0120093352
07-25-2012
David Harp, Complainant, v. Ray H. LaHood, Secretary, Department of Transportation (Federal Aviation Administration), Agency.
David Harp,
Complainant,
v.
Ray H. LaHood,
Secretary,
Department of Transportation
(Federal Aviation Administration),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120093352
Hearing No. 550-2008-00174X
Agency No. 2007-20963-FAA-06
DECISION
Complainant timely filed an appeal from the Agency's June 29, 2009, final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
� 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission VACATES the Agency's final order.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented are whether the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) erred when she did not consider one of Complainant's four claims, dismissed another claim, and issued a decision without a hearing in favor of the Agency on the remaining two claims of Complainant's complaint.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as an Air Traffic Control Specialist at the Agency's Oakland Center in Fremont, California. Complainant has been employed with the Agency since June 1972, with a break in service from August 1981 until July 1996. The Agency notified Complainant that, as an Air Traffic Control Specialist, he was subject to mandatory retirement effective April 30, 2007.
In or about May 2006, Complainant applied for a Support Specialist position under Vacancy Announcement Number AWP-AT-06-14AKNN-85836. The position closed on May 24, 2006, but the Agency cancelled this vacancy on or about July 17, 2007. In August 2006, Complainant applied for another Support Specialist position under Vacancy Announcement Number AWP-AT-06-14AKNN-88512. This vacancy was cancelled by the Agency on September 20, 2006. Additionally, on June 12, 2006, the Agency issued an "all hands" notice to employees in which it solicited volunteers for a Support Specialist assignment in the Training Department. The Agency reassigned four employees to the Support Specialist position in late 2006.
On or about September 27, 2006, Complainant submitted a request to waive his mandatory separation. In February 2007, the Agency notified Complainant of its denial of his waiver request. On or about March 19, 2007, the Complainant requested reconsideration of his waiver request based on "pre-developmental" work he performed in 1972 that was not covered by separation regulations. On or about April 27, 2007, the Agency notified Complainant that the effective date of his mandatory retirement had been extended to April 30, 2008.
Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the bases of sex (male), age (born in 1949), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when:
1. On or about July 17, 2007, the Agency cancelled a Support Specialist position, Vacancy Announcement Number AWP--AT-06-14AKNN-84547, for which Complainant had applied;
2. On September 20, 2006, the Agency cancelled a Support Specialist position, Vacancy Announcement Number AWP-AT-06-14AKNN-88512, for which Complainant had applied;
3. The Agency failed to timely respond to Complainant's request for a waiver of mandatory separation that he submitted on September 27, 2006; and
4. In late 2006, the Agency failed to select Complainant for a Support Specialist detail assignment in the Training Department.
In investigative affidavit statements, Complainant stated that he engaged in EEO activity when he gave a statement in support of a co-worker's EEO complaint in 2006. Complainant further stated that, on May 9, 2006, the Agency informed him that he must mandatorily retire from his position and offered to assist him in retaining employment in a non-mandatory retirement position. Complainant stated that he submitted a request to waive mandatory retirement on September 27, 2006, and asked the Agency to assist him in acquiring a non-mandatory retirement position. Complainant stated that he applied for two Support Specialist positions that were announced in May and August 2006, but he was informed in July 2006 that one of the positions had been cancelled. Complainant stated that he also received notice in December 2006 that the August 2006 announcement had been cancelled.
Complainant stated that he believed the August 2006 vacancy announcement was cancelled so that a few "hand-picked individuals" could be selected that did not have his level of experience and ability, including an attractive young female (C1) in her late 20s or early 30s who had less than one year Certified Professional Controller (CPC) experience and one or two serious Air Traffic Control errors. Complainant further stated that C1 failed training.
"Unbeknownst to me until 9 January 2007, the agency had filled at least four exempt-from-retirement training positions with others not of my protected status, i.e., white male over the age of 40 who has participated as a witness for others in their EEO complaints and had complained about what I saw as discrimination against minorities at the agency during the relevant period of time)," Complainant stated. "I was informed by other Air Traffic Controllers that the agency had placed and would be placing others who had failed their qualifications to be air traffic controllers into these exempt-from-mandatory retirement training positions," Complainant stated. Complainant stated that he would have been forced to retire on April 30, 2007, because he had not been placed in a Training Department position or any non-mandatory retirement position. Further, Complainant stated that if he were selected for a non-mandatory retirement position, he could retain his employment and acquire additional years of service towards retirement.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an AJ. Complainant timely requested a hearing. On January 15, 2009, the AJ dismissed claim 1 on the basis that it was initiated by untimely EEO counselor contact. On March 27, 2009, the Agency moved for a decision without a hearing in its favor on claims 2 and 3. Complainant responded in opposition to the Agency's motion on April 27, 2009.
The AJ's Decision
On June 1, 2009, the AJ issued a decision without a hearing in favor of the Agency. Specifically, the AJ determined that there was no dispute that the August 2006 vacancy (claim 2) was cancelled, no applications for the vacancy were reviewed or rated, and the Agency did not select anyone for the position pursuant to the vacancy announcement. The AJ further determined that "as everyone who applied was uniformly impacted in a negative manner when the position was cancelled, the complainant cannot establish that the agency took a tangible adverse employment action against him or that he was subjected to adverse treatment reasonably calculated to deter protected activity." AJ's Decision, p. 7. The AJ also determined that Complainant failed to show that the Agency's explanation for cancelling the announcement was pretext for unlawful discrimination. The AJ noted that the Agency stated that it cancelled the vacancy announcement because funding was not available.
Regarding the delay in granting Complainant's waiver request, the AJ determined that there was no dispute that, on or about March 19, 2007, the Agency denied Complainant's September 2006, request for a waiver of mandatory retirement. The AJ further determined that there was no dispute that Complainant's request for reconsideration of his waiver request was granted by the Agency on April 27, 2007, and the Agency extended Complainant's separation date to April 30, 2008. The AJ also noted that the Agency granted Complainant another waiver that extended his separation date to April 30, 2009, and there was no evidence that Complainant suffered any interruption in pay or benefits. Therefore, the AJ found that Complainant failed to establish a prima facie case for this claim because he did not show he was subjected to adverse treatment. The AJ further determined that Complainant failed to show that this action was motivated by discriminatory action. Additionally, the AJ concluded that Complainant's allegation that he was not selected for various detail assignments to the training department while other employees were selected for such assignments was not at issue in this case, and therefore, the AJ did not address the merits of this claim. The Agency subsequently issued a final order fully adopting the AJ's findings.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant contends that the AJ improperly failed to consider his claim that the Agency failed to select him for detail assignments. Complainant maintains that he raised this issue during counseling, in his formal complaint, and in his summary judgment response. Complainant contends that the Agency failed to provide any documentation that shows how the four employees selected for the detail assignments were selected. Complainant further contends that the Agency initially asserted that he must retire on April 30, 2007, and denied his request for a waiver of mandatory retirement on February 8, 2007. Complainant maintains that he contacted Agency Headquarters after he learned management incorrectly calculated his retirement date, and Headquarters determined that April 30, 2008, was his correct retirement date. Complainant further maintains that the Agency's failure to select him for a detail assignment prevented him from having a later mandatory retirement date. The Agency requests that we affirm its final order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency's final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from an Agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, � VI.B. (Nov. 9, 1999) (providing that both the Administrative Judge's determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, are subject to de novo review). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and Agency's, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chap. 9, � VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Untimely Counselor Contact
On January 15, 2009, the AJ dismissed claim 1 on the basis that it was initiated by untimely EEO counselor contact. The record reveals that Complainant initiated EEO Counselor contact on November 17, 2006. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.105(a)(1) requires that complaints of discrimination should be brought to the attention of the Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor within forty-five (45) days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel action, within forty-five (45) days of the effective date of the action. The Commission has adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed to a "supportive facts" standard) to determine when the forty-five (45) day limitation period is triggered. See Howard v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05970852 (Feb. 11, 1999). Thus, the time limitation is not triggered until a complainant reasonably suspects discrimination, but before all the facts that support a charge of discrimination have become apparent.
