DSP Group LTD.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 2, 2021

2020001958 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/938,878 11/12/2015 Moshe Haiut 8703-US 9967
69054 7590 07/02/2021
RECHES PATENTS
HaArba''a Towers
North Tower
TEL AVIV, 6473925
ISRAEL
EXAMINER
KIM, JONATHAN C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2659
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
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following e-mail address(es):
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte MOSHE HAIUT
____________

Appeal 2020-001958
Application 14/938,878
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, JOHN A. JEFFERY, and CATHERINE
SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges.

JEFFERY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1, 7–9, 16–18, and 23–38. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as DSP Group
Ltd. Appeal Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention involves voice triggering, namely speech
recognition technology that is intended to activate or wake up a device from
sleep mode via a pre-defined user voice command. To this end, a voice
trigger sensor (1) receives configuration information, namely a training
result, from a computer, and (2) receives input signals from a microphone on
a target device; and (3) detects voice commands. See Abstract; Spec. ¶¶ 3,
5–12. Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A method for voice triggering, the method comprises:

coupling during a training process, by an interface of a voice
trigger sensor, the voice trigger sensor to a computer; wherein the
voice trigger sensor does not include resources for performing the
training process;

receiving, by the voice trigger sensor, from the computer
configuration information; wherein the configuration information
comprises a training result that is generated by the computer that
executed a training process during a training period;

configuring the voice trigger sensor by using the configuration
information;

coupling, by the interface, the voice trigger sensor to a target
device during a voice activation period;

receiving, by a processor of the voice trigger sensor, during the
voice activation period, input signals sensed by a microphone of the
target device;

applying, by the processor, on the input signals a voice
activation process to detect a voice command; wherein the applying
of the voice activation process comprises applying, by the processor,
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on the input signals a training based voice activation process while
using the training result to detect the voice command; and

at least partially participating in an execution of the voice
command.

THE REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 7, 9, 16, 18, 24, 28, 32, 34, and 36
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sharifi (US 2016/0027439 A1;
published Jan. 28, 2016) and Jagatheesan (US 2015/0025890 A1; published
Jan. 22, 2015). Final Act. 4–27.2
The Examiner rejected claims 8, 17, and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sharifi, Jagatheesan, and Tan (US 2015/0073795 A1;
published Mar. 12, 2015). Final Act. 28–30.
The Examiner rejected claims 23 and 27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sharifi, Jagatheesan, and Hellwig (US 2002/0091511 A1;
published July 11, 2002). Final Act. 30–31.
The Examiner rejected claims 26, 29, and 33 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sharifi, Jagatheesan, and Dunton (US 2010/0157168 A1;
published June 24, 2010). Final Act. 32.
The Examiner rejected claim 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sharifi, Jagatheesan, and Mohammad Hassan Ghaed et al.,
Circuits for a Cubic-Millimeter Energy-Autonomous Wireless Intraocular
Pressure Monitor, 60 IEEE TRANS. ON CIRCUITS & SYS. 3152–62 (2013)
(“Ghaed”). Final Act. 33.

2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to (1) the Final Rejection mailed August
9, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed March 1, 2019 (“Appeal
Br.”); and (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed May 1, 2019 (“Ans.”).
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The Examiner rejected claim 31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sharifi, Jagatheesan, and Halash (US 2015/0243283 A1;
published Aug. 27, 2015). Final Act. 34–35.
The Examiner rejected claim 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sharifi, Jagatheesan, and Schuman (US 2015/0116110
A1; published Apr. 30, 2015). Final Act. 35–36.
The Examiner rejected claims 37 and 38 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Sharifi, Jagatheesan, and Smith (US 2016/0105644 A1;
published Apr. 14, 2016). Final Act. 36–38.

THE REJECTION OVER SHARIFI AND JAGATHEESAN
Regarding independent claim 1, the Examiner finds that Sharifi
discloses many recited elements of the recited voice triggering method
including a voice trigger sensor, namely mobile computing device 106,
which does not include resources for performing a training process. Final
Act. 4–8. Although the Examiner acknowledges that Sharifi (1) couples the
voice trigger sensor to a target application—not a target device as claimed—
and (2) receives input signals sensed by a microphone of the voice trigger
sensor—not that of the target device as claimed—the Examiner cites
Jagatheesan for teaching these features in concluding that the claim would
have been obvious. Final Act. 4–10.
Appellant argues that the cited prior art does not teach or suggest a
voice trigger sensor that does not include resources for performing the
training process as claimed. Appeal Br. 11–13. According to Appellant, the
claimed invention aims to solve a problem not addressed by Sharifi,
Jagatheesan, or Dunton, namely providing a cheap and small voice trigger
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sensor that does not include costly and large resources for performing the
training-based voice activation process. Appeal Br. 12. Appellant argues
other recited limitations summarized below.

ISSUES
Under § 103, has the Examiner erred by finding that Sharifi and
Jagatheesan collectively would have taught or suggested:
(1) a voice trigger sensor that does not include resources for
performing a training process as recited in claim 1 (“voice trigger sensor
resource limitation”)?
(2) mechanically connecting the voice trigger sensor to the computer
and target device as recited in claim 24?

ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 7, 9, 16, 18, 28, 32, 34, and 36
We begin by noting that the Examiner’s reliance on the secondary
reference to Jagatheesan is undisputed in connection with the rejection of
claim 1, as is the cited references’ combinability. Rather, as noted above,
this dispute turns solely on the Examiner’s reliance on Sharifi for teaching
the recited voice trigger sensor resource limitation. Therefore, we confine
our discussion to Sharifi.
As noted above, the voice trigger sensor resource limitation is a
negative limitation by reciting what the voice trigger sensor does not
include, namely resources for performing training. Our emphasis on the
term “resources” underscores that this dispute turns on what that term means
in the context of the claimed invention.
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To determine this meaning, we start with the Specification. The
Specification’s paragraph 48 defines the term “voice trigger sensor” as a
sensor configured to (1) detect one or more predefined voice commands, and
(2) react to the detection of any one or more of those commands. Although
the Specification defines the term “voice trigger sensor” and other terms
clearly and unambiguously in paragraphs 48, 137, and 138, noticeably
absent from the Specification is any such clear and unambiguous definition
of the term “resources.”
Although the Specification’s paragraph 50 notes that the disclosed
voice trigger sensor does not include resources required to perform the
training process and, thus, can be compact (e.g., 4mm x 2mm x 2mm) and
cheap, the Specification does not specify what those resources are exactly,
let alone define the term to limit the term “resources” to particular types or
forms of resources. That the Specification’s paragraph 61 refers explicitly to
processing resources underscores that the functionality in that paragraph
pertains to a particular type of resources, namely processing resources,
unlike the claimed invention that merely recites, quite broadly, that the voice
trigger sensor lacks resources for performing training, without further
qualification or elaboration on those unspecified resources.
We, therefore, construe the term “resources” with its plain meaning.
The term “resource” is defined, in pertinent part, as “something that lies
ready for use or that can be drawn upon for aid or to take care of a need.”
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 1143 (3d
College ed. 1993). Given this definition, the recited “resources for
performing the training process” are, therefore, things that lie ready for use
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or that can be drawn upon for aid or to take care of a need, where that use,
aid, or need pertains to training.
Given this interpretation, we see no error in the Examiner’s finding
that the recited resources for performing training include training data,
namely that data used to train pre-computed “hotword” models in step 304
of Sharifi’s Figure 3. See Final Act. 4–5; Ans. 4. As Sharifi explains,
speech recognition engine 208 obtains waveforms 120, 122 from mobile
computing devices 102, 104, where the waveforms correspond to (1) user
114 speaking the utterance “start my car,” and (2) user 116 speaking the
utterance 152 “where do I buy my computer?” Sharifi ¶ 65; Figs. 1, 3 (step
302). Based on these waveforms, hotword configuration engine 112 trains a
pre-computed hotword model for each word or subword. Sharifi ¶¶ 27, 65;
Figs. 1, 3 (step 304). After this training, the hotword configuration engine
then (1) receives a candidate hotword from mobile computing device 106 in
step 306; (2) identifies pre-computed hotword models corresponding to the
candidate hotword in step 308; and (3) provides those identified models to
the mobile computing device 106 in step 310. Sharifi ¶ 65; Figs. 1, 3.
The import of this functionality is that the resources, including the
data associated with the waveforms of users 114 and 116, that are used to
train the pre-computed hotword model is included in the hotword
configuration engine—not the mobile computing device 106 that the
Examiner maps to the recited voice trigger sensor. Accord Ans. 5 (noting
that Sharifi’s voice trigger sensor (mobile computing device 106) does not
include resources associated with training data and the pre-computed
hotword model). That is, under the Examiner’s mapping, Sharifi’s voice
trigger sensor, namely mobile computing device 106, does not include
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resources for performing a training process as claimed. Appellant’s
arguments (Appeal Br. 11–13) are, therefore, unavailing and not
commensurate with the scope of the claim.
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 1, and claims 7, 9, 16, 18, 28, 32, 34, and 36 not argued separately
with particularity.

