Douglas X. Zhu et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 9, 2019

14041243 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 9, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/041,243 09/30/2013 Douglas X. ZHU 83392943; 67186-001PUS3 7142
46442 7590 09/09/2019
CARLSON, GASKEY & OLDS, P.C./Ford
400 W. MAPLE RD.
SUITE 350
BIRMINGHAM, MI 48009
EXAMINER
PAIK, SANG YEOP
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3761
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/09/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cgolaw@yahoo.com
ptodocket@cgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte DOUGLAS X. ZHU, JACOB MATHEWS,
PATRICK DANIEL MAGUIRE, and PATRICK L. PADGETT
____________________
Appeal 2018-008453
Application 14/041,243
Technology Center 3700
___________________

Before LINDA E. HORNER, JOHN C. KERINS, and
PHILLIP J. KAUFFMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

KAUFFMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Douglas X. Zhu et al. (Appellant)1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C.
§ 134 of the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–11, 13–16, and 18–28. Final
Office Action, dated Sept. 27, 2017 (“Final Act.”). We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm-in-part.

1 Appellant identifies Ford Global Technologies, LLC as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 1.
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Application 14/041,243

2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to “thermal controls for an
electrical storage device in a vehicle.” Spec. ¶ 2. Claims 1, 11, 16, and 21
are independent. Claims 1 and 16 are reproduced below.
1. An electrical storage device heater system, comprising:
a high voltage electrical storage device;
a heater configured to regulate a temperature of said high
voltage electrical storage device, said heater including a
thermoelectric heater element; and
a controller configured to actuate said heater using power
sourced from a location separate from said high voltage
electrical storage device.

16. A method, comprising:
checking whether a vehicle is in a key ON or key OFF
condition with a controller;
connecting a heater to a high voltage electrical storage
device of a battery system of the vehicle if a temperature is
below a temperature threshold and the vehicle is in the key OFF
condition; and
disconnecting the heater from the high voltage electrical
storage device if the temperature is above the temperature
threshold or the battery system is disconnected from an external
power source.
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EVIDENCE
Anderson
Reed
Lee
Ijaz
McCall
US 3,798,072
US 5,115,116
US 5,281,792
US 5,948,298
US 5,994,669
Mar. 19, 1974
May 19, 1992
Jan. 25, 1994
Sept. 7, 1999
Nov. 30, 1999
McMahan
Buckley
US 6,002,240
US 6,183,855 B1
Dec. 14, 1999
Feb. 6, 2001
Kahlon
Cobb
Berels
Nada

US 2003/0140880 A1
US 2003/0155344 A1
US 2003/0169018 A1
US 6,668,963 B2

July 31, 2003
Aug. 21, 2003
Sept. 11, 2003
Dec. 30, 2003

REJECTIONS
1. Claims 1, 2, 4–10, 16, 20–22, and 26–28 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) over Nada, McCall, either Lee or Ijaz, and either
Buckley or Cobb. Final Act. 2–6.
2. Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Nada, McCall,
either Lee or Ijaz, and either Bukley or Cobb, and either Kahlon or
Berels. Final Act. 6.
3. Claims 11, 13, 15, and 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
over Nada, McCall, and Kahlon. Final Act. 6–7.
4. Claim 14 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Nada, McCall,
Kahlon, and either Anderson or Lee. Final Act. 7–8.
5. Claims 18 and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Nada,
McCall, either Lee or Ijaz, and either Buckley or Cobb, and
McMahan. Final Act. 8.
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6. Claim 23 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Nada, McCall,
either Lee or Ijaz, and either Buckley or Cobb, and Kahlon. Final
Act. 8–9.
7. Claim 25 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Nada, McCall,
Kahlon, either Anderson or Lee, and Reed. Final Act. 9.

ANALYSIS2
A. Claims 1, 2, 4–10, 16, 20–22, and 26–28 over Nada, McCall, either
Lee or Ijaz, and either Buckley or Cobb
1. Claim 1
The Examiner finds that Nada discloses a system as claimed, except
that Nada does not disclose the claimed heater and controller. Final Act. 2.
The Examiner finds that McCall discloses both a heater for a low power
vehicle starter battery and a controller. Id. The Examiner finds that either
Lee or Ijaz shows a battery warmer comprising a resistance heater. Id. at 3.
The Examiner finds that either Buckley or Cobb demonstrates that a
thermoelectric heater element (in the form of a Peltier element) was a known
alternative to a resistance heater. Id. The Examiner finds that it was known
that high voltage batteries, such as Nada’s, are like low voltage batteries,
such as McCall’s, in that both benefit from using heaters to counter exposure
to extreme cold temperatures. Id. at 3.

2 We review the appealed rejections for error that is identified by Appellant,
and those arguments that are not made are waived. Ex parte Frye, 94
USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential); 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to modify
Nada by adding a battery warmer and controller, as disclosed by McCall, to
both increase battery life and provide sufficient battery power in cold
temperatures. Final Act. 3. The Examiner concludes that it would have
been obvious to further modify the Nada and McCall combination so that the
heater was a thermoelectric heater, in the form of a Peltier element, as taught
by either Buckley or Cobb. Id.
Appellant traverses the rejection of claim 1 for five interrelated
reasons.
a. Reasonable Expectation of Success
Appellant contends that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not
have had a reasonable expectation of success in the proposed combination.
Appeal Br. 5; Reply Br. 2. Specifically, Appellant contends that the
Examiner proposes to incorporate McCall’s heating elements 13 into Nada,
but such a modification would violate McCall’s object of providing battery
warmer elements that are built into the battery casing. Id. (citing McCall,
2:2–30); Reply Br. 2 (essentially repeating the argument of the Appeal
Brief).
Appellant’s contention is unpersuasive because it is premised on a
mischaracterization of the rejection. The Examiner does not propose to
incorporate only McCall’s heating elements 13 into Nada; rather, the
Examiner proposes to modify Nada by adding McCall’s battery warmer
which includes both the case and the heating elements. Final Act. 2
(“McCall discloses a battery warmer case 10 including a heater 13”), id. at 3
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(proposing to add a “battery warmer” as disclosed by McCall); see also
McCall 3:19–24, Fig. 1 (disclosing that warmer case 10 includes numerous
heating elements 13).
b. Principle of Operation
Appellant contends that the proposed combination would completely
change the principle of operation of Nada and McCall, and would require a
substantial reconstruction and redesign of McCall’s battery case. Appeal Br.
5 (citing In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 813 (CCPA 1959)); Reply Br. 2–3.
In Ratti, the court held that claimed subject matter may not be obvious
when the proposed modification would require both: (1) substantial
reconstruction and redesign of the primary reference, and (2) a change in the
basic principles under which the primary reference was designed to operate.
In re Ratti, 270 F.2d at 811–813. Appellant’s contention is not persuasive
regarding either of the two prongs of Ratti. Specifically, Appellant presents
a conclusory assertion that substantial reconstruction and redesign of
McCall’s case would be required, but does not provide a cogent supporting
explanation. Further, Appellant does not allege that the modification would
require substantial reconstruction and redesign of the primary reference, i.e.
Nada, and does not provide a cogent explanation of any basic principle of
operation of either Nada or McCall that is changed by the proposed
modification. Essentially, Appellant states a legal principle without tying it
to the facts of this case.
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c. Unsatisfactory for Intended Purpose
Appellant contends that incorporating the Peltier heat pump of either
Buckley or Cobb would render the battery casing of the Nada and McCall
combination unsatisfactory for the intended purpose of providing battery
heating elements built into a battery casing.3 Appeal Br. 5–6 (citing In re
Gordon, 733 F.2d 900 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). As we explain below, Appellant
conflates the structure of a device with the intended pupose of that device.
In Gordon, the prior art was a liquid strainer for removing dirt and
water from gasoline (and other lighter oils). In re Gordon, 733 F.2d at 901.
The strainer included pocket 9 at the bottom of shell 1 for capturing the
unwanted dirt and water. Id. The strainer relied in part on the assistance of
gravity to operate, and the proposed modification turned the strainer upside
down so that pocket 9 would no longer capture unwanted dirt and water,
rendering the device “inoperable for its intended purpose.” Id. at 902. For
that reason, the Court said that the prior art would not have provided
motivation to orient the device upside down, and in fact, the prior art taught
away from such an orientation. Id.
In Gordon, the intended purpose of the device was to filter dirt and
water from gasoline. Pocket 9 was not the intended purpose of the device;
rather, pocket 9 was a part of the structure for carrying out the intended
purpose. Similarly, the intended purpose of McCall’s device is to warm a

3 Although Appellant mentions both Nada and McCall with regard to the
intended purpose, Appellant only provides a supporting citation to McCall.
See Appeal Br. 5–6.
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vehicle starter battery, and heating elements 13 within case 10 are part of the
structure that carries out that purpose. See McCall, abstract, [54], 1:66–2:40,
Fig. 1. The modified device proposed by the Examiner would still meet
McCall’s intended purpose of warming a vehicle starter battery.
Consequently, Appellant’s argument is not persuasive.
d. Rationale
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s reasoning for adding a battery
warmer and controller to Nada, namely, “to increase the life of Nada’s high
voltage battery and to ensure that the battery has sufficient power to meet
vehicle power requirements at extremely low temperatures,” is conclusory,
speculative, and insufficient to support a conclusion of obviousness. Appeal
Br. 6 (quoting Final Act. 3). In support of this argument, Appellant contends
that: (1) the proposed modification would require a substantial redesign and
reconstruction of Nada’s system, (2) Nada “doesn’t disclose a heater or
anything related to heating a battery,” and (3) the Office has not explained
how the proposed modification would somehow increase the life of Nada’s
battery or enable it to meet vehicle power requirements. Id. at 6‒7. We
analyze each of Appellant’s contentions in turn.
Appellant’s first underlying contention, that the proposed
modification would require a substantial redesign and reconstruction of
Nada’s system, is not supported by a cogent explanation. Appellant’s
second contention, that Nada does not disclose anything related to heating a
battery, implies that the absence of a feature demonstrates the
nonobviousness of adding that feature. Appellant’s logic would limit prior
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art rejections to anticipation and would do away with obviousness. Such is
not the law. Rejections for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, by
definition, involve some change, such as an addition, to the prior art.
Appellant’s third contention, that the Examiner did not explain how
the proposed modification would increase the life of Nada’s battery or
enable it to meet vehicle power requirements, is incorrect. As detailed
above, the Examiner explained that it was known that heating a battery
extends battery life, and high voltage batteries, such as Nada’s, are similar to
low voltage batteries, such as McCall’s, in that they benefit from using
heaters to counter exposure to extreme cold temperatures. See Final Act. 3;
McCall, 1:59–62; Ijaz, 1:15‒20. In sum, each of Appellant’s supporting
contentions are unpersuasive, and for that reason, Appellant’s argument that
the Examiner’s reasoning is conclusory is also unpersuasive.
Overall, Appellant’s argument here is a challenge to the Examiner’s
rationale for adding McCall’s battery warmer to Nada’s system. Appellant
does not cogently address the Examiner’s finding that it was known that
high voltage batteries, such as Nada’s, are similar to low voltage batteries,
such as McCall’s, in that they benefit from using heaters to counter exposure
to extreme cold temperatures. See id. In this light, adding McCall’s battery
warmer to Nada’s system is the “mere application of a known technique to a
piece of prior art ready for the improvement.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
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e. Use of Thermoelectric Heater
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s assertion that it was known to
use a thermoelectric heater in place of an electric resistant/resistive heating
element is conclusory and speculative. Appeal Br. 7. According to
Appellant, neither Buckley nor Cobb discloses a thermoelectric heat pump
for heating a high voltage battery. Id.
The Examiner cited two supporting references for the proposition that
using a thermoelectric heater in place of an electric resistant/resistive heating
element was known. Final Act. 3 (citing Buckley, 10:42–48 and Cobb ¶ 82).
Rather than address that evidence, Appellant simply asserts that the
Examiner’s assertion was conclusory. Further, Appellant’s contention that
neither Buckley nor Cobb discloses a thermoelectric heat pump for heating a
high voltage battery is inapposite in that the rejection relies on a
combination of references to meet that limitation. See id. at 2–3 (replacing
McCall’s battery warmer heating element, as modified by Lee or Ijaz to be a
resistance heater, with the heater of either Buckley or Cobb); see also In re
Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (one cannot show nonobviousness
by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on
combinations of references). Consequently, Appellant’s argument is
unpersuasive.
f. Claim 1 Conclusion
None of Appellant’s five arguments against the rejection of claim 1
apprises us of error, and therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 1.
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Claims 2 and 4–10 depend from, and fall with, independent claim 1. 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
2. Claim 16
Claim 16 is directed to a method that includes the steps of:
(1) “checking whether a vehicle is in a key ON or key OFF condition with a
controller,” (2) connecting the heater if the temperature is below a threshold
and the key is in the key OFF position, and (3) disconnecting the heater if
the temperature is above a threshold or if the battery system is disconnected
from an external power source. The Specification describes an embodiment
of a vehicle having controller 114 that controls operation of the heater by
actuating a switch based on the on or off condition of a key of the vehicle
(e.g., whether the key is in the vehicle ignition). Spec. ¶¶ 19, 34; Fig. 1.
The Examiner finds that Ijaz discloses use of a controller (controller
80) that activates battery heaters that: (1) raise the batteries to a desired
temperature and shut off above that temperature, and (2) do not operate the
heaters when the system is not “on plug,” meaning the system is not being
charged. Final Act. 5 (citing Ijaz, 5:5–67). The Examiner concludes that it
would have been obvious to modify Nada by adding a battery warmer and a
controller to: (1) maintain the battery at an optimal temperature, and (2) to
disconnect the heater when the batteries are “not charged from an external
power source,” as taught by Ijaz. Id.
Appellant argues that Ijaz’s disclosure of determining whether the
vehicle is “on plug” does not correspond to checking whether a vehicle is in
a key ON or key OFF condition as recited in claim 16. Appeal Br. 7–8
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(citing Final Act. 9–10); Reply Br. 4. For the reasons that follow, we agree
with Appellant.
The rejection of claim 16 makes no mention of a vehicle key
condition. See Final Act. 5. The rejection proposes to modify Nada so that
the controller disconnects the heater when the vehicle is “not charged from
an external power source.” Id. The rejection does not assert that Ijaz’s
detection of whether the vehicle is “on plug” corresponds to checking
whether the key is in a key ON or key OFF condition.
The portion of Ijaz cited by the Examiner discloses that battery
control module 80 only operates heaters 40, 64C, and 64D when batteries 30
of vehicle 20 are being charged as revealed by whether vehicle 20 is “on
plug.” See Final Act. 5; Ijaz, 5:30–47. Ijaz explains that battery control
module 80 determines whether batteries 30 are being charged using
information via a serial communication link to the on-board battery charger.
Ijaz, 5:36‒41. When vehicle 20 is “on plug” (charging batteries 30), it is
then possible for battery control module 80 to activate heaters 40, 64C and
64D based on certain temperature limitations. Ijaz, 5:48–67; Figs. 7A, 7B
(algorithms performed by battery control module 80). In light of this, Ijaz
discloses control of a battery warmer based on whether the vehicle is “on
plug” (being charged). In contrast, claim 16 requires checking whether a
vehicle key is in a key ON or key OFF condition.
In the Answer, the Examiner asserts that,
[s]ince the “on plug” or “off plug” is dependent on the battery
being charged or not, such condition would include turning on of
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the vehicle with a key that starts and runs the vehicle wherein the
“on plug” would be deemed in the broad scope as the key “on”
condition. It is also noted that McCall shows the heater that is
actuated when the vehicle is not running which is indicative of
the vehicle is in the key off condition.
Ans. 11.
As an initial matter, we disagree with the Examiner’s claim
interpretation that the on or off condition of the vehicle key as claimed is
broad enough to cover whether a vehicle is on or off plug. The ordinary
meaning of a vehicle key cannot reasonably be said to include a plug, nor
does the Specification include a lexicographical definition that supports such
an interpretation. With this claim interpretation in mind, we turn to the
Examiner’s factual findings.
The Examiner presents alternative findings: (1) Ijaz discloses that the
condition of being on plug would include the vehicle key being in the key
ON condition, and (2) McCall discloses not actuating the heater when the
vehicle key is in the key OFF position. See Ans. 11. We analyze these
contentions in turn.
Regarding the first alternative, as detailed above, Ijaz is silent
regarding a vehicle key. Nothing in Ijaz suggests that the condition of being
on or off plug (charging or not charging) is the same as, or has a defined
relationship with, the condition of the vehicle key.
Regarding the second alternative, the Examiner does not identify any
disclosure supporting the contention that McCall’s system only actuates the
battery heater when the vehicle key is in a key OFF condition. See Ans. 11
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(providing no citation to McCall); Final Act. 3 (asserting regarding claim 1
without a supporting citation, that “[i]t is also noted that the heater is
actuated when the vehicle is not running which is indicative of the vehicle
that is in the key off condition,” repeated at Ans. 11); Final Act. 5
(discussing only Ijaz and not McCall with regard to the limitation at issue in
claim 16).
McCall is titled, battery warmer with timer switch, and is directed to a
vehicle starter battery warming system having an on/off control switch with
a timer. McCall, [54], 1:4–11. The warmer can, for example, take the form
of a timed thermostatic controller 40 having an on/off switch 41. Id. at
3:49–52; Fig. 5. A user sets the desired time and temperature for warmer
operation. Id. at 2:66–3:18. McCall’s device can operate at a first lower
continual temperature to keep the battery warm overnight, and then operate
at an increased temperature near the time when the equipment or vehicle will
be used. Id. at 1:4–17. McCall makes no disclosure regarding a vehicle key,
let alone a disclosure regarding the relationship between the condition of the
vehicle key and operation of a battery heater.
We agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not shown that the
prior art teaches or suggests each limitation of claim 16. Claims 20, 26, and
27, depend from claim 16 and the rejection of these claims suffers from the
same shortcomings as that of claim 16. We reverse the rejection of claims
16, 20, 26, and 27.
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3. Claim 21
Independent claim 21 is directed to a battery heater system that
includes a controller configured to control operation of a switch to supply
power to a heater based on “at least battery cell temperatures, a key ON/OFF
condition, and a converter AC/DC active signal.”
The rejection of claim 21 makes no mention of a key condition (e.g.,
on or off). See Final Act. 5. Appellant argues that the prior art does not
disclose a controller configured to control operation of a switch based on a
key on or off condition. Appeal Br. 8. The Examiner responds that “a key
on/off condition is deemed taught by McCall as well as Ijaz.” Ans. 11.
Though not explicit, it appears the Examiner is relying on the same
assertions regarding Ijaz and McCall as relied upon for the rejection of claim
16. These assertions are not persuasive for the reasons given above.
Claim 28 depends from claim 21 and the rejection of claim 28 suffers
from the same shortcoming as that of claim 21. Accordingly, we reverse the
rejection of claims 21 and 28.
4. Claim 22
Claim 22 depends from claim 1 and contains a limitation similar to the
limitation discussed above in the analysis of claims 16 and 21, i.e., the
controller is configured to actuate the heater based on a vehicle key ON/OFF
condition. For the reasons discussed above, the Examiner has not shown
where this limitation is disclosed or rendered obvious by the prior art.
Accordingly, we reverse the rejection of claim 22.

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B. Claim 3 over Nada, McCall, either Lee or Ijaz, and either Buckley or
Cobb, and either Kahlon or Berels
Claim 3 depends from independent claim 1. Appellant repeats the
arguments for claim 1 above. Appeal Br. 9. Consequently, we sustain the
rejection of claim 3.

C. Claims 11, 13, 15, and 24 over Nada, McCall, and Kahlon
Independent claim 11 is directed to a vehicle that includes a
controller, and a high voltage electrical storage device that is selectively
heated by a heater. Claim 11 further requires that the heater is powered by a
“first power source,” and the controller that controls the operation of the
heater is powered by an “alternative power source” (a source separate from
the first power source).
The Examiner found that: Nada discloses a vehicle having a first
power source (auxiliary machinery battery 198) and a high voltage electrical
storage device (high voltage battery 194), McCall discloses a battery warmer
and a controller, and Kahlon discloses a plurality of battery sources
including primary battery source 36 and secondary battery 30 having low
voltage capacity for powering low voltage loads. Final Act. 6–7 (Kahlon
¶ 17). The Examiner concluded that it would have been obvious to modify
Nada by adding a battery warmer and controller, as taught by McCall, to
increase the life of Nada’s high voltage battery and to ensure sufficient
power to meet vehicle power requirements in low temperatures. Id. at 7.
The Examiner also concluded that it would have been obvious to modify the
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McCall and Nada combination by replacing the power source of Nada’s
controller (auxiliary machinery battery 198) with a secondary battery as an
alternative power source, as taught by Kahlon, “to power the low voltage
loads” to include Nada’s controller. Id.
Claim 11 requires the controller for the heater to be powered by the
alternative power source. The rejection relies on McCall’s controller to
control the heater (id.), but proposes to power Nada’s controller with an
alternative power source (Kahlon’s secondary battery 30). Id. Therefore,
the proposed combination does not meet the limitation of claim 11 that the
controller for the heater is powered by an alternative power source.
Consequently, we agree with Appellant that the rejection does not meet this
limitation of claim 11.4 Appeal Br. 9. Accordingly, we reverse the rejection
of claims 11, 13, 15, and 24.

