Dave Lewis, III, Complainant,v.John M. McHugh, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 5, 2012
0120112110 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 5, 2012)

0120112110

04-05-2012

Dave Lewis, III, Complainant, v. John M. McHugh, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.




Dave Lewis, III,

Complainant,

v.

John M. McHugh,

Secretary,

Department of the Army,

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120112110

Hearing No. 490-2008-00230X

Agency No. ARCEMEMP07JAN00209

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant’s

appeal from the Agency’s February 3, 2011 final decision concerning

his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., Section 501 of the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §

791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked

as a Motor Vehicle Operator (Seasonal Worker) in the Agency’s Revetment

Operations with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Memphis, Tennessee.

On March 12, 2007, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that the

Agency discriminated against him on the bases of race (African-American),

disability (diabetes) 1, age, and reprisal for prior protected EEO

activity under Title VII when:

1) in 2003, his first-level supervisor (FLS) purportedly made sarcastic

remarks to him and blocked his path to a deck barge;

2) from about August 26 to September 6, 2006, he was placed on

administrative leave and required to visit his physician to obtain

medical information before returning to work;

3) in January 2005, he traveled to a mediation session, only to find

out that the mediator was ill and the mediation cancelled;

4) in September 2006, he was reassigned to another job; and

5) in December 2006, he was reassigned to a mechanic’s helper position.

At the conclusion of the investigation, Complainant was provided with a

copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a

hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant elected a

hearing before an AJ. During the hearing proceedings, the AJ dismissed

Complainant's complaint because he failed to attend a settlement

conference scheduled for June 29, 2010, and failed to respond to a

show cause order, asking him to explain why his complaint should not be

dismissed for failure to attend the conference or provide notice that

he would not attend.

The Agency implemented that decision and Complainant appealed.

On December 8, 2010, the Commission overturned the dismissal of

Complainant's complaint and remanded the case to the Agency for a final

decision based on the investigative record.

In its final decision, the Agency found no discrimination. The Agency

determined that, even if Complainant could establish a prima facie

case, management had recited legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

its actions. The Agency noted that Complainant had failed to show that

some of the alleged conduct occurred or that any actions that did occur

were prompted by his protected EEO classifications. In this regard,

the FLS denied blocking the barge stairway. The FLS asserted, however,

that while he and Complainant were at Richardson Landing, Complainant had

grabbed his arm, and he had to ask Complainant three times to release it.

Complainant provided no evidence supporting his account of the incident

on the barge stairs. However, other witnesses including, the Heavy

Equipment Operator provided statements supporting the FLS’s assertions.

Management denied having made any derogatory remarks with respect to

Complainant's protected bases.

Concerning Complainant being placed on administrative leave, the record

reflects that in a August 25, 2006 memorandum, Complainant's second-level

supervisor (SLS) informed Complainant that he was being placed on Leave

without Pay (LWOP) pending receipt of medical information showing that

Complainant was fit for full duty. In the memorandum, the SLS noted that

on August 14, 2006, the FLS reported seeing Complainant sleeping on duty

on July 29 and August 12, 2006. The memorandum stated that because of the

safety concerns associated with sleeping in a truck waiting to be loaded,

the Activity sent Complainant for a fitness for duty examination, but

Complainant refused to see the Activity's contract doctor. Consequently,

the Activity concluded that Complainant was not ready, willing, and

able to perform his duties and would not be permitted to return to

work until he provided medical documentation indicating that he was

fit for full duty. The record also reflects that later the same day,

the memorandum was withdrawn and Complainant was notified that he was

being placed on paid administrative leave for up to ten days until he

provided medical documentation showing that he was fit for duty.

Regarding the cancelled mediation session, the record fails to support a

finding that the SLS failed to notify Complainant about the cancellation

or took any action based on Complainant's protected EEO classifications.

The record indicates that the SLS was not notified about the cancellation

until early on the morning of January 17, 2005, when he was sent an

e-mail by the EEO Office. The SLS explained that after he received the

e-mail, someone in the chain of command asked if there was any way to

reach Complainant but no one had his telephone number.

Concerning the September 2006 reassignment, the SLS explained that

Complainant was moved based on his conflict with the FLS. The SLS noted

that he had received reports of heated, verbal and physical conflicts

between Complainant and the FLS.

Regarding Complainant's reassignment to the mechanic’s helper position,

management stated that the job site in question had an excess number of

employees and had enough truck drivers. The affected manager also stated

that he reassigned Complainant in part because some workers had expressed

concern about Complainant’s driving, and he felt that he needed to

take action to ensure that no unsafe incidents occurred. He further

stated that Complainant did not ask why he had been reassigned until

about January 12 or 13, 2007, and at that time he reminded Complainant

that he had volunteered. The affected manager added that other people

working in the excavation pit also performed jobs other than their

regularly assigned duties.

In conclusion, the Agency found that the events of which Complainant

complains, either individually or collectively fail to rise to the level

of unlawful harassment prohibited by the ADEA, Rehabilitation Act or

Title VII. Most importantly, there is no evidence that any of the actions

or decisions of Agency management were motivated by unlawful reasons.

Complainant failed to establish that any of management's reasons for its

actions were pretextual or unworthy of belief. Complainant failed to

establish discrimination under either the theory of disparate treatment

or unlawful harassment.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo

review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management

Directive 110, Chapter 9, § VI.A. (November 9, 1999). (explaining that

the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine

the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of

the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents,

statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant

submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the

Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of

the law”).

Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee’s

race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, religion or prior

EEO activity is unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive.

Wibstad v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01972699

(Aug. 14, 1998) (citing McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39

(D.C. Cir. 1985)); EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift

Systems, Inc. at 3, 9 (March 8, 1994). In determining that a working

environment is hostile, factors to consider are the frequency of the

alleged discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, and if it unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,

510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Enforcement Guidance at 6. The Supreme Court

has stated that: “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to

create an objectively hostile work environment - an environment that

a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive - is beyond Title

VII’s purview.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (1993).

To establish a claim of hostile environment harassment, complainant

must show that: (1) he belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) he

was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical

conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of

was based on his statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected

a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of

unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an

intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a

basis for imputing liability. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897

(11th Cir. 1982). The harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the

objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances.

Enforcement Guidance at 6.

An employer is subject to vicarious liability for harassment when it is

"created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority

over the employee." Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 524

U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524

U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2292-93 (1998). When the harassment does not

result in a tangible employment action being taken against the employee,

the employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability. The agency

can meet this defense, which is subject to proof by a preponderance

of the evidence, by demonstrating: (a) that it exercised reasonable

care to prevent and correct promptly any harassing behavior; and (b)

that appellant unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive

or corrective opportunities provided by the agency or to avoid harm

otherwise. Burlington Industries, Inc., v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. at 2270;

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.Ct. at 2293; Enforcement Guidance:

Vicarious Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC Notice

No. 915.002 (June 18, 1999). This defense is not available when the

harassment results in a tangible employment action (e.g., a discharge,

demotion, or undesirable reassignment) being taken against the employee.

Here, Complainant asserted that based on his statutorily protected

classes, management continuously subjected him to a hostile work

environment. However, we find that Complainant has not shown that he

was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical

conduct involving his protected classes, or the harassment complained of

was based on his statutorily protected classes. Further, Complainant

has not shown that the purported harassment had the purpose or effect

of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an

intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. While Complainant

has cited various incidents where Agency management took actions that

were either adverse or disruptive to him, we find that Complainant fails

to show that these incidents were as a result of unlawful discrimination.

To the extent Complainant is alleging disparate treatment with respect

to his claims, even assuming Complainant is a person with a disability,

he has not shown that the Agency's reasons for its actions were a pretext

for discrimination.

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration

of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision

because the preponderance of the evidence of record does not establish

that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time

period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration

as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely

filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted

with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider

requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very

limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

April 5, 2012

__________________

Date

1 This case arose before January 1, 2009, the effective date of the

Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, which made a

number of significant changes to the definition of disability under

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act.

Because this matter occurred from 2003 - 2006, the Commission will use

the analytical framework as it existed before the enactment of the ADA

Amendments Act of 2008, to determine whether Complainant is an individual

with a disability.

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0120112110

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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