Devendra Bajpai

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 4, 2019

13927680 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 4, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/927,680 06/26/2013 Devendra Bajpai MAG04 P-2091 7625
153508 7590 12/04/2019
HONIGMAN LLP/MAGNA
650 TRADE CENTRE WAY
SUITE 200
KALAMAZOO, MI 49002-0402
EXAMINER
EVANS, GARRETT F
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3663
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/04/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
asytsma@honigman.com
patent@honigman.com
tflory@honigman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DEVENDRA BAJPAI
Appeal 2018-000031
Application 13/927,680
Technology Center 3600

Before CHARLES N. GREENHUT, NATHAN A. ENGELS, and
FREDERICK C. LANEY, Administrative Patent Judges.

GREENHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. See Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM AND DESIGNATE A NEW GROUND OF
REJECTION.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Magna Electronics,
Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
Appeal 2018-000031
Application 13/927,680
2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a vision-based adaptive cruise control
system. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. An adaptive cruise control system for a vehicle, said adaptive
cruise control system comprising:
a camera having a field of view forward of a vehicle
equipped with said adaptive cruise control system, said camera
operable to capture image data;
a control comprising an image processor operable to
process captured image data;
wherein said control is operable to determine curvature of
the road ahead of the equipped vehicle based on processing of
captured image data by said image processor;
wherein image processing by said image processor
comprises use of a traffic situation classifier, wherein said traffic
situation classifier, responsive to processing of captured image
data and to the determined curvature of the road ahead of the
equipped vehicle, determines a traffic condition ahead of the
equipped vehicle;
wherein said control is operable, at least in part responsive
to the traffic condition ahead of the equipped vehicle determined
by said traffic situation classifier that is responsive at least in part
to the determined curvature of the road ahead of the equipped
vehicle, to generate an output to accelerate or decelerate the
equipped vehicle to adjust the velocity of the equipped vehicle
based on the determined traffic condition and based on
processing of captured image data by said image processor;
wherein said control generates an output to decelerate the
equipped vehicle to reduce the velocity of the equipped vehicle
responsive at least in part to a determination, via processing of
captured image data by said image processor and responsive at
least in part to the determined curvature of the road ahead of the
equipped vehicle, that a target vehicle, on the road ahead of the
equipped vehicle and in a lane adjacent to the lane traveled by
the equipped vehicle, is likely to move into the lane traveled by
the equipped vehicle;
Appeal 2018-000031
Application 13/927,680
3
and wherein said control determines that the target vehicle
is likely to move into the lane traveled by the equipped vehicle
responsive at least in part to determination, based on processing
of captured image data by said image processor, of actuation of
a turn signal of the target vehicle indicating that the target vehicle
is likely to move into the lane traveled by the equipped vehicle.

REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Southall US 2007/0255480 A1 Nov. 1, 2007
Simon US 2011/0010094 A1 Jan. 13, 2011
Taneyhill US 2012/0179350 A1 July 12, 2012
Dagli, Cutting-in Vehicle Recognition for ACC Systems – Towards
Feasible Situation Analysis Methodologies, 2004 IEEE Intelligent
Vehicles Symposium, 925–30 (June 14–17, 2004).

