Eric Horvitz et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 26, 201912490413 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 26, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/490,413 06/24/2009 Eric Horvitz 327284.01 3430 69316 7590 07/26/2019 MICROSOFT CORPORATION ONE MICROSOFT WAY REDMOND, WA 98052 EXAMINER ADAMS, CHARLES D ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2152 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/26/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): chriochs@microsoft.com usdocket@microsoft.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte ERIC HORVITZ and KAMAL JAIN ____________ Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,4131 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, ERIC B. CHEN, and CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1–18, 21, and 22, which constitute all pending claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). An Oral Hearing was held June 25, 2019. We REVERSE. 1 The real party in interest is identified as Microsoft, Inc. App. Br. 3. Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,413 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The invention relates to a content provider providing content (full version and limited version) to requestors, including dealing with sponsoring referrers. Abstract; Spec. ¶¶ 16–20, 23–28, Figs. 1, 2. Claim 1, reproduced below, is exemplary of the subject matter on appeal (emphasis added): 1. A method of fulfilling requests for content items of a content item set accessible to a content item host having a processor, the method comprising: executing on the processor instructions that cause the content item host to: offer respective content items through a first offer comprising a referral from a sponsoring referrer that is providing sponsorship to the content item host for the content item set and, concurrently, a second offer not comprising a referral from a sponsoring referrer; and upon receiving from a requester a request for a content item: evaluate the request to determine whether the request comprises a referral by the sponsoring referrer responsive to the first offer; for requests that comprise a referral by the sponsoring referral responsive to the first offer, provide a full version of the content item to the requester; and for requests responsive to the second offer and that do not comprise a referral from a sponsoring referrer, provide a limited version of the content item to the requester. App. Br. 2 (Claims Appendix) (Revised dated Mar. 2, 2017). THE REJECTIONS Claims 1–18, 21, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Ans. Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,413 3 2–6 (New ground of rejection). Claim 21 is also separately rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter in the Final Office Action. See Final Act. 2–3. Claims 1–5, 7, 11, 12, 16–18, 21, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Fisher et al. (US 2005/0229220 A1; pub. Oct. 13, 2005) (“Fisher”) in view of Brodersen et al. (US 2010/0057576 A1; pub. March 4, 2010) (“Brodersen”). Final Act. 3–11. Claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Fisher, Brodersen, and Casey et al. (US 2007/0124781 A1; pub. May 31, 2007 (“Casey”). Final Act. 11–13. Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Fisher, Brodersen, and Abbott et al. (US 2008/0177588 A1; pub. July 24, 2008) (“Abbott”). Final Act. 13–14. Claim 9 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Fisher, Brodersen, and Sanz-Pastor et al. (US 8,005,713 B1; iss. Aug. 23, 2011) (“Sanz-Pastor”). Final Act. 14–15. Claim 10 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Fisher, Brodersen, and Andrews (US 7,788,686 B1; iss. Aug. 31, 2010). Final Act. 15–16. Claim 13–15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Fisher, Brodersen, and Axe et al. (US 2008/0046315 A1; pub. Feb. 21, 2008) (“Axe”). Final Act. 16–18. Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,413 4 ANALYSIS The § 101 Rejections PRINCIPLES OF LAW Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the Patent Act, which recites: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. There are, however, three judicially created exceptions to the broad categories of patent-eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: “‘[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.’” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (brackets in original). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,413 5 mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191–92 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,413 6 patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77, (alteration in original)). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) recently published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under that guidance, we first determine whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56. A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application applies, relies on, or uses the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception. See Guidance, Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,413 7 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. When the judicial exception is so integrated, then the claim is not directed to a judicial exception and is patent eligible under § 101. Id. The § 101 Rejection of claims 1–18, 21, and 22 set forth in the Answer The Examiner determines claim 1, and independent claims 21 and 22 “restrict access to full versions of content to those who use a sponsored link, wherein if a sponsored link is not used, a limited version of content is retrieved.” Ans. 2–6. The Examiner determines [t]his appears to be similar to an abstract idea of displaying an advertisement in exchange for access to copyrighted media. In Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC 772 F.3d 709, 112 U.S.P.Q.2d 1750 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the Federal Circuit found that displaying an advertisement in exchange for access to copyrighted media is a patent ineligible abstract