Dorea L. White, Complainant,v.R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 17, 2007
0120062651 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 17, 2007)

0120062651

04-17-2007

Dorea L. White, Complainant, v. R. James Nicholson, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


Dorea L. White,

Complainant,

v.

R. James Nicholson,

Secretary,

Department of Veterans Affairs,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01200626511

Agency No. 2004-0641-2005102304

DECISION

Complainant filed an appeal with this Commission from the February 22,

2006 agency decision finding no discrimination and dismissing claim 1

of the complaint on the grounds that it was a collateral attack on the

workers' compensation process.

Complainant, a certified Nursing Assistant, alleged that the agency

discriminated her on the bases of race (African-American) and color

(black) when: (1) the Case Manager of the Office of Workers' Compensation

Programs (OWCP) accused complainant of having filed a fraudulent claim

and refused to pay complainant's full claim; and (2) when complainant's

employment was terminated in April 2005.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge. Complainant timely

requested a hearing but subsequently withdrew her request. Consequently,

the agency issued its decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b).

In dismissing claim 1 of the complaint, the agency concluded that

complainant was using the EEO process to collaterally attack an action

which should have been challenged in the workers' compensation process.

Regarding claim 2, the agency concluded that complainant failed to

establish a prima facie case of race and color discrimination, noting that

complainant had failed to establish the causal nexus between her protected

classes and the agency's alleged discriminatory action. The agency

further concluded that even if complainant had established a prima facie

case, the agency had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for its termination of complainant. Specifically, the agency stated

that complainant was terminated because of a poor time and attendance

record. Noting that complainant was serving a one-year probationary

period as a career conditional appointee, the agency stated that during

her probationary period, complainant had used excessive unplanned leave.

Because this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing,

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject

to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).

Complainant may establish a prima facie case of color or race

discrimination by showing that: (1) complainant was a member of the

protected class; (2) an adverse action was taken against complainant;

(3) a causal relationship existed between complainant's membership in

the protected class and the adverse action; and (4) other employees

outside of complainant's protected class were treated differently.

In a complaint which alleges disparate treatment and there is an absence

of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocations of burdens and

the order of presentation of proof is a three-step process. A claim

of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first

enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, complainant must first establish

a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if

unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination,

i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse

employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco

Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Next, the agency

must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.

See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253

(1981). If the agency is successful in meeting its burden, complainant

must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate reason

proffered by the agency was a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 256.

The established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the

factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell

Douglas analysis to the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by

a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions were motivated

by discrimination. See United States Postal Service Board of Governors

v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department of

Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990).

The record contains a Memorandum from complainant's supervisor to the

Director of Human Services recommending that complainant not be retained

past her probationary period of April 13, 2005, noting that complainant

had used 64 hours of sick leave and 470 hours of leave without pay.

In her affidavit, complainant's supervisor stated that she recommended

complainant's termination because of her time and attendance record.

She also stated that she had terminated two White employees based on

their time and attendance. A memorandum provided by a Human Resources

Management Officer, dated October 26, 2005, reveals that there were

no terminations of term, temporary, or probationary appointments made

within the organizational unit going back two years from the date of

complainant's termination.

Upon review, the Commission finds that the agency's dismissal of

claim 1 was proper. Here, the record reveals that claim 1 concerns

the administration of complainant's workers' compensation claim and is

therefore appropriately dismissed pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1)

for failure to state a claim. The Commission has held that an employee

cannot use the EEO complaint process to lodge a collateral attack on

another proceeding. See Kleinman v. United States Postal Service, EEOC

Request No. 05940585 (September 22, 1994); Lingad v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05930106 (June 24, 1993). The proper forum for

complainant to have raised claim 1, concerning a March 2005 work injury,

was within the workers' compensation process.

Regarding claim 2, the Commission concurs with the agency's finding

of no discrimination. Assuming without deciding that complainant

has established a prima facie case of discrimination based on race and

color, the record reveals that complainant was terminated because of her

attendance record and not for discriminatory reasons. Complainant has

failed to show that the agency's explanation for terminating her during

her probationary period was not the real reason and was mere pretext

to mask unlawful discrimination. Complainant has failed to present

evidence that more likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons

for its actions were motivated by a discriminatory animus and a pretext

for unlawful discrimination. It is not sufficient "to disbelieve the

employer; the fact finder must believe the plaintiff's explanation of

intentional discrimination." St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 519 (1993). At all times, the ultimate burden of persuasion

remains with complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the

evidence that the agency's reasons were pretextual or motivated by

intentional discrimination. Complainant failed to carry this burden.

The agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your

time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil

action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph

above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

April 17, 2007

__________________

Date

1 Due to a new data system, this appeal has been re-designated with the

above-referenced appeal number.

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2

0120062651

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P. O. Box 19848

Washington, D.C. 20036