DrFirst.com, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 26, 2021

2020000244 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 26, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/606,843 01/27/2015 James F. Chen 0130-005001 3360
147442 7590 03/26/2021
BRAKE HUGHES BELLERMANN LLP / DR. FIRST INC.
P.O. Box 1077
Middletown, MD 21769
EXAMINER
BELL, KALISH K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2432
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/26/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cqian@drfirst.com
docketing@brakehughes.com
uspto@brakehughes.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JAMES F. CHEN, ZILONG TANG, and JIEH-SHAN WANG
Appeal 2020-000244
Application 14/606,843
Technology Center 2400
Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., IRVIN E. BRANCH, and
SCOTT RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judges.
RAEVSKY, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–5,
7–15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, and 25. 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies DrFirst.com, Inc. as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 1.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims relate to identity management involving a trusted
connector. Spec. Abstr. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A method, implemented on a computing device having at
least one processor, storage, and a communication platform
capable of communicating with a particular designated
credential verification service agent, the computing device
including a trusted connector operable to access at least one
credential verification server in an enterprise system behind a
security mechanism, the method comprising:
instantiating a trusted connector in the enterprise system
behind the security mechanism, wherein the trusted connector is
dedicated to communicating within the enterprise system only
with the at least one credential verification server and dedicated
to communicating via a secure channel through the security
mechanism with the particular designated credential verification
service agent external to the security mechanism;
establishing, upon being triggered by the particular
designated credential verification service agent, the secure
channel between the particular designated credential
verification service agent and the trusted connector;
receiving a credential verification request from the
particular designated credential verification service agent at the
trusted connector through the secure communication channel;
translating, by the trusted connector, the credential
verification request into one or more service requests for the at
least one credential verification server;
sending the one or more service requests to the at least
one credential verification server;
receiving a response from the at least one credential
verification server;
interpreting the response from the at least one credential
verification server for communicating with the particular
designated credential verification service agent; and
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sending the interpreted response to the particular
designated credential verification service agent through the
secure communication channel.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Mitchell US 2007/0174454 A1 July 26, 2007
Malakapalli US 2008/0270612 A1 Oct. 30, 2008
Thakur US 2011/0154443 A1 June 23, 2011
Grossner US 2007/0294399 A1 Dec. 20, 2007
Eckert US 7,761,500 B1 July 20, 2010
Obasanjo US 2012/0227098 A1 Sept. 6, 2012
Holar US 2009/0064307 A1 Mar. 5, 2009
Myers US 2009/0055642 A1 Feb. 26, 2009
Jackson US 8,176,490 B1 May 8, 2012
Stimpson US 2008/0066067 A1 Mar. 13, 2008
REJECTIONS
Claim 1 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite. Final
Act. 8–9.
Claims 1, 5, 6,2 9–11, 14, and 15 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over Mitchell, Malakapalli, and Thakur. Id. at 9.
Claims 2–4, 18, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Mitchell, Malakapalli, Thakur, and Grossner. Id. at 16.
Claim 7 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Mitchell, Malakapalli, Thakur, and Eckert. Id. at 19.
Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Mitchell, Malakapalli, Thakur, and Obasanjo. Id. at 20.

2 Claim 6 forms part of this rejection but is cancelled. Appeal Br. 40; see
also Adv. Act. (entering amendment).
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Claims 12 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Mitchell, Malakapalli, Thakur, and Holar. Id. at 21.
Claims 21 and 233 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Mitchell, Malakapalli, Thakur, and Myers. Id. at 22.
Claim 22 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Mitchell, Malakapalli, Thakur, Myers, and Grossner. Id. at 26.
Claim 24 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Mitchell, Malakapalli, Thakur, Myers, and Jackson. Id. at 27.
Claim 25 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Mitchell, Malakapalli, Thakur, Myers, and Stimpson. Id.
ANALYSIS
Rejection under § 112(b)
The Examiner rejects claim 1 as indefinite based on claim 1’s recital
of “a secure channel through the security mechanism.” Final Act. 9. The
Examiner finds it “unclear whether the ‘a secure communication channel
between the particular designated credential verification service agent’ claim
limitation: (1) relates back to the foregoing . . . limitation; or (2) references
to an entirely different claim element altogether.” Id.
Appellant contends claim 1 was amended from “changing ‘a secure
communication channel’ to ‘the secure channel.’” Appeal Br. 8. According
to Appellant, the antecedent for “the secure channel” is found in the previous
element, “a secure channel through the security mechanism.” Id. Although
the Examiner entered the amendment, Appellant asserts that the Examiner

3 Claim 23 forms a part of this rejection but is cancelled. Appeal Br. 43; see
also Adv. Act. (entering amendment).
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“maintains the rejection without any explanation of why the rejection is
maintained.” Id.
In the Answer, the Examiner asserts that the Examiner’s “position is
not that ‘[t]he antecedent for the secure channel is [not] found in the
limitation ‘a secure channel through the security mechanism,” but rather,
it is unclear whether “the secure channel between the particular
designated credential verification service agent and the trusted
connector” claim limitation: (1) relates back to the . . . “secure
channel through the security mechanism” claim limitation; or
(2) references an entirely different [secure channel] altogether
(namely, a “secure channel between the particular designated
credential verification service agent and the trusted connector”).
Ans. 9. In so stating, the Examiner essentially repeats the findings in the
Final Office Action and does not further elaborate as to why the rejection
was maintained.
We agree with Appellant. Appellant drew a reasonable inference that
the Examiner’s reference to “relat[ing] back” or “referenc[ing] an entirely
different” limitation was effectively an antecedent basis rejection and
amended the claim accordingly. Id.; see also Adv. Act. (entering
amendment). The Examiner did not then tailor the rejection to Appellant’s
amendment. We therefore reverse the Examiner’s rejection.

Rejection of Independent Claim 1 under § 1034
Appellant advances several arguments against the Examiner’s
obviousness rejections. We address each in turn.

4 Appellant italicizes reference names throughout. When quoting Appellant,
we omit this italicization without noting “emphasis omitted” after each
instance.
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1. Independent Claim 1’s “dedicated to communicating” Limitation
We first address Appellant’s argument that the combination of
Mitchell, Malakapalli, and Thakur fails to teach or suggest the following
limitation of claim 1: “dedicated to communicating via a secure channel
through the security mechanism with a particular designated credential
verification service agent external to the security mechanism.” Appeal Br.
24–28 (emphasis omitted). Appellant makes two main arguments: (1) that
Thakur does not teach the claimed “credential verification service agent”
and (2) that Thakur does not disclose a “particular designated” agent. Id.
First, Appellant contends that Thakur’s “collection agent 304” does
not teach the claimed “credential verification service agent.” Id. at 24.
Appellant views Thakur’s collection agent 304 as “a program for
‘identifying, obtaining, and/or collecting information about [a] client 102.’”
Id. at 24–25 (quoting Thakur ¶ 143). Appellant asserts that Thakur’s agent
does not verify a credential. Id. Appellant also asserts that because
Thakur’s collection agent 304 can be located in the same appliance as a
vServer 275, the collection agent 304 cannot perform as a “‘credential
verification service agent’ external to the security mechanism.” Id.
The Examiner finds that Thakur’s collection agent 304 teaches this
limitation and that the location of the collection agent 304 is not so
restrictive as Appellant says. Ans. 47; Final Act. 12–13. According to the
Examiner, Thakur’s collection agent 304 teaches the claimed “credential
verification service agent” because it collects information for a trusted
connector (“257av,” Fig. 6F) to support a credential verification service
(“RSA Secure ID”) and because it transmits information to a credential
verification server (“authentication server 580”). Ans. 47; Final Act. 12–13
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(citing Thakur Fig. 6F, ¶¶ 248, 258, 361, 363). The Examiner also finds that
Appellant’s reference to the agent 304 “can be located” in the server
appliance does not mean Thakur’s agent cannot be located in “any other
machine in the network.” Ans. 48. The Examiner points to paragraph 140
of Thakur as proof, which states “client agent 120 includes . . . collection
agent 304.” Id.
Appellant responds that “[c]ollecting information is not the same as
making a verification request.” Reply Br. 7. Appellant also reaffirms that
because Thakur’s agent can be co-located with the server, it cannot perform
the same function as the agent of claim 1—that of “serving as the particular
(singled out) external agent.” Id. at 8.
Appellant’s argument is flawed because it does not address all of the
Examiner’s findings. Appellant ignores the Examiner’s finding in the
Answer that the collection agent 304 is a “credential verification service
agent” because the information it collects supports a credential verification
service (“RSA Secure ID”) and because it transmits information to a
credential verification server (“authentication server 580”). Ans. 47.
Appellant’s response that “[c]ollecting information is not the same as
making a verification request” focuses narrowly on the first part of the
Examiner’s finding while ignoring the rest. Appellant’s co-location
argument also ignores the Examiner’s finding that “client agent 120 includes
. . . collection agent 304.” Id. at 48. For this reason alone, Appellant’s
arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error.
Appellant also overlooks that the Examiner relies not only on Thakur,
but also Mitchell, for the claimed “agent external to the security
mechanism.” Final Act. 10 (citing Mitchell ¶¶ 42, 54, 67). Appellant’s
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arguments attacking Thakur alone do not squarely address the Examiner’s
rejection. One cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually, where the rejections are based on combinations of references.
In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
We now turn to Appellant’s second argument for this limitation, that
Thakur does not disclose a “particular designated” agent. Appeal Br. 26–27.
Appellant addresses Thakur’s teachings on this point extensively, even
discussing a construction of “particular designated.”5 Id. The Examiner
also relies on Mitchell for teaching a “particular designated” agent, and
Appellant does not address the Examiner’s Mitchell findings. Final Act. 10.
Rather, Appellant avers that it previously argued that Mitchell does not
disclose a “particular designated” agent in previous Office Action responses
and purports to “incorporate these arguments as set forth in previously filed
Responses.” Appeal Br. 28. We do not consider Appellant’s previous
Office Action Responses because they are not included in the Appeal Brief.
“[A]ny arguments or authorities not included in the appeal brief will be
refused consideration by the Board for purposes of the present appeal.” 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2019).
Elsewhere, while arguing against the Examiner’s rationale to combine
references, Appellant tangentially addresses Mitchell, arguing that “[if] the
secure hosting center of Mitchell is dedicated to communicating with a
particular designated agent, then a user would be unable to make a request
from ‘a browser anywhere on the Internet.’” Appeal Br. 22–23 (citing
Mitchell ¶ 51). To the extent Appellant argues here that Mitchell does not

5 We address this construction in the next section.
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teach a “particular designated” agent, this argument is unpersuasive because
Appellant addresses Mitchell paragraph 51, not the paragraphs cited by the
Examiner. Final Act. 10 (citing Mitchell ¶¶ 42, 54, and 67).
We thus find none of Appellant’s arguments regarding the “dedicated
to communicating” limitation persuasive of Examiner error.
2. Independent Claim 1’s “establishing” Limitation
We next address Appellant’s argument that the combination of
Mitchell, Malakapalli, and Thakur fails to teach or suggest the following
limitation of claim 1: “establishing, upon being triggered by the particular
designated credential verification service agent, a secure communication
channel.” Appeal Br. 29–30 (emphasis omitted).
Appellant contends that “the remote client in Malakapalli is not a
‘particular designated’ agent.” Id. at 29. Appellant quotes two passages of
Malakapalli and concludes that “Malakapalli suffers from the same defect as
Mitchell (and Thakur).” Id. These two passages, as quoted by Appellant,
are reproduced below:
the TS gateway 216 is normally configured to enable authorized
remote clients to connect to terminal servers inside the
corporate network 231 from any Internet-connected device
running a terminal services client (which is also referred to as a
remote desktop client).

the TS gateway 216 typically eliminates the need to configure
VPN connections, enabling remote clients [plural] to connect to
corporate network 231 through the Internet, while providing a
comprehensive security configuration model that enables
administrators to control access to specific resources on the
network.
Id. (quoting Malakapalli ¶¶ 19, 23).
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Appellant’s argument is somewhat cryptic, as it relies on emphasizing
a few quoted words without explanation. As near as we can tell, Appellant
appears to emphasize that Malakapalli’s “any Internet-connected device”
and plural “clients” do not teach the claimed “particular designated” agent.
By referring back to its Thakur argument, Appellant also appears to rely on
its construction of “particular designated” agent to distinguish Malakapalli.
We now find it necessary to address Appellant’s proposed construction.
Appellant proposes that we construe “particular designated credential
verification service agent” to mean “the credential verification service agent
has been singled out and designated for communications with the trusted
connector, so the agent can be, in effect, integrated with the enterprise
system.” Appeal Br. 27. Appellant relies on the Specification for support,
reproducing paragraph 162 as follows:
Fig. 4-d shows an exemplary design of a trusted
connector at hospital A 430. The trusted connector at hospital A
is installed within the hospital A security, such as within the
firewall. As a “trusted” connector, Hospital A system 410
allows the trusted connector 430 to communicate with a
particular designated external source, e.g., OneStop, through a
secure channel through the firewall.
Id. Appellant does not elaborate, leaving us to puzzle over how this
paragraph supports Appellant’s proposed construction.
We find paragraph 162 does not support Appellant’s proposed
construction. Under the broadest reasonable construction standard, claim
terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, as would be
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire
disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir.
2007). Any special definition for a claim term must be set forth in the
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specification with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision. In re
Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Appellant points to no
definition set forth in the Specification with any clarity, deliberateness, or
precision. Appellant does not explain how paragraph 162 of the
Specification supports Appellant’s lengthy construction, nor do we see how
it could. For instance, the words “singled out” and “integrated with the
enterprise system” in Appellant’s proposed construction appear nowhere in
Appellant’s cited passage.
In the Answer, the Examiner proffers definitions for “particular” and
designated,” including: “an individual member of a specified group or class”
and “appointed to a specified position,” respectively. Ans. 44 (citing
https://www.google.com). Appellant responds with its own dictionary
definitions, including that “the plain meaning of particular is ‘used to single
out an individual from a class or group,” not just an individual of a group.
Reply Br. 6. Appellant also asserts that “dedicated” means “give all or a
large part of one’s time or resources to,” not just “devote time or effort to a
particular task.” Id. at 8.
Appellant’s Reply arguments remain unconvincing. Appellant’s
definitions are irrelevant because Appellant does not address another of the
Examiner’s findings, which we agree with, that “‘communicating with a
particular designated agent’ is an inherent feature [in Malakapalli] of
‘communicating with a plurality of agents.’” See Ans. 56. And Appellant’s
definition for “dedicated” cites a definition for “devote,” not “dedicated,”
but Appellant does not explain the relevance of the definition of this
different term. Reply Br. n. 4.
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As we agree with the Examiner that “‘communicating with a
particular designated agent’ is an inherent feature of ‘communicating with a
plurality of agents’” (Ans. 56) and do not find Appellant’s construction
persuasive, Appellant does not persuade us of Examiner error.
3. Arguments Against the Examiner’s Rationale to Combine
Appellant makes two arguments against the Examiner’s rationale to
combine. First, Appellant contends that the rejection relies on hindsight.
Appeal Br. 17–22. Second, Appellant contends that the combination makes
Mitchell unfit for its intended purpose. Id. at 22–23. Neither argument is
persuasive.
a. Hindsight
We address Appellant’s hindsight argument first. Appellant takes
issue with the Examiner’s stated rationale to combine Thakur into Mitchell
and Malakapalli. Id. at 17. The Examiner’s rationale states:
Before the effective filing date of the invention, it would
have been obvious to incorporate Thakur's foregoing
authentication/authorization service into the system of Mitchell
in view of Malakapalli in order to improve security by thus
having the system verify a credential (see Thakur ¶[¶] 248, 258,
363).
Final Act. 13. Appellant alleges improper hindsight principally because
Mitchell and Malakapalli already disclose successful credential
verification/user authentication techniques. Appeal Br. 17–18 (citing
Mitchell ¶ 13; Malakapalli ¶¶ 16, 19).
In the Answer, the Examiner further expands the rationale to combine,
stating:
the actual rationale for the standing prior art rejection of claim 1
recognizes that security can always be improved and, therefore,
it would have been obvious to “improve security” by
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“incorporat[ing] Thakur’s authentication/authorization service
into the system of Mitchell in view of Malakapalli” (i.e., “thus
having the system verify a credential”).
Ans. 33. Appellant does not address this expanded finding, waiving any
argument against it. See Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI
2010) (precedential) (The Board “reviews . . . rejection[s] for error based
upon the issues identified by appellant, and in light of the arguments and
evidence produced thereon,” and treats arguments not made as waived.); 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2019).
Appellant also contends that the Examiner does not explain why or
how one of ordinary skill in the art would change the components of
Mitchell and Malakapalli, “which operate to provide access after
authentication, to function as authentication servers, i.e., before
authentication.” Id. at 20 (emphasis omitted). And Appellant contends that
the combination “would use the authentication of Thakur to provide a
browser access to the middleware server of Mitchel[l], not to replace the
Middleware server and/or Broker.” Id. at 20. These arguments are
unpersuasive because we do not view the Examiner’s stated rationale as
proposing a bodily incorporation of Thakur into Mitchell and Malakapalli.
Ans. 33. Instead, the Examiner proposes adding Thakur’s
authentication/authorization feature as an additional service into the
combination of Mitchell and Malakapalli. Ans. 33. “The test for
obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be
bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather,
the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have
suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
425 (CCPA 1981).
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The Examiner also notes, correctly, that
Any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a
reconstruction based on hindsight reasoning, but so long as it
takes into account only knowledge which was within the level
of ordinary skill in the art at the time the claimed invention was
made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from
applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.
Ans. 30 (quoting In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1394–1395 (CCPA
1971)). Appellant does not persuade us of improper hindsight here.
b. Unfit for Intended Purpose
We now address Appellant’s argument that the combination would
make Mitchell unfit for its intended purpose. Appeal Br. 22–23. Appellant
contends that Mitchell enables a user to make a request “from a browser
anywhere on the Internet,” but “[i]f the secure hosting center of Mitchell is
dedicated to communicating with a particular designated agent, then a user
would be unable to make a request from ‘a browser anywhere on the
Internet.’” Id. at 22 (citing Mitchell ¶ 51). In other words, Appellant
argues, the proposed modification would make Mitchell unfit for its intended
purpose of providing access to any browser anywhere on the Internet. Id. at
23.
The Examiner finds that “Appellant’s instant argument that the
intended purpose of Mitchell is ‘providing access to any browser anywhere
on the Internet,’ is presented without support.” Ans. 45. We agree. Not
only is Appellant’s argument without support, but Mitchell’s disclosure
suggests the contrary. Mitchell merely states that a “user request may
originate from a browser anywhere on the Internet.” Mitchell ¶ 51
(emphasis added). By using the permissive term “may,” Mitchell makes no
requirement that a user request originate from a browser anywhere on the
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Internet. Thus, Appellant does not persuade us that Mitchell’s intended
purpose is what Appellant says it is.
But even if the proposed combination would diminish Mitchell’s
performance, the diminished performance would merely be one of several
competing considerations in the obviousness analysis. “A given course of
action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does
not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.” Allied Erecting v. Genesis
Attachments, 825 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Appellant
does not persuade us that the proposed combination would render Mitchell
so disadvantaged as to obviate the advantages of combining Mitchell with
Thakur and Malakapalli.
Lastly, Appellant does not point to evidence of record that the
combination would be “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary
skill in the art” or “represent[] an unobvious step over the prior art.”
Leapfrog Enters. Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418–19 (2007)).
Nor has Appellant provided objective evidence of secondary considerations,
which our reviewing court states “operate[] as a beneficial check on
hindsight.” Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak Cheese & Powder Sys., 725 F.3d
1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Examiner’s findings are reasonable
because the skilled artisan would “be able to fit the teachings of multiple
patents together like pieces of a puzzle” because the skilled artisan is “a
person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 420–21.
The claimed subject matter exemplifies the principle that “[t]he combination
of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious
when it does no more than yield predictable results.” Id. at 416.
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Accordingly, Appellant does not persuade us of Examiner error. We
therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1.

Rejection of Independent Claim 21 under § 103
Appellant contends that the combination of Mitchell, Malakapalli,
Thakur, and Myers fails to teach or suggest claim 21’s “wherein the
particular designated credential verification agent uses the interpreted
response to authenticate the provided credential to an application that is
independent of and external to the enterprise system.” Appeal Br. 32–34.
The Examiner’s findings and Appellant’s arguments focus on the
Myers reference. Appellant contends that Myer’s client authentication agent
405 is not the claimed “credential verification agent.” Id. at 33. Unlike the
claimed agent, according to Appellant, Myers’s agent only receives a
message from the browser, not from a trusted connector. Id. Appellant also
contends that the allegedly received message in Myers “is not ‘translated
from the response from the credential verification server.’” Id. Lastly,
Appellant contends that the Examiner provides no articulated reasoning for
changing the function of Myers’ client authentication agent 405 to arrive at
the claimed invention. Id. at 34.
The Examiner disagrees, finding that Myers’ agent 405 “presents
interpreted (e.g., decrypted) ‘credentials’ to application 300 of Myers to be
‘verified.’” Ans. 60 (citing Myers 141); Final Act. 26. Thus, to the
Examiner, Myers’ agent 405 and the claimed credential verification agent
are both agents “used for the ‘verification’ of credential(s).” Id.
Appellant responds that the Examiner “does not address Appellant’s
argument.” Reply Br. 10. Appellant views claim 21’s credential
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verification agent as “outside of a security mechanism” but “working with
the trusted connector inside the enterprise system.” Id. at 10–11. Myers,
according to Appellant, “is silent on an enterprise system.” Id. at 11.
Appellant also argues that “the Answer fails to provide any rebuttal to
Appellant’s argument” against the combination. Id.
We agree with the Examiner. Appellant does not address the
Examiner’s findings that Myers’ agent 405 “presents interpreted (e.g.,
decrypted) ‘credentials’ to application 300 of Myers to be ‘verified.’” See
Ans. 60. Instead, Appellant’s reply introduces a new argument about Myers
being silent about an “enterprise system.” Reply Br. 11. Appellant has not
explained why this argument was not raised in the Appeal Brief.
Accordingly, we find the argument was not timely and do not consider it.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). We do not find Appellant’s argument
persuasive of Examiner error because the Examiner finds that “it would have
been obvious to incorporate Myers . . . into [Mitchell, Malakapalli, and
Thakur] in order to make it more comprehensive by thus enabling the system
to authenticate to existing external application authentications (see Myers ¶
98).” Final Act. 25–26.
We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21.

Rejection of Dependent Claims under § 103
1. Dependent Claim 8
Appellant contends that the combination of Mitchell, Malakapalli,
Thakur, and Obasanjo fails to teach or suggest claim 8. Appeal Br. 36–37.
Claim 8 recites (emphasis added):
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The method of claim 1, wherein the particular designated
credential verification service agent includes a system that
provides cloud-based identity services.
Appellant contends that “the client device of [Obasanjo] does not provide
any identity services; instead the client devices use[] the services of a cloud-
based ID service, such as service 660.” Id. at 37.
The Examiner cites Obasanjo paragraphs 44 and 46, as well as Figure
6, for this limitation. Final Act. 21. In the Answer, the Examiner further
explains that “paragraphs 44 and 46 of Obasanjo disclose that its device 616
includes Obasanjo’s ‘cloud-based identity service communication
component 610,’ i.e., ‘a system that provides cloud based identity services.’”
Ans. 64. Appellant responds that “the Answer confuses providing an
identity service and consuming (using) such a service.” Reply Br. 12.
According to Appellant, Obasanjo’s client device consumes cloud-based
identity services, rather than providing them. Id.
Appellant’s argument overlooks that neither claim 8, nor claim 1 from
which it depends, recites a client device. So regardless whether Obasanjo’s
client device consumes a cloud identity service, Obasanjo discloses what
claim 8 recites—a system (“service 660”) that provides cloud-based identity
services. See Obasanjo ¶¶ 44, 46.
We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8.
2. Dependent Claim 11
Appellant contends that the combination of Mitchell, Malakapalli, and
Thakur fails to teach or suggest claim 11. Appeal Br. 34–36. Claim 11
recites (emphasis added):
The method of claim 1 wherein the trusted connector
includes a configuration operable to configure the connection
between the trusted connector and the particular designated
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credential verification service agent or to configure the
connection between the trusted connector and the at least one
credential verification server.
The crux of Appellant’s argument is that the Examiner doesn’t explain how
the references disclose the claimed “configuration.” See id. at 35. Appellant
asserts, “the Examiner does not explain how the TS gateway 216 discloses
the [claimed] configuration nor how the authentication server of Takur
discloses the [claimed] configuration.” Id. And Appellant asserts,
“[c]ommunicating with a server does not disclose or suggest the claimed
configuration.” Id. at 36.
The Examiner initially finds that Malakapalli and Thakur teach the
claimed configuration. Final Act. 15 (citing Malakapalli Fig. 3, element
216; Thakur Fig. 6F, element 275av). In the Answer, the Examiner expands
the Examiner’s findings for both Malakapalli and Thakur. Ans. 62–63. First
the Examiner finds that “paragraph 23 of Malakapalli explicitly discloses
that its trusted connector ‘216 is configured using a pluggable transport
mechanism,” which “thereby discloses as being able to configure the
connections of its trusted connector 216.” Id. at 62. Then the Examiner
finds,
the configuration depicted as element 275av in FIG. 6F of
Thakur has been configured with a “connection between the
trusted connector and the at least one credential verification
server” because paragraph 248 of Thakur explicitly discloses
that Thakur’s trusted connector “275av may communicate with
server 580,” which is an authentication (i.e., credential
verification) server.
Id. at 63.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues that Malakapalli is not “operable
to configure anything else”:
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The Answer merely restates that the TS gateway of
Malakapalli is configured using a pluggable transport
mechanism. But this does nothing to explain how Malakapalli
discloses that the TS gateway itself includes a configuration
operable to configure anything else. In other words, that the TS
gateway of Malakapalli is itself configured does not disclose or
suggest that the TS gateway includes information operable to
configure other connections.
Reply Br. 12. Appellant makes a similar argument for Thakur: “[t]hat the
vServer 275av of Thakur is configured does not mean it includes anything
additional that is ‘operable to configure’ other connections.” Id.
Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive of Examiner error. Appellant
concedes that Malakapalli configures something—the TS gateway. Id. The
gateway was not configured in a vacuum. Malakapalli at least suggests that
something does this configuring. That something is a “configuration” in the
broadest reasonable sense.
We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 11.
3. Remaining Dependent Claims
We sustain the rejection of the remaining dependent claims, which
Appellant does not argue separately. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1 112(b) Indefiniteness 1
1, 5, 9–11,
14, 15
103 Mitchell, Malakapalli,
Thakur
1, 5, 9–
11, 14, 15

2–4, 18, 19 103 Mitchell, Malakapalli,
Thakur, Grossner
2–4, 18,
19

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Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
7 103 Mitchell, Malakapalli,
Thakur, Eckert
7
8 103 Mitchell, Malakapalli,
Thakur, Obasanjo
8
12, 13 103 Mitchell, Malakapalli,
Thakur, Holar
12, 13
21 103 Mitchell, Malakapalli,
Thakur, Myers
21
22 103 Mitchell, Malakapalli,
Thakur, Myers, Grossner
22
24 103 Mitchell, Malakapalli,
Thakur, Myers, Jackson
24
25 103 Mitchell, Malakapalli,
Thakur, Myers, Stimpson
25
Overall
Outcome
1–5, 7–
15, 18,
19, 21,
22, 24, 25

Since at least one rejection encompassing all claims on appeal is
affirmed, the decision of the Examiner is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED