Decor Group, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Dec 22, 2010

22-CA-029379 (N.L.R.B. Dec. 22, 2010)

JD(NY)-53-10
Englewood, NJ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
NEW YORK BRANCH OFFICE
DÉCOR GROUP, INC.
and Case No. 22-CA-29379
NEW YORK NEW JERSEY REIGONAL JOINT
BOARD, WORKERS UNITED, LOCAL 132, SEIU
Tara Levy, Esq., Newark, NJ, for the General Counsel.
Richard S. Mazawey, Esq., Clifton, NJ, for the Respondent.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
STEVEN DAVIS, Administrative Law Judge: Based on a charge filed on April 8, 2010
by New York New Jersey Regional Joint Board, Workers United, Local 132, SEIU (Union), a
complaint was issued on July 30, 2010 against Décor Group, Inc. (Respondent or Employer).
The complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges and the Respondent’s answer admits
that, following the expiration of its collective-bargaining agreement with the Union, the
Respondent ceased making health care contributions on behalf of its unit employees. The
complaint further alleges and the Respondent denies that it stopped making the contributions
without notice to the Union. The answer also asserted certain affirmative defenses, which will be
discussed below.
On October 21, 2010, a hearing was held before me in Newark, New Jersey. On the
entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering
the briefs filed by Counsel for the General Counsel and the Respondent, I make the following:
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction and Labor Organization Status
The Respondent, a corporation having an office and place of business in Englewood,
New Jersey, has been engaged in the business of designing and manufacturing high-end
decorative glassware in the tableware, cosmetic, perfume and spirits industries. During the past
year, the Respondent derived revenue in excess of $50,000 from the sale and shipment of
goods directly from its Englewood facility to points outside New Jersey. The Respondent admits
and I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6)
and (7) of the Act. The Respondent also admits, and I find that the Union has been a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
JD(NY)-53-10
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
2
II. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. The Collective-Bargaining Agreement
The Union has represented the employees of the Respondent for at least 20 years. The
Respondent admits that the Union has been the designated exclusive collective-bargaining
representative in the following admitted appropriate bargaining unit:
All full-time and regular part-time production workers employed by
Respondent at its Englewood, New Jersey facility, excluding all
office clerical employees, sales employees, professional
employees, guards and supervisors, as defined in the Act.
The parties’ last contract before this dispute ran from July 1, 2005 through June 30,
2009. It provided for the payment, effective December 1, 2008, by the Employer of 14.3% of the
employees’ total gross earnings to the Trustees of the Laundry & Dry Cleaning Workers and
Allied Industries Health Fund (Health Fund). The contract also provided for the payment of
these amounts monthly, not later than the 10th day of the month following the month in which the
amounts accrued.
The contract’s expiration date was extended twice, once from June 30, 2009 to
September 30, 2009, and then to October 31, 2009.
B. The Bargaining and the Health Fund Contributions
During negotiations for a successor contract, which began in September or October,
2009, the Employer objected to contributing to the Health Fund for every employee as it had in
the then current contract. The Respondent and the Union took surveys of the employees and
found that a certain per centage of workers did not use the Union’s health plan because they
had other coverage. The Employer’s survey revealed that although the Employer was paying for
the use of the Union’s health plan by 100% of the employees, in fact, only about 27% of the
employees were actually using that plan.
Union agent Gomez recommended an “opt-in” program, pursuant to which employees
not having outside coverage may enroll in the Union’s health plan, and the Employer would pay
for only those workers utilizing that plan.
The Respondent admits that beginning on about November 1, 2009, following the
expiration of the last contract extension, it ceased making health care contributions on behalf of
the unit employees. Union representative Luis Gomez stated that he received no advance
notice that the Respondent would cease making contributions to the Health Fund. In addition,
there was no evidence that the Union agreed that the Employer could stop making such
contributions.
Amalgamated Life, the organization which provides and administers the Union’s Health
Fund, sent a series of letters to the Respondent from December 24, 2009 to April 23, 2010,
advising it that its contributions to the Health Fund for the period November, 2009 through
March, 2010, were past due. Copies were sent to the Union. Demand was made for immediate
payment of all delinquent contributions plus interest and liquidated damages “as required by the
collective bargaining agreement and the Fund trust agreement.”
JD(NY)-53-10
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
3
After first and second notices of delinquencies were sent to the Respondent, a “third and
final notice” was sent to the Employer on January 12, 2010, suspending the health and welfare
coverage for its employees based on its failure to pay contributions for November, 2010.
Letters were also sent to the unit employees advising them of the Respondent’s failure
to make the appropriate contributions, and informing them that the Fund would terminate their
Health Fund coverage, effective February 1, 2010.
On March 3, 2010, the parties reached agreement on a new collective-bargaining
contract, which runs from July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2015. The new contract provides essentially
for an “opt-in” program in which payments to the Health Fund are not based on the gross payroll
of the entire unit, as was the case with the expired contract. Rather, the new contract provides
that employees who do not have outside coverage through Medicare or Medicaid may enroll in
the Union’s Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurance plan as set forth in its Health & Welfare Plan. The
Employer pays a certain per centage of the cost of the plan only for those employees who enroll
in the plan. Enrollment in the Union Health & Welfare Plan is optional.
On March 8, 2010, the Trustees of the Amalgamated National Health Fund f/k/a/ UNITE
HERE National Health Fund sued the Employer in federal court, alleging that contributions to
the Health Fund from November 1, 2009 through January 31, 2010, have not been made and
are in arrears. The Employer filed an answer, and on July 15, 2010, the parties entered into a
“Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal.”
Analysis and Discussion
I. The Obligation to Make Payments to the Funds
After the Contract’s Expiration
The Respondent argues that it was not obligated to make contributions to the Union’s
Health Fund because its contract had expired. It further asserts that the Union made no
objection to its cessation of payments, and that both parties made “affirmative representations
to each other that all rights to performance under the expired contract were waived.”
The Board has held that an employer’s “obligation to pay benefit fund contributions
continues beyond the expiration date of the contract until a successor agreement or lawful
impasse is reached.” Made 4 Film, Inc., 337 NLRB 1152, 1152 (2002). Cibao Meat Products,
Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 547 F.3d 336, 339 (2d Cir. 2008); Derrico v. Sheehan Emergency Hosp., 844
F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1988). “Contractual terms, including benefit plans and related reporting
requirements, survive contract expiration and cannot be altered without bargaining.” MBC
Headwear, Inc., 315 NLRB 424, 424, fn. 3 (1994); Lou’s Produce, 308 NLRB 1194, 1194
(1992).
The Board has also held that “when, as here, parties are engaged in negotiations for a
collective-bargaining agreement, an employer’s obligation to refrain from unilateral changes
extends beyond the mere duty to provide notice and an opportunity to bargain about a particular
subject matter; rather it encompasses a duty to refrain from implementation at all, absent overall
impasse on bargaining for the agreement as a whole.” RBE Electronics of S.D., 320 NLRB 80,
81 (1995).
The Respondent does not claim that it reached an impasse in bargaining with the Union
which permitted it to cease paying the Health Fund contributions required in its expired contract,
and there is no evidence that it did reach impasse. Rather, the Respondent just believed that it
JD(NY)-53-10
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
4
could stop such payments simply because the contract expired.
As to the Respondent’s assertion that the Union did not object to its ceasing making
payments to the Health Fund, I credit Union agent Gomez’ testimony that after Amalgamated
sent its first notice of fund contributions’ delinquency in December, 2009, he discussed with the
Respondent in a January, 2010 bargaining session the fact that the Respondent had not made
the required payments. He told president Richard Engel and vice-president Richard Engel, Jr.,
that the Respondent was required to make the contributions, and that Engel Sr. replied that he
did not believe that the Employer had to pay into the fund.
Moreover, Amalgamated Life sent the Respondent numerous notices that it was
delinquent in its fund contributions, and the Respondent admits receiving those notices.
I accordingly find and conclude that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
by ceasing to make contributions to the Health Fund from November 1, 2009.
II. The Respondent’s Defenses1
A. Deferral to Arbitration
The Respondent asserts that the charge should have been deferred to the grievance
procedure in the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement, which was the same in the expired
contract and the renewal agreement. The grievance clause provides that the contractual
grievance procedure “shall be the exclusive means for the determination of… all complaints,
disputes, claims or controversies” and that no party or employee “shall institute any action or
proceeding against the other in any court of law or equity, state or federal, other than to compel
arbitration hereunder…. This provision shall be a bona fide defense in any action or proceeding
under this Agreement.”
Notwithstanding the broad nature of the grievance provision, the Board has held that an
employer’s failure to make fund payments following the expiration of a contract is not
presumptively arbitrable because the union’s right to payment did not accrue or vest until after
the contract expired. 15th Avenue Iron Works, 301 NLRB 878, 879 (1991). Deferral is not an
appropriate disposition of these allegations because post-contract expiration delinquencies are
not susceptible to prospective arbitration. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 284 NLRB 53, 60
(1987) citing Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Bakery Workers, 430. U.S. 243 (1977).
In this respect, Nolde and Litton Financial Printing v. N.L.R.B., 501 U.S. 190 (1991),
relied on by the Respondent, are inapposite. In Nolde, the Supreme Court found that a claim for
severance pay was in effect a dispute over deferred compensation for time already worked
under the unexpired contract, and thus the dispute involved rights which “accrued or vested”
under the unexpired agreement. In Litton, the Court held that a dispute over the layoff of
employees after the contract expired “did not involve facts and occurrences that arise before
expiration.” Here, any grievance the Union may have filed regarding the failure of the
Respondent to make contributions to the Health Fund did not “arise under” the expired contract.

1 The Respondent’s principal defenses are discussed here. Other affirmative defenses,
which have not been proven and which have no merit, are accord and satisfaction, judicial
determination and award, failure of consideration, want of consideration, fraud in the factum,
fraud in the inducement, illegality, laches, payment, statute of frauds, waiver, and entire
controversy doctrine.
JD(NY)-53-10
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
5
The grievances were “triggered by events or conduct that occurred after the expiration of the
contracts. None of the rights invoked were worked for or accumulated over time, and there is no
other indication that the parties contemplated that such rights could ripen or remain enforceable
even after the contracts expired.” Indiana & Michigan, above, at 61.
Moreover, the Supreme Court held in NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 360-361 (1969):
Admittedly, the Board has no plenary authority to administer and
enforce collective bargaining contracts. Those agreements are
normally enforced as agreed upon by the parties, usually through
grievance and arbitration procedures, and ultimately by the courts.
But the business of the Board, among other things, is to
adjudicate and remedy unfair labor practices. Its authority to do so
is not affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention
that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or
otherwise [citing Section 10(a) of the Act]. Hence, it has been
made clear that in some circumstances the authority of the Board
and the law of the contract are overlapping, concurrent regimes,
neither pre-empting the other. Arbitrators and courts are still the
principal sources of contract interpretation, but the Board may
proscribe conduct which is an unfair labor practice even though it
is also a breach of contract remediable as such by arbitration and
in the courts. It may also, if necessary to adjudicate an unfair labor
practice, interpret and give effect to the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement.
Similarly, in a case involving the employer’s failure to make full and timely payroll
payments, the Board rejected the employer’s request that the matter be deferred to arbitration,
holding that although other remedies exist, it is authorized to “remedy conduct… that amounts
to the repudiation of an obligation under the collective-bargaining relationship.” New Mexico
Symphony Orchestra, 335 NLRB 896, 898, fn. 8 (2001).
B. Utilization Theory
The Respondent also argues that under a “utilization theory,” since only 27% of its
employees used the contractually provided health benefits because they had other coverage,
the Respondent overpaid the Health Fund by paying for coverage for 100% of its workforce.
This overpayment, it argues, comprised a sum sufficient to compensate the Health Fund for the
contributions it did not make during the ensuing 16 months. Therefore, according to the
Respondent, it has already made the Health Fund contributions it is charged with not paying. I
cannot agree.
The Respondent was required to make the fund contributions in the expired contract to
which it agreed. It had not made an agreement with the Union that it would have to pay
contributions only for those who used the Union’s Health Fund. Rather, it was bound to its
contract to make fund payments for its entire payroll.
Accordingly, I cannot find merit in this theory.
C. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
As set forth above, Amalgamated Life sued in federal court, alleging that contributions to
JD(NY)-53-10
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
6
the Health Fund from November 1, 2009 through January 31, 2010, had not been made and
were in arrears. The Employer filed an answer, and on July 15, 2010, the parties entered into a
“Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal.”
The Respondent argues that, inasmuch as a legal claim has already been made by the
Fund’s Trustees in federal court, the complaint here must be dismissed on the grounds of res
judicata, arguing that the same parties and the same claims are involved. The General Counsel
argues that the same parties are not involved in both cases since the Trustees of the Funds
sued in federal court, and a different party, the Union is the charging party here. The
Respondent, however, asserts that the Trustees and the Union are “one in the same.”
The Union and the Union’s Funds are not “one in the same” as argued by the
Respondent. “It is well established that fund trustees and administrators are separate parties
from the union and employees who establish the funds.” Fallon-Williams, Inc., 336 NLRB 602,
604 (2001). Accordingly, the Board and the Union were not parties to the court action. “The
Board has consistently held that the Government is not precluded from litigating issues of
Federal law even though related claims have previously been decided in State or Federal courts
in actions to which the Government was not a party.” Fallon-Williams, above, at 604.
The Respondent further argues that the complaint must be dismissed on the ground of
collateral estoppel, asserting that although the Union knew, in November, 2009, that the
Respondent ceased making contributions to the Health Fund, it did not object to the cessation of
those payments and continued bargaining, ultimately reaching agreement on a new contract in
March, 2010. The Respondent claims that the Union “intentionally and maliciously concealed
the fact that it was planning to file a charge alleging the unlawful cessation of Fund contributions
notwithstanding that the Union and the Respondent “made affirmative representations to each
other that all rights to performance under the old CBA were waived. Décor clearly relied on this
information and representation during negotiations in entering into the new CBA with the new
Health Plan Contribution clause.”
As set forth above, Gomez told the Respondent during bargaining that it was required to
make the Fund payments. In addition, there is no requirement that a prospective charging party
union notify an employer that it intends to file a charge. As set forth above, there was no
evidence that the Union represented that the Respondent was not obligated to make the Fund
payments required under the expired contract.
However, the Respondent argues that it was led to believe that all matters concerning
the expired contract were resolved by the execution of the new agreement. That contract states
that “all terms of this Agreement become effective as of the date of ratification of this agreement
with no retroactive application of any item other than wages described … above.” From this, the
Respondent argues that the complaint must be dismissed because the Union agreed not to
pursue “retroactive” matters. I cannot agree. It is clear that the reference in the new agreement,
executed in March, 2010, applies to the terms of that agreement. It states that “all terms of this
agreement” (emphasis applied) may not be applied retroactively. In contrast, the term which is
the subject of this proceeding is the Health Fund contributions which were a part of the expired
agreement. Accordingly, I cannot find that the Union indicated “to the Company that there were
no outstanding issues left to resolve.”
Both res judicata and collateral estoppel essentially require that the court issue a final
judgment on the merits which bars further claims by the parties based on the same cause of
action. Here, of course, there was no final judgment on the merits. A Stipulation of Voluntary
Dismissal was entered into by the parties, pursuant to which the matter was voluntarily
JD(NY)-53-10
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
7
dismissed against the Employer. Accordingly, there was no decision on the merits rendered in
the court proceeding which could preclude the Board from proceeding with this complaint.
In Raymond Prats Sheet Metal Co., 285 NLRB 194, 195 (1987), a case similar to this
matter, the employer failed to pay fringe benefit contributions to the union’s health and welfare
fund. The union’s fund brought an action in federal court, resulting in an order that the employer
pay specific sums of money. Thereafter, a charge was filed by the union and the employer
argued that the charges should be dismissed based on the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. The Board held that the res judicata and collateral estoppel defenses lack
merit because (a) the causes of action and the issues decided by the district court were not the
same as those presented for the Board’s resolution (b) the Board and the union charging party
were not parties to the federal court action and (c) the court decided the issue whether the
employer was required to make contractual payments to various trust funds, whereas the issue
before the Board that could not have been raised in the court proceeding is whether the
employer’s refusal to make such payments constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the Act.
I accordingly reject the Respondent’s argument that the doctrines of res judicata or
collateral estoppel bar the instant complaint.
D. The Union’s Alleged Unclean Hands
The Respondent further argues that the complaint must be dismissed because of the
Union’s “unclean hands.” It argues that the new collective bargaining agreement requires the
Union to offer health insurance to the employees as of March 3, 2010, but the Union did not
begin providing such benefits until July 1, and also did not provide employees with a plan
benefits book or a list of participating physicians. In addition, the Union allegedly did not honor
the request of employee Mireya Hernandez to be removed from the benefits plan as of July 1,
2010, but instead continued to bill the Employer and the Union. Finally, the Union “unilaterally
dropped” employee Ecolstico Cedeno from the plan without notice.
Union agent Gomez testified that discussions were held during negotiations as to when
the new “opt-in” contribution system would become effective. The parties expected that it would
take 90 days, the period from the March 3 ratification date to June 1, for the complete
implementation of the new system, but the program was not begun for another month, on July 1,
2010. He noted that because the Respondent had stopped payments to the Health Fund, the
Fund would not begin coverage immediately until the Respondent paid what it owed under the
old contract, or began payments pursuant to the new collective-bargaining agreement. Since the
Respondent began such payments only in March, 2010, there was a one month delay in having
the employees covered. Gomez noted that if the Respondent had not ceased its payments
under the old contract, the employees would have been covered continuously under the old
health plan.
Clearly, based on this, if any party must bear the blame for the delay in the resumption
of coverage, it is the Respondent, for unlawfully failing to make contributions from November 1,
2009 to March 1, 2010.
Richard Engle, Jr. admitted that Gomez told him that there would be a “gap” in coverage,
and told the employees to save their receipts and bills for medical care, and that the Union
would reimburse them. Engle also acknowledges that the employees were given their
enrollment card containing their identification number, but that the plan benefits book was not
provided.
JD(NY)-53-10
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
8
Gomez stated that he distributed books of enrollment and advised the employees as to
which physicians they could see. He also told them that Blue Cross/Blue Shield no longer
issues books listing the participating physicians, but that they could call a phone number listed
in their enrollment booklet, or check on-line and obtain the names of participating physicians.
Accordingly, I find no wrongdoing by the Union in these respects. In addition, the Board
has held that the “unclean hands” doctrine of equity does not operate against a charging party
because Board proceedings are not conducted for the vindication of private rights, but are
brought in the public interest and to effectuate the statutory policy. California Gas Transport,
347 NLRB 1314, 1326 fn. 36 (2006).
Finally, the Respondent argues that the Union suffered no damages or financial loss due
to its failure to make contributions to the Health Fund. I find and conclude that whether the
Union suffered any damages or financial loss is irrelevant to the issues here.
Conclusions of Law
1. The following employees constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective-
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All full-time and regular part-time production workers employed by
Respondent at its Englewood, New Jersey facility, excluding all
office clerical employees, sales employees, professional
employees, guards and supervisors, as defined in the Act.
2. At all times material herein the Union has been the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the employees in the above unit.
3. By ceasing to make contributions to the Trustees of the Laundry & Dry Cleaning
Workers and Allied Industries Health Fund on behalf of the unit employees on about November
1, 2009 without prior notice to the Union and without affording the Union the opportunity to
bargain with the Respondent as to this conduct and the effects of this conduct, the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
The Respondent must make whole the Trustees of the Laundry & Dry Cleaning Workers
and Allied Industries Health Fund for its failure to make contributions from November 1, 2009 as
required by the parties’ July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2009 contract, as extended to October
31, 2009, including any additional amounts due to the Fund in accordance with Merryweather
Optical Co., 240 NLRB 1213, 1216 (1979). The Respondent shall also reimburse unit
employees for any expenses resulting form its failure to make such required payments or
contributions, as set forth in Kraft Plumbing & Heating, 252 NLRB 891 fn. 2 (1980), enfd. 661
F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1981). Such amounts are to be computed in the manner set forth in Ogle
Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), enfd. 444 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1971), with interest at the
rate prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily
as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8, slip op. at 4-5 (2010).
JD(NY)-53-10
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
9
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended2
ORDER
The Respondent, Décor Group, Inc., Englewood, New Jersey, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to bargain with the Union, by ceasing to make contributions to
the Trustees of the Laundry & Dry Cleaning Workers and Allied Industries Health Fund on
behalf of the unit employees without prior notice to the Union and without affording the Union
the opportunity to bargain with the Respondent as to this conduct and the effects of this
conduct. The appropriate collective-bargaining unit is:
All full-time and regular part-time production workers employed by
Respondent at its Englewood, New Jersey facility, excluding all
office clerical employees, sales employees, professional
employees, guards and supervisors, as defined in the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Make whole the Trustees of the Laundry & Dry Cleaning Workers and Allied
Industries Health Fund for its failure to make contributions from November 1, 2009 as required
by the parties’ July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2009 contract, as extended to October 31, 2009, in
the manner set forth in the Remedy section of this decision.
(b) Make whole the employees for any expenses, if any, ensuing from its failure to make
the required payments to the Health Fund set forth above.
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the
Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel
records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Englewood, New Jersey
facility, copies of the attached notice, marked “Appendix” 3 Copies of the notice, on forms

2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the
notice reading “Posted by Order of the National labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Continued
JD(NY)-53-10
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
10
provided by the Regional Director for Region 22, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since
November 1, 2009.
Dated, Washington, D.C. December 22, 2010.
____________________
Steven Davis
Administrative Law Judge
_________________________
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
JD(NY)-53-10
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this Notice.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to bargain with the New York New Jersey Regional Joint Board, Workers United, Local
132, SEIU, by ceasing to make contributions to the Trustees of the Laundry & Dry Cleaning Workers and Allied
Industries Health Fund on behalf of the unit employees, without prior notice to the Union and without affording the
Union the opportunity to bargain with us as to this conduct and the effects of this conduct.
The appropriate collective-bargaining unit is:
All full-time and regular part-time production workers employed by Respondent at
its Englewood, New Jersey facility, excluding all office clerical employees, sales
employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors, as defined in the
Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL make whole the Trustees of the Laundry & Dry Cleaning Workers and Allied Industries Health Fund for our
failure to make contributions from November 1, 2009 as required by our July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2009 contract,
as extended to October 31, 2009.
WE WILL make you whole for any expenses, if any, ensuing from our failure to make the required payments to the
Health Fund set forth above.
DÉCOR GROUP, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
20 Washington Place, 5th Floor
Newark, New Jersey 07102-3110
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
973-645-2100
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND
MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS
CONCERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE
REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 973-645-3784.