Eula McCottry-Howard, Complainant,v.Ray H. LaHood, Secretary, Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation Administration), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 27, 2012
0120091137 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 27, 2012)

0120091137

07-27-2012

Eula McCottry-Howard, Complainant, v. Ray H. LaHood, Secretary, Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation Administration), Agency.


Eula McCottry-Howard,

Complainant,

v.

Ray H. LaHood,

Secretary,

Department of Transportation

(Federal Aviation Administration),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120091137

Hearing No. 570-2005-00169X

Agency No. 2-04-20701

DECISION

Complainant timely filed an appeal from the Agency's final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C.

� 621 et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's final order.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues presented on appeal are: (i) whether the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) properly issued a summary judgment decision; and (ii) whether the AJ correctly found that the Complainant did not establish that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race, color, and age, as alleged.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Program Assistant, GS-7, at the Agency's Aerospace Medicine (AAM) 200 division in Washington, D.C. Report of Investigation (ROI), at 1. On May 6, 2004, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American), color, and age (53) when she was assigned additional duties without benefit of compensation, unlike a coworker who received a promotion and a cash award.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. Over Complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency's March 25, 2008, motion for a decision without a hearing on December 9, 2008, and entered judgment in favor of the Agency. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged.

The AJ noted that Complainant admitted that she was not given additional duties because of her race. The AJ noted that Complainant acknowledged that she did not have any evidence that she was subjected to race or color discrimination. The AJ also noted that Complainant testified that she was not claiming discrimination based on age. The AJ found no evidence that Complainant was assigned work outside of her position description, or in support of her claim that she should be compensated more for such work. The AJ found that there were no genuine issues of material fact or credibility requiring a hearing. The AJ therefore issued summary judgment in favor of the Agency.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant, through her attorney, contends that she applied for a Medical Appeal Specialist position in July 2002 and was never notified of a selection. Complainant contends that a coworker had been promoted to a GS-11 position while she was not. Complainant contends that this coworker's duties were reassigned to her, and she was not compensated for the extra work that she had to perform. Complainant contends that she performs at the level of a GS-11, but is denied the required compensation for that grade-level. Complainant contends that her present GS-7 grade-level prevents her from qualifying to bid on advertised vacancies that are posted at the GS-11 and above grade levels. Complainant further contends that she has been assigned to the duties of a recently retired GS-14, and continues to receive work outside of her position description. Complainant also contends that the AJ failed to address her claims of discrimination based on age.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency's final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from an Agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, � VI.B. (Nov. 9, 1999) (providing that both the Administrative Judge's determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, are subject to de novo review). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and Agency's, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chap. 9, � VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Summary Judgment

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).

After a careful review of the record, we find that summary judgment was appropriate. The record has been adequately developed, Complainant was given notice of the Agency's motion to issue a decision without a hearing, she was given a comprehensive statement of undisputed facts, and she had the opportunity to engage in discovery. We find that, even assuming all facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in her favor, as explained below. Therefore, we find that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Under these circumstances, we find that the AJ's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate.

Disparate Treatment

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). She must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with in this case, however, since the Agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 23, 1997). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks. 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Tx. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (Nov. 13, 1997); Pavelka v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (Dec. 14, 1995).

Upon review, we find that assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination based on race, color, and age, the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Namely, management explained that the duties assigned to Complainant all fall within her Program Assistant position description. ROI, at 3.

The burden now shifts to Complainant to establish that the Agency's nondiscriminatory reasons were pretext for discrimination. Burdine, at 254. In an attempt to show pretext, Complainant contends that management never made a selection for a Medical Appeal Specialist position that she applied for in July 2002. Complainant further contends that a coworker was promoted to the GS-11 grade-level, while she was not. Complainant contends that she performs at the level of a GS-11, but is denied the required compensation for that grade-level. Complainant contends that that her present GS-7 grade-level prevents her from qualifying to bid on advertised vacancies that are posted at the GS-11 and above grade levels. Complainant contends that she continues to receive work outside of her position description.

Notwithstanding Complainant's contentions, there is no dispute that the comparator whom Complainant asserts was promoted to the GS-11 grade-level was of the same protected groups as Complainant. ROI, Ex. F1, at 2. We further note that Complainant points to a Caucasian employee who was promoted in 1991 and another Caucasian employee who was a paralegal. Complainant's Deposition (Dep.), at 79. We also note that Complainant acknowledged that she did not have evidence to establish that she was subjected to discrimination. Id. at 67-68. Lastly, we note that Complainant testified that she no longer wished to pursue age as a basis for discrimination. Id. at 10-11, 56-57. While Complainant may have performed work outside of her position description, we can no find evidence that the Agency was motivated by discriminatory animus towards her race, color, or age. As such, we find that Complainant has failed to establish that the Agency's articulated reasons were pretext for discrimination.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency's final order adopting the AJ's decision without a hearing.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (Nov. 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 27, 2012

Date

1 The Agency also refers to this case as No. 2007-20839-FAA-02.

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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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