Eberlein, Peter

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 10, 2020

2019004585 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 10, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/584,112 08/13/2012 Peter Eberlein 54874-403F01US/2012P00387 5646
64280 7590 12/10/2020
Mintz Levin/SAP
Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky and Popeo, P.C.
One Financial Center
Boston, MA 02111
EXAMINER
SHEFFIELD, HOPE CORNELL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2178
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/10/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
IPDocketingBOS@mintz.com
IPFileroombos@mintz.com
mintzdocketing@cpaglobal.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte PETER EBERLEIN
________________

Appeal 2019-004585
Application 13/584,112
Technology Center 2100
________________

Before JEAN R. HOMERE, JASON V. MORGAN, and
MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judges.

MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 4, 7–13, 16–18, 20, and 21. Appeal
Br. 4. Claims 2, 3, 5, 6, 14, 15, and 19 are canceled. Id. at 18, 20–21. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant
identifies the real party in interest as SAP SE. Appeal Br. 2.
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SUMMARY OF THE DISCLOSURE
Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to a method that “includes
obtaining an XML document template object in which a subset of fields of
the XML document is designated by placeholders” and “processing the
subset of fields in an instance of the XML document that are designated by
placeholders in XML document template object.” Abstract.
REPRESENTATIVE CLAIM
(Disputed Limitations Emphasized and Bracketing Added)
1. A computer-implemented method for limiting processing of
an XML document to processing of only those fields of the
XML document that are designated as having variable values
from the perspective of a client device application on a client
device, the computer-implemented method carried out by
causing at least one processor to execute instructions recorded
on a computer-readable storage medium, the computer-
implemented method comprising:
obtaining, on a server, an XML document template object
prepared based on a prior instance of the XML document, the
XML document template object being a different object than
the XML document;
receiving, on the server, a characterization of data consumed as
input and data output by functions of the client device
application;
preparing a context object based on the received
characterization of data, the context object consisting of
placeholders limited specifically to a subset of fields of the
XML document that have variable values that are consumed as
input data by, or are output data of, functions in the client
device application, the context object being a different object
than the XML document and the XML document template
object;
[1] obtaining, on the server, a sparse XML document template
object from the XML document template object by placing the
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placeholders in a subset of fields in the XML document
template object to designate only the subset of fields of the XML
document that have variable values used as input or output
data of functions in the client device application as per the
context object;
providing an instance the XML document to be parsed to the
client device;
providing the sparse XML document template object including
the placeholders from the server to the client device; and
[2] limiting parsing of the provided instance of the XML
document, by the client application on the client device, to only
the designated subset of fields of the XML document that have
variable values used as input or output data of functions in the
client device application, using the provided sparse XML
document template object on the client device as a reference to
identify the designated subset of the fields to be parsed, while
excluding parsing of fields of the provided instance of the XML
document that are not designated as the subset of the fields to
be parsed.
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following prior art:
Name Reference Date
Hayton et al. (“Hayton”) US 7,051,084 B1 May 23, 2006
Jameson US 2003/0107597 A1 June 12, 2003
Fennelly et al. (“Fennelly”) US 2005/0060648 A1 Mar. 17, 2005
Cameron et al. (“Cameron”) US 2014/0032484 A1 Jan. 30, 2014
REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 4, 11–13, and 18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Fennelly and Hayton. Final Act. 2–9.
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The Examiner rejects claims 7, 8, 10, 16, 17, 20, and 21 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Fennelly, Hayton, and Cameron. Final Act.
9–13.
The Examiner rejects claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
over Fennelly, Hayton, and Jameson. Final Act. 13.
ADOPTION OF EXAMINER’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
We agree with and adopt as our own the Examiner’s findings as set
forth in the Answer and in the Final Action from which this appeal was
taken, and we concur with the Examiner’s conclusions. We have considered
Appellant’s arguments, but we do not find them persuasive of error. We
provide the following explanation for emphasis.
ANALYSIS
In rejecting claim 1 as obvious, the Examiner finds that Fennelly’s use
of placeholder or reference tags as input to a content transformation process
teaches recitation [1]:
obtaining, on the server, a sparse XML document template object
from the XML document template object by placing the
placeholders in a subset of fields in the XML document template
object to designate only the subset of fields of the XML
document that have variable values used as input or output data
of functions in the client device application as per the context
object.
Final Act. 3 (citing Fennelly ¶¶ 38–40); Ans. 5–6 (citing Fennelly ¶¶ 31, 35,
36, 40, 57, Fig. 4). The Examiner relies on Hayton’s execution of a code
fragment to generate a portion of a page to teach recitation [2], “limiting
parsing of the provided instance of the XML document, by the client
application . . . , to only the designated subset of fields of the XML
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document that have variable values . . . in the client device application.”
Final Act. 4 (citing Hayton 11:36–52); Ans. 6–7 (citing Hayton 6:38–54,
13:35–50). The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to an
artisan of ordinary skill to combine the teachings and suggestions of
Fennelly and Hayton “to reduce unnecessary network traffic[] between a
server and clients.” Final Act. 4 (citing Hayton 1:61–67); Ans. 8.
Appellant contends the Examiner erred because “Fennelly . . . is
directed to generating an output document for delivery to a user device.”
Appeal Br. 12 (emphasis added); Reply Br. 5. Thus, Appellant argues
Fennelly’s layout, an XML document containing placeholder tags, “is not
obtained by a server and provided to a client device ‘to designate only
the subset of fields of the XML document that have variable values used
as input or output data functions in the client device application as per
the context model.’” Appeal Br. 13; Reply Br. 5.
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive because, contrary to
Appellant’s contention, Fennelly is not limited to generating an output
document for delivery to a user device. Rather, Fennelly teaches both a push
mode where content is indicated first and a pull mode where “the layout
contains a reference (typically a URL) to the source, and it pulls (fragments
of) the source into the placeholders.” Fennelly ¶ 36. This pulling of
fragments into the placeholders is comparable to the Specification’s
disclosure that “particular placeholders used in an XML document template
may be identified” including, for example, context such as “a key-value
dictionary with placeholders as keys.” Spec. ¶ 26. That is, with both
Fennelly’s pull mode and the Specification’s use of a key-value dictionary,
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placeholders are replaced with variable content. Therefore, we agree with
the Examiner that Fennelly teaches recitation [1].
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in relying on Hayton because
[w]hile Hayton describes that portions of a web page are
transmitted to a client node, there is no limiting of “parsing of
the provided instance of the XML document,” as required by
claim 1, as instead the server in Hayton merely instructs the
client device which portions of a page should be updated and
provides the updated portions.
Appeal Br. 14 (citing Hayton 6:38–54); Reply Br. 6.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive because Hayton discloses that
when “additional software is called (e.g., by user action), the additional
software arranges that its arguments are transmitted to the server node 210.”
Hayton 13:43–45 (italicized emphasis added) (cited in Ans. 7). That is,
Hayton teaches limiting parsing to arguments (i.e., a designated subset of
fields that have variable values used as inputs of functions). Moreover,
because this use of arguments takes place in Hayton in response to user
action, and results in the transmission of arguments to the server, Hayton
does not merely teach a server instructing client devices on portions of a
page to update and providing the updates. See Appeal Br. 14. Therefore,
Appellant’s arguments do not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s reliance on
Hayton to teach recitation [2]. Final Act. 4; Ans. 6–7.
Appellant further argues:
it is unclear why one of ordinary skill in the art would tum to
Fennelly’s document transformation process and Hayton’s web
page updating methodology to address the issue of limiting
processing load or demand on the client devices by limiting the
portions of the XML document that have to be processed on an
individual client device to only those portions that may be
relevant to associated individual client device applications, as
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provided by claim 1. In fact, to combine Fennelly and Hayton
would instead at best result in portions of a page that have
changed being transmitted to a client device, as per Hayton, with
the page being transformed for a particular user device, as per
Fennelly.
Appeal Br. 15; Reply Br. 7.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because they are not
responsive to the Examiner’s proffered reason that it would have been
obvious to combine Fennelly and Hayton in the claimed manner “to reduce
unnecessary network trafficking between a server and clients.” Final Act. 4
(citing Hayton 1:61–67). Rather than showing error in the reason advanced
by the Examiner for why combining the teachings and suggestions of
Fennelly and Hayton would have been obvious to an artisan of ordinary
skill, Appellant essentially rephrases the argument that Hayton does not
teach recitation [2] (compare Appeal Br. 15 with id. at 14) and presents an
unsupported argument that the combination of Fennelly and Hayton would
have resulted in a method different from the method of claim 1. Because we
are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments with respect to recitation [2],
and because Appellant does not address the Examiner’s reasons for why it
would have been obvious to combine Fennelly and Hayton in the claimed
manner, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in relying on the
combined teachings and suggestions of Fennelly and Hayton.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claim 1, and the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
rejections of claims 4, 7–13, 16–18, 20, 21, which Appellant does not argue
separately. Appeal Br. 15; Reply Br. 7.
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CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. § References Affirmed Reversed
1, 4,
11–13, 18
103(a) Fennelly, Hayton 1, 4, 11–13,
18

7, 8, 10, 16,
17, 20, 21
103(a) Fenelly, Hayton,
Cameron
7, 8, 10, 16,
17, 20, 21

9 103(a) Fennelly, Hayton,
Jameson
9
Overall
Outcome
1, 4, 7–13,
16–18, 20, 21

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED