Decca Records, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 15, 1951

93 N.L.R.B. 819 (N.L.R.B. 1951)

DECCA RECORDS, INC. 819
5. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, General Teamsters' Union No. 428, AFL, was on March
22, 1950, and at all times thereafter has been, the exclusive representative of
all the employees in the appropriate unit described in paragraph 4 of these
Conclusions for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9 (a) of the Act.
6. By refusing to bargain collectively with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, General Team-
sters' Union No. 428, AFL, the Coal Company from March 24, 1950, to March
29, 1950, engaged in, and the Trucking Company from March 29, 1950, to date
has engaged in and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
7. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing their employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondents have
engaged in and are engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication in this volume.]
DECCA RECORDS, INC. (BRUNSWICK RADIO CORPORATION) and INTER-
NATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL, PETITIONER.
Case No. 35-1RC-4k3. March, 15, 1951
Decision and Direction of Election
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before William D. McGowan,
hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are
free froth prej udiclal error and are hereby affirmed.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member
panel [Members Houston, Reynolds, and Styles].
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent employees
of the Employer.
3. The question concerning representation :
The Petitioner seeks a unit of all production and maintenance
employees employed at the Richmond, Indiana, phonograph manu-
facturing plant of the Employer. An Intervenor, United Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers of America, herein referred to as the
UE, alleges that its current collective bargaining contract, discussed
93 NLRB No. 131.
820 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
infra, bars the instant petition. The Petitioner, the Employer, and
the other Intervenor, International Union, United Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, CIO, herein referred to as the IUE,
contend that this contract does not cover the Richmond plant, and is
therefore not a bar to the instant proceeding.
On August 21, 1948, the Employer and the UE executed a master
contract effective to August 20, 1950, subject to automatic renewal,
absent 60 days' notice by either party, which covered all the plants of
the Employer. At that time the Company had plants in New York
City; Bridgeport, Connecticut; Chicago, Illinois; and Los Angeles,
California. The Richmond, Indiana, plant of the Company had
closed in June 1948, but was included in the schedule of plants covered
by this master agreement. When this contract was being negotiated
in New York City, committees from each of the above-enumerated
plants were present, except for the Richmond, Indiana; plant, which
then had no employees.
When the parties thereafter pursuant to a reopening clause in the
master contract executed a contract supplement effective April 27,
1949, increasing the wage rate, they specifically enumerated the same
list of plants as in the 1948 agreement, as being covered by this supple-
mental agreement, but omitted any reference to the Richmond plant.
Meanwhile, however, on April 25, 1949, the Richmond plant having
reopened, the Employer and the UE entered into a separate contract,
applying the above master contract to the Richmond plant but with
different wage rates. The Richmond plant remained open only until'
July 1949, when it was again completely closed, due to business
reasons, for an indefinite period of time. In February 1950, while
the Richmond. plant was still closed, the parties again reopened the
1948 master contract and amended' it by a letter agreement dated
February 3, 1950. This agreement extended the original 1948 con-
tract term to August 1, 1951. The Richmond plant was not men-
tioned in this contract, although all the other plants of the Employer
were specifically enumerated therein.
The Richmond plant was again reopened in September 1950, and
the Employer refused recognition to all the unions which are parties
hereto, pending certification by the Board. The petition in this case
was filed on October 5, 1950. In December 1950, the Employer and
the UE reopened their February 3, 1950, contract to provide for an
increased wage rate for all the Employers' plants, but again omitted
any reference to the Richmond plant.
The UE contends that the 1948 agreement, which lists the Rich-
mond plant, and the supplements thereto, which omitted any reference
to it, is a bar to this proceeding. The Employer testified that the
DECCA RECORDS, INC. 821
Richmond plant was inadvertently listed in the 1948 master contract,
but thereafter deliberately omitted (except for the April 25, 1949,
supplement), since it was considered a closed plant, with no likelihood
of being reopened.
We find no merit to the DE's contention. Whatever the intention
of the parties may have been with respect to the coverage of the 1948
master contract, it was contemplated that that contract would expire
on August 21, 1950, unless automatically renewed. The contract was
not in fact automatically renewed but was expressly extended on
February 3, 1950, to August 1, 1951. However, there is no evidence
that in extending the contract on February 3, the parties desired the
contract as so extended to apply to the Richmond plant. On the con-
trary, the omission of the Richmond plant from the schedule of plants
covered by the February 3 extension agreement and from the list of
plants covered by the subsequent wage amendments of December
1950, convinces us that the parties did not intend to include the
Richmond plant in the coverage of the extended contract.
Moreover, assuming, arguendo, that the Richmond plant was in-
tended to be covered by the 1948 master contract and the current
extension thereof, we would still not find the instant petition to be
barred thereby.
The Board has heretofore held that a contract does not bar a peti-
tion filed after the automatic renewal date of the contract, where on
such date the plant had suspended operations, and operations were
later resumed with new employees., In the instant case the Rich-
mond plant was shut down both at the time of the Mill B date of the
original master contract of August 21, 1948 (June 20, 1950), and on
February 3, 1950, when the master contract was extended to August
1, 1951.2 Moreover, in the instant case, as in the Sheets case, the ma-
jority of the employees at the Richmond plant are new employees,
because the former employees were no longer available.
Under all the foregoing circumstances, and on the basis of the
entire record,3 we are of the opinion that we should not give effect
to the February 3, 1950, contract renewal to find that contract a
bar insofar as it applies to the Richmond, Indiana, plant. Accord-
ingly, we find that a question affecting commerce exists concerning
the representation of employees of the Employer within the meaning
1 Sheets and Mackey, 92 NLRB 179. 1
2 While the extension of the master contract on February 3, 1950, was premature, that
fact does not prevent the contract from operating as a bar, as the petition in this case was
filed on October 5, 1950, after the original Mill B date of the 1948 contract. Pillsbury
Mills, Inc., 92 NLRB 172.
We find no merit to the IUE's contention that the contract in question is not a bar
since it contains illegal union -security provisions The 1948 master agreement and the
subsequent modification and renewals contain no illegal union -security provisions.
822 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4
of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, which
can best be resolved by an election.
4. We find that the following employees employed at the Rich-
mond, Indiana, plant of the Employer constitute a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec-
tion 9 (b) of the Act:
All production and maintenance employees,4 excluding office and
clerical employees, and all guards, professional employees, and super-
visors as defined in the Act.
5. The IUE urges that the election be postponed until such time as
a full working staff has been recruited. All the other parties to the
proceeding request an immediate election.
The Richmond plant commenced operations during October 1950,
and at the time of the hearing had recruited approximately 85 per-
cent of its anticipated staff. The Employer's representative stated
at the hearing that whether or not substantially more employees are
hired is dependent on the Employer's next governmental allocation
of materials.
As the Richmond plant now has a representative number of its
total anticipated complement, and any future expansion in the plant
complement is highly speculative, we perceive no reason for deviating
from established practice, and we shall direct an immediate election .5
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication in this
volume.]
4 Included within the unit are group leaders, who the parties stipulated are not super-
visors within the meaning of the Act , and janitors.
5 Electrical Reactance Corporation, 92 NLRB 1256
THE MCKAY MACHINE COMPANY' and UNITED STEELWORKERS OF
AMERICA, CIO, PETITIONER. Case No. 8-RC-I124. March 15,
1951
Decision and Direction of Election
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Bernard Ness, hearing
officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from
prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.'
1 The name of the Employer appears as amended at the hearing.
2 In the course of the hearing , the Employer moved to dismiss the petition and the
motion was referred to the Board by the hearing officer For reasons stated hereinafter
under paragraph numbered 4, the motion is denied.
93 NLRB No. 138.