Edwin Garcia, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (All./Mid-Atl. Region), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 5, 1999
01971736 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 5, 1999)

01971736

02-05-1999

Edwin Garcia, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (All./Mid-Atl. Region), Agency.


Edwin Garcia, ) Appeal No. 01971736

Appellant, ) Agency No. 62-0160-92

v. ) Hearing No. 170-95-8316X

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

(All./Mid-Atl. Region), )

Agency. )

DECISION

The Commission accepts appellant's timely appeal from a final agency

decision ("FAD") concerning his complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.; and Section 501 of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791 et seq.

See EEOC Order No. 960.001. In his complaint, appellant alleged that he

was discriminated against based on his national origin, color and race

(Black Puerto Rican), as well as his physical disability (injuries to

lower back, right knee and both ankles) and mental disability (depressive

neuroses/stress related disorder) when he was denied: (1) PS-5 level

pay since March 1992; and (2) a reassignment to the Main Post Office in

Newark, New Jersey.

Appellant timely sought EEO counseling and filed his instant EEO

complaint, which was accepted and investigated by the agency. Thereafter,

appellant timely requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge

("AJ"). After a hearing, the AJ issued a recommended decision ("RD")

finding no discrimination. The agency adopted the RD in its FAD.

In the RD, the AJ found as follows: In 1987, during his employment as

an Air Records Processor, PS-5, at the Airport Mail Facility (�AMF�) in

Newark, New Jersey, appellant began providing information to State and

Federal prosecutors regarding criminal activities. In 1990, appellant

began providing similar information to Postal Service Inspectors.

This information ultimately resulted in the arrest of AMF employees, which

led to concerns about appellant's safety. The Postal Service Inspectors

facilitated appellant's transfer from the AMF. First, appellant briefly

was sent to two other facilities in New Jersey. In early 1991, appellant

met with a Postal Inspector (the �PI�) and an agreement was reached which

provided that appellant would be reassigned to the General Mail Facility

(�GMF�) in Wilkes-Barre, PA, as a part time Flexible Mail Handler, PS-4.

While there, appellant would function as a Confidential Informant (�CI�)

and, in exchange for providing information about illegal drug activity at

the GMF, it would be arranged that appellant would receive the difference

between PS-4 and PS-5 level pay. In order to receive this differential,

appellant was directed to submit his payroll statements to the PI.

Appellant believed that his �cover was blown� approximately 30 days after

his arrival at the GMF. In addition, while he was able to provide the

PI with information regarding illegal firearms, union leader activities

and other matters, he did not provide any information regarding illegal

drug activity at the GMF, although the PI had instructed appellant that

the agency only was interested in narcotics. The AJ found that after six

months, appellant ceased to provide the PI with his payroll statements.

The PI also testified that appellant was ineffective in his role as a CI.

Insofar as appellant compared his treatment to that of another CI (�CI-1")

outside his protected groups, the PI testified that CI-1 was effective

in his role and had submitted the appropriate payroll information.

(Appellant withdrew his request that CI-1 testify at the hearing.)

In January 1992, appellant submitted a request for reassignment to

the Main Post Office in Newark, New Jersey. This request was denied.

The AJ found that with the exception of skilled maintenance specialists,

no agency employee was accepted for reassignment to the Main Newark

Post Office during the applicable period because increased automation

had decreased the number of positions available at the facility.

The AJ found that the official who denied appellant's request for

the reassignment was unaware of his race, color or national origin.

While appellant argued that agency officials had facilitated CI-1's

request for a reassignment from the GMF to Las Vegas, the AJ again

noted that appellant had withdrawn his request for CI-1's appearance

at the hearing, and found that appellant's testimony was insufficient

to establish that his request for a reassignment to New Jersey was

sufficiently similar to CI-1's request for a reassignment to New Jersey.

Accordingly, while the AJ found that appellant's physical impairments

constituted a disability as defined by the Commission's Regulations,

the AJ found that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination on the bases of race, color, national origin or disability

with respect to either of his allegations.

In the brief filed on appeal, appellant's counsel reviews the testimony of

each of the witnesses. Counsel argues that appellant acted as a CI to the

best of his ability; that he was not responsible for any ineffectiveness

which resulted from his �cover being blown� or from his status as a

non-narcotic user; and that, had he discovered any use of narcotics,

he would have reported it. The brief argues that the contract between

the Postal Service and appellant regarding his service as a CI was

breached by the agency (including an agreement that appellant and his

wife be transferred to Puerto Rico, which appellant had not requested on

the basis that he was to first be transferred to New Jersey and then to

Puerto Rico). The brief contends that appellant was similarly situated

to all other CIs and, thus, a discriminatory motive can be inferred since

there can be no explanation except a discriminatory animus for denying

appellant the benefit of the bargain he reached with the Postal Service

to act as a CI. Accordingly, counsel asserts that appellant established

a prima facie case of discrimination and that the agency failed to rebut

this prima facie case because the �[PI] was never asked if the treatment

accorded to [appellant] had any relationship to the fact that he was

[H]ispanic or suffered from any physical disabilities.� Specifically,

with respect to the denial of PS-5 level pay, the brief asserts that the

AJ simply erred in finding that appellant failed to submit his payroll

information, as testified to by the PI, because appellant testified that

he did submit the information. Regarding the denial of a reassignment

to New Jersey, the brief concedes that no other employee was granted a

reassignment to that facility, but argues that the �issue is not so easily

resolved� since �it was part and parcel of his agreement� to act as a CI.

In its comments on the appeal, the agency argues that the AJ properly

determined that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination.

After a thorough review of the record, the Commission finds that the

RD adequately set forth the relevant facts and analyzed the appropriate

regulations, policies and laws. The Commission notes that it generally

will not disturb the credibility determination of an AJ, where, as here,

such determinations are based on the AJ's observation of the witnesses.

Esquer v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05960096

(September 6, 1996); Willis v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request

No. 05900589 (July 26, 1990). Accordingly, the Commission discerns no

basis to disturb the AJ's finding that appellant failed to establish

discrimination. Therefore, it is the decision of the Commission to

AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

February 5, 1999

________________ ___________________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations