu into Du Brueil. This is not the standard. See In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review.”) (citations omitted); Keller, 642 F.2d at 425 (The “test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; . . . Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.”). 7 Appeal 2016-008152 Application 13/142,249 Moreover, “[a] reference must be considered for everything it teaches by way of technology and is not limited to the particular invention it is describing and attempting to protect.” EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis omitted). Appellants have not asserted that the modification required in combining Lu and Du Breuil to “exchange . . . access information each time a connection is established,” as disclosed in Lu, would have been beyond the capabilities of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Absent such an assertion, we “take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ,” and find a person of ordinary skill in the art would overcome those difficulties within their level of skill. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007); see also id. at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). In the absence of sufficient evidence or a line of technical reasoning to the contrary, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of independent claims 1, 36, 71, 72, and 76. For the same reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections of dependent claims 2—7, 9-28, 30-35, 74, 75, 86, and 87, which were not separately argued. DECISION For the above reasons, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—3, 5—7, 9— 28, 30-36, 71, 72, 74—76, 86, and 87 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation