Enriqueta T.,1 Complainant,v.Dr. Mark T. Esper, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Jun 6, 2019

0120182097 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 6, 2019)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Enriqueta T.,1
Complainant,

v.

Dr. Mark T. Esper,
Secretary,
Department of the Army,
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120182097

Agency No. ARARL16MAY02292

DECISION

On June 6, 2018, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s
May 2, 2018, final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint
alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS
the Agency’s final decision.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issue presented are whether the Agency subjected Complainant to discrimination and
harassment on the bases of race and sex when (1) a Program Security Officer allegedly bullied her
and (2) the Agency terminated her employment.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Security Specialist,
GG-0080-13, at the Agency’s U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Laboratory Operations,
Intelligence and Security, in Adelphi, Maryland. On August 2, 2016, Complainant filed an EEO
complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-
American) and sex (female) when:

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.
0120182097

2

1. from March 2016 to May 2016, the Program Security Officer subjected her to
bullying (which she reported through her chain of command but to no avail); and

2. on May 24, 2016, the Chief of the Intelligence and Security Office notified her that
the Agency was terminating her from her position (during the trial period), effective
June 1, 2016.

Complainant received an appointment to the Security Specialist position on June 29, 2015; her
appointment was subject to a two-year trial period. She previously had worked as a contractor at
the Agency. The Chief of Intelligence and Security was Complainant’s first-level supervisor (S1).
From September 6, 2015, until March 21, 2016, Complainant served as the Acting Program
Security Officer. On March 21, 2016, a GG-0080-14 Security Specialist became the Program
Security Officer and acted as Complainant’s non-supervisory Team Leader (TL).

In a December 18, 2015, email to S1, the Special Programs Office (SPO) Chief stated that
Complainant continued to go to the post office to pick up mail even though she had been told not
to do so. He stated that two employees had told him that Complainant had collected mail-pick-up
sheets, claimed that the sheets were not valid because they did not contain her name, and accused
one of the employees of making changes and going behind her back. S1 issued Complainant a
December 22, 2015, Memorandum for the Record concerning her Failure to Follow or Observe
Verbal Orders, Procedures, and Instructions. In the Memorandum, S1 stated that the SPO Chief
told him that Complainant had disobeyed S1’s and the SPO Chief’s instructions regarding retrieval
of the SPO’s mail. He stated that Complainant was not authorized to make weekly trips to the post
office to pick up mail and, if she was the only available person who could make the trip, then she
should obtain prior approval from S1.

On May 2, 2016, S1 issued Complainant a Memorandum for the Record regarding her Time and
Attendance, Starting and Ending Duty Hours, and Failure to Follow Proper Notification
Procedures. He stated that Complainant had arrived one hour and nine minutes late on April 20
and 33 minutes late on April 25, 2016 and had not followed proper notification procedures. He
further stated that Complainant had been leaving work 30 minutes early, that she “disappear[ed]
or [went] missing for unaccounted periods” during the workday, and that her time-and-attendance
was “suspect.” He directed her to adhere to her designated duty hours, to obtain advance approval
from him or TL for planned absences, and to report to TL when she arrived at and left work.

In a May 4, 2016, Memorandum to the Director of the Civilian Human Resources Agency, S1
stated that he had decided to terminate Complainant’s employment during her probationary period.
He noted that Complainant had received written counseling on December 22, 2015, and May 2,
2016; that the Program Manager stated that she did not follow rules, was manipulative and close-
minded, was not accountable for her actions, and hurt morale; and that her coworkers complained
that she was disruptive and not a team player. In addition, S1 stated that Complainant “was also
involved in a situation wherein she had knowledge of an alleged fraudulent Co-Utilization
Agreement being signed and failed to report the incident in a timely manner.”
0120182097

3

In a May 9, 2016, memorandum, the SPO Chief stated that Complainant had supported the SPO
as a contractor and employee. He asserted that, as an employee, she had been insubordinate. He
also asserted that she “disappeared during work hours,” had “very questionable attendance,”
“alienated co-workers,” and “made the work place uncomfortable and very awkward.” In a May
11, 2016, memorandum to S1, TL claimed that Complainant had demonstrated “multiple instances
of disruptive, defiant/insubordinate, and divisive conduct.” He asserted that Complainant had
disparaged coworkers and did not adhere to the Agency’s time-and-attendance rules. He stated
that, when he tried to confirm that Complainant would attend a May 2, 2016, staff meeting
regarding a new time-and-attendance policy, Complainant “was defiant and claimed that she did
not need to attend.” According to TL, Complainant followed him to S1’s office and told TL that
“she was not going to be bullied just because she was a woman, and that she knows about me.” In
addition, TL stated that Complainant had left work early instead of taking the mandatory 30-minute
lunch break.

By memorandum dated May 24, 2016, S1 notified Complainant that the Agency would terminate
her employment, effective June 1, 2016, because of unacceptable conduct. He stated that
Complainant had shown “a lack of professionalism” on “numerous occasions” and that her
customers, coworkers, and team leader had complained to him about her. In addition, S1 noted
that he had counseled her on December 22, 2015, and May 2, 2016.

In her affidavit, Complainant denied that anyone had instructed her not to pick up mail. She stated
that a coworker (CW1) created a mail-run schedule for December 2015, and that she was scheduled
to perform the run from December 21 to 25, 2015. According to Complainant, S1 and the SPO
Chief agreed to allow the December 2015 Memorandum for the Record to “go dormant” after she
showed them the schedule.

She also denied that she had violated the Agency’s time-and-attendance requirements. She stated
that she had “maxi-flex” clearance, which required her to work core hours three days per week,
and physical-fitness clearance. Complainant asserted that she had permission to work outside of
her core hours, that Agency “policy requires notification within two hours of normal scheduled
arrival time,” and that she did not notify her supervisor because she was in the office within the
two-hour time frame. She stated that she spoke to the Experimentation Support Group Chief, who
was her second-level supervisor (S2), about the matter and that he agreed with her.

Complainant alleged that TL made accusatory statements to her, badgered her, used “an aggressive
tone,” “made constant threats against” her, and put up roadblocks when she tried to engage with
customers. She asserted that he accused her of intentionally missing a meeting in March 2016
even though she did not know about the meeting and that he questioned her time and attendance
in April 2016. She also asserted that he insisted that she attend a Special Access Programs
Oversight Committee (SAPOC) meeting on April 7, 2016, and then told a coworker (CW1) that
he would prevent “that woman” from attending subsequent meetings. Complainant noted that TL
attended the May 2, 2016, meeting at which S1 issued her a Memorandum for the Record and
alleged that he was there “as a provocateur.” She asserted that, after the meeting, TL told her that
0120182097

4
he would hold another meeting with her and CW1, followed her when she went to S1’s office to
ask about the meeting, threatened to charge her with insubordination, and bullied her.

Complainant alleged that the accusations in the memoranda supporting her discharge were
“staged” and that the memoranda contained “stereotypical ‘angry black woman’ references.” She
also alleged that the “stereotypical language” in TL’s May 11, 2016, memorandum “and his
obvious collaboration on” memoranda written by the SPO Chief and S1 demonstrated that TL
acted because of race. She denied telling TL that she would not be bullied because she was a
female. She argued that TL’s claim that she had made that statement, as well as his reference to
preventing “that woman” from attending SAPOC meetings demonstrated that TL acted based on
sex. In addition, Complainant claimed that the Agency treated TL, who is a Caucasian male, and
three other named male Program Security Officers more favorably than it treated her. Two of the
named Officers are African American (CW2 and CW3), and one is Caucasian (CW4). She asserted
that the Agency did not subject them to the level of micro-management that she experienced. She
further asserted that other African American women on S1’s team complained in 2015 about their
inability to receive promotions. She claimed that coworkers engaged in a “gossip/sabotage
culture.”

In his affidavit, TL denied that he bullied Complainant. He asserted that his interactions with
Complainant “started normal but quickly degraded.” According to TL, Complainant “would
disappear for hours at a time” and “became defensive and argumentative” when he spoke to her
about it. He asserted that Complainant alleged that other women in the office sabotaged and
conspired against her. He also asserted that Complainant delayed his work by hiding a document
from him.2 TL claimed that Complainant “was the bully,” that she belittled other employees, and
that she “was disrespectful, defiant, and insubordinate toward” him. He denied that Complainant’s
race and sex were factors in his interactions with her. With respect to Complainant’s allegation
that he referred to her as “that woman,” TL stated that he was speaking to CW1 about a different
employee and that he told Complainant that the conversation was not about her. With respect to
time-and-attendance matters, TL stated that Complainant said that she had made special
arrangements with S1, S1 told her in TL’s presence that they had not made such arrangements,
and he and S1 subsequently set up a system for signing in and out of the office. He denied that he,
S1, and the SPO Chief collaborated to have Complainant fired. He stated that he did not believe
that he received more favorable treatment because of his race or sex and that two of the other
employees who Complainant alleged received more favorable treatment worked in different
offices.

S1 stated in his affidavit that Complainant did not tell him that she felt bullied by TL. He also
stated that CW1 was the main person who collected mail, that Complainant started to perform the
task when she was the Acting Team Manager, that he “instructed her several times not to do the
mail runs,” that the SPO Chief also told her not to do them, and that the SPO Chief told him on

2 In her rebuttal affidavit, Complainant asserted that the document was a facsimile that “should
have been covered up with a pink cover sheet and placed in the IT Room or handed directly to”
CW1 because of security issues. She argued that TL “embellishes it into a. . . very false rant.”
0120182097

5
December 18, 2015, that Complainant had told two employees that the mail-collection schedule
was invalid. He explained that he issued the December 2015 Memorandum for the Record because
Complainant continually disobeyed his orders. He acknowledged that Complainant stopped
performing the mail runs after she received the Memorandum.

S1 further stated that he issued the May 2016 Memorandum for the Record regarding time and
attendance because of Complainant’s late arrival on April 20 and 25, 2016. According to S1, he
needed to ensure that there was office coverage and that Complainant understood time-and-
attendance requirements. He asserted that the Memorandum did not improve Complainant’s
behavior and that she arrived late “a few days later.” S1 stated that, in 2012, he counseled a
Caucasian female, an African American female, and a Caucasian male about their time and
attendance.

With respect to the May 2, 2016, meetings, S1 asserted that Complainant and TL came to his office
and “were both being unprofessional.” He stated that he told them that their behavior was
unprofessional and disruptive and that they needed to end the unprofessional behavior. He later
held a security-team meeting to explain TL’s role and to address time-and-attendance matters.

S1 stated that he terminated Complainant’s employment because of unacceptable conduct. He
noted that S2 and the SPO Chief concurred with his decision. He denied that the Agency treated
other employees more favorably than it treated Complainant. S1 stated that he counseled TL for
his conduct, that CW2 “was downgraded and moved out of the organization,” that CW3 left the
organization and received a promotion, and that CW4 “left of his own free will.”

In his affidavit, S2 stated that Complainant spoke to him about TL but did not accuse TL of
bullying her. When she showed him an email that TL had sent to her, S2 explained that
Complainant had not answered TL’s questions and suggested that she answer the questions without
adding extra information. He spoke with S1 about the office conflict and Complainant’s concerns.
He also spoke with S1 after Complainant complained to him about the May 2016 Memorandum
for the Record regarding time and attendance. S2, who denied that he told Complainant that she
had done nothing wrong with respect to her time and attendance, agreed with S1 about the matter
and told him that he was handling it appropriately. S2 stated that S1 discussed the termination of
Complainant’s employment with him, that S1 had the authority and responsibility to make the
decision, that he agreed with S1’s assessment, and that the Agency discharged Complainant
because her “actions were unprofessional, and counseling did not result in any positive change.”

The SPO Chief explained that Complainant provided service to SPO and that he was her internal
customer. He stated that he had not witnessed any bullying. He further stated that, although he
did not play a formal role in the decision to discharge Complainant, S1 consulted with him and he
agreed with the decision. He asserted that Complainant was insubordinate with him. According
to the SPO Chief, Complainant “was out of the office for hours at a time” doing mail runs,
continued to do the runs even though she had been told not to do them, prevented the two
employees to whom he had assigned the mail runs from doing them, and was not a team player.
He stated that he made “numerous comments” to S1 about the problems that he had with
0120182097

6
Complainant and that S1 counseled Complainant “numerous times.” He denied that anyone tried
to entrap Complainant on time-and-attendance matters.

Five of Complainants coworkers provided affidavits. All of them stated that they had not
witnessed TL bully Complainant. One of them believed that S1 was dissatisfied with Complainant
and expected TL to handle her.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report
of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge. In accordance with Complainant’s request, the
Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b).

In its decision, the Agency found that Complainant had not proven that the Agency discriminated
against her or subjected her to a hostile work environment on the bases of race and sex. Assuming
that Complainant established prima facie cases of discrimination, the Agency found that it
articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions and that Complainant did not
establish that the articulated reasons were a pretext for discrimination. It concluded that
Complainant’s allegations were “general and unspecific” and not supported by the totality of
evidence.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant argues that she performed her job “more than adequately,” that there were
no security incidents during her tenure, and that she resolved potential security issues. She asserts
that the Agency fired her based on “proven, fallacious misconduct allegations” as well as “staged
events” and misinformed testimony. She discusses interactions with her coworkers and disagrees
with some of the statements that they made in their affidavits. In addition, Complainant states that
she made a “deliberate effort” to respect TL’s leadership. She argues that, if TL believed that she
was insubordinate with respect to the mail-run matter, then he should have taken the mail-box key
from her. She asserts that she always contacted a coworker when she was going to be late to work,
that she shared her whereabouts with two named coworkers “most often,” that it would have been
“impractical” to check in with S1 every time that she went to a different floor, and that her
“whereabouts were always known to someone.” Complainant reiterates her allegation that TL
engaged in “fallacious diatribes” and “an angry black woman narrative.” She argues that the
Agency’s articulated reasons are “inaccurate” and that “fallacious misconduct allegations, staged
events, [and] uninformed, not present witnesses all served as a pretext for discrimination.”

In response, the Agency argues that Complainant did not establish harassment or discrimination
based on race or sex. The Agency further argues that it articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its actions and that Complainant did not establish that the articulated reasons were a
pretext for discrimination.

0120182097

7
STANDARD OF REVIEW

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b),
the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a).
See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9,
§ VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the
Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the
previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of
record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision
based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”).

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Disparate Treatment

To prevail in a disparate-treatment claim, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary
scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was
subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference
of discrimination. Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima
facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 802 n.13. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
Agency’s explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). Complainant can do this
by showing that the proffered explanations are unworthy of credence or that a discriminatory
reason more likely motivated the Agency. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. A showing that the
employer’s articulated reasons are not credible permits, but does not compel, a finding of
discrimination. Hicks at 511.

We assume, for purposes of analysis only and without so finding, that Complainant has established
prima facie cases of discrimination based on race and sex. We also find that the Agency has
articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. TL, who denied bullying
Complainant, stated that he was speaking about another employee when he used the phrase “that
woman” and that he told Complainant that the conversation was not about her. He also stated that
Complainant disappeared from work and became defensive when he spoke to her about it. The
May 24, 2016, memorandum notifying Complainant that the Agency was terminating her
employment because of unacceptable conduct, referred to her “lack of professionalism,” and cited
the December 22, 2015, and May 2, 2016, Memoranda for the Record. S1 stated that Complainant
disobeyed his orders regarding mail runs and arrived at work late.

Complainant has not shown that the articulated reasons are a pretext for discrimination. The
evidence does not establish that the Agency’s explanation is unworthy of credence. Complainant
0120182097

8
argues that she informed a coworker when she would be late, but she has not shown that she arrived
on time on the dates cited in the Memorandum for Record or that she notified S1 that she would
be late. Similarly, Complainant’s assertion that she usually let coworkers know of her whereabouts
does not establish that S1 or TL knew where she was. Her argument that TL could have taken the
mail-box key from her is insufficient to refute S1’s and the SPO Chief’s statements that
Complainant continued to perform mail runs even after being instructed not to do them.

Further, Complainant has not shown that discriminatory reasons more likely motivated the
Agency’s actions. She has argued that the memoranda supporting her discharge contained
“stereotypical ‘angry black woman’ references” and “stereotypical language,” but she has not
identified any specific language in support of that contention. Our review of the memoranda does
not disclose the use of sex- or race-based stereotypes. Complainant also has argued that TL’s
reference to “that woman” demonstrates that TL acted because of her sex. Under the circumstances
presented here, we do not find that TL’s use of the phrase - which he stated referred to a different
employee - demonstrates sex-based animus.

The evidence does not establish that the Agency’s reasons for its actions are unworthy of credence
or that discriminatory reasons more likely motivated the Agency. We find, therefore, that
Complainant has not shown that the actions at issue occurred because of her race or sex.

Harassment

In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), that harassment is actionable
if it is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [complainant's] employment and
create a hostile or abusive working environment.” The Court explained that an "objectively hostile
or abusive work environment [is created when] a reasonable person would find [it] hostile or
abusive” and the complainant subjectively perceives it as such. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. Whether
the harassment is sufficiently severe to trigger a violation of Title VII must be determined by
looking at all the circumstances, including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id. at 23.

To establish a claim of harassment, Complainant must show that: (1) she is a member of a
statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome verbal or physical conduct
involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on the protected class;
(4) the harassment had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment
and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for
imputing liability to the employer. Humphrey v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01965238
(Oct. 16, 1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11. The harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the
objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance
on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994) (Enforcement
Guidance on Harris). The evaluation “requires careful consideration of the social context in which
0120182097

9
particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).

In this case, the record does not support a finding that the Agency subjected Complainant to
discriminatory harassment. As noted above, the evidence does not establish that the Agency took
the actions at issue because of Complainant’s race or sex. A finding of discriminatory harassment
is therefore precluded by our determination that Complainant did not show that the Agency’s
actions were motivated by discriminatory animus. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal
No. 01982923 (Sept. 21, 2000). Accordingly, we find that Complainant has not demonstrated that
the Agency subjected her to harassment based on race or sex.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not
specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision and its finding of no
discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or
law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal
Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have
twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in
which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment
Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B
(Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be
submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131
M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to
reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted
in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. §
1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
0120182097

10
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as
untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety
(90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must
name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department
head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result
in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider
and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of
your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request
permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs.
Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the
court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or
appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole
discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for
filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for
the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

June 6, 2019
Date