Deborah McCants, Complainant,v.Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 6, 2012
0120110870 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 6, 2012)

0120110870

03-06-2012

Deborah McCants, Complainant, v. Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.




Deborah McCants,

Complainant,

v.

Michael J. Astrue,

Commissioner,

Social Security Administration,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120110870

Hearing No. 550-2009-00367X

Agency No. SF090026SSA

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant’s

appeal from the Agency’s October 25, 2010 final order concerning

her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked

as a Service Representative at the Agency’s Antioch Office, Walnut

Creek District facility in San Francisco, California.

Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that she was subjected

to hostile workplace discrimination on the basis of reprisal for prior

protected EEO activity under Title VII when:

1) on October 9, 2008, her manager spoke to her in an aggressive, angry,

hostile and negative manner about an alteration she had made to her

previously approved leave slip;

2) on October 8, 2008, she received an inaccurate performance appraisal;

3) on September 25, 2008, she learned that vacancy announcements

SC-197787-08-RXA and SC-176228-08-JJJ in the Antioch, California office

were cancelled after she applied for the positions and after her name

was referred to the selecting official; and

4) on January 9, 2009, her supervisor undertook a series of actions and

comments which induced a panic attack, resulting in her need for sick

leave and a modified work schedule.

Concerning claim 1, Complainant stated that her second-level

supervisor’s facial expressions and words were abusive to her when she

told Complainant that she (Complainant) must have management approval

to change her already approved leave on her time card and when this

supervisor stated "it can't happen again; it can't happen again."

Regarding claim 4, Complainant alleged that her first-level supervisor

(FLS) spoke to her in an unprofessional manner. Complainant asserted

that later that day, the FLS came to the window where she was working,

reached over her head and grabbed a sign that said "Express Window," and,

in an aggressive and demeaning tone, told her that this was unacceptable.

Towards the end of the day, the FLS repeatedly asked her what she was

doing at her desk and stated her name at least ten times.

At the conclusion of the investigation, Complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested

a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(f).

On September 14, 2010, the AJ issued a summary decision finding no

discrimination. In reaching this decision, the AJ determined that

even if Complainant could establish a prima facie case, the Agency

had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

Concerning claims 1 and 4, the AJ determined that even if Complainant's

supervisors acted harshly with respect to the incidents cited by

Complainant, there is no evidence that this occurred in retaliation

for Complainant's prior EEO activity, rather than an effort to exercise

their managerial obligations based on legitimate considerations of the

Agency's operations. Regarding Complainant's performance appraisal,

the FLS stated that in order for Complainant to have garnered a

higher rating (Level 5), Complainant must have achieved continuous and

sustained performance, not doing extra work for just a couple of times.

The FLS also noted that he had acknowledged in Complainant's appraisal

her receipt of the highest cash award in the office in 2008 for her

extra work. With respect to the non-selections, the Agency stated that

one vacancy announcement simply expired because its District Manager was

unable to fill the position before she left her position at the Agency.

The Agency determined that better qualified candidates were referred

for selection under the remaining vacancy announcement.

In conclusion, the AJ found that the events of which Complainant

complains, either individually or collectively fail to rise to the level

of unlawful harassment prohibited by Title VII. Most importantly, there

is no evidence that any of the actions or decisions of Agency management

were motivated by unlawful reasons. Complainant failed to establish

that any of management's reasons for its actions were pretextual or

unworthy of belief. Complainant failed to establish discrimination

under either the theory of disparate treatment or unlawful harassment.

Complainant proffers no statement on appeal.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

We must determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or

she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. §

1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment

procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where

a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary

standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of

material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court’s

function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether

there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the

non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all

justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case

can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision

without holding a hearing is not appropriate.

Upon review of the record we find that the AJ properly found that the

instant complaint was suitable for summary judgment. The record is

adequately developed and there are no disputes of material fact.

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(a), the agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, § VI.A. (November 9, 1999). (explaining that

the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine

the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of

the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents,

statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant

submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the

Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of

the law”).

Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee’s

race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, religion or prior

EEO activity is unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive.

Wibstad v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01972699

(Aug. 14, 1998) (citing McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39

(D.C. Cir. 1985)); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift

Systems, Inc. at 3, 9 (March 8, 1994). In determining that a working

environment is hostile, factors to consider are the frequency of the

alleged discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, and if it unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,

510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Enforcement Guidance at 6. The Supreme Court

has stated that: “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to

create an objectively hostile work environment - an environment that

a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive - is beyond Title

VII’s purview.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (1993).

To establish a claim of hostile environment harassment, complainant

must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class;

(2) she was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal

or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment

complained of was based on her statutorily protected class; (4) the

harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the

purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment

and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment;

and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability. See Henson v. City of

Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). The harasser's conduct should

be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the

victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance at 6.

An employer is subject to vicarious liability for harassment when it is

"created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority

over the employee." Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 524

U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524

U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2292-93 (1998). When the harassment does not

result in a tangible employment action being taken against the employee,

the employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability. The agency

can meet this defense, which is subject to proof by a preponderance

of the evidence, by demonstrating: (a) that it exercised reasonable

care to prevent and correct promptly any harassing behavior; and (b)

that appellant unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive

or corrective opportunities provided by the agency or to avoid harm

otherwise. Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. at 2270;

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. at 2293; Enforcement Guidance:

Vicarious Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Notice

No. 915.002 (June 18, 1999). This defense is not available when the

harassment results in a tangible employment action (e.g., a discharge,

demotion, or undesirable reassignment) being taken against the employee.

Here, Complainant asserted that based on her statutorily protected class,

management continuously subjected her to a hostile work environment.

However, we find that Complainant has not shown that she was subjected to

harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving

her protected class, or the harassment complained of was based on her

statutorily protected class. Further, Complainant has not shown that

the purported harassment had the purpose or effect of unreasonably

interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating,

hostile, or offensive work environment. While Complainant has cited

various incidents where Agency management took actions that were either

adverse or disruptive to her, we find that Complainant fails to show that

these incidents were as a result of unlawful discrimination. To the

extent Complainant is alleging disparate treatment with respect to her

claims, she has not shown that the Agency's reasons for its actions were

a pretext for discrimination.

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration

of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the Agency's final order,

because the Administrative Judge’s issuance of a decision without a

hearing was appropriate and a preponderance of the record evidence does

not establish that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time

period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration

as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely

filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted

with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider

requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very

limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

March 6, 2012

__________________

Date

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0120110870

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0120110870