Claim 24
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 24 reciting, in
pertinent part, mechanically connecting the voice trigger sensor to the
computer and target device.
First, as noted previously, the Examiner’s rejection is not based solely
on Jagatheesan, but rather is based on Sharifi and Jagatheesan. That is, in
rejecting claim 1 from which claim 24 depends, the Examiner cites Sharifi
for teaching coupling the voice trigger sensor to (1) the computer, namely
the hotword configuration engine under the Examiner’s mapping, and (2) a
target application instead of a target device as claimed. See Final Act. 4–6.
Notably, the Examiner’s reliance on Jagatheesan for teaching coupling the
voice trigger sensor, namely Sharifi’s mobile computing device 106, to a
target device in claim 1 in lieu of Sharifi’s coupling the voice trigger sensor
to a target application is undisputed. See Final Act. 8–10.
The question, then, is whether it would have been obvious for these
respective couplings, namely between the voice trigger sensor and both the
computer and target device, respectively, to comprise mechanical
connections as claimed.
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On this record, we see no error in the Examiner’s reliance on
Jagatheesan at least to the extent that mechanical connections, such as wired
connections, between electronic components are known in the art, and that
using such mechanical wired connections to connect Sharifi’s mobile
computing device 106 to the computer and target device, respectively, would
have been at least an obvious variation. Notably, this variation would yield
a predictable result, namely transferring data and electrical signals via
electrical conductors, namely wires, between the respective devices. See
Final Act. 23–24 (noting the wired pathways between transmitting and
receiving devices in Jagatheesan’s paragraph 32); Ans. 5–6. Such an
enhancement uses prior art elements predictably according to their
established functions—an obvious improvement. See KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
To the extent Appellant contends that coupling Sharifi’s mobile
computing device 106—which can be a portable computer (Sharifi ¶ 18)—to
the hotword configuration engine (i.e., “computer”) and a target device,
respectively, via wires as the Examiner proposes would have been uniquely
challenging or otherwise beyond the level of ordinarily skilled artisans, there
is no persuasive evidence on this record to substantiate such a contention.
Appellants’ arguments regarding Jagatheesan’s individual shortcomings in
this regard (Appeal Br. 13–16) do not show nonobviousness where, as here,
the rejection is based on the cited references’ collective teachings. See In re
Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 24.

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THE OTHER OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS
We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 8,
17, 23, 25–27, 29–31, 33, 35, 37, and 38. Final Act. 28–38. Because these
rejections are not argued separately with particularity, we are not persuaded
of error in these rejections for the reasons previously discussed.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1, 7, 9, 16,
18, 24, 28,
32, 34, 36
103 Sharifi,
Jagatheesan
1, 7, 9, 16, 18,
24, 28, 32, 34,
36

8, 17, 25 103 Sharifi,
Jagatheesan,
Tan
8, 17, 25
23, 27 103 Sharifi,
Jagatheesan,
Hellwig
23, 27
26, 29, 33 103 Sharifi,
Jagatheesan,
Dunton
26, 29, 33
30 103 Sharifi,
Jagatheesan,
Ghaed
30
31 103 Sharifi,
Jagatheesan,
Halash
31
35 103 Sharifi,
Jagatheesan,
Schuman
35
37, 38 103 Sharifi,
Jagatheesan,
Smith
37, 38
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Overall
Outcome
1, 7–9, 16–18,
23–38

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED