Ex Parte AMAITIS et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 14, 2018

13288223 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 14, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/288,223 11/03/2011
63710 7590 12/18/2018
INNOVATION DIVISION
CANTOR FITZGERALD, L.P.
110 EAST 59TH STREET (6TH FLOOR)
NEW YORK, NY 10022
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
LeeAMAITIS
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
10-2295 1410
EXAMINER
ALLADIN, AMBREEN A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/18/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentdocketing@cantor.com
lkorovich@cantor.com
phowe@cantor.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte LEE AMAITIS and PAUL WILLIAMS
Appeal2017-004014
Application 13/288,223
Technology Center 3600
Before ANTON W. PETTING, MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, and
BRUCE T. WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judges.
PETTING, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
Lee Amaitis and Paul Williams (Appellants) seek review under
35 U.S.C. § 134 of a final rejection of claims 1-22 and 25-30, the only
claims pending in the application on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the
appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
The Appellants invented a way of wagering. Specification para. 2.
1 Our decision will make reference to the Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App.
Br.," filed April 19, 2016) and Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed January 4,
2017), and the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed November 4, 2016), and
Final Action ("Final Act.," mailed March 31, 2015).
Appeal2017-004014
Application 13/288,223
An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of
exemplary claim 1, which is reproduced below (bracketed matter and some
paragraphing added).
1. A method comprising:
[ 1] establishing, by a computing device,
a first account from which a player may make first
wagers associated with a first gaming operator but not a
second gaming operator;
[2] establishing, by a computing device,
a second account from which a player may make second
wagers associated with the second gaming operator but
not the first gaming operator;
[3] presenting, by the computing device,
information to the player identifying a balance in the first
account;
[ 4] in response to the indication that the at least the portion is
available, storing, by the computing device,
information identifying that the at least the portion has
been pre-permissioned for transfer;
[ 5] presenting, by the computing device,
a user interface to the player through which the player
may request a transfer of money between the first
account and the second account;
[ 6] receiving, by the computing device,
a request to transfer a first amount of money from the
first account to the second account;
[7] determining, by the computing device,
and
that the amount of money is less than or equal to the at
least the portion in response to receiving the request to
transfer;
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[8] in response to determining that the amount is less than or
equal to the at least the portion, transferring, by the computing
device,
the amount of money from the first account to the second
account.
The Examiner relies upon the following prior art:
Paravia US 6,811,488 B2
Martin US 2008/0026829 Al
Jorasch US 2008/0132329 Al
Nov. 2, 2004
Jan. 31, 2008
June 5, 2008
Claims 1-22 and 25-30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to a judicial exception without significantly more.
Claims 1-22 and 25-30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Jorasch, Paravia, and Martin.
ISSUES
The issues of eligible subject matter tum primarily on whether the claims
recite more than abstract conceptual advice of what a computer is to provide
without implementation details.
The issues of obviousness tum primarily on whether the art describes
the claim limitations and one of ordinary skill would have combined the art
to meet the limitations.
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FACTS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES
The following enumerated Findings of Fact (FF) are believed to be
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
Facts Related to the Prior Art
Jorasch
01. Jorasch is directed to reinvestment of payouts at a gaming
device, for example, a slot machine. More specifically,
embodiments relate to manual and automatic reinvestment of
payouts from a first game into a second game. Jorasch para. 12.
02. Jorasch describes the term "reinvestment configuration" as a
condition ( e.g., a reinvestment condition), situation, preset, etc. m
which all or a portion of a payout for a first game may be directly
or indirectly reinvested as a wager on a second game. The first
and second games may comprise different plays or rounds of the
same game or game type, and may also be different sub-games,
e.g., paylines, of a single game. A condition or configuration may
be "triggered" or "activated," for example by an event or
occurrence. Jorasch para. 18.
03. Jorasch describes a payout from a first wagering game being
reinvested into play of a second wagering game. All or a portion
of the payout may be reinvested, and the reinvestment may be
automatic. Reinvestment options, such as the amount of a payout
to reinvest, may be determined in advance or at the time of
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reinvestment, and may be determined by a player of the wagering
games or by a game owner or operator. Jorasch para. 21.
04. Jorasch describes a slot machine automatically transferring all
or a portion of a payout from a first payline and/or game to a
separate credit balance that is associated with a different payline
and/or game. In other words, a portion of the payout may be
designated to be reinvested only for play of a different payline
and/ or game apart from the pay line and/ or game on which the
payout was won. J orasch para. 22.
05. Jorasch describes a user selecting options for reinvestment of
payouts from a plurality of such options (e.g., how and/or when
payouts are reinvested at a gaming device). These options may
also be stored, e.g., at a gaming device. In one embodiment,
reinvestment is automatically executed based on any previously
selected option(s). For example, at least a portion of a payout for
a first payline is allocated to a second payline in accordance with
the stored rules. Jorasch para. 25.
06. Jorasch describes a reinvestment configuration being
determined, followed by play of a first game. If the player wins
the first game, a payout is provided to an account. After payout is
provided to the account, a determination is made whether to allow
play of a second game based on the reinvestment configuration.
The second game is played using at least a portion of the payout
from the first game. If the player wins the second game, a payout
for the second game is provided to an account. The two accounts
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of the two games may be the same account, or may be different
accounts. Jorasch para. 29.
07. J orasch describes the payout as being recorded in a benefit
output device comprising multiple credit meter balances
associated with different games or portions of a game.
Alternately, the gaming device may credit a monetary amount to a
financial account associated with a player as a benefit provided to
a player. The financial account may be, for example, a credit card
account, a debit account, a charge account, a checking account,
and/or a casino account. Jorasch para. 84.
Paravia
08. Paravia is directed to providing interactive gaming using
computer resources. Para via 1: 11-13.
09. Para via describes various players accessing the automated
gaming system from remote locations. Paravia 2:3-8.
Martin
10. Martin is directed to cashless computer-controlled games.
Martin para. 3.
11. Martin describes using a monitoring system with the capability
to disable a player terminal, for example, if fraud is suspected or
for maintenance. This embodiment may be used to comply with
laws in jurisdictions that require strict supervision and control
over games. This type of embodiment also reduces the risk to
game operators that provide games at remote locations. Martin
para. 74.
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ANALYSIS
Claims 1-22 and 25-30 rejected under 35 US.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more
Method claim 1 recites establishing two accounts, presenting balance
data, receiving indication data, storing portion data, presenting a user
interface for query, receiving a transfer request, determining whether amount
data meet criteria, and transferring funds if the criteria are met. Thus,
claim 1 recites receiving, analyzing, modifying, displaying, and transmitting
data. None of the limitations recite implementation details for any of these
steps, but instead recite functional results to be achieved by any and all
possible means. Data retrieval, analysis, modification, display, and
transmission are all generic, conventional data processing operations to the
point they are themselves concepts awaiting implementation details. The
sequence of data reception-analysis-modification-display-transmission is
equally generic and conventional. The ordering of the steps is therefore
ordinary and conventional. The remaining claims merely describe
parameters, fields of use, and balance adjustments, with no implementation
details.
The Supreme Court
set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, []
determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of
those patent-ineligible concepts. [] If so, we then ask, "[ w ]hat
else is there in the claims before us? [] To answer that question,
[] consider the elements of each claim both individually and "as
an ordered combination" to determine whether the additional
elements "transform the nature of the claim" into a patent-
eligible application. [The Court] described step two of this
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analysis as a search for an "'inventive concept"'-i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is "sufficient to ensure
that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."
Alice Corp., Pty. Ltd. v CLS Bank Intl, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citing
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012)).
To perform this test, we must first determine whether the claims at issue
are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. The Examiner finds the claims
directed to using accounts for wagering purposes. Final Act. 2.
Although the Court in Alice made a determination as to what the claims
were directed to, we find that this case's claims themselves and the
Specification provide enough information to inform one as to what they are
directed to.
The preamble to claim 1 does not recite what it is directed to, but the
steps in claim 1 result in transferring funds between accounts absent any
technological mechanism other than a conventional computer for doing so.
The Specification at paragraph 2 recites that the invention relates to
wagering. Thus, all this evidence shows that claim 1 is directed to
transferring funds for wagers, i.e., funding wagers. This is consistent with
the Examiner's finding.
It follows from prior Supreme Court cases, and Bilski (Bilski v Kappas,
561 U.S. 593 (2010)) in particular, that the claims at issue here are directed
to an abstract idea. Like the risk hedging in Bilski, the concept of funding
wagers is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of
commercial entertainment. The use of funding wagers is also a building
block of ingenuity in the gambling industry. Thus, funding wagers, like
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hedging, is an "abstract idea" beyond the scope of§ 101. See Alice Corp.
Pty. Ltd. at 2356.
As in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., we need not labor to delimit the precise
contours of the "abstract ideas" category in this case. It is enough to
recognize that there is no meaningful distinction in the level of abstraction
between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of funding
wagers at issue here. Both are squarely within the realm of "abstract ideas"
as the Court has used that term. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. at 2357.
Further, claims involving data collection, analysis, and display are
directed to an abstract idea. Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that "collecting information, analyzing it, and
displaying certain results of the collection and analysis" are "a familiar class
of claims 'directed to' a patent ineligible concept"); see also In re TL!
Commc 'ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 (Fed. Cir.
2016). Claim 1, unlike the claims found non-abstract in prior cases, uses
generic computer technology to perform data retrieval, analysis,
modification, display, and transmission and does not recite an improvement
to a particular computer technology. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314--15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims
not abstract because they "focused on a specific asserted improvement in
computer animation"). As such, claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea of
receiving, analyzing, modifying, displaying, and transmitting data.
The remaining claims merely describe parameters, fields of use, and
balance adjustments. We conclude that the claims at issue are directed to a
patent-ineligible concept.
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The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the analysis
at Mayo step two.
the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea "while adding the words 'apply it"' is
not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea "'to a particular technological environment."'
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words "apply it with a
computer" simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent's recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to "implemen[ t ]" an abstract idea
"on . . . a computer," that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption
concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the
ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of "additional
featur[ e ]" that provides any "practical assurance that the
process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [ abstract idea] itself."
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (citations omitted).
"[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply
instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea [] on a generic
computer." Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2359. They do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer for receiving, analyzing, modifying, displaying, and transmitting
data amounts to electronic data query and retrieval----one of the most basic
functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry. See Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., supra. See also In re Katz
Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303, 1316
(Fed.Cir.201 l)("Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms
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'processing,' 'receiving,' and 'storing,' ... those functions can be achieved
by any general purpose computer without special programming"). In short,
each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic
computer functions. As to the data operated upon, "even if a process of
collecting and analyzing information is 'limited to particular content' or a
particular 'source,' that limitation does not make the collection and analysis
other than abstract." SAP America Inc. v. InvestPic LLC, 898 F.3d 1161,
1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The fact that the data may represent funds does not
alter this analysis, as the cases cited supra treat such data as equally abstract.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellants' method add nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis-
modification-display-transmission is equally generic and conventional or
otherwise held to be abstract. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F .3d
709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for
exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an
abstraction), Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d
1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of data retrieval, analysis,
modification, generation, display, and transmission), Two-Way Media Ltd. v.
Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring). The
ordering of the steps is therefore ordinary and conventional.
Viewed as a whole, Appellants' method claims simply recite the concept
of funding wagers as performed by a generic computer. To be sure, the
claims recite doing so by advising one to use a separate account for funding
and placing funds there as available. But this is no more than abstract
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conceptual advice on the parameters for such funding wagers and the generic
computer processes necessary to process those parameters, and do not recite
any particular implementation.
The method claims do not, for example, purport to improve the
functioning of the computer itself. Nor do they effect an improvement in
any other technology or technical field. The Specification spells out
different generic equipment2 and parameters that might be applied using this
concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail
based on the concept of funding wagers under different scenarios. It does
not describe any particular improvement in the manner a computer
functions. Instead, the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more
than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of funding wagers using some
unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to
transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice Corp.
Pty. Ltd. at 2360.
As to the structural claims, they
are no different from the method claims in substance. The
method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic
computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic
computer components configured to implement the same idea.
This Court has long "warn[ ed] ... against" interpreting § 101 "in
ways that make patent eligibility 'depend simply on the
draftsman's art.'
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. at 2360.
2 The Specification describes using general purpose computers. Spec. paras.
184--185.
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As to Appellants' Appeal Brief arguments, we adopt the Examiner's
determinations and analysis from Final Action at pages 2-3 and Answer at
pages 35--46 and reach similar legal conclusions. We now tum to the Reply
Brief.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the cases Examiner
cites to support the determination that the claims are directed to an abstract
idea actually support that determination. Reply Br. 8-10. First, accounts
per se are mental abstractions, as are funds data stored in such accounts.
Each of accounts and funds exist only in the minds of the beholders. This is
supported by court precedent, as in storing funds in bank accounts.
The claims of the asserted patents are drawn to the abstract idea
of 1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the
collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a
memory. The concept of data collection, recognition, and
storage is undisputedly well-known. Indeed, humans have
always performed these functions. And banks have, for some
time, reviewed checks, recognized relevant data such as the
amount, account number, and identity of account holder, and
stored that information in their records.
Content Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 776 F.3d
1343, 1347 (2014).
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We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the claims would not
preempt the idea. Reply Br. 9. "Where a patent's claims are deemed only to
disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo [/Alice] framework,
as they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made
moot." Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the Examiner still
has presented no evidence that the claims are routine and conventional.
Reply Br. 10. We support such determinations supra.
Appellants further argue that the asserted claims are akin to the
claims found patent-eligible in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.
773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Reply Br. 10-11. In DDR Holdings,
the Court evaluated the eligibility of claims "address[ing] the problem of
retaining website visitors that, if adhering to the routine, conventional
functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be instantly
transported away from a host's website after 'clicking' on an
advertisement and activating a hyperlink." Id. at 1257. There, the Court
found that the claims were patent eligible because they transformed the
manner in which a hyperlink typically functions to resolve a problem
that had no "pre-Internet analog." Id. at 1258. The Court cautioned,
however, "that not all claims purporting to address Internet-centric
challenges are eligible for patent." Id. For example, in DDR Holdings
the Court distinguished the patent-eligible claims at issue from claims
found patent-ineligible in Ultramercial. See id. at 1258-59 (citing
Ultramercial, 772 F.3d 709, 715-16 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). As noted there,
the Ultramercial claims were "directed to a specific method of advertising
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and content distribution that was previously unknown and never
employed on the Internet before." Id. at 1258 (quoting Ultramercial, 772
F.3d at 715-16). Nevertheless, those claims were patent ineligible
because they "merely recite[d] the abstract idea of 'offering media content
in exchange for viewing an advertisement,' along with 'routine additional
steps such as updating an activity log, requiring a request from the
consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public access, and use of the
Internet."' Id.
Appellants' asserted claims are analogous to claims found ineligible in
Ultramercial and distinct from claims found eligible in DDR Holdings.
The ineligible claims in Ultramercial recited "providing [a] media product
for sale at an Internet website;" "restricting general public access to said
media product;" "receiving from the consumer a request to view [a]
sponsor message;" and "if the sponsor message is an interactive message,
presenting at least one query to the consumer and allowing said consumer
access to said media product after receiving a response to said at least one
query." 772 F.3d at 712. Similarly, Appellants' asserted claims recite
receiving, analyzing, modifying, displaying, and transmitting data. This is
precisely the type of Internet activity found ineligible in Ultramercial.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the transfer of
money electronically among funds in a highly regulated and risky
environment is a contemporary problem that does not have a brick and
mortar analogy. Reply Br. 11. This argument is not commensurate with the
scope of the invention which does not recite either regulation or risk.
Transfer of funds between accounts is no more than copying and deleting
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data representing such funds in the memory locations representing such
accounts. These are primitive and conventional computer operations.
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the claims contain
an inventive concept that is also found in the specific ordered combination
of the limitations, similar to the Federal Circuit's findings in BASCOM
(BASCOM Global Internet v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2016)). Reply Br. 11. Initially, we remind Appellant that BASCOM did not
find claims eligible on the substance, but rather that the Appellees did not
provide sufficient evidence to support a 12(b )( 6) motion to dismiss in which
facts are presumed in the non-movant's favor. More to the point, this
argument is entirely conclusory with no supporting facts and analysis.
Claims 1-22 and 25-30 rejected under 35 US.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Jorasch, Paravia, and Martin
We adopt the Examiner's determinations and analysis from Final Action
at pages 3-26 and Answer at pages 3-34 and reach similar legal conclusions.
We now tum to the Reply Brief.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the Examiner fails to
follow compulsory examination procedure. Reply Br. 2. Relief from
improper examination procedure is by petition to the Director. See MPEP
§ 1002.02( c ), item 3 and § 1201. Thus, the relief sought by the Appellant
would have been properly presented by a petition to the Director under 37
C.F.R. § 1.181 instead ofby appeal to this Board.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the Examiner cites
art that teaches away from the claim. Reply Br. 2. Appellants contend "the
paragraphs ... do not teach or suggest a second gaming operator ... the
prior art actually teaches that those devices are at a single gaming operator."
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This is not a contention that the prior art disparages the claimed subject
matter.
A reference may be said to teach away when a person of
ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be
discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or
would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was
taken by the applicant. The degree of teaching away will of
course depend on the particular facts; in general, a reference
will teach away if it suggests that the line of development
flowing from the reference's disclosure is unlikely to be
productive of the result sought by the applicant.
In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
In any event, the Examiner applies Paravia for wagers in games between
two players. Claim 1 recites that the same player makes wagers with first
and second gaming operators. Thus the first and second operators are on the
opposite side of the bet. The player uses the first account to wager with the
first operator and the second account to wager with the second operator. It is
the wagers, not the accounts, that are associated with the first and second
operators ("may make first wagers associated with a first gaming operator").
This is consistent with Jorasch referring to the same player in the first and
second game. Paravia shows it was at least predictable for the player to
switch opponents between games.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the Examiner fails to
make a prima facie showing of an indication that at least a portion of the
balance is available for transfer to the second account. Reply Br. 3. Jorasch
describes the amount of a payout to reinvest being determined at the time of
reinvestment by a player of the wagering games, and that the amount is all or
a portion of the payout, and that the reinvestment may be into a second
account. As the player determines how much to reinvest at the time of
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reinvestment, which occurs after a payout, Jorasch necessarily provides
some means for doing so, and that it is possible, indicating that at least a
portion of the payout is available for transfer. As the payout is placed in a
first account, this is necessarily an indication that at least a portion is
available for transfer to the second account.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the Examiner fails to
make a prima facie showing of a user interface to the player through which
the player may request a transfer of money between the first account and the
second account. Reply Br. 4. We determined supra that Jorasch describes
some means for the player determining how much to reinvest at the time of
reinvestment, which occurs after a payout. As any such means is a
mechanism for allowing the player to communicate with the game, this falls
within the scope of an interface. And as the claim does not recite or narrow
the manner of implementation for the request, the option the player makes at
that time is within the scope of such a request for the game to follow the
player's selection.
We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that
These interfaces show a reinvestment amount from a payout of
a first game into a second account in response to a win of the
first game. But there is no way for a user in these interfaces to
request that money be transferred from one account to another
account. In fact, no money movement happens after a user
establishes a reinvestment scheme until the user actually wins a
first game. Then money is made available to play the second
game. This is not a transfer between two accounts or an
interface through which a user may request such a transfer
Reply Br. 4. Jorasch describes a slot machine automatically transferring all
or a portion of a payout from a first payline and/or game to a separate credit
balance that is associated with a different payline and/or game. In other
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words, a portion of the payout may be designated to be reinvested only for
play of a different payline and/or game apart from the payline and/or game
on which the payout was won. As the claims do not recite or narrow the
implementation for the recited accounts, such player paylines, which are
recorded amounts assigned to the player, are within the scope of accounts.
An account is no more than an identifiable record.
The arguments as to the remaining claims only refer back to the Appeal
Brief arguments, for which we adopted the Examiner's response supra.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The rejection of claims 1-22 and 25-30 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to a judicial exception without significantly more is proper.
The rejection of claims 1-22 and 25-30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Jorasch, Paravia, and Martin is proper.
DECISION
The rejection of claims 1-22 and 25-30 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv) (2011).
AFFIRMED
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