01993262_r
11-06-2001
Debra J. Leon, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Debra J. Leon v. U.S. Postal Service
01993262
November 6, 2001
.
Debra J. Leon,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01993262
Agency No. 4-G-770-0547-98
DECISION
Complainant filed a timely appeal from a final agency decision concerning
her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination brought pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended,
42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405.
Complainant claims discrimination on the basis of race (white) regarding
her termination from employment as a Casual Carrier on April 23, 1998.
The record reveals that the agency hired complainant to work as a
Casual Carrier at its River Oaks, Texas postal facility on January
1, 1998. However, during the course of a routine background check, a
management official (MO) discovered that complainant falsely documented
her employment application to show that she had never been fired from
a position. The MO then met with complainant and informed her that a
previous employer submitted information revealing that complainant had
been fired from her position for misconduct. Complainant denied this,
and informed the MO that she had instead abruptly left this position
under duress. The MO then informed complainant that agency policy
required that she be terminated for falsifying her employment application.
Complainant contends that had she been an African-American, the MO would
have worked with her to resolve this issue, but because she is white,
the MO simply terminated her employment, refusing to even provide her
with a copy of the former employer's statement.
Believing she was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO
counseling and subsequently filed a formal complaint on June 12, 1998.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed
of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative
Judge or alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency.
When complainant failed to respond within the time period specified in
29 C.F.R. � 1614.108(f), the agency issued a final decision.
In its decision, the agency concluded that complainant failed to satisfy
the elements of a prima facie case of race discrimination. Specifically,
the agency found that complainant failed to provide any evidence to
show that workers similarly situated to her, outside of her protected
class, were treated more favorably. In fact, the agency found that
two African-American Causal Carriers were also terminated in the same
manner as complainant for falsifying their employment applications.
Therefore, finding that complainant otherwise presented no evidence
to show that the agency terminated her because of her race, the agency
found no discrimination regarding the captioned complaint.
Complainant now appeals this determination. Neither party submits
statements on appeal.
A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis
first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). For complainant to prevail, she must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that
a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment
action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the
agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the
ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of
the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason.
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the
first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima
facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel
action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the
third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of
whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. U.S. Postal
Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);
Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159
(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,
EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of
the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
Applying these legal standards to the case before us, we find that the
agency has met its burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its action. Specifically, we find that the agency demonstrated
that it terminated complainant for falsifying her employment application,
providing documentary evidence consisting of the termination report from
complainant's previous employer verifying that she had been fired, and
a copy of personnel rules reflecting the agency's policy to disqualify
those applicants providing false statements, as well as those dismissed
from prior employment for cause.
The burden now shifts to complainant to show that the agency's action
was motivated by discrimination. Upon review of the record, we find
that complainant has failed to do so. Instead, we find that complainant
offers only speculation that she would have been treated more favorably
if she were an African-American, and we further find that this statement
is rebutted by the agency's evidence that two African-American Causal
Carriers were also terminated for falsifying their applications.
Additionally, we find that complainant provides no evidence to support
her statement denying that she had been fired from her former position,
nor does she provide any evidence to show that the agency's proffered
reason was untrue or a mere pretext for racial discrimination.
Accordingly, after a careful review of the record, for the reasons
set forth above, as well as arguments and evidence not specifically
addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the agency's decision finding no
discrimination regarding the captioned complaint.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
November 6, 2001
__________________
Date