In this case, Complainant acknowledges that he was notified about the cancellation of the Vacancy Announcement AWP--AT-06-14AKNN-84547 on July 17, 2006, but did not reasonably suspect discrimination until he learned of the "secret" detail assignments within 45 days of November 17, 2006. We find that Complainant did not acquire reasonable suspicion of discrimination for claim 1 until he learned of the identity of the selectees. See Hill v. Dep't of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01A62164 (June 26, 2006) (complainant had reasonable suspicion of discriminatory performance evaluation one year after evaluation date after discovering comparators). Consequently, we find that the AJ improperly dismissed claim 1.
Amendment of Complainant's Complaint
The AJ determined that Complainant's complaint did not include the claim that the Agency failed to select him for a detail assignment because of unlawful discrimination. However, we note that, during counseling, Complainant raised the issue of detail assignments in the following manner:
I went back to the Reviewing Official and explained what had happened with my application and he informed me that he was going to re-bid the job soon and that I should re-apply. Two or three weeks later the Chief detailed four Controllers to the Training Department for what I believe to be 180 day details. I do not believe I will be offered another opportunity for this position before I am separated from service.
ROI Tab A2, at pg 3.
In his formal complaint, Complainant alleged that the Agency detailed four Controllers to the Training Department in 180-day details that he was denied. Likewise, in his investigative statement, Complainant alleged that the Agency cancelled two vacancy announcements so that four employees outside his protected classes could be selected for detail assignments.
Further, we note that in a letter dated January 9, 2007, Complainant asked the Agency to amend his complaint to include the following sex discrimination and reprisal claim:
After a staff position I had bid was cancelled, a Female Controller was offered the very same job. This Controller has very limited time-in-grade and very limited experience.
We note that Commission regulations provide, in pertinent part, that a Complainant may amend a complaint any time prior to the conclusion of the investigation to include issues or claims like or related to those raised in the complaint. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.106(d) (1999). EEO Management Directive 110 provides that if a Complainant raises a new claim with an investigator, the investigator must instruct the Complainant to submit a letter to the Agency's EEO Director or Complaints Manager describing the new claim and stating that he wishes to amend his complaint. EEO MD-110, Chap. 5 Sect. 111(B). Further, once the Agency is aware that a Complainant is raising a new like or related claim, the Agency is required to amend the complaint and acknowledge the amendment in writing. See EEO MD-110, Chap. 5 Sect. III(B)(2); see also 29 C.F.R. � 1614.106(e). The Agency must also notify the EEO investigator to include the new allegations in the investigation. See EEO MD-110, Chap. 5 Sect. III(B)(2).
We note that in the 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 administrative process, a claim is defined as having two components: (1) a factual statement of the employment practice or policy being challenged; and (2) the basis of discrimination. EEO MD-110, Chap. 5, Sect. III(A). Thus, when an individual seeks to add a new basis, he is seeking to add a new claim.
In this case, the Agency did not respond to Complainant's request to amend and did not fully investigate Complainant's allegation about the detail assignments. The AJ compounded the Agency's error when she determined that detail assignments were not at issue in this case. We find that the detail assignments are like and related to Complainant's claims about the cancellation of the vacancy announcements and his request for a waiver of mandatory retirement requirements. The non-selection of Complainant for a detail assignment is inextricably intertwined with the vacancy announcement cancellations and Complainant's request for a mandatory retirement waiver. For example, the non-competitive selection of four employees outside of Complainant's protected class for detail assignments could constitute relevant evidence of discriminatory motive for cancelling the vacancy announcements and delaying Complainant's request for a retirement waiver.
Having found that Complainant raised like-or-related claims during the investigation, we also find that the Agency failed to amend Complainant's complaint in accordance with our regulations and management directive. The Agency does not dispute that the investigator never acknowledged the like or related claim raised by Complainant, and the investigator did not instruct Complainant to submit a letter to the Agency's EEO Director or Complaints Manager. Additionally, we find that the Agency had actual knowledge that Complainant raised like-or-related claims when it reviewed Complainant's counseling statement, formal complaint, investigative statement, and request to amend his complaint. The Agency failed to address the amendment in writing and failed to notify the investigator to include the like-or-related detail assignment claim in the investigation. As such, we find that the Agency improperly failed to amend Complainant's complaint, and the AJ erred when she found that detail assignments are not at issue in this case. See Sheehy v. Nat'l Security Agency, EEOC Request No. 0520100403 (Feb. 27, 2012).
Decision without a Hearing
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249.
The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep't of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). We find that the AJ improperly issued a decision without a hearing because there are genuine issues of material fact and credibility at issue in this case.
Claims 1 through 4
Generally, claims of disparate treatment are examined under the tripartite analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology. Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976). For Complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978).
For instance, to establish a prima facie case of reprisal, Complainant must show that (1) he engaged in protected EEO activity; (2) the Agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently, he was subjected to adverse treatment by the Agency; and (4) a nexus exists between his protected activity and the adverse treatment. Whitmire v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340 (Sept. 25, 2000).
Once a complainant has established a prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the Agency is successful, the burden reverts back to Complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency's reason(s) for its action was a pretext for discrimination. At all times, Complainant retains the burden of persuasion, and it is his obligation to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-16 (1983).
In this case, the Agency provided a document dated June 19, 2006, for the record. The document solicited volunteers for a temporary Support Specialist assignment in the Oakland Area. The document further stated that volunteers must have 52 weeks as a CPC, the assignment would not exceed 120 days, and volunteers must submit their names in written to a Human Resources official.
However, in deposition testimony, the Training Manager testified that he could not recall seeing the June 2006 memorandum and did not know how the selectees were assigned to his Training Department. Contrary to the Air Traffic Control Manager's assertions, C1 testified she never requested a detail assignment in the Training Department, but she thought that her supervisor may have asked her if she wanted the training assignment. Yet, C1's supervisor denied asking C1 if she wanted the detail assignment or recommending C1 for the detail assignment. The Operations Manager stated that he did not know how C1 was selected, and the Deputy Air Traffic Manager testified that did not recommend C1 for the detail assignment.
The Agency has not provided any evidence that the selectees submitted their names as volunteers for the detail assignment, as required by the memorandum. Significantly, one of the selectees specifically denies she volunteered for the detail assignment. Complainant contends that this supports his contention that the Agency used secret, unadvertised procedures to deny him a Support Specialist position. Moreover, the Training Manage testified that he could not recall seeing the June 2006 memorandum and did not know how the selectees were assigned to his Training Department. Further, C1 testified that she never requested a detail assignment in the Training Department, but C1's supervisor denied asking C1 if she wanted the detail assignment or recommending C1 for the detail assignment. Additionally, the Operations Manager stated that she did not know how C1 was selected, and the Deputy Air Traffic Manager testified that she did not recommend C1 for the detail assignment.
As such, we find that the process whereby the Agency made the detail assignment selections is unclear. In fact, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the Agency's explanations are so inconsistent and vague that they prove that the Agency's explanations are pretextual. As such, we find that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the selectees volunteered for the position and how they were chosen for the position. Therefore, a decision on the merits of claim 4 is improper at this juncture because summary judgment must not be used as a trial by affidavit to resolve this issue. Redmond v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766, 768 (1st Cir. 1975). The credibility of Complainant, C1, management officials, and other witnesses must be assessed through live testimony at a hearing. Further, all the claims in Complainant's complaint involve Complainant's attempts to prevent her mandatory retirement from the Agency, whether by waiving mandatory retirement or by placement into another position. Therefore, Complainant's claims are interrelated by common core facts and issues. Because of the interrelated nature of Complainant's claims, we find that all of Complainant's claims should be considered together at the hearing.
Consequently, we find that the AJ erred in issuing a decision without a hearing because there are material facts in dispute, and the credibility of witnesses is at issue.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we VACATE the Agency's final order and REMAND this matter for further processing in accordance with this decision and the Order below.
ORDER
The Agency shall submit to the Hearings Unit of the EEOC San Francisco District Office a request for a hearing within 15 calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency is directed to submit a copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings Unit within 15 calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The Agency shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at the address set forth below that the complaint file has been transmitted to the Hearings Unit. Thereafter, the Administrative Judge shall issue a decision on Complainant's reasonable accommodation claim in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109 and the agency shall issue a final action in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610)
This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
July 25, 2012
Date
2
0120093352
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
2
0120093352