idea. Id. at 2–3. The Examiner determines: The independent claims do not appear to have any limitations that individually, or as a combined whole, render the claims to be substantially more than the abstract idea restricting access to full versions of content to those who use a sponsored link. The sponsoring referrer simply provides sponsorship to the content item host, and does not appear to add significantly more to an abstract idea of restricting access to content to those who use a sponsored link. The content item host simply appears to be a conventional and routine content item host. While the claims do contain computer elements such as a processor and a content item host (claim 1), a memory device and a content item host (claim 21), and a server having a processor (claim 22), it is noted that these computer elements appear to be conventional computer elements performing routine functions. Id. at 3. Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,413 8 Appellants argue, inter alia, the Examiner errs in not properly identifying a recited abstract idea and not explaining how the specific claim limitations set forth in the claims correspond to a concept that the courts have identified as an abstract idea. Reply Br. 5–11. Appellants argue claim 1, and independent claims 21 and 22, do not recite “an ‘advertisement’ or ‘copyrighted’ media.” Id. at 8–11 (emphasis omitted). According to Appellants: The “limited” content item may comprise an excerpt, a summary, a downsampled version, a bibliographic reference, some descriptive metadata, etc. – none of which constitutes an advertisement. Moreover, the claimed techniques are presented as an alternative to inserting advertisements into content, with numerous examples of why the insertion of advertisements is undesirable. The examiner may have recognized this nuance had the examiner chosen not to disregard, as immaterial, the portions of the specification and claims reciting these aspects, as the examiner has explicitly admitted while encouraging the Board to do the same. Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted). Appellants argue the Examiner does not recognize that the claims present significantly more than the abstract idea because of the Examiner’s unreasonably broad claim interpretation. Id. at 12. Appellants argue Ultramerical is not applicable because the claims are not directed to displaying an advertisement in exchange for access to copyrighted material. Id. at 13 (citing Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715). Appellants argue DDR is applicable because, as in DDR, the claims provide a “‘solution [that] is necessarily rooted in computer technology to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.’” Id. at 14–16 (quoting DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,413 9 We agree with Appellants that the Examiner’s determination that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of “displaying an advertisement in exchange for access to copyrighted material” and similar to the patent eligible claims in Ultramerical is based on an unreasonably broad interpretation of the claims, and an inadequate review of all elements of the claims. The claims are unlike the claims of Ultramercial in which the court held a claim describing “only the abstract idea of showing an advertisement before delivering free content” is patent ineligible. Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 715; Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52 n.13. Even if claim 1 recites an abstract idea, such as a commercial interaction (“displaying an advertisement in exchange for access to copyrighted material” or “restricting access to full versions of content to those who use a sponsored link”) the Federal Circuit explains the “directed to” inquiry is not simply asking whether the claims involve a patent-ineligible concept: The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical products and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical world. See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (“For all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”). Rather, the “directed to” inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether “their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (“In determining the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole.”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,413 10 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the claims as a whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”). Therefore, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance to determine whether additional elements of claim 1 integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Such additional elements may reflect an improvement to a technology or technical field. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. We determine additional elements of claim 1 integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. We refer to the claim 1 limitations “the content item host to:” offer respective content items through a first offer comprising a referral from a sponsoring referrer that is providing sponsorship to the content item host for the content item set and, concurrently, a second offer not comprising a referral from a sponsoring referrer; and upon receiving from a requester a request for a content item: evaluate the request to determine whether the request comprises a referral by the sponsoring referrer responsive to the first offer; for requests that comprise a referral by the sponsoring referral responsive to the first offer, provide a full version of the content item to the requester. These limitations set forth that, for the first offer, the sponsoring referrer (1) provides the referral and (2) provides sponsorship to the content item. For example, the sponsoring referrer may constitute a search engine that receives requests. By providing the referral and sponsorship, the processing of content request is improved as the content host, sponsoring Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,413 11 referrer, and advertisers are motivated to provide content to requestors. See Spec. ¶¶ 28, 35. The claim 1 limitation regarding a second offer not comprising a referral from a sponsoring referrer, “upon receiving from a requester a request for a content item:” for requests responsive to the second offer and that do not comprise a referral from a sponsoring referrer, provide a limited version of the content item to the requester. Similar to the first offer limitation, discussed supra, this limitation improves the processing of the content requests and enables the provision of sponsored and non-sponsored content. See Spec. ¶¶ 28, 35. The additional elements of claim 1 reflect technology improvement of improving the processing of content requests. See claim 1; see also DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257 (holding the claims satisfy Alice step two because “the claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks”). Additionally, these limitations use the alleged abstract idea in a meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP § 2106.05(e). Because the additional elements of claim 1 integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, we determine claim 1, and independent claims 21, and 22, are not directed to an abstract idea. See Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 2. For similar reasons, each of claims 2–18 integrates the abstract idea into a practical application, and is not directed to an abstract idea. Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,413 12 Therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 1–18, 21, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The § 101 Rejection of claim 21 set forth in the Final Office Action In the Final Office Action, the Examiner determines that the claimed “memory device” of claim 21 is not defined and indicates that computer readable media may include communication media forms of energy that are not patent eligible. Final Act. 2–3 (citing Spec. ¶ 51). The Examiner suggests Appellants use the term “non transitory” to ensure that the claims are directed towards patentable subject matter (id. at 3 (citing 1351 Off. Gaz. 212 (Feb. 23, 2010) — Kappos Memo on SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY OF COMPUTER READABLE MEDIA)). In the Appeal Brief, Appellants refer to the Specification, paragraphs 51, 53, and Figure 5, and argue that [t]hese portions of the specification present different terms to describe different classes of computer-readable media – one of which is directed to memory devices, such as that shown in Fig. 5 (as an example of a physical disc storing data), while the other, “communications media,” includes signals. It is submitted that the term “memory device,” as presented in claim 21, would be recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art as directed to the subset of computer-readable media identified above as “computer storage media,” and the well-recognized types of memory devices presented therein, rather than “communications media” that include signals. App. Br. 17–18. Appellants additionally argue that “[n]on-transitory” is not a requirement, but simply one option and Applicant can choose other ways to amend the claim in accordance with the original disclosure. Id. at 18 (citing August 2015 USPTO training materials entitled: “35 USC § 101: STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AND FOUR CATEGORIES OF INVENTION”). Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,413 13 In the Answer, the Examiner notes that the phrase used in the claim is “a memory device.” Paragraph [0051] does not include any definition or example of the claimed “memory device.” It is noted that a “memory 148” is an example of computer storage media, wherein “computer storage media” includes media “implemented in any method or technology for storage of information.” As noted in paragraph [0053], communication media is a technology that may store information and a “modulated data signal” such as a carrier wave or other transport mechanism. Because there is no explicit definition for “memory device,” and because the definition for “computer storage media” is open ended, the claim is not limited to solely non-transitory forms of media. Because the claimed limitation may encompass transitory media, the claim is patent ineligible under 35 USC 101. Ans. 6–7. We are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments because one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term “memory device” as computer storage media” including exemplary devices. See Spec. ¶ 51, Fig. 5. Therefore, we do not sustain this rejection of claim 21. The § 103 Rejections Appellants argue, inter alia, that the Examiner errs in finding that the combination of Fisher and Brodersen teaches the claim 1 limitation “offer respective content items through a first offer comprising a referral from a sponsoring referrer that is providing sponsorship to the content item host for the content item set” and “upon receiving from a requester a request for a content item: evaluate the request to determine whether the request comprises a referral by the sponsoring referrer responsive to the first offer.” App. Br. 20–28; Reply Br. 17–20. In the Answer, the Examiner finds: Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,413 14 Fisher et al. does not teach, and is not relied upon to teach, wherein the first offer comprises a referral from a sponsoring referrer. The first offer, or link to the full version of content in Fisher et al., requires that a user pay money to access the full version of content. Brodersen et al. is relied upon to show that a full version of content may be supported by advertisements from advertisers, or “sponsoring referrer.” Advertisements are “a referral from a sponsoring referrer” because advertisements are referral to a product provided by the sponsor. Brodersen et al. discusses where content may be purchased or viewed with advertisements in lieu of payment (see paragraph [0039]-[0040]). Notably, this shows that a user may access a full version of content in exchange for viewing advertisements instead of paying for, as is required in Fisher et al. Thus, the combination of Fisher et al. in view of Brodersen et al. does teach the claim limitations notably a first offer (see Fisher et al. Figure 7 and paragraph [0076], links to a full version of content) comprising a referral from a sponsoring referrer that is providing sponsorship to the content item host for the content items set (see Brodersen et al. paragraphs [0039]-[0040], wherein access to a full version of content may be supported by advertisements), and, concurrently, a second offer not comprising a referral from a sponsoring referrer (see Fisher et al. Figure 7 and paragraph [0076], links to a short preview version of content). Id. at 9–10 (emphasis omitted). In the Reply Brief, Appellants reiterate arguments presented in the Appeal Brief and argue that the Examiner’s claim interpretation is unreasonably broad: At page 14, the examiner refers to a portion of the Appeal Brief noting that “the sponsoring referrer provides, to the content source, both referrals of requests for content items and sponsorship,” and asserts that “this subject matter is not claimed.” However, claim 1 provides: (1) a sponsoring referrer provides sponsorship to the content item host for the content item Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,413 15 set, and (2) determining whether the request comprises a referral (of a requested content item) by the sponsoring referrer. Together, these elements provides: a sponsoring referrer that provides, to the content item host, both sponsorship and referrals of requests by requesters for content items. Id. at 19–20 (emphasis omitted). We are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner’s claim interpretation is unreasonably broad. In particular, the Examiner’s interpretation does not properly apply the recited claim terms “through a first offer comprising a referral from a sponsoring referrer that is providing sponsorship to the content item host for the content item set” and “evaluate the request to determine whether the request comprises a referral by the sponsoring referrer responsive to the first offer.” Emphasis added. Claim terms in a patent application are given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification, as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We agree with Appellants that in this case, these limitations narrow the claim and must be taught by the references. See Santarus, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (limitation “restricted the claims to this preferred use[,] . . . [t]his exclusion narrowed the claims, as the patentee is entitled to do.”). Here claim 1 recites that “a first offer compris[es] a [1] referral from a sponsoring referrer that is [2] providing sponsorship to the content item.” See also Spec. ¶¶ 23, 24, Figs. 1, 2. As used in the Specification, “sponsoring” includes sharing advertising revenue with the content provider. See Spec. ¶ 23. Appellants refer to Figure 2 as showing the claimed feature in which the content provider receives both the request 36 via the referrer 18 and sponsorship 46 via the sponsoring referrer 48. The Examiner Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,413 16 determines advertisements, as in Brodersen, are “‘a referral from a sponsoring referrer’ because advertisements are referral to a product provided by the sponsor.” Ans. 9–10. According to the Examiner, the claims do not contain any steps wherein a referrer serves as an intermediary for a request. There is no claim limitation wherein a request is submitted through a referrer. The examiner also notes that no explicit definition is provided in the specification for “referrer.” To differentiate from the cited art, appellant is relying on subject matter from the specification that simply does not exist in the claims. The claims require only a content item host to “offer respective content items to a first offer comprising a referral from a sponsoring referrer.” Id. at 11. In the Reply Brief, Appellants argue the Examiner errs in interpreting Brodersen’s “‘. . . full version of content may be supported by advertisements from advertisers’” as ‘a referral from a sponsoring referrer’ because advertisements are referral to a product provided by the sponsor.” Reply Br. 17 (citation omitted). According to Appellants: Once again, the examiner’s argument confuses the concept of a sponsoring referrer, as provided in the claimed techniques, with the concept of a sponsored referrer, as provided in Broders[e]n. The examiner’s interpretation of Broders[e]n requires the content host to be construed as the “referrer,” and the advertiser is construed as the “content host” of the advertised product. However, this interpretation would also require the content host to submit a sponsorship fee to the advertiser, along with “referring” users who view and follow the advertisement. It is submitted that the notion that a content host would pay an advertiser for the privilege of inserting product advertisements into content is peculiar, and, in addition, is not shown by either Broders[e]n or Fisher. Id. at 17 (emphasis omitted). Appeal 2017-011286 Application 12/490,413 17 We are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments because the Examiner’s claim interpretation is unreasonably broad. In view of the above, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 1, and independent claims 21 and 22 as these claims are argued together with claim 1 and are commensurate in scope. We also do not sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2–18. Cf. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[D]ependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious . . . .”). Because our decision is dispositive of the rejection of these claims, we do not address additional arguments raised by Appellants. DECISION We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–18, 21, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–18, 21, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). REVERSED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation