David Wyatt et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardSep 3, 201913251178 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 3, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/251,178 09/30/2011 David Wyatt NVID-P-SC-11-0164-US1 3343 45594 7590 09/03/2019 NVIDIA C/O MURABITO, HAO & BARNES LLP 111 NORTH MARKET STREET SUITE 700 SAN JOSE, CA 95113 EXAMINER MAMO, ELIAS ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2184 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/03/2019 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte DAVID WYATT and RAMBOD JACOBY ____________ Appeal 2018-005972 Application 13/251,1781 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before JOHNNY A. KUMAR, LINZY T. McCARTNEY, and SCOTT E. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judges. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1–4, 6–11, 13–17, 19, and 20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Appellants identify NVIDIA Corporation as the real party in interest. Br. 4. Appeal 2018-005972 Application 13/251,178 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Claimed Invention Appellants’ claimed invention relates to power management for a graphics processor, and specifically, for managing “entry into a power management state” by utilizing a “display-local frame buffer.” Spec. ¶¶ 2, 6. Claims 1, 8, and 14 are independent. Claim 8 is illustrative of the invention and the subject matter of the appeal, and reads as follows: 8. A method of entering a power conservation state, the method comprising: detecting a system idle event of a computer system; activating a local frame buffer; responsive to the detecting, storing display information in the local frame buffer from a graphics processor before the graphics processor enters into a power conservation state; subsequent to the storing the display information and responsive to the detecting, initiating the power conservation state for the graphics processor; and during the power conservation state, self-refreshing a display device with the display information stored in the local frame buffer, wherein the display device is refreshed a plurality of times with the same display information while the graphics processor remains in the power conservation state. Br. 34–35 (Claims App.). The Rejections on Appeal Claims 1–4, 6–11, 13–17, 19, and 20 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tupman (US 8,041,968 B2; Appeal 2018-005972 Application 13/251,178 3 iss. Oct. 18, 2011) and Juenemann et al. (US 2008/0143695 A1; pub. June 19, 2008) (“Juenemann”). Final Act. 2–6.2 ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’ arguments presented in this appeal. Arguments which Appellants could have made but did not make in the Brief3 are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). On the record before us, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred. We adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth in the rejections from which the appeal is taken and in the Examiner’s Answer, and provide the following discussion for highlighting and emphasis. Rejection of Independent Claim 8 Appellants argue the Examiner erred in finding the prior art teaches or suggests “during the power conservation state, self-refreshing a display device with the display information stored in the local frame buffer” from a “graphics processor,” as recited in claim 8. Br. 15–17 (emphasis added). Specifically, Appellants argue the Examiner relied on Juenemann as teaching the disputed limitation, but Juenemann “merely discloses that components in the display controller,” not a graphics processor, can be “powered off or maintained in a low power state while a display self- refreshes.” Id. at 16–17. Appellants argue that there are significant 2 According to the Examiner, “[c]laims 5, 12, and 18 are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.” Final Act. 5. 3 No reply brief was filed. Appeal 2018-005972 Application 13/251,178 4 distinctions between a graphics processing unit and a display controller, and one of ordinary skill would not equate the two. Id. Appellants also argue that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine the references. Br. 17–20. We, however, are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. As the Examiner explains in the (unrebutted) Answer, the Examiner relies on the combination of Tupman with Juenemann as teaching the disputed limitation, not Juenemann alone. Ans. 3–6. Although Appellants are correct in asserting that Juenemann does not disclose a “graphics processor,” Tupman does. Ans. 3–4; Tupman Fig. 10, 2:34–36, 9:63–65, 10:45–58. As the Examiner finds, Tupman teaches a “graphics processor which is powered OFF after a certain instruction is carried out, and is idling.” Ans. 3–4; Tupman 9:63–65; 10:45–58. Tupman further teaches “storing/writing data to memory local to the display during the sleep/low power mode interval.” Ans. 4; Tupman 2:34–36. Juenemann, in turn, teaches “a display frame buffer stored within images retrieved from system memory,” and “[w]hen the display frame buffer has been static for predetermined time, the display controller is switched and powered down or placed in a low power mode.” Ans. 4; Juenemann ¶¶ 33, 35–37. Further, the “static image already stored in the display buffer is retrieved to be displayed on a display unit during a display refresh.” Ans. 4; Juenemann ¶¶ 33, 35–37. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that the combination of Tupman and Juenemann teaches or suggests the disputed limitations. Moreover, because “one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where . . . the rejections are based on Appeal 2018-005972 Application 13/251,178 5 combinations of references,” we are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments regarding Juenemann. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (citation omitted). We also find that the Examiner has sufficiently articulated “some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Both references are directed to the problem of power management in display devices. A person of ordinary skill would desire to reduce power needs and power consumption in the system of Tupman, and reasonably would turn to the low power self-refresh system of Juenemann, in the same field and directed to the same problem, to do so. Ans. 6; see Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entertainment Inc., 637 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding obviousness where the references are directed to the same problem, the same purpose, or relate to the same goal). Moreover, Appellants have not provided persuasive evidence to show incorporating Juenemann’s low power self-refresh into the system of Tupman would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art.” See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418–19). Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred, and we sustain the obviousness rejection of claim 8. Rejections of Remaining Claims Appellants argue dependent claim 10 separately from its base claim 8. Br. 23–26. Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding the prior art teaches or suggests “maintaining active at least one input device during the power conservation state,” as recited in claim 10. Br. 23–26. As the Appeal 2018-005972 Application 13/251,178 6 Examiner finds, however, Tupman teaches display power management circuitry that includes “user inputs” that can cause the device to switch from one power mode to another. Tupman 4:4–8, 7:60–8:3. According to the disclosure in Tupman, when the user uses an interface of the device . . . a power-ON event may be received at input 242 at power management circuitry 240. In response to receiving the power-ON event, the power management circuitry may switch the device from the low power mode to the ON power mode. Tupman 7:60–8:3 (emphases added). We agree with the Examiner’s finding that the foregoing passages in Tupman teaches the disputed limitation of claim 10. Ans. 9. Appellants also argue that the Examiner erred in rejecting dependent claim 11, for the same reasons as claims 8 and 10 (from which claim 11 depends). For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded of error. The remaining claims are not argued separately. We, therefore, sustain the obviousness rejections of claims 1–4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13–17, 19, and 20. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–4, 6–11, 13–17, 19, and 20. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation