Dorothy D. Hatchett, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 1, 1998
01964256 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 1, 1998)

01964256

10-01-1998

Dorothy D. Hatchett, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic), Agency.


Dorothy D. Hatchett v. United States Postal Service

01964256

October 1, 1998

Dorothy D. Hatchett, )

Appellant, )

)

) Appeal No. 01964256

v. ) Agency Nos. 4D-1246-93

) 4D-1616-93

) Hearing Nos. 120-94-5322X

William J. Henderson, ) 120-94-5323X

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

(Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic), )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

On May 10, 1996, Dorothy D. Hatchett (appellant) timely appealed the

final decision of the United States Postal Service (agency), dated

March 21, 1996, concluding she had not been discriminated against in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. Appellant had alleged that agency officials

discriminated against her:

(1) on the basis of her race (black) when, on October 28, 1992, she

was harassed by being questioned by a Postal Inspector about her injury

compensation claim; and

(2) on the basis of her race (black), and in reprisal for engaging in

prior EEO activity, when, in January 1993, she was issued a Letter of

Removal, which was subsequently reduced to a 2 1/2 day suspension.

This appeal is accepted in accordance with the provisions of EEOC Order

No. 960.001.

At the time this matter arose, appellant was employed as a Distribution

Window Clerk, PS-05, at the Midlothian, Virginia Post Office. The record

indicates that in 1989 appellant suffered a work-related injury, diagnosed

as a pulled chest muscle. Subsequently, appellant claimed a recurrence of

this original injury and went out on medical leave on November 4, 1991.

In December 1991, appellant underwent surgery for a herniated cervical

disc. Following the surgery, appellant was unable to return to work

and perform her regular duties. Therefore, in January 1992, after all

her accrued leave had been used, appellant requested a limited duty job

assignment within her medical restrictions. The Midlothian Postmaster

(white) denied her request, asserting he had no such position available.

At this time, appellant was advised by the agency's Human Relations office

that, because she was not receiving workers' compensation benefits,<0>

she could apply for unemployment benefits from the Virginia Employment

Commission (VEC), the state unemployment agency. The record indicates

that appellant received unemployment benefits from February through August

1992, at which time she returned to work at the agency in a limited duty

assignment.

The record indicates that appellant was also a real estate agent, having

received her license in 1988. Agency officials testified that postal

employees were permitted to engage in other employment outside their

work hours, such as real estate sales, provided it did not conflict with

their Postal Service job. During June 1992, while she was out of work,

appellant was listed in a real estate magazine as the agent to contact

to see two different homes for sale. The evidence of record indicates

that while appellant was listed in the advertisement she was not the

listing agent. The record further establishes that appellant received

no real estate commissions during the period in question.

Upon learning of her real estate work, agency officials requested an

investigation by a Postal Inspector into whether appellant was improperly

receiving other income, both from working and in unemployment benefits,

that might be offset over any future OWCP award which appellant might

receive. In July 1992, a Postal Inspector posed as a home buyer and made

arrangements for appellant to show the two homes in the advertisement.

It appears that appellant expressed much reluctance to show the homes due

to her health problems, but agreed when the Postal Inspector persisted.

Following the investigation, the agency reported appellant to the VEC for

possibly misleading that agency in her unemployment benefits application.

The VEC later determined that appellant was entitled to the benefits

she received and took no action against her.

As already noted, appellant returned to work with the agency in a

limited duty assignment in September 1992. In October 1992, a Postal

Inspector (white) interviewed appellant twice concerning her injury

compensation claim and what she had told the Midlothian Postmaster and

the VEC about the alleged recurrence of a prior work-related injury.

The Postal Inspector testified that he concluded that appellant had not

violated any agency rules or regulations when she received unemployment

benefits from VEC because management had informed her that no limited

duty assignment was available for her to perform when her leave ran out.

By letter dated January 19, 1993, the agency issued appellant a Letter of

Removal for: (1) making false statements to the VEC regarding her postal

employment, and (2) working as a real estate agent during the period of

time when she was disabled from working her postal job. The removal was

to be effective on February 28, 1993. However, as a result of a grievance

resolution, the proposed removal was reduced to a 2 1/2 day suspension.

The record establishes that appellant had engaged in prior EEO activity

at the time her removal was proposed. However, both agency officials

involved in the proposal denied any knowledge of that prior activity at

the time they sought appellant's removal.

Appellant cited a comparative employee (white) who had been determined by

the agency to have improperly collected workers' compensation benefits.

The record established that this employee was required to return some

of the benefit money he received, but was not subjected to disciplinary

action. Appellant also noted that two other employees (white) were

provided limited duty assignments in less time than appellant, and at

least one worked at McDonald's while her workers' compensation claim

was pending, but was not referred to the Postal Inspectors. The agency

countered with other examples of employees (white and black) who were

investigated for improprieties concerning injury reimbursement claims.

The record reveals that appellant filed two separate EEO complaint

with the agency on November 16, 1992 (Agency Case No. 4D-1246-93) and

March 31, 1993 (Agency Case No. 4D-1616-93), alleging that the agency

had discriminated against her as referenced above. The agency accepted

the complaints and conducted investigations. At the conclusion of the

investigations, appellant requested an administrative hearing before an

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) administrative judge (AJ).

The AJ consolidated the two complaints for hearing.

On December 15, 1995, following a hearing at which eleven witnesses

testified, the AJ issued a recommended decision concluding that

the evidence of record supported a finding that appellant had been

discriminated against on the basis of her race, but not in reprisal for

engaging in prior EEO activity, when the agency proposed her removal and

later reduced the penalty to a 2 1/2 day suspension.<0> By contrast,

the AJ concluded that the evidence did not support a finding of race

discrimination with regard to the actions of the Postal Inspector in

this matter. In reaching his discrimination finding, the AJ noted that

the agency's explanation for the proposed removal was its reliance

on the Postal Inspector's investigative report. However, applying

the three-tiered analytical framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),<0> the AJ concluded that appellant

had proven this articulated reason was "not worthy of credence" and

"based on discriminatory animus" because the evidence established

that appellant committed no violation of agency rules as charged,

and similarly situated white employees were treated more favorably.

The AJ further noted that the agency proffered no evidence to justify

the disparate treatment of appellant.

In order to remedy appellant for the agency's discriminatory actions,

the AJ recommended that the suspension be rescinded and expunged from

agency records, and appellant be awarded backpay and restoration of

all benefits lost as a result of the suspension. The AJ also awarded

appellant all reasonable costs for the prosecution of her case, including

restoration of leave used for the purpose of preparing for her EEO hearing

if a reasonable amount of official time was denied her. Finally, the AJ

found that appellant was entitled to $20,000 in non-pecuniary compensatory

damages for the physical and emotional distress she suffered as a result

of the discrimination.

In a final decision dated March 21, 1996, the agency adopted the AJ's

conclusion that no discrimination occurred with regard to the actions

of the Postal Inspector and that appellant was not subjected to unlawful

retaliation. However, the agency rejected the findings and conclusions

of the AJ with regard to race discrimination in the disciplinary action

issued against appellant. It is from this decision that appellant now

appeals.

After a careful review of the record in its entirety, including the

statements submitted on appeal, the Commission finds that the AJ's

recommended decision sets forth the relevant facts and properly analyzes

the appropriate regulations, policies and laws. Nothing proffered by the

agency in its final decision or on appeal differs significantly from the

arguments presented at the hearing and given full consideration by the AJ.

The agency, for example, citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502 (1993), contends the AJ erred in his ultimate finding in this

case because a conclusion of discrimination cannot be drawn solely from

appellant's showing that the agency's proffered reasons for its actions

were false. The Commission finds that the agency misunderstands the

meaning of Hicks. Rather, the majority of the circuit courts have

interpreted Hicks, like the AJ in the instant matter, to mean that

evidence sufficient to discredit an employer's proffered reasons

for its actions, taken together with appellant's prima facie case,

may be sufficient to support a finding of discrimination. See McCoy

v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01956826 (October 31, 1997).

Therefore, the Commission discerns no basis upon which to overturn the

AJ's finding of discrimination in this matter.

We also affirm the AJ's recommended relief, including the award of

non-pecuniary compensatory damages in the amount of $20,000 for physical

and mental distress cause by the discrimination.<4> In this regard,

the AJ found that appellant, her physicians and her coworker credibly

testified to the emotional and physical harm appellant suffered as a

result of the removal/suspension action. The AJ further was correct

in recognizing the preexisting mental and emotional condition of

appellant prior to the proposed removal action. However, the AJ found

that the evidence supported a conclusion that the suspension resulted

in a worsening of appellant's anxiety and depression, and caused her

to become withdrawn from her family and friends, and exhibit anger

and suspicion which had not previously existed. Based on all these

factors, the Commission finds that the AJ's award was proper under the

circumstances and consistent with the amount awarded in similar cases.

See, e.g., Terrell v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, EEOC

Request No. 05970336 (November 20, 1997); Wallis v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01950510 (November 13, 1995); and Carpenter

v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01945652 (July 17, 1995).

Accordingly, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission to REVERSE that portion of the agency's final decision which

entered a finding of no race discrimination with regard to the agency's

decision to propose appellant's removal and later suspend her for 2

1/2 days. In order to remedy appellant for its discriminatory actions,

the agency shall, comply with the following Order.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:

(A) Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, the agency is directed to rescind the suspension at

issue and expunge from appellant's personnel files all reference

to the suspension and the proposed removal action from which the

suspension originated. Appellant shall be provided with appropriate

back pay and benefits, with interest, as indicated below.

(B) The agency shall determine the appropriate amount of backpay,

interest and other benefits due appellant, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �

1614.501, no later than thirty (30) calendar days after the date

this decision becomes final. The appellant shall cooperate in

the agency's efforts to compute the amount of backpay and benefits

due, and shall provide all relevant information requested by the

agency. If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of backpay

and/or benefits, the agency shall issue a check to the appellant

for the undisputed amount within thirty (30) calendar days of the

date the agency determines the amount it believes to be due. The

appellant may petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount

in dispute. The petition for clarification or enforcement must be

filed with the Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the

statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision."

(C) Within thirty calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall solicit from appellant an accounting of all

costs associated with the prosecution of this complaint. Within thirty

days of receipt of that information from appellant, the agency shall

issue her a check reimbursing her for all reasonable costs. As part

of this process, the agency shall review the amount of official time

requested by appellant to prepare for her hearing on these matters,

and if any reasonable amount of official time was denied, the agency

should restore the leave appellant used for that purpose.

(D) Within thirty calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall award appellant the amount of $20,000 in

non-pecuniary compensatory damages for mental and physical distress.

(E) The agency shall post at the Midlothian, Virginia Post Office

copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed

by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted by the

agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive

days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to

employees are customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable

steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered

by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to

the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph entitled

"Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar

days of the expiration of the posting period.

(F) The agency shall provide training in the obligations and duties

imposed by the Title VII to the officials responsible for the action

at issue.

(G) The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the

agency's calculation of backpay and other benefits due appellant,

including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1092)

If appellant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. �1614.501 (e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. �1614.501 (e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid

by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � l6l4.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you

have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some

jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner

suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your

civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision

or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative,

you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR

DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your

appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME

AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY

HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME

AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of

your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Oct 1, 1998

_________________ _______________________________

DATE Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

An Agency of the United States Government

This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission dated _____________ which found that

a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq., has occurred at this facility.

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any

employee or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE,

COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or PHYSICAL or MENTAL

DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation,

or other terms, conditions or privileges of employment.

The United States Postal Service supports and will comply with such

Federal law and will not take action against individuals because they

have exercised their rights under law.

The United States Postal Service has been found to have discriminated

against the individual affected by the Commission's finding on the bases

of her race when her removal was proposed and she was subsequently

suspended. The agency has been ordered to rescind the suspension,

provide the individual with appropriate backpay and costs for prosecuting

her complaint, and award the individual $20,000 in compensatory damages.

The United States Postal Service will ensure that officials responsible

for personnel decisions and terms and conditions of employment will

abide by the requirements of all Federal equal employment opportunity

laws and will not retaliate against employees who file EEO complaints.

The United States Postal Service will not in any manner restrain,

interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual who exercises his

or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by, or who participates

in proceedings pursuant to, Federal equal employment opportunity law.

____________________

Date Posted: _____________________

Posting Expires: _________________

29 C.F.R. Part 1614

01 Appellant's workers' compensation claim, filed in June-July 1992,

was rejected by the Office of Workers Compensation Programs (OWCP)

because that agency determined that appellant's current injury was not

a recurrence of her previous work-related injury.

02 The AJ found appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of

reprisal discrimination because there was insufficient evidence that the

responsible management officials were aware of her prior EEO activity at

the time her removal was proposed.

03 See also, Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867

(1984); U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,

715-716 (1983); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450

U.S. 248, 253-256 (1981).

04 In Jackson v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01923399

(November 12, 1992), request for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request

No. 05930306 (February 1, 1993), the Commission held that Congress

afforded it the authority to award such damages in the administrative

process. It based this assessment, inter alia, on a review of the

statutory provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in relation

to one another and on principles of statutory interpretation which

require statutes to be interpreted as a whole. In particular, the

Commission discussed the meaning of the statute's definition of the term

"complaining party" and the significance of the reference to the word

"action" in Section 102(a). In addition to the specific reasons set

forth in Jackson for this holding, Section 2000e-16(b) (Section 717) of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.)(CRA) conveyed

to the Commission the broad authority in the administrative process

to enforce the nondiscrimination provisions of subsection (a) through

"appropriate remedies". Similarly, in Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act

of 1991 (CRA of 1991), Congress refers to its first stated purpose as

being "to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination

and unlawful harassment in the workplace", thereby reaffirming that

authority. Consequently, it is our view that in 1991, Congress clearly

intended to expand the scope of the "appropriate remedies" available

in the administrative process to federal employees who are victims

of discrimination. Moreover, in Section 717(c) of the CRA, the term

"final action" is used to refer to administrative decisions by agencies

or the Commission, as distinguished from the term "civil action", used

to describe the rights of employees after such final action is taken.

Therefore, the Commission reaffirmed the holding therein. See Cobey

Turner v. Department of the Interior, EEOC Appeal Nos. 01956390 and

01960518 (April 27, 1998).