D. Claim 14 over Nada, McCall, Kahlon, and either Anderson or Lee
Claim 14 depends from independent claim 11. The rejection does not
rely on Anderson or Lee to correct the shortcoming of the rejection of claim
11. See Final Act. 7–8. Consequently, we agree with Appellant that the
rejection of claim 14 is in error for the same reason given with regard to
claim 11. See Appeal Br. 10.

4 The Examiner’s response to argument regarding what Kahlon discloses
(Ans. 11) does not correct this deficiency in the rejection.
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E. Claims 18 and 19 over Nada, McCall, either Lee or Ijaz, and either
Buckley or Cobb, and McMahan
Claims 18 and 19 depend, directly or indirectly, from independent
claim 16. The rejection does not rely on McMahan to correct the
shortcoming of the rejection of claim 16. See Final Act. 8. Consequently,
we agree with Appellant that the rejection of claims 18 and 19 suffers from
the same shortcomings as that of claim 16 analyzed above. See Appeal
Br. 10.

F. Claim 23 over Nada, McCall, either Lee or Ijaz, and either Buckley or
Cobb, and Kahlon
Claim 23 depends from independent claim 1, and adds that the
“controller is powered by a low voltage battery that is separate from either of
said high voltage electrical storage device and said power sourced from said
location separate from said high voltage electrical storage device.” The
added limitation is similar to the limitation at issue in claim 11. The
rejection of claim 23 builds upon the rejection of claim 1, and relies on
Kahlon for the added limitation. Final Act. 8–9. Appellant repeats the
argument made for independent claim 11 that none of the asserted references
discloses powering a controller with an auxiliary power source that is
separate from both the high voltage electrical storage device and a low
voltage battery. Appeal Br. 11. Our analysis of claim 11 above is applicable
here, and therefore, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 23.

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G. Claim 25 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Nada, McCall,
Kahlon, either Anderson or Lee, and Reed.
Claim 25 depends from claim 14, which depends in turn from
independent claim 11. The rejection does not rely on Anderson, Lee, or
Reed to correct the shortcomings of the rejection of claim 11. See Final Act.
9. Consequently, we agree with Appellant that the rejection of claim 25 is in
error for the same reason given with regard to claim 11. See Appeal Br. 11–
12.

DECISION
Claims 35 U.S.C. § 103 over Decision
1, 2, and 4–10 Nada, McCall, either Lee or Ijaz,
and either Buckley or Cobb
Affirmed
16, 20–22, and 26–28 Nada, McCall, either Lee or Ijaz,
and either Buckley or Cobb
Reversed
3 Nada, McCall, either Lee or Ijaz,
either Buckley or Cobb, and either
Kahlon or Berels
Affirmed
11, 13, 15, and 24 Nada, McCall, and Kahlon Reversed
14 Nada, McCall, Kahlon, and either
Anderson or Lee
Reversed
18 and 19 Nada, McCall, either Lee or Ijaz,
and either Buckley or Cobb, and
McMahan
Reversed
23 Nada, McCall, either Lee or Ijaz,
and either Buckley or Cobb, and
Kahlon
Reversed
25 Nada, McCall, Kahlon, either
Anderson or Lee, and Reed
Reversed
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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART