Donald McMorrow, Appellant,v.William M. Daley, Secretary, Department of Commerce, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 18, 1999
01970666 (E.E.O.C. May. 18, 1999)

01970666

05-18-1999

Donald McMorrow, Appellant, v. William M. Daley, Secretary, Department of Commerce, Agency.


Donald McMorrow v. Department of Commerce

01970666

May 18, 1999

Donald McMorrow, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01970666

v. ) Agency No. 96-54-0045

)

William M. Daley, )

Secretary, )

Department of Commerce, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal of a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint of

unlawful employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; and

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. Appellant alleges that he was discriminated

against on the bases of race (White) and age (DOB: 11/19/42) when he was

not selected for the position of Bindery Machine Operator Supervisor.

The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

For the following reasons, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, appellant was employed

as a Bindery Machine Operator in the Finishing Section of the Reproductive

Division at the agency's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Believing he was discriminated against as referenced above, appellant

sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed a complaint on October

11, 1995. At the conclusion of the initial investigation, appellant

requested that the agency issue a final decision.<1>

The FAD concluded that appellant established prima facie cases of

race and age discrimination when he demonstrated that a similarly

situated employee not in his protected classes was selected. However,

the FAD concluded that appellant failed to establish that the agency's

explanation for not selecting appellant, specifically that to do so would

have violated nepotism regulations, was a pretext for discrimination.

It is from this decision which appellant appeals. Appellant raises no

new contentions on appeal. The agency requests that we affirm its FAD.

Based on the standards set forth in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973) and Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979),

we agree with the agency that while appellant may have established prima

facie cases of race and age discrimination, appellant failed to prove

that, more likely than not, the agency's legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its action was a pretext for discrimination. In reaching

this conclusion, we note that there is no dispute between the parties

that appellant was the best qualified candidate for the supervisory

position and that the selectee, a younger Black male, was considerably

less qualified than appellant. However, had appellant been selected, he

would have been the supervisor of his brother-in-law, a Bindery Machine

Operator in appellant's same Section, in violation of the Office of

Personnel Management regulation at 5 C.F.R. � 310.103, which prohibits

a public official from advocating or actualizing the appointment,

employment, promotion, or advancement of one of his relatives. See 5

C.F.R. � 310.101 et seq.

Appellant alleges that the agency used the anti-nepotism rules to

reject his application and select a minority candidate. However, the

evidence establishes that management, after determining that all of

the Section employees worked the same shift and reported to the same

supervisor, attempted to retitle the position in order to circumvent

the anti-nepotism rules, but Personnel determined that the rules would

still apply. Consequently, management then made a good faith effort to

transfer appellant's brother-in-law to another division.<2> When this

effort was unsuccessful, management acknowledged that the best qualified

applicant, appellant, could not be selected for the position.

Thereafter, the Division Chief requested the Section Chief determine which

employees in the Division could qualify for the position. The Division

Chief also stated that "it would certainly not hurt if any of the

candidates were part of (an) under-represented minority group." The

Division Chief also stated, "If all things were equal, I would prefer

to see a minority candidate selected." Consequently, the Section Chief

focused his Division wide search on minority candidates and encouraged two

employees to apply. However, the Section Chief stated that, to the best

of his knowledge, besides appellant and his brother-in-law, there were no

White employees, 40 years or older, who were qualified for the position.

Under the circumstances of this case, the Division Chief's comments,

viewed in their context, do not rise to the level of discrimination.

The Division Chief specifically stated that "if all things were equal,"

he would prefer to see a minority candidate selected. However, in this

case, there were no equally qualified candidates. The Division Chief,

the Section Chief and other management officials unanimously agreed that

appellant was the best qualified applicant; that he was their first choice

for the position; and had it not been for the anti-nepotism regulations,

appellant would have been promoted. Therefore, after a careful review

of the record, including appellant's contentions on appeal, the agency's

response, and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this

decision, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive the decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive the decision. To ensure that your civil action is

considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive the decision or to consult an attorney

concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your

action would be filed. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court

appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you

to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security.

See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��

791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole

discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not

extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request

and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in

the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

May 18, 1999

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

1 A supplemental investigation was conducted to clarify the record

before the agency issued its final decision.

2 The record establishes that management attempted to have appellant's

brother-in-law reassigned to a position in the Automated Data Processing

Unit but ultimately determined that he was not sufficiently qualified.

Management then explored the possibility of reassignment as a Negative

Engraver, a position which would require three to five years of training

to obtain required proficiency. The Supervisor of the Negative Engraving

Unit was unwilling to hire a trainee. Management stated that when

union officials discovered that management was attempting to reassign

appellant's brother-in-law, they accused management of giving preferential

treatment to a White employee. Management stated that during this time

period, no other employees in the Reproduction Division were reassigned

to positions which required extensive and lengthy training.