ELECTROLUX HOME PRODUCTS, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 8, 2021

2019006730 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 8, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/752,281 06/26/2015 James Fisher E63830 1290US.1 (0074.1) 3177
26158 7590 06/08/2021
WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP
ATTN: IP DOCKETING
P.O. BOX 7037
ATLANTA, GA 30357-0037
EXAMINER
NDIAYE, CHEIKH T
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2447
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/08/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
BostonDocket@wbd-us.com
IPDocketing@wbd-us.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte JAMES FISHER,
GIORGIO FRANCESCANGELI, and
PAUL STOUFER
________________

Appeal 2019-006730
Application 14/752,281
Technology Center 2400
________________

Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, JASON V. MORGAN, and
DAVID J. CUTTITA II, Administrative Patent Judges.

Opinion for the Board filed by Administrative Patent Judge MORGAN.

Opinion Dissenting filed by Administrative Patent Judge THOMAS.

MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. Claims 21 and 22 are canceled.

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant
identifies the real party in interest as Electrolux Home Products, Inc. Appeal
Br. 1 (Feb. 7, 2019).
Appeal 2019-006730
Application 14/752,281
2

Supp. Appeal Br. 6 (Mar. 20, 2019). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We REVERSE.
SUMMARY OF THE DISCLOSURE
Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to a “hub for managing
networked household appliances.” Abstract. “The hub may include a
network communication interface for wirelessly connecting to a wireless
access point of a wireless local area network (WLAN), and a wireless
repeater for receiving and rebroadcasting signals from the wireless access
point.” Id. (emphases added).
ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
(disputed limitations emphasized and bracketing added)
1. A hub for managing networked household appliances, the
hub comprising:
a network communication interface configured to connect the
hub to a wireless access point of a wireless local area network
(WLAN);
[1] a wireless repeater configured to receive and rebroadcast
signals from the wireless access point;
an appliance communication interface configured to wirelessly
connect the hub to a plurality of household appliances and
thereby establish a wireless local appliance network over which
the hub and the plurality of household appliances are
configured to communicate with one another; and
a control module coupled to the appliance communication
interface and configured to provide a user interface to enable a
user to interact with the plurality of household appliances from
the hub over the wireless local appliance network, and for each
household appliance of the plurality of household appliances,
view status information associated with the household
appliance.
Appeal 2019-006730
Application 14/752,281
3

REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following references:
Name Reference Date
Dawes et al. (“Dawes”) US 9,172,553 B2 Oct. 27, 2015
Shanmugan et al.
(“Shanmugan”)
US 2016/0165663 A1 June 9, 2016
REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1–9 and 11–19 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Shanmugan. Non-Final Act. 6–10.
The Examiner rejects claims 10 and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious over the combination of Shanmugan and Dawes. Non-Final
Act. 10–11.
ANALYSIS
In rejecting claim 1 as anticipated, the Examiner finds that
Shanmugan’s relaying of a message from a connected device to a mobile
device via home router 140 and gateway 150 discloses recitation [1], “a
wireless repeater configured to receive and rebroadcast signals from the
wireless access point.” Non-Final Act. 6 (citing Shanmugan ¶¶ 20, 31);
Ans. 9 (citing Shanmugan ¶ 45); see also Shanmugan Fig. 1.
Appellant contends the Examiner erred because “Shanmugan’s
gateway does not include a wireless repeater configured to receive and
rebroadcast signals from a wireless access point.” Appeal Br. 5 (emphasis
added). Appellant notes that “Shanmugan describes a home network
including its gateway connected on one end to the home router, and on the
other end to the connected devices with disparate communication protocols
(e.g., LAN/Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Z-Wave, Zigbee, X10).” Id. at 6. Appellant
Appeal 2019-006730
Application 14/752,281
4

argues this “demonstrates that, at least as to communication with the
connected devices of disparate communication protocols, the gateway does
not operate on the physical layer, working with the actual physical signal
without any attempt to interpret the data.” Id. Rather, “Shanmugan describes
its gateway translating commands to a particular format of a connected
device, or decoding and processing signals of a particular format.” Id. Thus,
Appellant concludes that
Shanmugan’s gateway does not in fact simply “relay” messages
similar to a wireless repeater that rebroadcasts an existing
signal from a wireless router or wireless access point, working
with the actual physical signal . . . . Rather, the gateway
translates, decodes or processes signals to accommodate the
connected devices that do not comply with a signal standard or
compatible communication protocol.
Id. at 7 (citing Shanmugan ¶¶ 2, 21); Reply Br. 4.
The Examiner responds by finding “the argued limitation or
description of the wireless repeater cannot be found in the specification.”
Ans. 9. The Examiner, however, acknowledges that the Specification
“discloses that the wireless repeater may be or include at least two wireless
routers in which the first router may be configured to receive a signal from
the wireless access point, and transmit the signal to the second router.” Id.
(citing Spec. ¶ 45) (emphases added). The Examiner concludes that
accordingly, “the wireless repeater is a router/gateway that transmits
signals.” Id. (emphasis added). The Examiner finds that Shanmugan teaches
recitation [1] by disclosing “gateway 150 relaying messages/commands
passing from router 142 to the connected devices 161 – 163.” Id. (citing
Shanmugan ¶¶ 20, 71).
We find Appellant’s arguments persuasive because they accord with
the limitations of recitation [1], which recites “a wireless repeater configured
Appeal 2019-006730
Application 14/752,281
5

to receive and rebroadcast signals” (emphasis added). This recitation
accords with the portions of the Specification—disclosing receiving and
rebroadcasting signals—cited by Appellant and the Examiner. See, e.g.,
Appeal Br. 2 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 45, 57); Ans. 6 (citing Spec. ¶ 45). Appellant’s
characterization of a repeater as operating on the physical layer of a
computer networking protocol stack (Appeal Br. 5) also accords with the
meaning of a repeater as “[e]quipment installed at intervals on a long
communications circuit to amplify and/or reshape signals to offset the
effects of attenuation and distortion occurring on the circuit” (S. W. Amos,
et al., Newnes Dictionary of Electronics (4th ed.) 270–71 (1999)).
Appellant’s arguments regarding Shanmugan accord with
Shanmugan’s disclosure that gateway device 150
supports connection to and communication with a variety of
home automation or personal connected devices within the
home network 130 that communicate using disparate protocols
such as Z-Wave devices 161, Bluetooth low energy (BLE)
devices 163, Zigbee devices 165, transport control/Internet
protocol (TCP/IP) devices 167, and other devices 169, such as
X10 protocol devices.
Shanmugan ¶ 31 (cited in Non-Final Act. 6).
Moreover, Shanmugan teaches that “when sending a message to a
connected device (e.g., 163) from mobile device MD1, the mobile device
MD1 contacts . . . the gateway 150” instead of with the connected device
itself. Id. ¶ 20 (cited in Non-Final Act. 6). “[G]ateway 150 relays the
message to the connected device 163” rather than merely repeating or
rebroadcasting a received signal. Id. (emphasis added). Relaying messages
rather than repeating signals enables “control commands sent by the
customer connected device control application on the mobile device [to] be
in a communication protocol format different from the customer connected
Appeal 2019-006730
Application 14/752,281
6

devices 161–169.” Id. ¶ 21. Therefore, rather than repeating or
rebroadcasting signals (i.e., providing amplification or reshaping at the
physical layer), Shanmugan’s gateway 150 relays messages (i.e., data at a
higher-level layer) using the protocols supported by connected devices.
For these reasons, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner’s
findings do not show that Shanmugan teaches the wireless repeater of
recitation [1]. Moreover, the Examiner does not show that Dawes cures the
noted deficiency of Shanmugan. Non-Final Act. 10–11. Accordingly, we do
not sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) of claims 1–9 and 11–19,
nor do we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims 10 and
20.
CONCLUSION
Claim(s)
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–9, 11–19 102(a)(1) Shanmugan 1–9, 11–
19
10, 20 103 Shanmugan,
Dawes
10, 20
Overall
Outcome
1–20
REVERSED

Appeal 2019-006730
Application 14/752,281
7

Thomas, Administrative Patent Judge, dissenting.

To the extent that the majority is reversing the rejection based on
Shanmugan’s alleged failure to disclose the claimed wireless repeater, I
respectfully disagree with the majority opinion. Based on the record before
us, and for the reasons set forth below, I see no error in the Examiner’s
reliance on Shanmugan for disclosing the claimed wireless repeater.
Specifically, claim 1 broadly recites, inter alia, a wireless repeater
configured to receive and rebroadcast signals from the wireless access point.
See claim 1. As such, I believe claim 1 merely dictates that the repeater is
capable of receiving and rebroadcasting signals from the access point.
However, no further requirements are spelled out for the repeater, including
no limitations on the rebroadcasting.
The claims measure the invention. See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec.
Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). During prosecution
before the USPTO, claims are to be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation, and the scope of a claim cannot be narrowed by reading
disclosed limitations into the claim. See In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054
(Fed. Cir. 1997). Here, I believe the majority is improperly narrowing the
claims by not only reading disclosed limitations into the claims, but by also
applying a narrow extrinsic definition to the claimed repeater. See Decision
5.
Our reviewing court guides that extrinsic evidence is unlikely to result
in a reliable interpretation of patent claim scope unless considered in the
context of the intrinsic evidence. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The court in Phillips guided that “different
dictionaries may contain somewhat different sets of definitions for the same
Appeal 2019-006730
Application 14/752,281
8

words. A claim should not rise or fall based upon the preferences of a
particular dictionary editor, or the court’s independent decision, uninformed
by the specification, to rely on one dictionary rather than another.” Id. at
1322. The court in Phillips reaffirmed its view that the specification “is
always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is
dispositive: it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id.
at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582
(Fed. Cir. 1996)).
Here, Appellant’s Specification states:
In some example implementations, the wireless repeater may be
or include at least two wireless routers in which the first router
may be configured to receive a signal from the wireless access
point, and transmit the signal to the second router. The second
router may then be configured to boost the received signal and
transmit the boosted signal such that the wireless repeater
thereby establishes the second WLAN. . . . As such, the hub
104 may function as a Wi-Fi range extender for the wireless
access point.

Spec. ¶ 45; see also ¶ 33. In other words, Appellant’s Specification merely
illustrates an exemplary repeater which may simply be represented as two
routers, with the first router receiving the signal from the access point and
transmitting it to the second router. The second router may boost the signal
and transmit the boosted signal, thereby extending the Wi-Fi range.
Claim construction is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo.
See In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1994). However,
the claim construction analysis begins with the words of the claim. See
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Absent an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a claim term, the
words take on the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them by
Appeal 2019-006730
Application 14/752,281
9

those of ordinary skill in the art. Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical,
Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Because the Specification is the
single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term, I broadly but reasonably
construe the claimed term “repeater” as denoting two or more routers that
extend a Wi-Fi range for a transmitted signal.
Consistent with this claim interpretation, the Examiner finds that
Shanmugam’s “gateway 150 extends/created a wireless network from the
router 140/142 to the connected devices 161-169.” Ans. 9. In other words,
Shanmugam discloses a first router 140/142 and a second router, e.g.,
gateway 150, that works together to extend the propagation of signals from
an access point 128. See Shanmugam Fig. 1.
As for the claimed “rebroadcasting,” Appellant’s Specification fails to
limit any rebroadcasting to the original signal. One of ordinary skill in the
art would know that rebroadcasting can entail rebroadcasting in the original
format or in a different format, such as in a different language.
Although Appellant argues that Shanmugam’s “gateway does not
operate on the physical layer, working with the actual physical signal
without any attempt to interpret the data” (see Appeal Br. 6), I agree with the
Examiner that Appellant’s aforementioned “description of the wireless
repeater cannot be found in the [S]pecification” (Ans. 9), or the claims for
that matter. For example, the express language of claim 1 does not require
the claimed repeater to only “operate on the physical layer, working with the
actual physical signal without any attempt to interpret the data,” as proffered
by Appellant (see Appeal Br. 6), and apparently endorsed by the majority.
See Decision 5.
Additionally, claim 1 does not prohibit an intelligent repeater that
translates, decodes, or processes signals. Specifically, claim 1 recites “[a]
Appeal 2019-006730
Application 14/752,281
10

hub . . . comprising: . . . .” The use of “comprising” in the preamble renders
the claim open to the use of additional steps and components, such as a
translating/processing step. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793
F.2d 1261, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Because, I find that the Examiner has sufficiently directed our
attention to the claimed repeater in Shanmugam’s disclosure, respectfully, I
would not reverse the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of the claims over
Shanmugam.