01a50424
04-19-2005
Donald Eaton, Complainant, v. Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary, Department of Transportation, Agency.
Donald Eaton v. Department of Transportation
01A50424
April 19, 2005
.
Donald Eaton,
Complainant,
v.
Norman Y. Mineta,
Secretary,
Department of Transportation,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A50424
Agency Nos. 3-01-60124 and 3-01-6076
Hearing No. 340-2002-03258X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order
concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �
621 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final
order.
The record reveals that complainant, an Airways Transportation Systems
Specialist at the agency's Palm Springs, California facility, filed
formal EEO complaints alleging that the agency discriminated against him
on the bases of race (African-American) and age (over 40 years of age),
and in reprisal for prior EEO activity (arising under Title VII) when;
On August 25, 2000, the agency issued complainant a Letter of Reprimand;
In January 2001, the agency denied complainant a pay raise; and
On February 7, 2001, the agency issued complainant another Letter
of Reprimand.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy
of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ). On July 20, 2004, the AJ issued a Notice of
Intent to Issue a Decision Without a Hearing, accompanied by a Statement
of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law. Both parties filed
responses. On September 10, 2004, the AJ issued a decision without a
hearing, finding no discrimination. The AJ found that complainant failed
to establish prima facie cases of discrimination for claims 1 and 3.
The AJ further found that complainant failed to persuasively rebut the
agency's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions with
evidence of pretext for any of his claims. The agency's final order
implemented the AJ's decision. On appeal, complainant restates arguments
previously made before the AJ. In response, the agency restates the
position and requests that we affirm its final order.
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the
summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of
the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and
all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that
a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"
if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can
only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, a decision without
a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative
proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without a
hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately
developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003).
Generally, in order to establish a prima facie case of race or age
discrimination, the complainant must demonstrate that: (1) he is a member
of a protected class; and (2) he was treated differently, with respect
to some condition of employment, from others outside his protected
class and in a manner that creates an inference of discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal by presenting
facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference
of discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Admin., EEOC Request
No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., U.S. 792,
802 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal claim, and in accordance
with the burdens set forth in McDonnell Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester
Foundation for Experimental Biology, 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.),
aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976), and Coffman v. Department of Veteran
Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473 (November 20, 1997), a complainant may
establish a prima facie case of reprisal by showing that: (1) he engaged
in a protected activity; (2) the agency was aware of the protected
activity; (3) subsequently, he was subjected to adverse treatment by
the agency; and (4) a nexus exists between the protected activity and
the adverse treatment. Whitmire v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC
Appeal No. 01A00340 (September 25, 2000).
The burden of production then shifts to the agency to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department
of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the
agency has articulated such a reason, the question becomes whether the
proffered explanation was the true reason for the agency's action, or
merely a pretext for discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). Although the burden of production may shift,
the burden of persuasion, by a preponderance of the evidence, remains
at all times on complainant. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
In this matter, complainant failed to provide any evidence that any
similarly situated individuals not within his protected classes were
treated differently than he, nor any other evidence that would raise
of inference of race of age discrimination for any of his claims.
Consequently, we find that complainant failed to provide evidence
from which a prima facie case of race or age discrimination could be
established.
Moreover, we find that the agency provided legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for each of its actions. Specifically, for claim 1,
complainant's second-line supervisor responded that the August 2000
reprimand was issued to complainant for leaving a radar site unsecured,
with the security gate open and unlocked. In response to claim 2, the
agency responded that payment of complainant's pay increase was delayed
because the increase had to be processed by the national headquarters
instead of the regional office. The undisputed record reveals that
complainant received his pay increase after the processing was completed.
Regarding claim 3, the second-line supervisor responded that complainant
was issued the February 2001 reprimand because complainant interrupted
the radar service of air traffic controllers in Palm Springs, California.
The agency maintained that keyboard entry data confirmed that service
was interrupted because complainant left the serial input in the manual
position instead of the proper automatic position. Upon review of each
claim, we find that complainant failed to rebut the agency's legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for its actions with any actions from which
a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the reasons were pretext
for unlawful discrimination or retaliation.
Accordingly, after a careful review of the record, the Commission finds
that the issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate, as no
genuine dispute of material fact exists. We find that the AJ's decision
properly summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate
regulations, policies, and laws. Further, construing the evidence to
be most favorable to complainant, we conclude that complainant failed
to present evidence that any of the agency's actions were motivated by
discriminatory animus toward complainant's protected classes. Therefore,
we affirm the final order finding no discrimination.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
_April 19, 2005_________________
Date