David Wyatt et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 3, 2019

13251178 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 3, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/251,178 09/30/2011 David Wyatt NVID-P-SC-11-0164-US1 3343
45594 7590 09/03/2019
NVIDIA C/O MURABITO, HAO & BARNES LLP
111 NORTH MARKET STREET
SUITE 700
SAN JOSE, CA 95113
EXAMINER
MAMO, ELIAS
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2184
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/03/2019 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DAVID WYATT and RAMBOD JACOBY
____________

Appeal 2018-005972
Application 13/251,1781
Technology Center 2100
____________

Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and
SCOTT E. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1–4, 6–11, 13–17, 19, and 20. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Appellants identify NVIDIA Corporation as the real party in interest. Br.
4.
Appeal 2018-005972
Application 13/251,178
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Claimed Invention
Appellants’ claimed invention relates to power management for a
graphics processor, and specifically, for managing “entry into a power
management state” by utilizing a “display-local frame buffer.” Spec. ¶¶ 2, 6.
Claims 1, 8, and 14 are independent. Claim 8 is illustrative of the invention
and the subject matter of the appeal, and reads as follows:
8. A method of entering a power conservation state, the
method comprising:
detecting a system idle event of a computer system;
activating a local frame buffer;
responsive to the detecting, storing display information in
the local frame buffer from a graphics processor before the
graphics processor enters into a power conservation state;
subsequent to the storing the display information and
responsive to the detecting, initiating the power conservation
state for the graphics processor; and
during the power conservation state, self-refreshing a
display device with the display information stored in the local
frame buffer, wherein the display device is refreshed a plurality
of times with the same display information while the graphics
processor remains in the power conservation state.
Br. 34–35 (Claims App.).

The Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1–4, 6–11, 13–17, 19, and 20 stand rejected under pre-AIA
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tupman (US 8,041,968 B2;
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Application 13/251,178
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iss. Oct. 18, 2011) and Juenemann et al. (US 2008/0143695 A1; pub. June
19, 2008) (“Juenemann”). Final Act. 2–6.2
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments presented in this appeal. Arguments which Appellants could
have made but did not make in the Brief3 are deemed to be waived. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). On the record before us, we are not persuaded
the Examiner erred. We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth
in the rejections from which the appeal is taken and in the Examiner’s
Answer, and provide the following discussion for highlighting and emphasis.
Rejection of Independent Claim 8
Appellants argue the Examiner erred in finding the prior art teaches or
suggests “during the power conservation state, self-refreshing a display
device with the display information stored in the local frame buffer” from a
“graphics processor,” as recited in claim 8. Br. 15–17 (emphasis added).
Specifically, Appellants argue the Examiner relied on Juenemann as
teaching the disputed limitation, but Juenemann “merely discloses that
components in the display controller,” not a graphics processor, can be
“powered off or maintained in a low power state while a display self-
refreshes.” Id. at 16–17. Appellants argue that there are significant

2 According to the Examiner, “[c]laims 5, 12, and 18 are objected to as being
dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in
independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any
intervening claims.” Final Act. 5.

3 No reply brief was filed.
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distinctions between a graphics processing unit and a display controller, and
one of ordinary skill would not equate the two. Id. Appellants also argue
that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to
combine the references. Br. 17–20. We, however, are not persuaded by
Appellants’ arguments.
As the Examiner explains in the (unrebutted) Answer, the Examiner
relies on the combination of Tupman with Juenemann as teaching the
disputed limitation, not Juenemann alone. Ans. 3–6. Although Appellants
are correct in asserting that Juenemann does not disclose a “graphics
processor,” Tupman does. Ans. 3–4; Tupman Fig. 10, 2:34–36, 9:63–65,
10:45–58. As the Examiner finds, Tupman teaches a “graphics processor
which is powered OFF after a certain instruction is carried out, and is
idling.” Ans. 3–4; Tupman 9:63–65; 10:45–58. Tupman further teaches
“storing/writing data to memory local to the display during the sleep/low
power mode interval.” Ans. 4; Tupman 2:34–36.
Juenemann, in turn, teaches “a display frame buffer stored within
images retrieved from system memory,” and “[w]hen the display frame
buffer has been static for predetermined time, the display controller is
switched and powered down or placed in a low power mode.” Ans. 4;
Juenemann ¶¶ 33, 35–37. Further, the “static image already stored in the
display buffer is retrieved to be displayed on a display unit during a display
refresh.” Ans. 4; Juenemann ¶¶ 33, 35–37.
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that the
combination of Tupman and Juenemann teaches or suggests the disputed
limitations. Moreover, because “one cannot show non-obviousness by
attacking references individually where . . . the rejections are based on
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combinations of references,” we are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments
regarding Juenemann. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981)
(citation omitted).
We also find that the Examiner has sufficiently articulated “some
rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Both references are
directed to the problem of power management in display devices. A person
of ordinary skill would desire to reduce power needs and power
consumption in the system of Tupman, and reasonably would turn to the low
power self-refresh system of Juenemann, in the same field and directed to
the same problem, to do so. Ans. 6; see Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA
Entertainment Inc., 637 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding obviousness
where the references are directed to the same problem, the same purpose, or
relate to the same goal). Moreover, Appellants have not provided persuasive
evidence to show incorporating Juenemann’s low power self-refresh into the
system of Tupman would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for
one of ordinary skill in the art.” See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price,
Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–19).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred, and we sustain
the obviousness rejection of claim 8.
Rejections of Remaining Claims
Appellants argue dependent claim 10 separately from its base claim 8.
Br. 23–26. Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding the prior art
teaches or suggests “maintaining active at least one input device during the
power conservation state,” as recited in claim 10. Br. 23–26. As the
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Examiner finds, however, Tupman teaches display power management
circuitry that includes “user inputs” that can cause the device to switch from
one power mode to another. Tupman 4:4–8, 7:60–8:3. According to the
disclosure in Tupman,
when the user uses an interface of the device . . . a power-ON
event may be received at input 242 at power management
circuitry 240. In response to receiving the power-ON event, the
power management circuitry may switch the device from the low
power mode to the ON power mode.

Tupman 7:60–8:3 (emphases added). We agree with the Examiner’s finding
that the foregoing passages in Tupman teaches the disputed limitation of
claim 10. Ans. 9.
Appellants also argue that the Examiner erred in rejecting dependent
claim 11, for the same reasons as claims 8 and 10 (from which claim 11
depends). For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded of error.
The remaining claims are not argued separately. We, therefore,
sustain the obviousness rejections of claims 1–4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13–17, 19, and
20.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–4, 6–11, 13–17,
19, and 20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED