DSP Group LTD.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 2, 20212020001958 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 2, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/938,878 11/12/2015 Moshe Haiut 8703-US 9967 69054 7590 07/02/2021 RECHES PATENTS HaArba''a Towers North Tower TEL AVIV, 6473925 ISRAEL EXAMINER KIM, JONATHAN C ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2659 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/02/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): OREN@I-P.CO.IL eofficeaction@appcoll.com patents@geraghtyipservices.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte MOSHE HAIUT ____________ Appeal 2020-001958 Application 14/938,878 Technology Center 2600 ____________ Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, JOHN A. JEFFERY, and CATHERINE SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges. JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 7–9, 16–18, and 23–38. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as DSP Group Ltd. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-001958 Application 14/938,878 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s invention involves voice triggering, namely speech recognition technology that is intended to activate or wake up a device from sleep mode via a pre-defined user voice command. To this end, a voice trigger sensor (1) receives configuration information, namely a training result, from a computer, and (2) receives input signals from a microphone on a target device; and (3) detects voice commands. See Abstract; Spec. ¶¶ 3, 5–12. Claim 1 is illustrative: 1. A method for voice triggering, the method comprises: coupling during a training process, by an interface of a voice trigger sensor, the voice trigger sensor to a computer; wherein the voice trigger sensor does not include resources for performing the training process; receiving, by the voice trigger sensor, from the computer configuration information; wherein the configuration information comprises a training result that is generated by the computer that executed a training process during a training period; configuring the voice trigger sensor by using the configuration information; coupling, by the interface, the voice trigger sensor to a target device during a voice activation period; receiving, by a processor of the voice trigger sensor, during the voice activation period, input signals sensed by a microphone of the target device; applying, by the processor, on the input signals a voice activation process to detect a voice command; wherein the applying of the voice activation process comprises applying, by the processor, Appeal 2020-001958 Application 14/938,878 3 on the input signals a training based voice activation process while using the training result to detect the voice command; and at least partially participating in an execution of the voice command. THE REJECTIONS The Examiner rejected claims 1, 7, 9, 16, 18, 24, 28, 32, 34, and 36 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharifi (US 2016/0027439 A1; published Jan. 28, 2016) and Jagatheesan (US 2015/0025890 A1; published Jan. 22, 2015). Final Act. 4–27.2 The Examiner rejected claims 8, 17, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharifi, Jagatheesan, and Tan (US 2015/0073795 A1; published Mar. 12, 2015). Final Act. 28–30. The Examiner rejected claims 23 and 27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharifi, Jagatheesan, and Hellwig (US 2002/0091511 A1; published July 11, 2002). Final Act. 30–31. The Examiner rejected claims 26, 29, and 33 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharifi, Jagatheesan, and Dunton (US 2010/0157168 A1; published June 24, 2010). Final Act. 32. The Examiner rejected claim 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharifi, Jagatheesan, and Mohammad Hassan Ghaed et al., Circuits for a Cubic-Millimeter Energy-Autonomous Wireless Intraocular Pressure Monitor, 60 IEEE TRANS. ON CIRCUITS & SYS. 3152–62 (2013) (“Ghaed”). Final Act. 33. 2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Rejection mailed August 9, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed March 1, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); and (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed May 1, 2019 (“Ans.”). Appeal 2020-001958 Application 14/938,878 4 The Examiner rejected claim 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharifi, Jagatheesan, and Halash (US 2015/0243283 A1; published Aug. 27, 2015). Final Act. 34–35. The Examiner rejected claim 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharifi, Jagatheesan, and Schuman (US 2015/0116110 A1; published Apr. 30, 2015). Final Act. 35–36. The Examiner rejected claims 37 and 38 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharifi, Jagatheesan, and Smith (US 2016/0105644 A1; published Apr. 14, 2016). Final Act. 36–38. THE REJECTION OVER SHARIFI AND JAGATHEESAN Regarding independent claim 1, the Examiner finds that Sharifi discloses many recited elements of the recited voice triggering method including a voice trigger sensor, namely mobile computing device 106, which does not include resources for performing a training process. Final Act. 4–8. Although the Examiner acknowledges that Sharifi (1) couples the voice trigger sensor to a target application—not a target device as claimed— and (2) receives input signals sensed by a microphone of the voice trigger sensor—not that of the target device as claimed—the Examiner cites Jagatheesan for teaching these features in concluding that the claim would have been obvious. Final Act. 4–10. Appellant argues that the cited prior art does not teach or suggest a voice trigger sensor that does not include resources for performing the training process as claimed. Appeal Br. 11–13. According to Appellant, the claimed invention aims to solve a problem not addressed by Sharifi, Jagatheesan, or Dunton, namely providing a cheap and small voice trigger Appeal 2020-001958 Application 14/938,878 5 sensor that does not include costly and large resources for performing the training-based voice activation process. Appeal Br. 12. Appellant argues other recited limitations summarized below. ISSUES Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding that Sharifi and Jagatheesan collectively would have taught or suggested: (1) a voice trigger sensor that does not include resources for performing a training process as recited in claim 1 (“voice trigger sensor resource limitation”)? (2) mechanically connecting the voice trigger sensor to the computer and target device as recited in claim 24? ANALYSIS Claims 1, 7, 9, 16, 18, 28, 32, 34, and 36 We begin by noting that the Examiner’s reliance on the secondary reference to Jagatheesan is undisputed in connection with the rejection of claim 1, as is the cited references’ combinability. Rather, as noted above, this dispute turns solely on the Examiner’s reliance on Sharifi for teaching the recited voice trigger sensor resource limitation. Therefore, we confine our discussion to Sharifi. As noted above, the voice trigger sensor resource limitation is a negative limitation by reciting what the voice trigger sensor does not include, namely resources for performing training. Our emphasis on the term “resources” underscores that this dispute turns on what that term means in the context of the claimed invention. Appeal 2020-001958 Application 14/938,878 6 To determine this meaning, we start with the Specification. The Specification’s paragraph 48 defines the term “voice trigger sensor” as a sensor configured to (1) detect one or more predefined voice commands, and (2) react to the detection of any one or more of those commands. Although the Specification defines the term “voice trigger sensor” and other terms clearly and unambiguously in paragraphs 48, 137, and 138, noticeably absent from the Specification is any such clear and unambiguous definition of the term “resources.” Although the Specification’s paragraph 50 notes that the disclosed voice trigger sensor does not include resources required to perform the training process and, thus, can be compact (e.g., 4mm x 2mm x 2mm) and cheap, the Specification does not specify what those resources are exactly, let alone define the term to limit the term “resources” to particular types or forms of resources. That the Specification’s paragraph 61 refers explicitly to processing resources underscores that the functionality in that paragraph pertains to a particular type of resources, namely processing resources, unlike the claimed invention that merely recites, quite broadly, that the voice trigger sensor lacks resources for performing training, without further qualification or elaboration on those unspecified resources. We, therefore, construe the term “resources” with its plain meaning. The term “resource” is defined, in pertinent part, as “something that lies ready for use or that can be drawn upon for aid or to take care of a need.” WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 1143 (3d College ed. 1993). Given this definition, the recited “resources for performing the training process” are, therefore, things that lie ready for use Appeal 2020-001958 Application 14/938,878 7 or that can be drawn upon for aid or to take care of a need, where that use, aid, or need pertains to training. Given this interpretation, we see no error in the Examiner’s finding that the recited resources for performing training include training data, namely that data used to train pre-computed “hotword” models in step 304 of Sharifi’s Figure 3. See Final Act. 4–5; Ans. 4. As Sharifi explains, speech recognition engine 208 obtains waveforms 120, 122 from mobile computing devices 102, 104, where the waveforms correspond to (1) user 114 speaking the utterance “start my car,” and (2) user 116 speaking the utterance 152 “where do I buy my computer?” Sharifi ¶ 65; Figs. 1, 3 (step 302). Based on these waveforms, hotword configuration engine 112 trains a pre-computed hotword model for each word or subword. Sharifi ¶¶ 27, 65; Figs. 1, 3 (step 304). After this training, the hotword configuration engine then (1) receives a candidate hotword from mobile computing device 106 in step 306; (2) identifies pre-computed hotword models corresponding to the candidate hotword in step 308; and (3) provides those identified models to the mobile computing device 106 in step 310. Sharifi ¶ 65; Figs. 1, 3. The import of this functionality is that the resources, including the data associated with the waveforms of users 114 and 116, that are used to train the pre-computed hotword model is included in the hotword configuration engine—not the mobile computing device 106 that the Examiner maps to the recited voice trigger sensor. Accord Ans. 5 (noting that Sharifi’s voice trigger sensor (mobile computing device 106) does not include resources associated with training data and the pre-computed hotword model). That is, under the Examiner’s mapping, Sharifi’s voice trigger sensor, namely mobile computing device 106, does not include Appeal 2020-001958 Application 14/938,878 8 resources for performing a training process as claimed. Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 11–13) are, therefore, unavailing and not commensurate with the scope of the claim. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1, and claims 7, 9, 16, 18, 28, 32, 34, and 36 not argued separately with particularity. Claim 24 We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 24 reciting, in pertinent part, mechanically connecting the voice trigger sensor to the computer and target device. First, as noted previously, the Examiner’s rejection is not based solely on Jagatheesan, but rather is based on Sharifi and Jagatheesan. That is, in rejecting claim 1 from which claim 24 depends, the Examiner cites Sharifi for teaching coupling the voice trigger sensor to (1) the computer, namely the hotword configuration engine under the Examiner’s mapping, and (2) a target application instead of a target device as claimed. See Final Act. 4–6. Notably, the Examiner’s reliance on Jagatheesan for teaching coupling the voice trigger sensor, namely Sharifi’s mobile computing device 106, to a target device in claim 1 in lieu of Sharifi’s coupling the voice trigger sensor to a target application is undisputed. See Final Act. 8–10. The question, then, is whether it would have been obvious for these respective couplings, namely between the voice trigger sensor and both the computer and target device, respectively, to comprise mechanical connections as claimed. Appeal 2020-001958 Application 14/938,878 9 On this record, we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on Jagatheesan at least to the extent that mechanical connections, such as wired connections, between electronic components are known in the art, and that using such mechanical wired connections to connect Sharifi’s mobile computing device 106 to the computer and target device, respectively, would have been at least an obvious variation. Notably, this variation would yield a predictable result, namely transferring data and electrical signals via electrical conductors, namely wires, between the respective devices. See Final Act. 23–24 (noting the wired pathways between transmitting and receiving devices in Jagatheesan’s paragraph 32); Ans. 5–6. Such an enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007). To the extent Appellant contends that coupling Sharifi’s mobile computing device 106—which can be a portable computer (Sharifi ¶ 18)—to the hotword configuration engine (i.e., “computer”) and a target device, respectively, via wires as the Examiner proposes would have been uniquely challenging or otherwise beyond the level of ordinarily skilled artisans, there is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention. Appellants’ arguments regarding Jagatheesan’s individual shortcomings in this regard (Appeal Br. 13–16) do not show nonobviousness where, as here, the rejection is based on the cited references’ collective teachings. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 24. Appeal 2020-001958 Application 14/938,878 10 THE OTHER OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 8, 17, 23, 25–27, 29–31, 33, 35, 37, and 38. Final Act. 28–38. Because these rejections are not argued separately with particularity, we are not persuaded of error in these rejections for the reasons previously discussed. CONCLUSION In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/ Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 7, 9, 16, 18, 24, 28, 32, 34, 36 103 Sharifi, Jagatheesan 1, 7, 9, 16, 18, 24, 28, 32, 34, 36 8, 17, 25 103 Sharifi, Jagatheesan, Tan 8, 17, 25 23, 27 103 Sharifi, Jagatheesan, Hellwig 23, 27 26, 29, 33 103 Sharifi, Jagatheesan, Dunton 26, 29, 33 30 103 Sharifi, Jagatheesan, Ghaed 30 31 103 Sharifi, Jagatheesan, Halash 31 35 103 Sharifi, Jagatheesan, Schuman 35 37, 38 103 Sharifi, Jagatheesan, Smith 37, 38 Appeal 2020-001958 Application 14/938,878 11 Overall Outcome 1, 7–9, 16–18, 23–38 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). 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