Debbi Cunningham, Appellant,v.Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation, (Federal Aviation Administration), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 30, 1998
01981170 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 30, 1998)

01981170

10-30-1998

Debbi Cunningham, Appellant, v. Rodney E. Slater, Secretary, Department of Transportation, (Federal Aviation Administration), Agency.


Debbi Cunningham v. Department of Transportation

01981170

October 30, 1998

Debbi Cunningham, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01981170

) Agency No. DOT 4-97-009

Rodney E. Slater, ) Hearing No. 220-97-5244X

Secretary, )

Department of Transportation, )

(Federal Aviation Administration), )

Agency. )

___________________________________)

DECISION

On November 19, 1997, Debbi Cunningham (appellant) timely appealed

the final decision of the Department of Transportation (agency), dated

November 7, 1997, concluding she had not been discriminated against in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

U.S.C. �2000e et seq. In her complaint, appellant alleged that she had

been discriminated against on the basis of her sex (female) when she

was harassed and subjected to a hostile working environment by a male

coworker and management failed to take appropriate action. This appeal

is accepted in accordance with the provisions of EEOC Order No. 960.001.

At the time this matter arose, appellant was employed by the agency as an

air traffic controller at the Mansfield, Ohio, Air Traffic Control Tower.

Appellant explained that she and the alleged harasser, a male air traffic

controller (hereinafter referred to as "Coworker A"), had been in the

same training program. She failed the course, but was later reinstated

as the result of an EEO settlement and placed at the Mansfield Tower.

Coworker A was already working there when she arrived in October 1991.

Appellant alleged that Coworker A harassed her from the day she arrived

until he transferred to another facility in October 1996. She noted,

however, that from sometime in 1993 they worked on different shifts,

and there were only two or three occasions since that time when their

shifts overlapped. As examples of the harassment, appellant alleged

that: (1) Coworker A refused to work with her and would reschedule

his shifts to avoid her; (2) he would complain to management about her

controlling abilities and reported alleged operational errors on her

part; (3) he refused to train her, give her position relief briefings

or coordinate verbally with her; (4) he was rude to her; (5) he went

AWOL (absent without approved leave) when told to work with her; (6)

he "forgot" to relay a message to her from her husband; and (7) he

filed a grievance against appellant and her husband concerning their

early departure from work on July 26, 1996. Appellant also alleged

that another male coworker joined in the harassment by signing a note

in support of Coworker A's grievance against appellant and her husband,

by refusing to relieve appellant on one occasion for a break, and by

making comments about appellant being treated more favorably concerning

her yearly agency-required physical exam.

On November 15, 1996, appellant filed a formal EEO complaint with

the agency, alleging that the agency had discriminated against her

as referenced above. The agency accepted the complaint and conducted

an investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation, appellant

requested an administrative hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) administrative judge (AJ).

On November 4, 1997, the AJ, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.109(e), issued

a decision without a hearing, concluding discrimination had occurred

in these matters. In that decision, the AJ held that even if all

appellant's allegations were regarded as true, it would not establish that

the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute

a violation of Title VII. Instead, the AJ found that the weight of

the evidence established the existence of a personality conflict between

two coworkers who were usually separated on different shifts. While the

coworkers were of different genders, the AJ noted no evidence to support

the allegation that the hostility was the result of sex discrimination.

On November 7, 1997, the agency adopted the findings and conclusions

of the AJ and issued a final decision finding no discrimination. It is

from this decision that appellant now appeals.

After a careful review of the record in its entirety, the Commission finds

that the AJ's recommended decision sets forth the relevant facts and

properly analyzes the case using the appropriate regulations, policies

and laws. Based on the evidence of record, the Commission discerns

no basis to disturb the AJ's finding of no discrimination. Nothing

proffered by appellant on appeal differs significantly from the arguments

raised before, and given full consideration by, the AJ. The Commission

noted that in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), the

Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,

477 U.S. 57 (1986), that harassment is actionable if it is sufficiently

severe or pervasive that it results in an alteration of the conditions

of the appellant's employment. EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994),

Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. at 3. See also,

Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05970077 (March 13,

1997). After reviewing the evidence of record, the Commission concurs

with the AJ's holding that appellant has failed to establish that she

was subjected to harassment which was sufficiently severe or pervasive

so as to constitute a hostile work environment.

Accordingly, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final decision which adopted the AJ's

finding of no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � l6l4.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from

the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil

action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY

(30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to

consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil

action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO

IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON

BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may

result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or

"department" means the national organization, and not the local office,

facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will

terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Oct 30, 1998

__________________ _______________________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations