Diane L. Beesley, Complainant,v.Peter B. Teets, Acting Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 7, 2005
01a46012 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 7, 2005)

01a46012

03-07-2005

Diane L. Beesley, Complainant, v. Peter B. Teets, Acting Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.


Diane L. Beesley v. Department of the Air Force

01A46012

March 7, 2005

.

Diane L. Beesley,

Complainant,

v.

Peter B. Teets,

Acting Secretary,

Department of the Air Force,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A46012

Agency No. 8I1M03007

Hearing No. 150-2004-00157X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

During the relevant time, complainant was employed as a Traffic Management

Specialist, GS-2130-09, at the agency's 96th Transportation Logistics

Readiness Squadron/Traffic Management Flight (LRS/LGRT), Elgin Air Force

Base (AFB), Florida<1>.

Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed a formal

complaint on March 3, 2003. Therein, complainant claimed that she was

discriminated against on the bases of sex (female), age (D.O.B. 12/10/52),

and in reprisal for prior EEO activity (for reporting a claim of sexual

harassment during March 2000 and/or for contacting an EEO Counselor on

December 4, 2002) when:

(1) on January 24, 2003, complainant received an AF Form 860B,

[Civilian Progress Review Sheet] which rated her for work not required

by her work plan and which contained disparaging comments;

(2) she was discriminated against relating to her work assignments on

November 5, 2002; and

(3) since March 2000, she was subjected to a hostile work environment

when she first reported a previous claim of sexual harassment.

Complainant based her claim of harassment on fourteen separate incidents.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

the right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ)

or alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

initially requested a hearing before an AJ. By letter to the AJ dated May

19, 2004, complainant withdrew her hearing request and requested that the

agency issue a final decision. By Order dated May 20, 2004, the AJ issued

an Order of Dismissal dismissing complainant's request for a hearing

without prejudice and ordered the agency to issue a final decision.

In its July 26, 2004 final decision, the agency construed the above

referenced three claims as one overall claim of hostile work environment

based on sex, age, and in reprisal for prior protected activity.

The agency indicated that the specific incidents that comprised the

claim of hostile work environment included the following incidents:

a. management's failure to properly code complainant's budget experience

since 1998;

b. the alleged withholding of tools and equipment from complainant's

use on the job since March 2000;

c. complainant's assignment during May 2001, to perform additional

computer duties;

d. complainant's assignment during June 2001, to work with the passenger

travel software;

e. complainant's assignment during January 2002, to train military

personnel on the Cargo Movement Operating System (CMOS);

f. complainant's assignment during April 2002, to show a General Officer

the CMOS software;

g. on August 22, 2002, [a named System Administrator] took the printers

off line and caused an altercation between a co-worker and complainant;

h. complainant was offered a physical evaluation upon her return to

duty from sick leave on September 30, 2002;

i. on October 1, 2002, [Complainant's named first-level Supervisor]

allegedly made a sarcastic remark to her;

j. on November 5, 2002, complainant's workgroup manager duties were

deleted;

k. complainant was charged Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) for

her absence from November 25 to 29, 2002;

l. on December 3, 2002, complainant's e-mail was forwarded to her

supervisor;

m. complainant was informed that her position would be abolished on

December 3, 2002;

n. during December 2002, complainant was reassigned to a new immediate

supervisor;

o. on January 24, 2004, complainant received her AF Form 860B, which

rated for work not required by her work plan, contained disparaging

comments and received a new work plan, AF Form 860; and

p. complainant's AF Form 860A for rating period, April 1, 2002 through

March 31, 2003 was lowered.

Claims (o) and (p)

The agency first addressed claims (o) and (p) separately, and found that

management articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its

actions and that complainant did not establish that these reasons were

a pretext for discrimination.

Specifically, the agency noted that in her declaration, complainant's

immediate supervisor (S1) stated she wrote comments which she did not

perceive as disparaging, on complainant's AF Form 860B because complainant

had not been to work in three months, and that S1 had received a sick

slip for only one week. S1 stated that she used the guidance from

a Human Resources Specialist, an agency official, and her immediate

supervisor in her determination rating complainant's performance; and

that they advised S1 that it would not be fair to other employees to

give complainant a high rating when she was not at work. S1 stated

that she did not feel that complainant's performance rating was bad,

considering that she had not been at the worksite, and that she had not

received an unsatisfactory rating.

The agency also noted that complainant's second-level supervisor (S2)

stated that as a reviewer, she signed complainant's performance plan.

S2 further stated that she did not recall any disparaging remarks in

complainant's performance plan; and that complainant "was not at the

worksite performing her job because she had been on some type of leave

from September through December 2002 and that she had difficulty with

working relationships with other employees." Moreover, S2 stated

that she was in agreement with S1 concerning complainant's performance,

and knew that complainant was not in a duty status for "most the quarter."

The agency noted in her declaration, the third-level supervisor (S3)

stated that complainant's work plan "was being revised to accurately

reflect her duties as contained in her position description." The S3

further stated that complainant was doing budget work, and should have

been performing CMOS duties in accordance with her position description.

Moreover, the agency then determined that complainant failed to provide

any evidence that management's reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

Regarding claim (p), the agency found that the record does not contain

specific information showing how S3 rated other employees under her

supervision. The agency noted that complainant's AF Form 860A contained

an overall �acceptable� rating with eight appraisal factor ratings of

�8" and one appraisal factor rating of �9.� The agency concluded that

appraisal factor ratings such as complainant's ratings are generally

considered not to be adverse ratings because the rating of �8" is the

second highest factor rating; and the rating of �9" is the highest factor

rating an employee may receive.

Harassment claim

Furthermore, the agency concluded that complainant failed to prove that

she was subjected to harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive so as

to render her work environment hostile. Specifically, the agency found

that the majority of complainant's claims appear to be actions of S1, S2,

and S3 attempting to accomplish the actions required of their positions

of responsibility. The agency also found that when dealing with agency

management, complainant was at times uncooperative; and misunderstood and

challenged management's attempts to assist her and to perform necessary

supervisory duties.

Regarding claim (a), the agency noted that S1 stated that she placed

budget work on complainant's work plan so that complainant could get

credit for such work. S1 further stated that if complainant wished to

have the budget plan placed in her personnel records, that she would

need to complete a 612 form and "then I would sign this 612 form

indicating [Complainant] had performed this work." S1 stated that

when she was complainant' s supervisor, complainant "did not provide

me with a completed 612 form showing the budget work or with any other

completed form to document her budget work experience so that it may be

inputted into the computer system." Furthermore, S1 stated that she,

complainant' s second-level Supervisor and S3 advised complainant that

she needed to complete the appropriate form to have her budget work

experience coded by Civilian Personnel Office. The agency further noted

in her declaration, S3 stated that prior to her departure in 2003,

she provided a copy of complainant' s budget experience paperwork to

[Human Resources Analyst]. S3 further stated that [Human Resources

Analyst] assured me that complainant's budget experience paperwork

"would be inputted into the system."

Regarding claim (b), the agency noted that S1 stated that she bought

tools and equipment for complainant to do her job. S1 further stated

that a System Administrator did not withhold tools and equipment from

complainant because they each had their own tools/equipment to use.

S1 stated that the System Administrator is the building custodian and

is responsible for equipment, and locked up old computers that were not

being used.

With respect to complainant's claim that a System Administrator would

not provide her a laptop, the agency noted that S3 stated that she was

informed that the System Administrator told complainant that if she

signed up for a laptop computer, he would let her have it.

Regarding claim (c), the agency noted that S1 stated that in March 2001,

complainant requested additional duties, and that after such duties were

assigned, complainant reconsidered, causing agency management to remove

the duties.

Regarding claim (d), S1 stated that she did not give complainant the

additional duty of working with the passenger travel software.

Regarding claim (e), the agency noted in her declaration, complainant

claimed that S3 instructed her to train about five military personnel

in CMOS for deployments and that S1 �tasked me to perform this function

because [a named System Administrator] did not want to do it.� The

agency noted in her declaration, S3 stated that the CMOS training was

part of complainant's position description and that she had conducted

CMOS training for air terminal operators and CMOS users. Further,

the agency noted in his declaration, the System Administrator stated he

offered to assist complainant �in getting the computers ready for the

training to the five military personnel,� but she declined his offer.

Furthermore, the System Administrator stated that on February 7, 2002, he

was not available for the CMOS training because he had a Barcode training.

Regarding claim (f), S1 stated that she asked complainant to put

together a briefing for a General Officer]. The S1 further stated

that she informed complainant that it would be "an informal and not

in-depth briefing," and that she would be fine. S1 stated that it was

a �bonus� for the General Officer to see what complainant could do.

Furthermore, S1 stated that complainant was "excited about this task;"

and that she "did well in this 5 or 10 minute presentation to [the named

General Officer]."

Regarding claim (g), S1 stated that following her investigation, she

learned that the System Administrator did not cause the altercation

between complainant and a co-worker. S1 further stated that she received

letters from other employees "that indicated [the named Co-worker] did not

want to talk with [complainant] and stated that he was tired of hearing

[complainant's] problems and that he was busy."

Regarding claim (h), the agency noted in her declaration, S2 stated

that on September 30, 2002, she issued complainant a memorandum of

Offer of Medical Examination/Evaluation because she was concerned with

complainant's state of health. S2 further stated that she was doing

what Employee Relations recommended, and that a named Employee Relations

employee drafted the memorandum. S2 further stated that she issued this

memorandum to complainant "because she was having panic attacks in the

office and employees were concerned." S2 stated that the memorandum was

not a Fitness for Duty memorandum.

Regarding claim (i), the agency noted that complainant claimed

that S1 inquired regarding her signing the letter of medical

examination/evaluation and then made a sarcastic remark to her.

The agency noted in her declaration, S1 denied making a sarcastic remark

as alleged by complainant.

Regarding claim (j), S1 stated that she did not take away workgroup

manager duties from complainant. S1 further stated that once a

merger went through, complainant no longer worked for Transportation

but worked for Management Systems. Furthermore, S1 stated that all

of the computer employees, including complainant, started working for

Management Systems. The agency noted that S3 stated that Workgroup

Manager duties were not part of complainant's position description,

and that it was an additional duty assigned to her. S3 further stated

when the two squadrons merged, the Systems Management Supervisor took

away Workgroup Manager from employees, including complainant, because

she was trying to make the organization "more efficient and streamlined."

Regarding claim (k), the agency noted in her declaration, S1 stated

that she placed complainant on AWOL "because she walked off the job."

S1 also stated that complainant was placed on AWOL for three days, and

"then it was subsequently changed to either annual or sick leave."

Regarding claim (l), the agency noted in her declaration, S3 stated that

she had no knowledge of the Supervisor, Freight Rate Specialist advising

complainant that S3 instructed him to forward his e-mails received from

complainant to S3. Moreover, S3 denied instructing the Supervisor,

Freight Rate Specialist to forward his e-mails received from complainant

to her.

Regarding claim (m), the agency noted in her declaration, S1 stated

that during a meeting, S3 informed complainant that one of the systems

administrator positions was being abolished and that it would be up

to Civilian Personnel to decide which position would be abolished.

S1 further stated that complainant interpreted this as a statement

that her position was being abolished. The agency further noted in

her declaration, S3 stated that she made this management decision "for

efficiency of the organization" because she felt that there was no need

for two administrators.

Regarding claim (n), S1 stated that complainant was reassigned to a

new immediate supervisor because she was under Management Systems.

The agency further noted in her declaration, S3 stated that after

complainant filed a complaint against S1, she made the decision that

complainant could no longer be supervised by S1; and that it would "not

be healthy or appropriate" to have S1 supervise complainant during the

processing of complainant' s complaint. S3 stated that she then needed

to determine the next line of supervisory authority. S3 stated that

she determined that the Supervisor of the Computer Systems Section would

be the "logical person" to be assigned as complainant's new supervisor

because complainant's section was being transferred into the Computer

Systems Section. S3 also stated that she decided to directly supervise

complainant until the reorganization was "completely finished."

Disparate Treatment

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that

a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment

action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction

Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to

the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the

complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder

by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of

a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Upon review of the record, the Commission finds that the agency

articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its employment

actions, which we determine were not persuasively rebutted by complainant.

Complainant has not demonstrated that the agency's articulated reasons

for its employment actions were a pretext for discrimination.

Harassment

To establish a claim of harassment based on race, color, national

origin, and sex, a complainant must show that (1) she is a member of

the statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment

in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the

protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on the

statutorily protected class; and (4) the harassment affected a term or

condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably

interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating,

hostile, or offensive work environment. Humphrey v. USPS, EEOC Appeal

No. 01965238 (October 16, 1998); 29 C.F.R. � 1604.11. The harasser's

conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable

person in the victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance on Harris

v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.003 (March 8, 1994).

Further, the incidents must have been �sufficiently severe and pervasive

to alter the conditions of complainant's employment and create an abusive

working environment.� Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21

(1993); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 23 U.S. 75

(1998). In the case of harassment by a supervisor, complainant must

also show that there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer.

See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).

Upon review of the record, we find that the environment created within

complainant's workplace was not sufficient to show a hostile work

environment due to her sex, age or in reprisal for prior protected

activity. Therefore, we conclude that complainant failed to establish

her claim of unlawful discrimination.

Accordingly, the agency's decision finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

March 7, 2005

__________________

Date

1On January 24, 2003, complainant was

reassigned to the 96th LRS/Management and Systems Flight (LGRS)/Systems

Management Section (LGRSS).