Donald Bruno, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 16, 2002
01996301 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 16, 2002)

01996301

01-16-2002

Donald Bruno, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific Area), Agency.


Donald Bruno v. United States Postal Service

01996301

January 16, 2002

.

Donald Bruno,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Pacific Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01996301

Agency No. 4F-950-0031-97

Hearing No. 370-97-X2604

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., Section

501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.,<1> and the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is

accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons,

the Commission affirms the agency's final order.

The record reveals that complainant, a letter carrier at the agency's

Monterey, California facility, filed a formal EEO complaint on November

22, 1996, alleging that the agency had discriminated against him on the

bases of sex (male), disability (bipolar disorder and anxiety disorder),

and age (DOB: 3/10/53) when:

on September 17, 1996, a supervisor (S1) put his hand within inches of

complainant's face in a threatening manner; and

he was not allowed to work from September 23-26, 1996, although he

provided a medical release to return to work.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing,

finding no discrimination.

In her decision, the AJ concluded, with respect to the first incident,

that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

In so concluding, the AJ determined that the action by S1 did not

constitute an adverse action for the purposes of a disparate treatment

claim, nor was it sufficiently offensive standing alone so as to

constitute a hostile work environment. Regarding the second incident,

the AJ found that the agency articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for its action without specifically determining whether complainant

made a prima facie case of discrimination. Specifically, the AJ found

that the reason complainant was not permitted to return to work was

because he did not properly follow agency regulation requiring him to

submit his medical clearance to the medical unit.

The AJ then concluded that complainant failed to establish that more

likely than not, the reasons provided by the agency were a pretext for

discrimination. The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.

On appeal, complainant contends that the AJ erred when she did not

construe complainant's complaint to allege a failure of the agency

to reasonably accommodate complainant's disability. Complainant also

disputes the conclusions drawn by the AJ: 1) that S1 did not create an

intimidating or hostile environment for complainant based on his sex,

age or disability; and 2) that the agency was negligent in not permitting

him to go back to work on September 23.<2> Further, complainant raises

the additional claim that S1 improperly disclosed complainant's medical

information. Insomuch as complainant is raising this argument for the

first time on appeal, we will not address it.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record

and that the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and

referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We note that

complainant failed to present evidence that any of the agency's actions

were motivated by discriminatory animus toward complainant's age, sex

or disability. Further, we concur with the AJ's finding that the reason

complainant was not permitted to return was because he failed to follow

agency regulations.

With respect to the issue of whether denying complainant entry into the

workplace on September 23 was tantamount to a refusal to accommodate

his disability requires a more in-depth inquiry. To establish a

case of discrimination based on a failure to accommodate a disability,

complainant must show: (1) that she is an individual with a disability and

(2) that she is a qualified individual with a disability, in that she is

qualified for and can perform the essential elements of the position

held or desired with or without reasonable accommodation. Cansino

v. Department of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05960674 (Aug. 27, 1998)

(citing Prewitt v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th

Cir. 1981)). An individual with a disability is one who: 1) has a

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits or restricts

one or more of his or her major life activities; 2) has a record of

such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having the impairment. See 29

C.F.R. � 1630.2(g). Major life activities include functions such as

self care, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,

breathing, learning, and working. See 29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(i).

Herein complainant did not ask for leave or a modification of his job

duties, location, or the like. Complainant, therefore, did not make a

request for a reasonable accommodation. Rather, complainant's argument

can be construed as an opposition to the medical clearance requirement

that prevented him from returning to work on September 23.

The EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical

Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act

(Disability Guidance), No. 915.002 (July 26, 2000) states:

The ADA [Americans with Disabilities Act] states, in relevant part:

A covered entity<3> shall not require a medical examination and shall

not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an

individual with a disability or as to the nature and severity of the

disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related

and consistent with business necessity.<4>

This statutory language makes clear that the ADA's restrictions on

inquiries and examinations apply to all employees, not just those with

disabilities. Unlike other provisions of the ADA which are limited to

qualified individuals with disabilities,<5> the use of the term �employee�

in this provision reflects Congress's intent to cover a broader class of

individuals and to prevent employers from asking questions and conducting

medical examinations that serve no legitimate purpose.<6>

Disability Guidance at 5. (Footnotes in original). Thus, we need not

determine whether complainant is a qualified individual with a disability.

The Disability Guidance goes on to state that an employer may make

disability-related inquires or require a medical examination when an

employee has been on leave for a medical condition and seeks to return

to work. An employer may do so when the �employer has a reasonable belief

that an employee's present ability to perform essential job functions

will be impaired by a medical condition or that s/he will pose a direct

threat due to a medical condition . . . .� (Emphasis in original)

Herein, following the incident with S1 on September 17, complainant

requested Continuation of Pay leave and left the post office. Complainant

went to see his psychiatrist, who diagnosed the complainant as suffering

from �acute stress.� The psychiatrist advised complainant to remain

off work until September 23.

When complainant sought to return to work on September 23, he was advised

that he could not do so until the district's medical officer had received

and reviewed complainant's medical clearance. Complainant was made aware

that such a clearance would be required, and to whom it must be provided,

via letter dated September 17 from a management official.

We find that the agency had a reasonable belief that complainant could

pose a direct threat due to his medical condition and, thus, that the

request for medical clearance was job-related and consistent with the

agency's business necessity. Indeed, by complainant's on admissions in

his statement on appeal, prior to his departure on September 17th, he

had been behaving in an �excitable� manner. As to the agency's review of

the psychiatrist's medical clearance, agency officials stated that they

merely wanted a clarification from the agency medical unit as to what

�stressed� meant. Finally, within four days, the medical documentation

had been received and promptly reviewed by the district's medical unit,

and complainant was returned to work.

The Commission discerns no basis to disturb the AJ's decision. After

a careful review of the record, including complainant's contentions on

appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence not specifically

addressed in this decision, we affirm the agency's final order.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

January 16, 2002

__________________

Date

1 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination

by federal employees or applicants for employment.

2 As stated above, all dates occur in 1996.

3"Covered entity� means an employer, employment agency, labor

organization, or joint labor management committee. 29 C.F.R. �

1630.2(b)(1998). For simplicity, this guidance refers to all covered

entities as �employers.� The definition of �employer� includes persons

who are �agents� of the employer, such as managers, supervisors, or

others who act for the employer (e.g., agencies used to conduct background

checks on applicants and employees). 42 U.S.C. � 12111(5)(1994).

442 U.S.C. � 12112(d)(4)(A)(1994); 29 C.F.R. �1630.14(c)(1998).

See Disability Guidance at Question 5 and accompanying text for a

discussion of what the �job-related and consistent with business

necessity� standard means.

5See e.g., 42 U.S.C. � 12112(a)(1994)(no entity shall discriminate against

a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of

such individual).

6Congress was particularly concerned about questions that allowed

employers to learn which employees have disabilities that are not

apparent from observation. It concluded that the only way to protect

employees with nonvisible disabilities is to prohibit employers from

making disability-related inquiries and requiring medical examinations

that are not job-related and consistent with business necessity.

See S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 39-40 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2,

at 75 (1990) (�An inquiry or medical examination that is not job-related

serves no legitimate employer purpose, but simply serves to stigmatize

the person with a disability.� A person with cancer �may object merely

to being identified, independent of the consequences [since] being

identified as [a person with a disability] often carries both blatant

and subtle stigma�).