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–4, 6–12, 14, and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Southall in view of Simon. Final Act. 3.
Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Southall in view of Simon and Taneyhill. Final Act. 7.
Claims 13 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Southall in view of Simon and Dagli. Final Act. 7.
Claims 17–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Southall in view of Simon and Dagli. Final Act. 9.
Appeal 2018-000031
Application 13/927,680
4
OPINION
Independent Claim 1
The Examiner relied on Southall for all aspects of claim 1 except for
those relating to leading vehicle lane-change detection. Final Act. 3–4. Many
of Appellant’s arguments are premised on a misunderstanding of Southall.
Appellant considers Southall’s yaw sensor to be the only curve detecting
element of Southall. Appeal Br. 13–23. If this were the case, Appellant’s
arguments concerning the use of “image data” to determine curvature and
the determination of curvature “ahead of” the vehicle (see Appeal Br. 9–10)
might carry some weight. However, as the Examiner correctly points out,
although Southall discloses that a yaw sensor may be included (Ans. 4
(citing Southall paras. 69–73)) the Examiner’s rejection was premised on
Southall determining curvature via its image processing and not it’s yaw
sensor. Ans. 4–5.
According to paragraph 73 of Southall:
In the case of a curved road, two additional steps may be
taken in the search for lane boundaries. The first of these extra
steps depends on whether or not the vehicle speed and yaw-rate
are available.
This language seems to make it very clear that the yaw sensor is something
that “may,” and thus optionally, be employed in the special circumstance of
encountering a curved road, if the yaw-rate sensor is available.
Southall discusses detecting the curvature of the road using the Road
Detection and Awareness (RDA) algorithm. Southall paras. 53, 69, 71. RDA
algorithm, at step 54, clearly receives as input, image data acquired at step
52 from forward-facing cameras 26. See Southall Fig. 2; para. 45 (“Camera
units 26a and 26b are . . . securely affixed in a suitable headway position.”).
Appeal 2018-000031
Application 13/927,680
5
We recognize the Examiner did include a general citation to
paragraphs 69–73 in the Office Action, which may have caused some
confusion because paragraph 69 introduces the possibility of additionally
using an external sensor (“may also employ the use of an external sensor”)
and paragraph 73 discusses the use of the optional yaw-rate sensor.
However, the Examiner’s citation to the specific reference numerals
associated with Figures 2 and 3B, the Examiner’s citation of paragraphs 6, 7,
14, 15, and 53, in addition to the clarification provided on pages 9–10 of the
Final Action (discussing paragraph 53) and pages 3–5 of the Examiner’s
Answer make it clear that it is the analysis of the data obtained from the
forward facing camera units 26a and 26b, which are used “to locate the road
surface in the headway direction of the host vehicle” (Southall para. 53), that
the Examiner relies on for the curvature determining ahead of the host
vehicle aspect of claim 1. Thus, Appellant’s arguments concerning
Southall’s yaw sensor are inapposite.
Appellant additionally argues:
Nor does Southall or Simon or any other prior art of record, alone
or in any combination, disclose or suggest or render obvious such
a control that generates an output to decelerate the equipped
vehicle to reduce the velocity of the equipped vehicle responsive
at least in part to a determination, via processing of captured
image data by the image processor and responsive at least in part
to the determined curvature of the road ahead of the equipped
vehicle, that a target vehicle, on the road ahead of the equipped
vehicle and in a lane adjacent to the lane traveled by the equipped
vehicle, is likely to move into the lane traveled by the equipped
vehicle.
Appeal Br. 15; see also Appeal Br. 20–23.
Appeal 2018-000031
Application 13/927,680
6
Appellant recognizes Southall decelerates in response to a traffic
condition, such as the distance from the controlled host vehicle to a leading
or target vehicle in front of the host vehicle:
If a lead vehicle in the same lane (i.e., the target vehicle) slows
down or enters the lane of the host vehicle, the system sends a
signal to the engine or braking units of the host vehicle to
decelerate.
Southall para. 7. However, Appellant fails to acknowledge or rebut a critical
aspect of the cited portion of Southall. The Examiner repeatedly points to
paragraph 53 of Southall which states:
Road awareness data additionally may be used to compensate for
pitching motion of the host vehicle and to judge when either the
host or tracked lead vehicle changes into an adjacent lane or is
going around a curve along the detected road surface.
Southall para. 53 (emphasis added).
If Southall makes the decision to adjust speed based on the position of
a tracked lead vehicle (para. 7, above), and the determined position of the
tracked lead vehicle as being within or without the host vehicle lane is based
on the curvature of the road surface (para. 53, above), it is reasonable to
regard the speed change determination as being “responsive at least in part
to the determined curvature of the road ahead of the equipped vehicle” as
required by claim 1. Paragraph 7 clearly associates deceleration with
changing into the host vehicle lane. Paragraph 53 does not expressly specify
whether “changes into an adjacent lane” is referring to a situation where the
lane change contemplated ultimately results in vehicles sharing a lane or not
sharing a lane. However, read in light of Southall’s disclosure, one skilled in
the art would understand this as a generic teaching applicable to both
situations where the host vehicle controller should consider accelerating
Appeal 2018-000031
Application 13/927,680
7
because the vehicles are no longer in the same lane and consider
decelerating when they are in the same lane and within a predetermined
distance of one another.
For predictive acceleration or deceleration based on the likeliness of
the lane change happening, the Examiner relies on Simon. Final Act. 4
(citing Simon paras. 54, 56). We do not find within Appellant’s arguments
any specific disagreement regarding the particular features for which Simon
is relied upon by the Examiner. We agree with the Examiner that the
proposed modification to incorporate Simon’s teachings relating to likely
lane changes would yield the subject matter defined by the argued limitation:
wherein said control generates an output to decelerate the
equipped vehicle to reduce the velocity of the equipped vehicle
responsive at least in part to a determination, via processing of
captured image data by said image processor and responsive at
least in part to the determined curvature of the road ahead of the
equipped vehicle, that a target vehicle, on the road ahead of the
equipped vehicle and in a lane adjacent to the lane traveled by
the equipped vehicle, is likely to move into the lane traveled by
the equipped vehicle.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 1.

Dependent Claims 6 and 14
Appellant persuasively argues that it was not reasonable for the
Examiner to regard vehicle flasher information in Simon as the recited “road
information pertaining to a detection of a traffic sign indicative of a curve in
the road ahead of the equipped vehicle.” Appeal Br. 24–25, 29; Final Act. 5–
6. First, it is not clear whether the Examiner, in rejecting claims 6 and 14,
regards the vehicle flasher of Simon as “road information” or as “a traffic
sign.” The Examiner does not provide any evidence or analysis to
Appeal 2018-000031
Application 13/927,680
8
demonstrate why a “traffic sign,” read in light of Appellant’s Specification,
would reasonably be understood to include vehicle flashers. See Spec. para.
15 (discussing an entirely different ilk of traffic signs); see also In re
Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Although the PTO must
give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation, this interpretation must
be consistent with the one that those skilled in the art would reach.).
Alternatively, although vehicle flashers may sometimes coincide with “a
traffic sign indicative of a curve in the road ahead,” that is not necessarily
going to be the case. Thus, we are not apprised by the Examiner of any
reasonable basis to conclude that one skilled in the art would regard a
vehicle flasher as “information pertaining to a detection of a traffic sign
indicative of a curve in the road ahead” either. The Examiner’s reliance on
the presence or detection of brake lights in Simon (Final Act. 5–6 (citing
Simon para. 80)) as road information pertaining to the presence of an entry
or exit ramp is flawed for similar reasons.
In the Examiner’s Answer, the Examiner does not rebut Appellant’s
arguments concerning the unreasonableness of the Examiner’s reliance on
Simon with regard to the limitations of claim 6 discussed above. Instead, the
Examiner cites the lane boundary markers of Southall as being “traffic
sign[s] indicative of a curve in the road ahead of the equipped vehicle.” Ans.
8 (citing Southall para. 73).2
Appellant contends “[w]hile the lane boundary markers of Southall
are painted lines on the sides of a road indicating road lanes, the claimed

2 It is noted that 37 C.F.R. § 41.39(a)(2) describes the procedure the
Examiner should follow when modifying the thrust of the rejection.
Appeal 2018-000031
Application 13/927,680
9
traffic sign is understood by one skilled in the art to be a physical sign
displaying information pertaining to road conditions.” Reply. Br. 12.
Rather than reach the issue of whether Southall’s lane markers are
reasonably regarded as “traffic sign[s],” at this time, we instead modify the
basis for the rejection and designate this opinion as including a new ground
of rejection under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
Paragraphs 6, 29, 40, 67, and Figure 2 of Simon clearly discloses
considering information on traffic signs 11 of the same type described in
Appellant’s Specification (Spec. para. 15). In particular, consideration is
given to traffic sign information when determining whether to decelerate the
host vehicle. See Simon paras. 65, 67. Although no specific indicia of the
traffic signs, such as those indicating curves or exit/entry ramps, is expressly
mentioned in Simon, we conclude that it would have been obvious to
consider that type of information on traffic signs because it is notoriously
well-known that curves and exit/entry ramps, and therefore signs indicative
of curves or exit/entry ramps, are frequently affiliated with speed changes.
Incorporating information obtained from curve or exit/entry signs would
predictably provide an additional relevant input to Southall’s system, further
advancing Southall’s stated goal of using roadway features to assist in
collision avoidance and adaptive vehicle control. Southall paras. 10–14.
For the foregoing reasons we sustain the rejection of claims 6 and 14
as being unpatentable over Southall and Simon. As we have altered the
thrust of the Examiner’s rejection, we designate this opinion as including a
new ground of rejection under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) so as to afford Appellant
the options for response associated therewith.

Appeal 2018-000031
Application 13/927,680
10
Remaining claims
Appellant either reiterates arguments already addressed above or
argues the remaining claims based only on dependency. Appeal Br. 24, 26–
29, 30–34. We sustain the rejections of these claims for the reasons
explained hereinabove.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are AFFIRMED. We designate our
affirmance of claim 6 as introducing a new ground of rejection.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed New
Ground
1–4, 6–
12, 14,
16
103(a) Southall, Simon 1–4, 6–
12, 14,
16
6, 14
5 103(a) Southall, Simon,
Taneyhill
5
13, 15 103(a) Southall, Simon,
Dagli
13, 15
17–20 103(a) Southall, Simon,
Dagli
17–20
Overall
Outcome
1–20 6, 14

FINALITY AND RESPONSE
This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection
pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.”
Section 41.50(b) also provides:
Appeal 2018-000031
Application 13/927,680
11
When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant,
within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise
one of the following two options with respect to the new ground
of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected
claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to
the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered
by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be
remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection is
binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new
Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the opinion
of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection
designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the claims,
appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this subpart.
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under §41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The
request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection
and state with particularity the points believed to have been
misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of
rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing
is sought.
Further guidance on responding to a new ground of rejection can be
found in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1214.01 (9th Ed., Rev.
08.2017, Jan. 2018).

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2016).
AFFIRMED; 37 C.F.R. 41.50(b)