Devrim Varoglu et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJul 31, 201913597894 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 31, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/597,894 08/29/2012 Devrim Varoglu P15124US1 (119-0334US1) 5323 61947 7590 07/31/2019 Apple - Blank Rome c/o Blank Rome LLP 717 Texas Avenue, Suite 1400 HOUSTON, TX 77002 EXAMINER SADANANDA, ABHIJIT B ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3624 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 07/31/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): houstonpatents@blankrome.com mbrininger@blankrome.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte DEVRIM VAROGLU and SWAPNIL DAVE ____________ Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,8941 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before ANTON W. FETTING, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges. FETTING, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Apple Inc. (Appeal Br. 3). Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 Devrim Varoglu and Swapnil Dave (Appellants) seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of a final rejection of claims 1–4 and 37–55, the only claims pending in the application on appeal. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). The Appellants invented a way to improve the flexibility in electronically scheduling an event between two or more parties using a scheduling application. Specification para. 1. An understanding of the invention can be derived from a reading of exemplary claim 47, which is reproduced below (bracketed matter and some paragraphing added). 47. A computer-implemented method, comprising: [1] receiving from a user interface of a first electronic device, electronic scheduling parameters for creating a proposed event in an electronic schedule stored in the first electronic device, the electronic schedule includes a plurality of existing scheduled events for an initiator of the proposed event; [2] automatically search[ing], using the first electronic device, through the electronic schedule, one or more other electronic schedules stored in the first electronic device, or both, 2 Our decision will make reference to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed February 2, 2017) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed July 13, 2017), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed May 22, 2017), and Final Action (“Final Act.,” mailed September 22, 2016). Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 3 using the electronic scheduling parameters to extract a plurality of available event time periods for the initiator of the proposed event; [3] updat[ing], using the first electronic device, the electronic scheduling parameters based on the automatic search to account for the existing scheduled events and the available event time periods for the proposed event; [4] identify[ing], using the first electronic device, a plurality of electronic user accounts associated [with] a plurality of invitees for the proposed event with the user interface; [5] transmit[ting], using the first electronic device and over a computer network, the updated electronic scheduling parameters to the one or more other electronic devices associated with the electronic user accounts based on a ranking order of the invitees, the updated electronic scheduling parameters includ[ing] the ranking order of the invitees; [6] receiv[ing], using the first electronic device and over the computer network, one or more modified sets of electronic scheduling parameters associated with the at least one of the invitees, the one or more received modified sets of electronic scheduling parameters include[ing] invitee available time periods determined from the updated electronic scheduling parameters; and [7] transmit[ting], using the first electronic device and over the computer network, to the one or more other electronic devices an electronic invitation for the proposed event Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 4 that is based on the one or more modified sets of electronic scheduling parameters. The Examiner relies upon the following prior art: Edlund US 2005/0102245 A1 May 12, 2005 Nelken US 2006/0200374 A1 Sept. 7, 2006 Bhogal US 2009/0083105 A1 Mar. 26, 2009 O'Sullivan US 2009/0171700 A1 July 2, 2009 Claims 1–4 and 37–55 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Claims 1, 2, 37–45, 47–51, 53, and 54 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Edlund and Bhogal. Claims 4, 46, 523, and 55 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Edlund, Bhogal, and Nelken. Claim 3 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Edlund, Bhogal, and O’Sullivan. ISSUES The issues of eligible subject matter turn primarily on whether the claims recite more than abstract conceptual advice of results desired. The issues of obviousness turn primarily on whether the claims recite communications from and to a particular device. FACTS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES The following enumerated Findings of Fact (FF) are believed to be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 3 Claim 52 recites “the device of claim 51 . . .” Claim 51 is a method claim, not a device claim. We take this to be a typographic error that should be corrected. Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 5 Facts Related to the Prior Art Edlund 01. Edlund is directed to negotiating the details of a meeting such as time without requiring participants to relinquish control of their calendars or information on their calendars to a meeting organizer. Edlund para. 1. 02. Edlund describes separating the negotiation from the invitation. Edlund decentralizes the negotiation, removing the burden of negotiation from the meeting organizer. Instead, the meeting organizer delegates the process to a negotiation object. Each participant interacts with the negotiation object until a mutually satisfactory time is determined. The negotiation process saves the meeting organizer from managing the details of the negotiation. Edlund empowers the meeting participants to book the meeting organizer’s time rather than the meeting organizer booking the participant's time, providing a more successful and less time- consuming approach to scheduling meetings. Edlund para. 16. 03. Edlund describes an organizer initiating a negotiation by specifying the known meeting attributes. The organizer also “offers” time interval(s) when he is willing to meet, associating with each interval his level of desirability and an aggregate view of the free time of all the participants, if available. Edlund para. 18. 04. Edlund describes a participant accesses the negotiation upon being notified of a pending negotiation. The participant offers the time interval(s) when he is willing to meet, associating with each Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 6 interval his own level of desirability in meeting at that time. A participant may offer time intervals other than that originally proposed by the organizer. A participant indicates his preferences on the time intervals. Edlund para. 19. 05. Edlund describes the organizer viewing the integrated scheduling information contained within the negotiation to determine the meeting time after all participants have responded to the negotiation. The organizer then selects the actual start time of the meeting, the duration having already been defined. Based on the information provided by the participants and the original meeting bounds, the organizer finalizes the negotiation. Finalizing the negotiation initiates an invitation for the event, which comprises the date/time of the meeting, the location, subject, participants, etc. Edlund para. 20. 06. Edlund describes a negotiation object that integrates all scheduling related information. As an aggregate, the negotiation objects for past and current events provide a history from which patterns can be detected. These patterns of activity can be used to facilitate current or future negotiations by enabling automatic processing. Automatic processing can encompass, when appropriate, such things as preselecting the bounds of negotiation based on a user's scheduled events, preselecting the earliest start and end points, preselecting participants based on the subject of the event, optimizing the finalization of an event, and accepting an event. Edlund para. 26. Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 7 07. Edlund describes a negotiation server that interacts with a negotiation persister to store, retrieve or update negotiations in a negotiation database. In addition, the negotiation server interacts with a notifier to issue notifications when new negotiations, have been created. Further, the negotiation server interacts with a negotiation finalizer to finalize negotiations. Furthermore, the negotiation server uses a calendar retriever to access free-time information from external calendaring systems. Edlund para. 54. 08. Edlund describes a meeting organizer reviewing schedule information for one participant or for all participants as an aggregate. The system displays an aggregate of responses from participants in participants’ aggregated timeline. An aggregate of the participant's calendar is shown in participants' aggregated calendar. Access to participant's calendars is not required; however, if available, Edlund uses information in an electronic calendar maintained by participants to present an overview to the meeting organizer exposing potential conflicts. Edlund paras. 77– 78. Bhogal 09. Bhogal is directed to scheduling meetings. Bhogal para. 2. 10. Bhogal describes sending a meeting invitation to the invitees of a meeting, wherein the meeting is contingent upon a dependency rule associated with at least one invitee's attendance. Typically, the meeting invitation specifies a time and place for the meeting. The system receives responses back from at least some of the invitees, including positive responses from the invitees Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 8 subject to the dependency rule. In response to receiving these acceptances for the meeting back, the system can continue setting up the meeting. Bhogal para. 7. 11. Bhogal describes sending invitations to the required attendees and waiting to get their responses back before sending invitations to others. In this way, the system can avoid having to cancel a meeting because a required attendee cannot be at the meeting. Bhogal para. 37. ANALYSIS Claims 1–4 and 37–55 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more STEP 14 Claim 47, as a method claim, nominally recites one of the enumerated categories of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. The issue before us is whether it is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. STEP 2 The Supreme Court set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, . . . determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else is there in the claims before us? To answer that question, . . . consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a 4 For continuity of analysis, we adopt the steps nomenclature from 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 FR 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 9 patent-eligible application. [The Court] described step two of this analysis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Alice Corp., Pty. Ltd. v CLS Bank Intl, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) (citations omitted) (citing Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012)). To perform this test, we must first determine what the claims are directed to. This begins by determining whether the claims recite one of the judicial exceptions (a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea). Then, if claims recite a judicial exception, determining whether the claims at issue are directed to the recited judicial exception, or whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception, i.e., that the claims “apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Revised Guidance at 54. If the claims are directed to a judicial exception, then finally determining whether the claims provide an inventive concept because the additional elements recited in the claims provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception. STEP 2A Prong 1 At a high level, and for our preliminary analysis, we note that method claim 47 recites receiving, updating, and transmitting parameter data, searching schedule data, identifying user data, and transmitting invitation data. Searching and identifying are rudimentary forms of computer analysis. Thus, claim 47 recites receiving, updating, analyzing, and transmitting data. None of the limitations recite technological implementation details for any Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 10 of these steps, but instead recite only results desired by any and all possible means. From this we see that claim 47 does not recite the judicial exceptions of either natural phenomena or laws of nature. Under Supreme Court precedent, claims directed purely to an abstract idea are patent in-eligible. As set forth in the Revised Guidance, which extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts, abstract ideas include (1) mathematical concepts5, (2) certain methods of organizing human activity6, and (3) mental processes7. Among those certain methods of organizing human activity listed in the Revised Guidance are managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people. Like those concepts, claim 47 recites the concept of managing an assembly of people. Specifically, claim 47 recites operations that would ordinarily take place in advising one to schedule an event based on user ranking data and updated parameters. The advice to schedule an event based on user ranking data and updated parameters involves inviting attendees, which is a social act, and receiving scheduling parameters, which is an act ordinarily performed in the stream of scheduling. For example, claim 47 recites 5 See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010); Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 6 See, e.g., Bilski, 561 U.S. at 628; Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed Cir. 2014); Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re Marco Guldenaar Holding B.V., 911 F.3d 1157, 1160–61 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 7 See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 11 “transmitting . . . an electronic invitation,” which is an activity that would take place whenever one is inviting attendees for an event interaction among people. Similarly, claim 1 recites “receiving . . . scheduling parameters,” which is also characteristic of scheduling a gathering of people. The Examiner determines the claims to be directed to scheduling an event among a plurality of users. Final Act. 6. The preamble to claim 47 does not recite what it is to achieve, but the steps in claim 47 result in modifying schedule parameter data and sending invitation data for an event absent any technological mechanism other than a conventional computer for doing so. As to the specific limitations, limitations 1 and 6 recite receiving data. Limitations 5 and 7 recite transmitting data. Limitation 3 recites updating data. Limitations 2 and 4 recite conventional data analysis of parameter data, which advise one to apply generic functions to get to these results. The limitations thus recite advice for scheduling an event based on user ranking data and updated parameters. To advocate scheduling an event based on user ranking data and updated parameters is conceptual advice for results desired and not technological operations. The Specification at paragraph 1 describes the invention as relating to improving the flexibility in electronically scheduling an event between two or more parties using a scheduling application. Thus, all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 47 is directed to processing data to create and send data representing an event invitation, i.e. managing an assembly of people. This is consistent with the Examiner’s determination. This in turn is an example of managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people as a certain method of organizing human Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 12 activity because managing an assembly of people is managing and the object of the management is a meeting, which is an interaction, of people. The concept of managing an assembly of people by scheduling an event based on user ranking data and updated parameters is one idea for getting a common time for the assembly. The steps recited in claim 47 are part of how this might conceptually be premised. Our reviewing court has found claims to be directed to abstract ideas when they recited similar subject matter. Digitech Image Techs, LLC v. Elecs for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (2014)(process of taking plural data sets and combining them into a single data set); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (2014)( data collection, recognition, and storage); Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1271 (2016)(features such as a customized user interface do not convert the abstract idea of delivering media content into a concrete solution to a problem). Alternately, this is an example of concepts performed in the human mind as mental processes because the steps of receiving, updating, analyzing, and transmitting data mimic human thought processes of observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion, perhaps with paper and pencil, where the data interpretation is perceptible only in the human mind. See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Claim 47, unlike the claims found non-abstract in prior cases, uses generic computer technology to perform data reception, update, analysis, and transmission and does not recite an improvement to a particular computer technology. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 13 Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims not abstract because they “focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer animation”). As such, claim 47 is directed to receiving, updating, analyzing, and transmitting data, and not a technological implementation or application of that idea. From this we conclude that at least to this degree, claim 47 is directed to managing an assembly of people by scheduling an event based on user ranking data and updated parameters, which is a way of managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people identified in the Revised Guidance, and, thus, an abstract idea. STEP 2A Prong 2 The next issue is whether claim 47 not only recites, but is more precisely directed to this concept itself or whether it is instead directed to some technological implementation or application of, or improvement to, this concept i.e. integrated into a practical application.8 At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law. At some level, “all inventions ... embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Thus, an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract concept. “[A]pplication[s]” of such concepts “‘to a new and useful end,’” we have said, remain eligible for patent protection. Accordingly, in applying the § 101 exception, we must distinguish between patents that claim the “‘buildin[g] block[s]’” of human ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into something more. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (citations omitted). 