0120114295
01-04-2013
Ericka A. Goff, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southwest Area), Agency.
Ericka A. Goff,
Complainant,
v.
Patrick R. Donahoe,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Southwest Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120114295
Hearing No. 461-2011-00058X
Agency No. 4G-700-0118-10
DECISION
On September 13, 2011, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency's August 18, 2011, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The Commission deems the appeal timely and accepts it pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).1
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Transitional Letter Carrier at the Agency's Post Office facility in Kenner, Louisiana.
On August 16, 2010, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American) and sex (female) when: on May 19, 2012, she was terminated from her employment. The termination became effective on May 21, 2010.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. The AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency's February 17, 2011, motion for a decision without a hearing and issued a decision without a hearing on June 23, 2011. It is noted that Complainant failed to respond to the Agency's motion.
The AJ determined that there were no material facts in dispute and that the matter was appropriate for summary judgment. The AJ turned to Complainant's prima facie case of discrimination based on race and sex. Complainant provided two comparators that were treated more favorably than she. As to one comparator, the AJ found that she had been transferred to another facility prior to the reduction in Transitional Employees. As such, she was not considered similarly situated to Complainant. As for the second comparator, the AJ noted that he was of the same race as Complainant but not the same sex. Therefore, the AJ found that Complainant only established a prima facie of sex-based discrimination.
The AJ then found that the Agency provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, namely that the Agency had to release one of its three Transitional Employees and Complainant was the least consistent carrier in meeting her scheduled base delivery time. As such, the Agency determined that she should be the Transitional Employee who should be removed. The AJ found that Complainant failed to show that the Agency's reasons were pretext for discrimination based on her race and/or sex.
The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
We must determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate.
We note that Complainant failed to provide any arguments on appeal. She merely requested that the Commission review the record in support of her appeal. Upon review of the record, we find that the AJ properly found that the instant complaint was suitable for summary judgment. The record is adequately developed and there are no disputes of material fact.
Therefore, the Commission turns to Complainant's claim of discrimination. A claim of disparate treatment based on indirect evidence is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For Complainant to prevail, he or she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the Agency has met its burden, Complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the Agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether Complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Dep't. of Transp., EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Dep't. of Health and Human Serv., EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Dep't. of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
Upon review of the record, we find that the Agency provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action. The Manager averred that the Agency had undergone route adjustments reducing the number of employees allowed in each unit. As a result, fewer positions were available for Transitional Employees like Complainant. Therefore, the Agency had to reduce the number of Transitional Employees. Complainant was selected for termination based on the Agency's review of work performance, attendance and ability to maintain assigned schedule on a consistent basis. The Manager specifically averred that Complainant was most inconsistent in her performance of her duties as compared to the two other Transitional Employees.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency's final order implementing the AJ's decision without a hearing.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
January 4, 2013
__________________
Date
1 We note that Complainant expressed her desire to file a civil action. However, there is no indication at this time that Complainant has in fact filed her civil action with a Federal District Court.
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0120114295
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
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