8 See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 223, discussing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 14 Taking the claim elements separately, the operation performed by the computer at each step of the process is expressed purely in terms of results, devoid of implementation details. Steps 1 and 6 are pure data gathering steps. Limitations describing the nature of the data do not alter this. Steps 5 and 7 are conventional activity, such as storing, transmitting, or displaying the results. Steps 2 and 4 recite generic computer processing expressed in terms of results desired by any and all possible means and so present no more than conceptual advice. All purported inventive aspects reside in how the data is interpreted and the results desired, and not in how the process physically enforces such a data interpretation or in how the processing technologically achieves those results. Viewed as a whole, Appellants’ claim 47 simply recites the concept of managing an assembly of people by scheduling an event based on user ranking data and updated parameters as performed by a generic computer. This is no more than conceptual advice on the parameters for this concept and the generic computer processes necessary to process those parameters, and do not recite any particular implementation. Claim 47 does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor does it effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. The 23 pages of specification spell out different generic equipment9 and parameters that might be applied using this concept and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on the concept of managing an assembly of people by scheduling an event based on user ranking data and updated parameters under different scenarios. They 9 The Specification describes a personal digital assistant (PDA); personal music player, mobile telephone, notebook, laptop or tablet computer, desktop computer; or server computer. Spec. para. 37. Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 15 do not describe any particular improvement in the manner a computer functions. Instead, claim 47 at issue amounts to nothing significantly more than an instruction to apply managing an assembly of people by scheduling an event based on user ranking data and updated parameters using some unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 225–26. None of the limitations reflect an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field, applies or uses a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition, implements a judicial exception with, or uses a judicial exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim, effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or thing, or applies or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. We conclude that claim 47 is directed to achieving the result of managing an assembly of people by advising one to schedule an event based on user ranking data and updated parameters, as distinguished from a technological improvement for achieving or applying that result. This amounts to managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people, which fall within certain methods of organizing human activity that constitute abstract ideas. The claim does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 16 STEP 2B The next issue is whether claim 47 provides an inventive concept because the additional elements recited in the claim provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception. The introduction of a computer into the claims does not generally alter the analysis at Mayo step two. [T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea “‘to a particular technological environment.’” Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to “implement[t]” an abstract idea “on . . . a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption concern that undergirds our § 101 jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of “additional feature[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (citations omitted). “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea [] on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do not. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a computer for receiving, updating, analyzing, and transmitting data amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic functions of a Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 17 computer. All of these computer functions are generic, routine, conventional computer activities that are performed only for their conventional uses. See Elec. Power Grp. v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Also see In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming”). None of these activities are used in some unconventional manner nor do any produce some unexpected result. Appellants do not contend they invented any of these activities. In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. As to the data operated upon, “even if a process of collecting and analyzing information is ‘limited to particular content’ or a particular ‘source,’ that limitation does not make the collection and analysis other than abstract.” SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of Appellants’ claim 47 add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The sequence of data reception-update-analysis- transmission is equally generic and conventional. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation, display, and transmission), Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (sequence of processing, routing, controlling, Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 18 and monitoring). The ordering of the steps is therefore ordinary and conventional. We conclude that claim 47 does not provide an inventive concept because the additional elements recited in the claim do not provide significantly more than the recited judicial exception. REMAINING CLAIMS Claim 47 is representative. The remaining method claims merely describe process parameters. We conclude that the method claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept itself, and not to the practical application of that concept. As to the structural claims, they are no different from the method claims in substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer components configured to implement the same idea. This Court has long “warn[ed] ... against” interpreting § 101“in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 226. As a corollary, the claims are not directed to any particular machine. LEGAL CONCLUSION From these determinations we further determine that the claims do not recite an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself or to any other technology or technical field, a particular machine, a particular transformation, or other meaningful limitations. From this we conclude the claims are directed to the judicial exception of the abstract idea of certain methods of organizing human activity as exemplified by the managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people of Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 19 managing an assembly of people by scheduling an event based on user ranking data and updated parameters, without significantly more. APPELLANTS’ ARGUMENTS As to Appellants’ Appeal Brief arguments, we adopt the Examiner’s determinations and analysis from Final Action 6–9 and Answer 3–7 and reach similar legal conclusions. We now turn to the Reply Brief. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the claims are distinguishable from those in Electric Power Group. Reply Br. 3–7. Appellants first contend that when combining together the functions of determining an initial set of electronic scheduling parameters, updating the electronic scheduling parameters according to search results from electronic schedules, transmitting the updated electronic scheduling parameters to user accounts according to the invitees ranking order, and receiving a modified set of electronic scheduling parameters associated with the invitees, claims 1-4 and 37-55 as a whole differ from claim 12 of the ’710 Patent in Electric Power Group. In particular, the combined functions recited in claims 1-4 and 37-55 produce a particular solution that hones in on one or more relevant time periods prior to generating electronic invitations relating to the electronic event scheduling technology. Reply Br. 6. “Honing in” is a conceptual result and not a technological implementation. The result is information, not technological improvement. Information per se is abstract. “Information, whether displayed in the form of price values or P&L values, is abstract.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019). An abstract idea, however useful, remains an abstract idea. “That the automation can ‘result in life altering consequences,’ is laudable, but it does not render it any less Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 20 abstract.” Univ. of Florida Research Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2019). We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that claims 1-4 and 37-55 provide how to generate electronic scheduling parameters and the unique way of communicating electronic scheduling parameters amongst multiple electronic devices. Claims 1-4 and 37-55 provide a particular way to achieve a desired outcome of electronically scheduling and generating electronic event invitations to improve electronic event scheduling technology. Reply Br. at id. The “how to generate electronic scheduling parameters” of this argument is recited as receiving and updating the parameters. The update is “based on the automatic search to account for the existing scheduled events and the available event time periods for the proposed event,” but this is no more than a recitation of criteria and operand data used with no recitation of how they are used technologically, or even mathematically. The “unique way of communicating electronic scheduling parameters amongst multiple electronic devices” of this argument is recited as “transmit[ting], using the first electronic device and over a computer network, the updated electronic scheduling parameters to the one or more other electronic devices” and “transmitting, using the first electronic device and over the computer network, to the one or more other electronic devices an electronic invitation.” This is conventional data transmission. To the extent Appellants rely on the “based on a ranking order of the invitees” limitation to narrow the transmission step, the claim does not recite how or in what manner the transmission is so based, and in any event, this would only affect the criteria for sequencing and filtering data, not the Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 21 transmission step itself. Such use of criteria, sequencing, and filtering themselves are conventional data processing operations. Claims 1, 2, 37–45, 47–51, 53, and 54 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Edlund and Bhogal Edlund describes a user who is a meeting organizer, beginning the scheduling process by searching that user’s device for schedule data and then forwarding that to a server that then distributes notifications to other users who are to attend and accept responses back. Because it is the server that performs such communications, Appellants argue the combination of Edlund and Bhogal fails to disclose this subject matter because (1) Edlund’s negotiation server 15 is not an electronic device associated with a user account of an invitee; [and] (2) Edlund does not send the updated electronic scheduling parameters from the first electronic device (i.e., the meeting organizer's electronic device) to the electronic devices associated with the invitees (i.e., participants)[.] App. Br. 19. Similarly, Appellants contend that the combination of Edlund and Bhogal fails to disclose “receiv[ing], by the first electronic device and over the computer network, a modified sets of electronic scheduling parameters ...wherein each of the received modified sets of electronic scheduling parameters include invitee available time periods determined from the updated electronic scheduling parameters.” App. Br. 24. We agree that as to non-transitory program storage device claims 1 and 53 and device claim 41, and their dependent claims, Edlund does not recite these limitations because Edlund communicates through the server instead of a user’s device. The Examiner made no determinations as to the obviousness of using a server as contrasted with the user device. Method claim 47 and its dependent claims, however, do not recite Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 22 performing these from or to the user device, but only using the device. The claims do not recite or narrow the manner, implementation, scope, or level of indirection of such “using.” Edlund describes initiating the entire sequence from a user’s device, and this initiation in turn leads to the server performing the communications. In this sense, Edlund uses the first user’s device to perform the recited communications. Claims 4, 46, 52, and 55 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Edlund, Bhogal, and Nelken These claims are not separately argued. Claim 3 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Edlund, Bhogal, and O’Sullivan This claim depends from claim 1 and is not separately argued. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The rejection of claims 1–4 and 37–55 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more is proper. The rejection of claims 1, 2, 37–45, 53, and 54 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Edlund and Bhogal is improper. The rejection of claims 47–51 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Edlund and Bhogal is proper. The rejection of claims 4, 46, and 55 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Edlund, Bhogal, and Nelken is improper. The rejection of claim 52 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Edlund, Bhogal, and Nelken is proper. The rejection of claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Edlund, Bhogal, and O’Sullivan is improper. Appeal 2017-009858 Application 13/597,894 23 DECISION The rejection of claims 1–4 and 37–55 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2011). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation