Dattco, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 27, 2002

338 N.L.R.B. 49 (N.L.R.B. 2002)

DATTCO, INC. 1
Dattco, Inc. and Civil Service Employees affiliates
Local 760M, SEIU, AFL–CIO. Cases 34–CA–
8596 and 34–CA–8658
September 27, 2002
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, COWEN, AND BARTLETT
On January 14, 2000, Administrative Law Judge Ray-
mond P. Green issued the attached decision.1 The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the
General Counsel filed a cross-exception and brief in sup-
port of the exception and otherwise in support of the
judge’s decision. The Respondent filed answering and
reply briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has reviewed the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclu-
sions only to the extent consistent with this Decision and
Order.
The judge found, among other things, that the Respon-
dent was a successor employer and that it violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to recognize
and bargain with the Union. We find that the unit in
which bargaining was requested was not an appropriate
unit and that the Respondent did not violate the Act in
this respect.2
Unit Appropriateness and Successorship
For a number of years, Laidlaw, Inc. has provided
general schoolbus transportation services for the city of
Hartford. During the 1997–1998 school year, Laidlaw
also provided schoolbus transportation for children in
Hartford under Project Concern, a local school desegre-
gation program. The Union was certified as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of the schoolbus drivers
and monitors at Laidlaw’s Hartford facility on February
2, 1998.3 At that time, it represented approximately 100
monitors and 180 drivers at Laidlaw’s Hartford facility.4

1 The judge issued an errata on January 21, 2000.
2 In the absence of exceptions, we affirm the judge’s finding that the
Respondent threatened applicant Lawrence Clayton with bodily harm in
violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act and refused to hire him in violation
of Sec. 8(a)(3), (4), and (1). We also agree that Clayton should be
offered reinstatement and backpay. As explained below, however, we
disagree with the judge’s determination regarding when the backpay
period should begin. Hence, we have included a new Order that cor-
rects the description of the backpay period. Our Order also includes the
remedial language required by the Board’s decisions in Ferguson Elec-
tric Co., 335 NLRB 142 (2001), and Ishikawa Gasket America, Inc.,
337 NLRB 175 (2001).
3 All dates are in 1998 unless otherwise stated.
4 Approximately 25 of Laidlaw’s drivers, but no monitors, were as-
signed to the Project Concern routes, as opposed to the regular
schoolbus routes.
In January, the Respondent acquired a facility in Hart-
ford to use as a bus terminal. Thereafter, it bid on and in
May was awarded the contract to provide schoolbus
transportation for the upcoming 1998–1999 school year
for children in Hartford and suburban-Hartford under
Project Choice, a statewide racial, ethnic, and economic
balancing school program that replaced Project Concern.
Laidlaw retained the general schoolbus transportation
contract for Hartford when the Project Choice contract
was awarded to the Respondent.
In August, the Respondent began hiring schoolbus
drivers and monitors, many of whom previously worked
for Laidlaw. By late October, it had hired a representa-
tive complement of employees at the Hartford terminal,
i.e., approximately 59 drivers and monitors. On October
23, the Union faxed to the Respondent a demand for rec-
ognition as the representative of the Respondent’s drivers
and monitors and an attendant request for bargaining.
The Respondent refused, asserting then and now that its
Hartford terminal is a functionally integrated part of its
statewide operations and is not an appropriate unit for
bargaining.
The judge found that, with respect to its Hartford op-
erations, the Respondent was Laidlaw’s successor and
that it violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to rec-
ognize and bargain with the Union. As explained below,
because we agree with the Respondent that the unit en-
compassed by the Union’s October 23 demand was not
an appropriate unit, we reverse the judge’s finding that
the Respondent’s refusal to recognize the Union and bar-
gain was unlawful.5
The judge accurately set forth the test that the Board
uses in assessing whether an employer is a legal succes-
sor with an obligation to recognize and bargain with a
union. Citing Fall River Dyeing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S.
27 (1987), the judge stated that “a purchasing employer
is required to recognize and bargain with a union repre-
senting the predecessor’s employees when there is ‘sub-
stantial continuity’ of operations after the transaction and
if a majority of the new employer’s work force, in an
appropriate unit, consists of the predecessor’s employees
when the new employer has reached a ‘substantial and
representative complement.” (Emphasis added.) See
also Banknote Corp. of America v. NLRB, 84 F.3d 637,
642–643 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Subsections 8(a)(5) and 9(a) of
the Act, read together, only require a successor to bargain
with the representative of an ‘appropriate’ bargaining
unit”).
5 In view of our dismissal of the 8(a)(5) charge on this ground, we
find it unnecessary to pass on the other successorship issues raised in
this case.
338 NLRB No. 7
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2
Although the judge analyzed most of the successorship
factors, he did not independently assess the appropriate-
ness of the unit. Rather, he relied on two earlier cases
involving the Respondent where the Board found that
single-facility units at other locations were appropriate.
Dattco, Inc., 324 NLRB 323 (1997) (Clinton terminal);
Dattco, Inc., 325 NLRB No. 138 (1998) (not reported in
Board volumes) (North Branford terminal).6 He found
that the Respondent’s operations at the Hartford terminal
were not materially different from the operations at the
Clinton and North Branford terminals, and believing that
he was bound by those cases, he found that the Hartford
terminal constituted an appropriate unit. For the reasons
set forth below, we disagree.
It is well settled that a single-facility unit is presump-
tively appropriate for collective bargaining, unless it has
been so effectively merged into a more comprehensive
unit, or is so functionally integrated, that it has lost its
separate identity. New Britain Transportation Co., 330
NLRB 397 (1999), citing J & L Plate, 310 NLRB 429
(1993). To determine whether the presumption has been
rebutted, the Board considers such factors as central con-
trol over daily operations and labor relations, including
the extent of local autonomy; degree of employee inter-
change; similarity of skills, functions, and working con-
ditions; and bargaining history, if any. J & L Plate, Inc.,
supra; D & L Transportation, Inc., 324 NLRB 160
(1997). Each case must be assessed on its own facts,
even where, as here, the Board has made previous deter-
minations about other facilities of the same employer.
See generally Dunbar Armored, Inc. v. NLRB, 186 F.3d
844 (7th Cir. 1999). We find that the Respondent has
rebutted the single-facility presumption and demon-
strated that the Hartford terminal is not an appropriate
unit standing alone.
The Respondent operates nine terminals in eight cities
and towns in Connecticut—one each in New Britain,
Westport, Middletown, Hartford, Plainville, Avon, and
Cheshire, and two in New Haven. From these terminals,
drivers are dispatched to drive school, commuter, and
charter routes in many adjacent towns. Each terminal is
headed up by a terminal manager or dispatcher who has
authority to explain local rules to drivers, tell them where
to park buses, and issue initial oral warnings for atten-
dance and tardiness.
The Respondent’s headquarters is located in New Brit-
ain near the terminal there. All of the terminals are lo-
cated within 55 miles of New Britain. All bus service
and charter contracts are negotiated or booked by head-
quarters. Administratively, the statewide operation is

6 The Clinton and North Branford terminals have since closed.
divided into northern and southern districts, each with a
district manager. The district managers spend much of
the workday on the road, monitoring routes and drivers.
They also investigate all accidents. These individuals
work at headquarters in New Britain, as does the vice
president of operations. Each district has a safety super-
visor who is primarily responsible for hiring.
The formulation of schoolbus routes and assignments
is done at headquarters by computer. Each afternoon at
4, dispatchers at each terminal contact headquarters to
report the terminals’ personnel and resource needs for the
following morning, and each morning at 10 the dispatch-
ers contact headquarters to report their needs for the af-
ternoon routes. Every day the Respondent assigns driv-
ers out of their base terminals to satisfy the requirements
of contractual schoolbus routes. These drivers are shut-
tled from their base terminals to a receiving terminal at
the beginning of the day, and shuttled back to their base
terminals at the end of the workday.7 Thus, 24 of the
drivers and monitors based at the Hartford terminal are
assigned on a regular basis to drive bus routes that begin
and end at other terminals. The managers or dispatchers
at the receiving terminals supervise the drivers sent to
them even though the drivers are based elsewhere.
All wages and benefits are corporatewide and are de-
termined by headquarters.8 All accounting, payroll, per-
sonnel, and records functions are carried out at headquar-
ters.9 Paychecks are generated by and issued from head-
quarters. All employees are subject to the same corpo-
ratewide policies and rules, and only headquarters per-
sonnel may issue written warnings, suspend, or terminate
employees.
Neither Hartford Terminal Manager David Madison
nor any of his counterparts at other terminals hires em-
ployees or grants time off. Although applicants for
driver positions may pick up applications at local termi-
nals, their applications are forwarded to the Respondent’s
New Britain headquarters where hiring is done by the
district safety supervisors.10 A driver applicant must
report to New Britain for a physical examination and
drug screen prior to being hired. District safety supervi-
sors investigate the applicant’s driving history and back-
7 Drivers who are assigned out of their base terminals are paid dur-
ing this shuttle time.
8 Wages are higher only at the Westport terminal, where municipal
law governs the hourly wage paid to the drivers.
9 No personnel records are kept at the Hartford terminal.
10 Presumably, this process applies to monitors as well. Although
most of the testimony on the subject of hiring concerned drivers, noth-
ing in the record refutes the Respondent’s assertion that “all hiring”
was done by headquarters. Only 8 of the 72 employees of the Hartford
terminal during the 1998–1999 school year were monitors. The vast
majority of the employees at Hartford are and were drivers.
DATTCO, INC. 3
ground.11 All drivers, irrespective of the terminal to
which they are hired, must possess a class B commercial
drivers license with passenger and schoolbus endorse-
ments. If an applicant does not already have the requisite
license and certifications, he or she is given the time and
training necessary to procure one prior to being hired.
Mandatory monthly and yearly safety seminars for all
drivers and monitors are conducted at the New Britain
headquarters.
New Britain and Middletown are the only terminals
that have repair shops, so the drivers take buses from all
terminals there for service. All bodywork on buses is
performed at the Middletown terminal.
On this record, we are constrained to conclude that the
drivers and monitors at the Hartford terminal do not con-
stitute a unit appropriate for collective bargaining. The
record demonstrates highly centralized control over daily
operations, and uniform working conditions, functions,
and skills. All bus routes are coordinated by computer at
the Respondent’s headquarters, and the staffing needs for
the routes are reported twice a day to, and coordinated by
headquarters. Hiring, written discipline and suspension,
and termination decisions are made at headquarters.
Time off is granted by managers at headquarters. Payroll
and personnel functions are carried out at headquarters.
All benefits, wages, rules, and policies are uniformly set
and applied. All drivers operate school, commuter, or
charter buses, and monitors ride along to watch and assist
students on the schoolbuses. All drivers are required to
have a class B license with passenger and schoolbus en-
dorsements, and all drivers must undertake the same
training.
In the prior cases relied on by the judge, the Board
found that single-facility units were appropriate at the
Respondent’s now-closed Clinton and North Branford
terminals, despite the highly centralized operations and
labor relations and the uniformity of skills and terms and
conditions of employment, which also exist here. In
those cases, the Board found that the terminal managers
and dispatchers exercised a high degree of autonomy
over day-to-day operations, including assignment, dis-
patch, and minor discipline, and that there was only
minimal interchange of drivers between the facilities in
issue and the Respondent’s other terminals.
Here, by contrast, the employee interchange is substan-
tial and the terminal manager at Hartford exercises much
less authority over drivers based at the terminal. Specifi-
cally, 24 Hartford-based drivers are shuttled out to other
terminals daily to service routes at those terminals. They

11 If the safety supervisor discovers something questionable about an
applicant, such as a speeding ticket, the district manager makes the
hiring decision.
are supervised by the managers of their receiving termi-
nals daily in the performance of their work, and not by
the Hartford terminal manager. In other words, unlike
the Clinton and North Branford terminals in previous
litigation, the Hartford terminal is a labor pool that regu-
larly supplies a significant amount of manpower to other
terminals. We cannot find that the drivers and monitors
at the Hartford terminal constitute a viable unit when
fully one-third of the employees there do not actually
work in the unit on a regular basis and are separately
supervised by terminal managers elsewhere. This level
of interdependence and interchange is significant and,
with the centralization of operations and uniformity of
skills, functions, and working conditions, is sufficient to
rebut the presumptive appropriateness of the single-
facility unit.12
Because the Hartford terminal does not constitute an
appropriate unit within the Respondent’s operation, we
find the Respondent is not a successor under Board law,
and that it had no obligation to recognize and bargain
with the Union. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the
8(a)(5) allegations.
Remedy for the Discrimination Against
Lawrence Clayton
On November 30, 1998, former Laidlaw busdriver and
union adherent Lawrence Clayton applied for a driving
position at the Respondent’s Hartford terminal. There
are no exceptions to the judge’s finding that Clayton was
threatened with bodily harm in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and discriminatorily denied employment in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(3), (4), and (1). An issue is pre-
sented, however, as to his backpay remedy.
At the time of the discrimination against him, Clayton
did not have a class B driver’s license, which the Re-
spondent requires of all busdrivers.13 As indicated above,
however, it was the Respondent’s practice to train appli-
cants and allow them time to procure the necessary li-
cense and certifications in anticipation of hiring them—a
12 In this respect, this case is similar to Novato Disposal Services,
328 NLRB 820, 820 (1999), in which among other things, the Board
relied on the “significant degree of . . . temporary interchange” between
petitioned-for drivers and drivers from other of the employer’s compa-
nies.
See also Budget Rent A Car Systems, 337 NLRB 884 (2002), in
which the Board found that the single-facility unit presumption had
been rebutted. There, branch managers at the two petitioned-for stores
had little or no input into hiring, terminations, serious discipline, wages,
benefits, or scheduling overtime; control of labor relations was central-
ized; there was substantial functional integration and employee contract
among all the stores; and job functions and terms and conditions of
employment were identical from store to store.
13 Laidlaw did not require that all employees have a class B license.
At Laidlaw, Clayton drove smaller schoolbuses for which a class C
license was required.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4
process which took an average of 2 to 4 weeks. In di-
recting the Respondent to offer employment to Clayton
and make him whole, the judge found that the backpay
period should run from the date Clayton received or re-
ceives the appropriate credentials to the date the Respon-
dent offers him employment. The General Counsel has
excepted to the backpay remedy and argues that Clayton
should be awarded backpay from the date of the dis-
crimination against him until the Respondent offers him
employment. We disagree with both the judge and the
General Counsel.
The fundamental purpose of Board remedies is to
“undo the effects of violations of the Act.” NLRB v.
Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953). The
Board’s customary remedy for a discriminatory failure to
hire is to direct instatement and backpay, with interest.
The purpose of the remedy is to make the victim of the
discrimination “whole”—that is (as nearly as possible),
to put him in the position, employment-wise and mone-
tarily, that he would have been in had no discrimination
occurred. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177,
194 (1941).
Clearly, neither the judge’s recommended remedy nor
that proposed by the General Counsel would accomplish
this purpose. The judge’s remedy would effectively
deny Clayton backpay for at least part of the period from
the date of the unlawful conduct toward him until the
date he is offered employment. The remedy requested by
the General Counsel would give Clayton more than he
would have earned had he been treated lawfully and been
given the time and training necessary to obtain the class
B license. Accordingly, we reject both of these ap-
proaches.
To restore Clayton to the position he would have been
in absent the unlawful discrimination, we shall impose a
remedy based on the Respondent’s own hiring practices.
As stated above, the Respondent’s practice was to offer
applicants employment conditioned on their obtaining
the license, then to train them so that they could meet
licensing and certification requirements, and finally to
employ them once they received the license. Consistent
with that practice, we find that the backpay period should
begin on the date after November 30 (the day he applied
for employment) that Clayton would have obtained the
required license had he not been treated unlawfully.
Of course, we can only speculate about the amount of
time it would have taken him to obtain the class B li-
cense and certifications in 1998 had he been offered em-
ployment and received appropriate training. We think it
reasonable to assume, however, that the length of time
that it actually takes him to acquire the license (or that it
took him if he has since gotten the license) is the same
amount of time it would have taken him to do so in
1998.14
More precisely, to determine the date the backpay pe-
riod should begin, we shall add the length of time that it
takes, or took, Clayton to apply for and receive the requi-
site class B license to the date that he was discriminato-
rily refused employment, November 30. To illustrate, if
Clayton applied for and received the appropriate license
in 15 days, the backpay period should begin on Decem-
ber 15, 1998. And if Clayton has not obtained the li-
cense but does so within a reasonable period of time after
being offered employment by the Respondent, and if, for
example, it takes him 22 days to receive it, then the
backpay period should begin on December 22, 1998.15
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Dattco, Inc., Hartford and New Britain,
Connecticut, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to hire applicants for employment be-
cause of their affiliation or support for the Union or be-
cause they have participated or given evidence in a prior
unfair labor practice proceeding.
(b) Threatening bodily injury to job applicants or em-
ployees because they are members or supporters of the
Union.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days of the date of this Order, offer Law-
rence Clayton, as may be appropriate to the circum-
stances, entry to its training program or employment as a
busdriver.
(b) Make Clayton whole with interest, for any loss of
earnings he may have suffered in the manner described
above.
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-

nse.
14 We disavow the judge’s suggestion that Clayton’s entitlement to
backpay should be limited because he did not obtain a class B license
when he worked at Laidlaw. Clayton had a class C license, which was
required to drive the smaller buses that Laidlaw operated. More impor-
tantly, as stated above, the Respondent gave other applicants the
opportunity to get the class B lice
15 If Clayton did not obtain the license and fails to do so within a rea-
sonable period, we shall assume that he would not have done so in 1998
either, and therefore would not have been employed by the Respondent.
In such circumstances, Clayton would not be entitled to backpay.
DATTCO, INC. 5
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel re-
cords and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic
form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility copies of the attached notice marked “Appen-
dix.”16 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 34, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facil-
ity involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the no-
tice to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at any time since November
30, 1998.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency Of The United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

16 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
WE WILL NOT refuse to hire applicants for employment
because of their affiliation or support for the Union or
because they have participated or given evidence in a
prior unfair labor practice proceeding.
WE WILL NOT threaten bodily injury to job applicants or
employees because they are members or supporters of
the Union.
WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days of the date of this Order, of-
fer Lawrence Clayton entry to our training program or
employment as a busdriver, whichever is appropriate
under the circumstances.
WE WILL make Lawrence Clayton whole, with interest,
for any loss of earnings he may have suffered as a result
of our discrimination against him.
DATTCO, INC.

Jennifer Dease, Esq., for the General Counsel.
George E. Obrien Jr. and Deborah Dehart Cannavino, Esq.,
for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RAYMOND P. GREEN, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was heard by me in Hartford, Connecticut, on September 28–
30, 1999. The charge in Case 34–CA–8596 was filed on No-
vember 18, 1999, and the charge and amended charge in Case
34–CA–8658 were filed on January 14 and May 13, 1999. A
complaint was issued in Case 34–CA–8596 on July 28, 1999,
and a complaint in Case 34–CA–8658 was issued on June 22,
1999. In substance the complaints alleged as follows:
1. That on February 2, 1998, the Union was certified by the
Board as the exclusive collective-bargaining agent of certain
employees of a company named Laidlaw Transit, Inc., in a unit
consisting of all schoolbus drivers and bus monitors employed
by the employer at its Hartford Connecticut facility; but exclud-
ing all other employees, mechanics, dispatchers, maintenance
employees, office clerical employees, and guards, professional
employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
2. That in August 1998, the Respondent, Dattco, Inc., ob-
tained a contract from the State of Connecticut pursuant to
which it replaced Laidlaw and continued Laidlaw’s business in
basically unchanged manner and employed as a majority of its
(Dattco’s) employees at the Hartford facility, a majority of the
individuals previously employed by Laidlaw. That as a conse-
quence of such actions, Dattco became a successor to Laidlaw
having an obligation to bargain with the Union.
3. That since on or about October 7, 1998, the Respondent,
as a successor to Laidlaw, has refused to recognize and bargain
with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining represen-
tative of its employees in the unit described above.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6
4. That on or about November 30, 1998, the Respondent, by
its manager, David Madison, threatened employees with bodily
harm if they engaged in union activities.
5. That on or about December 7, 1998, the Respondent by
Madison told employees that they would not be hired because
of their union activity and refused to hire Lawrence Clayton for
such unlawful reasons.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed, I
make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The parties agree and I find that the Respondent, an em-
ployer, engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. It also is agreed and I find that the
Charging Party, Civil Service Employees, affiliates, Local 760,
SEIU, AFL–CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
A. The Successorship Issue
On February 2, 1998, the Union was certified as the bargain-
ing representative of the busdrivers and monitors who were
employed by Laidlaw at a facility located at 2909 Main Street,
Hartford, Connecticut. The employees, then employed by
Laidlaw at this facility, were working pursuant to a contract
between Laidlaw and the city of Hartford for the transportation
of public school students. This contract, which was overseen
by the Hartford Board of Education, provided transportation of
students within the city of Hartford (intracity routes) and trans-
portation from Hartford to some of the suburban school districts
surrounding Hartford. The latter function was undertaken pur-
suant to “Project Concern” designed in an attempt to desegre-
gate the public school system of Hartford. The Project Concern
transportation was overseen by Mary Carroll.
In performing the Hartford contract, Laidlaw employed
about 180 busdrivers and 100 monitors. (Monitors are people
who go along with the bus and tend to the children when
needed.) Of the total unit consisting of about 280 people, there
were about 25 busdrivers assigned to Project Concern routes.
There were no monitors who were employed by Laidlaw for
these routes.
In 1997, the State of Connecticut enacted a new desegrega-
tion program which was called “Project Choice.” This was to
be implemented in the 1998–1999 school year. Like its prede-
cessor, the new Project Choice was designed to foster desegre-
gation of various areas in Connecticut including the Hartford
city schools by affording city students an opportunity to enroll
in suburban school districts. (The program also theoretically
provided transportation options for suburban students to enroll
in inner city schools.) Under the new program, which was
regional in nature, three sending districts were designated; these
being Hartford, New Haven, and Bridgeport. Additional educa-
tional services were also provided, but for our purposes, we
remain focused on busing. For the Hartford area, an entity
called the Capitol Regional Education Counsel (CREC) was set
up and Mary Carroll moved from Project Concern to the Hart-
ford area administration of Project Choice.
In May 1998, bids were solicited by CREC for the schoolbus
routes related to Project Choice in Hartford. Laidlaw and
Dattco, each submitted competing bids for this work. Dattco
turned out to be the successful bidder and was awarded the
Project Choice routes for the 1998–1999 school year. Laidlaw
ceased to perform this work in late spring of 1998. Neverthe-
less, Laidlaw retained the intracity routes for Hartford which, as
noted above, constituted the bulk of its work in the Hartford
area.
Unlike Laidlaw which is a publicly owned corporation oper-
ating throughout the United States and Canada, Dattco is a
private, family owned business, headquartered in New Britain
Connecticut and principally doing business in that State.
In January 1998, Dattco leased a property in Hartford which
it used as a bus terminal. At that time, it transferred from New
Britain, a few routes in Hartford unrelated to the Hartford pub-
lic schools. These were a shuttle service for the University of
Hartford and bus service for two private schools. In August,
Dattco moved more buses and increased its rented space at the
Hartford facility to take care of the Project Choice contract.
Dave Madison was transferred from New Britain to be the
Hartford terminal manager and Yolanda Carabello was hired to
be the Hartford dispatcher. Dattco also transferred some main-
tenance people to Hartford. Prior to his employment by Dattco,
Madison had been a supervisory employee of Laidlaw at its
Hartford facility.
The physical facility at Hartford consists of a garage with
three bays, a drivers’ room, a dispatch office, and the terminal
manager’s office. It also has space to park buses.
Beginning in mid-August 1998, Dattco commenced hiring
drivers and monitors for Hartford. Although most of these
people would be hired to work on Project Choice routes, some
were utilized for other work as well. In any event, this hiring
process began around August 13, 1998, and continued through-
out the year. The largest group of new hires took place in Au-
gust and smaller numbers of new hires occurred in September,
October, and thereafter. The school year commenced in early
September 1998, presumably soon after Labor Day, and by
September 8, 1998, Dattco had assigned a total of 58 people to
be drivers and monitors at the Hartford facility. By the end of
September, Dattco had hired about 60 drivers and monitors for
the Hartford facility. By the end of the 1998–1999 school year,
the number of drivers and monitors employed at this facility
reached about 72 or 73. At the beginning of the 1999–2000
school year and despite an expansion of the Project Choice
program, the number of such employees was in the range of
between 69 to 73 employees. (An Appendix A to this decision
describes who was hired and when.)
By letter dated October 6, 1998, the Union made a demand
for recognition.1 This was followed up by a telephonic demand
occurring in or about mid-November 1998. There is no dispute

1 The Employer in an appendix to its brief offered to show, by way
of a cover fax sheet, that the demand was not actually sent until Octo-
ber 23, 1998. Even if this is so, I don’t think it would have any effect
on the outcome of this case.
DATTCO, INC. 7
as to the fact that the Respondent has refused to recognize the
Union.
In order to put the evidence in context, it is useful at this
point to focus on the theories of the respective parties. The
General Counsel argues (1) that Dattco’s Hartford facility con-
stitutes a single and separate appropriate unit and (2) that a
majority of the employees hired for this facility had been em-
ployed by Laidlaw in the certified bargaining unit. Contending
that Dattco is engaged in essentially the same business as Laid-
law (driving schoolbuses); that there was continuity of opera-
tions when Dattco replaced Laidlaw in this portion of Laidlaw’s
Hartford business; and that a majority of Dattco’s Hartford
work force consisted of former Laidlaw unit employees, the
General Counsel argues that Dattco is a successor having a
legal obligation to bargain with the Union.
The Respondent contends that the Hartford unit is not a sepa-
rate appropriate bargaining unit inasmuch as Dattco’s statewide
operations are highly integrated and centralized. It argues
among other things, that employees at all of its facilities receive
the same level of wage and benefits; that they work under the
same employee rules and regulations; that the distribution of
routes is determined at its central headquarter facility; and that
there is a significant degree of regular employee interchange
among the Respondent’s several Connecticut facilities. Ac-
cordingly, it argues that the smallest appropriate unit would
have a statewide unit consisting of at least 800 employees and
therefore, the Hartford/Laidlaw employees who have been inte-
grated into its centralized operations, would comprise only a
small fraction of the work force. Moreover, the Respondent
argues that even if the Hartford facility were held to be a sepa-
rate appropriate unit, the former Laidlaw employees would not
make up a majority of its work force as of the date that recogni-
tion was granted and when the number of employees reached a
“representative complement.”
The General Counsel and the Respondent differ as to how to
count people who had worked for Laidlaw but who left that
Company at a point in time well before the transition was made
to Dattco.
There has been considerable prior litigation at the Hartford
Regional Office, in the context of representation cases, regard-
ing Dattco and the question of appropriate units. This has led
to a number of decisions on this issue which are summarized
below.
In 1994, in Case 34–RC–1290, the Regional Director con-
cluded that a proposed unit of drivers at Dattco’s North Bran-
ford, Connecticut facility was not appropriate. Consequently,
in December 1994, a representation election was conducted in a
statewide unit of busdrivers which resulted in a certification of
results. (The Union lost.)
In 1996, Local 443 IBT filed a petition in Case 34–RC–1431
in relation to drivers at a Dattco facility in Clinton, Connecti-
cut. Once again the Regional Director concluded that the pro-
posed unit was inappropriate. Local 443 appealed to the Board
which reversed the Regional Director, and relying on D&L
Transportation, 324 NLRB 160 (1997), found that the Clinton
facility constituted a separate appropriate unit. Dattco Inc., 324
NLRB 323 (1997). When the employer refused to bargain, in
order to test the certification in the court of appeals, the Board
issued its decision after summary judgment holding that Dattco
refused to bargain. 325 NLRB No. 138 (1998) (not reported in
Board volumes). That matter is still pending, as is another case
involving Dattco’s North Branford facility, where the Board
denied the Respondent request for review of the Regional Di-
rector’s conclusion that a single facility unit is appropriate.
As the operations of the Respondent were not materially dif-
ferent at the time of the present hearing, it seems to me that the
Board’s decision, finding that single-facility units are appropri-
ate for Dattco, is binding on me.2 I note parenthetically, that if
it is ultimately concluded that the Hartford unit is not appropri-
ate and that a multifacility unit is the only appropriate unit, then
no successorship could be found in this case and the Respon-
dent clearly would not have an obligation to bargain with the
Union.
The basic case defining successorship is Fall River Dyeing &
Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987). In that case, the
Supreme Court held that a purchasing employer is required to
recognize and bargain with a union representing the predeces-
sor’s employees when there is a “substantial continuity” of
operations after the transaction and if a majority of the new
employer’s work force, in an appropriate unit, consists of the
predecessor’s employees when the new employer has reached a
“substantial and representative complement.”
If majority status exists in the new unit (meaning more than
half of the new unit consists of the predecessor’s employees),
then an obligation to bargain via successorship will be found
even where the new bargaining unit has changed to some ex-
tent. NLRB v. Winco Petroleum Co., 668 F2.d 973 (8th Cir.
1982) (purchaser consolidated the predecessor’s three service
stations with four others). A purchaser can be a successor even
if it takes over a fragment of the seller’s unit, where the new
unit can exist on its own as an appropriate unit. Stewart Granite
Enters, 255 NLRB 569 (1981). An extreme example of this is
illustrated by Bronx Health Plan, 326 NLRB 810 (1998), where
a Board majority concluded that a new entity was a successor
even though it was engaged in a somewhat different type of
business and where the new unit consisted of less than 6 per-
cent of the predecessor’s existing unit. Thus, in the present
case, the fact that Dattco’s Hartford facility and the routes run
from that facility constitute only a portion of Laidlaw’s preex-
isting unit, would not negate a successorship finding.
Successorship will not be found in the event that the new
employer substantially changes the nature of the business and
thereby disrupts the continuity of the enterprise. CitiSteel USA,
Inc., v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In School Bus
Services, 312 NLRB 1 (1993), the Board held that with respect
to continuity, the questions to be answered are (1) whether the
business of both employers was essentially the same; (2)
whether the employees of the new company are doing the same

2 I note that the Respondent spent a good part of its brief discussing
its contention that all of the Company’s facilities are functionally inte-
grated and have a significant amount of employee interchange. I mean
no disrespect to the Respondent or its counsel in not discussing the
evidence on this point. But as the Board has already ruled against
Dattco’s unit position on facts which have not significantly changed,
Respondent’s reargument of its position, more appropriately must be
made either to the Board or to a reviewing court.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 8
jobs in the same working conditions, under the same supervi-
sors; and (3) whether the new entity has the same production
process, produces the same products and basically has the same
customers. On the issue of continuity, see also Sierra Realty
Corp., 317 NLRB 832, 836 (1995); Systems Management, 292
NLRB 1075 (1989), enfd. in part 901 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1990);
Steward Granite Enterprises, 255 NLRB 569, 573 (1991); and
Spruce-Up Corp., 209 NLRB 194 (1974).
In the present case, I would conclude that there is substantial
continuity between the Hartford operations of Laidlaw and the
Hartford operations of Dattco, despite the fact that Dattco took
over only a portion of the schoolbus routes that Laidlaw had
previously performed in the area. Most of the routes run by
Dattco were routes which previously had been run by Laidlaw.
Dattco’s local terminal manager, Dave Madison, had also been
the terminal manager for Laidlaw. And many, but not all of
new employees of Dattco, had been employed by Laidlaw dur-
ing the preceding school year. The services being performed
by Dattco are essentially the same as those performed by Laid-
law and the manner in which the employees do their work is
not, in my opinion, significantly different. (Lets face it, the
work from an employee’s point of view, consists of driving a
schoolbus on a predetermined route set by Dattco. This in-
volves arriving on time in the morning, taking a bus out on the
run and returning it to the facility when the route is concluded.
Although I would characterize this as a highly responsible job,
it cannot, in my judgment, be called a job which affords a great
deal of latitude in the means of its performance.)
Inasmuch as the Board has already concluded that for Dattco
a single facility unit is appropriate, the remaining question is
whether or not, at an appropriate period of time, a majority of
Dattco’s Hartford work force consisted of former employees of
Laidlaw.
The record indicates to me that Dattco reached its normal
operations at Hartford in mid-September 1998, or at the very
latest, by the end of October 1998. After that, employees came
and went as a result of normal turnover and although there was
some expansion of the work force during the 1999–2000 school
year, this did not involve a significant increase in employee
numbers and was speculative at the beginning of the 1998–
1999 school year. Because Dattco hired people in August, Sep-
tember, October, and to a lesser degree in the ensuring months,
it is difficult to pinpoint a precise date when it reached a repre-
sentative complement. I therefore have tried to evaluate the
numbers over a period of time.
In tallying the numbers, I have included persons who appear
on General Counsel’s Exhibits 19 and 20 which are computer
runs made by Dattco of the drivers and monitors assigned to the
Hartford facility payroll. I have also used General Counsel’s
Exhibit 16 which is a payroll record from Laidlaw plus a num-
ber of Dattco application forms which were put into evidence
by both the General Counsel and the Respondent. The applica-
tions indicate what the job applicants listed as their previous
employments when they applied for jobs at Dattco. Thus,
combining the application forms with General Counsel’s Ex-
hibit 16, I was able to ascertain which people on General Coun-
sel’s Exhibits 19 and 20 had previously worked for Laid-
law/Vancom and when they worked for the predecessor.
General Counsel’s Exhibit 19 is a computer printout that was
run on September 29, 1999, and lists the people employed in
order of date of hire. If an employee left Dattco’s employ be-
fore September 29, 1999, the date is listed; otherwise it is as-
sumed that the individual was employed from the start date
shown to the date of the computer run. (9/29/99.) I should note
that there are several names which have a start date and termi-
nation date which are identical. When this occurs, this means
that the individual never actually showed up for work and those
individuals are not counted. General Counsel Exhibit 19 lists
individuals who were employed from January 9, 1998, to Sep-
tember 21, 1999. (The latter date would be in the second year
of Dattco’s Hartford operation.)
General Counsel’s Exhibit 20 is a printout of Dattco’s em-
ployees that was run on March 10, 1999. It lists the employees
in alphabetical order and I assume that it lists all persons who
became employed by Dattco at the Hartford facility since its
names on General Counsel’s Exhibit 20 who do not appear on
General Counsel’s Exhibit 19. Obviously this would include
people hired after September 21, 1999. But it also includes a
few people who were apparently hired much earlier. (For ex-
ample, Maria Rupert listed on General Counsel’s Exhibit 20 as
being hired on January 9, 1998, is not listed on General Coun-
sel’s Exhibit 19.)
The combination of General Counsel’s Exhibits 19 and 20
shows that the majority of Dattco’s hiring took place in August
1998, with 30 people hired on August 19 and 20. By the end of
August 1998, and still before the start of the school year, Dattco
employed at this facility, exclusive of the terminal manager and
dispatcher, 44 drivers and monitors. Additional people were
hired in September and October 1998. And more people were
hired thereafter. By my count, Dattco employed 54 drivers and
monitors by September 14, 1998 (soon after the school year
began); 59 by September 21, 1998; 60 by September 28, 1998;
and 59 by the end of October 1998. (By the end of October
1998, seven employees had left their employment during Octo-
ber and were replaced.) I should note that the combination of
General Counsel’s Exhibits 19 and 20 should list all unit cate-
gory people who were on the Hartford facility payroll including
those individuals who arrived at this facility in the morning and
who were shuttled to other terminals.3
To determine which employees of Dattco at the Hartford fa-
cility had previously been employed by Laidlaw, I reviewed
Laidlaw’s payroll records and the employment applications of
the people hired by Dattco. Because as a matter of industry
practice many (perhaps most) of the Laidlaw drivers were laid
off at the end of the school year (at the end of May or in June),
I counted as a former Laidlaw employee any person thereafter
hired by Dattco who was employed by the predecessor up to
late May 1998 or thereafter. That is, if the evidence indicated
that an individual was employed by Laidlaw on or after late

3 I can see no reason to exclude from the count any individuals who
were employed by Dattco during an appropriate period of time because
they may also have worked for Laidlaw at the same time. Assuming
this to be the case, there is no reason to exclude from a bargaining unit,
people who work regular part-time jobs for two employers at the same
time.
DATTCO, INC. 9
May 1998, I counted that person as being a predecessor em-
ployee who should count toward the Union’s majority status.
On the other hand, if the evidence indicated merely that an
individual had worked at one time for Laidlaw, but who was
not employed by Laidlaw at or shortly before the end of the
1997–1998 school year, I did not count that individual as being
a predecessor employee. Thus, if for example, an individual
had worked for Laidlaw or Vancom but had an intervening
employer before becoming employed by Dattco, that individual
was treated as if he was a new employee who should not be
counted toward the Union’s majority status. In this regard, the
Respondent cited a General Counsel memorandum on this sub-
ject which supported its view of the law and which is persua-
sive to me. In General Counsel’s memo, November 2, 1999;
NLRB Press Release (R-2347) the General Counsel stated:

We initially found that there was substantial continuity
between operations of the predecessor and those of the
successor. However, we also found that various employ-
ees whose employment relationships with the predecessor
had been severed and who had then been hired by the suc-
cessor, should not be included in determining whether a
majority of the bargaining unit had been union-represented
predecessor employees at the time of the predecessor’s
cessation.
In our view, those employees had severed their em-
ployment relationships for reasons unrelated o the cessa-
tion of the predecessor’s operations. WE thus found dis-
tinguishable such cases as Derby Refining, 292 NLRB
1015, (1989) enfd. 915 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1990) and
Cincinnati Bronze, 286 NLRB 39 (1987) where employees
who had previously terminated their relationship with the
predecessor were counted in the successor’s bargaining
unit. In those cases, however, the employees had been
terminated as a consequence of the shift in operations from
the predecessor to the successor. In such circumstances,
there was no reason to believe that the employees would
have ceased their employment but for the predecessor’s
cessation of operations. In our case, the predecessor em-
ployees in question had terminated their employment or
had been terminated for unrelated reasons. Therefore,
they were not to be counted in determining the union’s
majority status. Absent those employees, the union lacked
majority status, and we decided to dismiss the Section
8(a)(5) charge.

In counting the number of Dattco employees at various times
and determining whether a majority came from Laidlaw, I as-
sumed that a single facility unit in Hartford, Connecticut, is
appropriate and assumed that all employees who reported to
that facility (whether or not working on Hartford routes),
should be included in the unit. Where there are situations which
are ambiguous, I have given the Respondent the benefit of the
doubt on the theory that it is the General Counsel who has the
burden of proving majority status. Thus, for example, I have
not counted as part of the Union’s majority, Elizebeth Jenkins,
Jesus Fernandez, Teresa Rodriguez, and Lydia Ferrer because
neither the Laidlaw records nor their Dattco employment appli-
cations clearly indicated when they ceased working for Laidlaw
before going to work for Dattco. I have also concluded that the
company reached normal operations and had a representative
complement no later than the end of September 1998, although
I have included in Appendix A all hires (and terminations),
from January 1998 through October 31, 1998. The count is as
follows:
As of August 31, 1998, there were 44 employees in unit jobs
of whom 27 had been employed by Laidlaw in the working
period immediately preceding their hire by Dattco.
As of September 14, 1998 (right after the start of the 1998-
99 school year), there were 54 employees in unit jobs of whom
31 had been employed by Laidlaw in the working period im-
mediately preceding their hire by Dattco.
As of September 21, 1998, there were 59 employees in unit
jobs of whom 36 had been employed by Laidlaw in the working
period immediately preceding their hire by Dattco.
As of September 28, 1998, there were 60 employees in unit
jobs of whom 36 had been employed by Laidlaw in the working
period immediately preceding their hire by Dattco.
As of the end of October 1998, there 59 employees in unit
jobs of whom 37 had been employed by Laidlaw in the working
period immediately preceding their hire by Dattco.
Accordingly, as a majority of the Dattco Hartford unit at any
given time from the end of August until the end of October
1998, contained a majority of employees who had worked for
Laidlaw during the immediately preceding working season, I
conclude that Dattco was a successor, having an obligation to
bargain with the Union upon its request to bargain.
B. Lawrence Clayton
Clayton was employed from 1991 to 1996 as a busdriver for
Laidlaw/Vancom. During that period he drove a type 2 small
schoolbus which required a commercial driver’s license with a
C endorsement. Other people drove larger schoolbuses requir-
ing a B endorsement which Clayton did not have. He resigned
in December 1996.
In January or February 1997, Clayton began assisting the
Union in its attempt to organize the Laidlaw/Vancom employ-
ees in Hartford. He distributed union literature outside the
facility and solicited employees to join the Union. At this time,
Dave Madison, who later became the terminal manager for
Dattco, was the manager of the Hartford facility for Laidlaw.
In March 1997, Clayton told Madison that he wanted to re-
sume his job as a driver. He credibly testified that Madison
asked him about his involvement in the Union and that he told
Madison that his involvement should be obvious inasmuch as
he could be seen each day outside the facility handing out lit-
erature. Clayton told Madison that he was one of the lead union
organizers but that he wasn’t there to talk about the Union; he
was there to ask for a job.
Thereafter, Clayton met with Laidlaw’s operations manager
who told him that he would not be hired because he did not
have the C endorsement on his license and that the Company
was only hiring people who could drive both small and large
schoolbuses. (Requiring a B endorsement.)
The Union filed an unfair labor practice alleging that Laid-
law unlawfully refused to hire Clayton. After an investigation,
that Company entered into a settlement agreement pursuant to
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 10
which it agreed to hire Clayton. As a condition of hire, Clayton
agreed that after he started working, he would complete the
necessary training to get a B endorsement thereby enabling him
to drive the big buses. Notwithstanding this agreement, Clay-
ton, although rehired in September, did not complete the train-
ing, did not obtain the license endorsement, and again left Laid-
law’s employment in June 1998. Among other things, Clayton
told Madison that he was tired of driving schoolbuses.
In the meantime, the Union’s organizing drive culminated in
an election which resulted in it being certified on February 2,
1998. The Union and Laidlaw thereupon commenced collec-
tive bargaining and Clayton was on the Union’s negotiating
committee. When Clayton left his job at Laidlaw, he was hired
by the Union as an organizer.
On or about November 30, 1998, Clayton visited the facility
and asked Madison if he could be employed by Dattco. Clay-
ton credibly testified that while giving him an application,
Madison said, “[Y]ou’re not going to put a union in here, be-
cause some bodily harm might come your way this time, not by
me of course, but there will be some bodily harm.”
Madison testified that right after Clayton’s visit, he called his
superior, Phil Johnson, who is Dattco’s director of operations
for the Northern District. According to Madison, he told John-
son that he knew Clayton as a union organizer when they both
worked at Laidlaw and that he didn’t think that Clayton’s ap-
plication was serious. Madison testified that he told Johnson
that Clayton did not have an up-to-date license and that he had
some kind of ticket on his record. Clayton also testified that he
told Johnson that Clayton’s personality wouldn’t fit in with the
people currently working, that Clayton could be very argumen-
tative over any subject and that he didn’t think that Clayton
would work very well with the people who were working.
Madison recommended that Clayton not be hired, although he
testified that he also told Johnson that if they did not hire Clay-
ton, they would likely be faced with an unfair labor practice
charge. Johnson testified that he decided not to hire Clayton
based solely on Madison’s recommendation. He also testified
that based on Clayton’s report to him, he felt that Clayton
would be a “skunk in the woodpile.”
In relation to the refusal to hire Clayton, a number of things
should be noted. First, the Company’s witnesses testified that
at that time (November 1998), there was a severe shortage of
schoolbus drivers in Connecticut and as a consequence, it was
willing to make a lot of allowances in terms of a person’s quali-
fications. The record shows that a considerable number of
other drivers were hired by Dattco despite having various
speeding and other tickets on their records. These included
Wayne Bryce, Isaac Giles, Francis Matthews, Kevin McKinnis,
Miguel Cordero, Sherwood Dickson, Dwayne Foster, and oth-
ers. Indeed McKinnis, who had two speeding tickets listed on
his employment application, was hired soon after Clayton ap-
plied for a job.
Second, the fact that Clayton had let his commercial driving
license lapse (for nonpayment), is also irrelevant. In this re-
gard, the Company’s procedure is to agree with prospective
employees to train them (without pay), and if an applicant ob-
tains the proper license, then employ that person after comple-
tion of the training. As such, many people are put into the
Company’s training program and ultimately hired who do not
have a commercial driver’s license to begin with, much less the
C or B endorsements. In Clayton’s situation, he clearly could
have renewed his commercial driver’s license and no doubt,
with the training afforded to any other prospective employee,
could have obtained the B endorsement necessary to operate a
full sized schoolbus.
In sum, I conclude, in accordance with the Board’s decision
in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), that the Gen-
eral Counsel has met her burden of showing that a reason for
refusing to hire Clayton was because of his union activity at
Laidlaw, which Madison assumed would also occur at Dattco if
Clayton was employed there. Further, I conclude that the Gen-
eral Counsel has made out a strong prima facie showing that
Madison’s recommendation, relied on by Johnson, to not hire
Clayton, was based on the fact that Clayton had been involved
in a previous unfair labor practice case which involved Madi-
son in that situation as well. The reasons put forward by
Dattco’s management for refusing to hire Clayton, were, in my
opinion, not convincing and I therefore conclude that the Re-
spondent has not met its burden of showing that it would not
have hired Clayton for reasons unrelated to his union activity or
unrelated to the previous unfair labor practice in which he was
involved.
I also conclude, based on the credited testimony of Clayton,
that on November 30, 1998, the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, when Madison threatened Clayton with bod-
ily harm.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent Dattco, Inc., as a successor to Laidlaw,
has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to
recognize and bargain with Civil Service Employees affiliates,
Local 760, SEIU, AFL–CIO.
2. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of
the Act by refusing to hire Lawrence Clayton because of his
union activity and because of his participation in a previously
filed unfair labor practice.
3. The Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) by threaten-
ing Clayton with bodily harm.
4. The violations found herein effect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
With respect to Clayton, I shall recommend that the Respon-
dent offer to admit him immediately to its training program and
if he obtains the proper license with a B endorsement, offer him
employment as a busdriver. If however, he has obtained his
license with the B endorsement, I shall recommend that the
Respondent offer him employment as a driver.
There is a problem however with respect to backpay inas-
much as Clayton, without a commercial driver’s license and
without a B endorsement, would not have been hired. How-
DATTCO, INC. 11
ever, had the Company offered to employ him, he easily could
have had his license renewed by paying the $40 fee that he
owed. Also, it doesn’t seem that obtaining a B endorsement
should be much of a problem assuming, however, that the indi-
vidual sticks with the training program. The problem here is
that Clayton didn’t do this when he was reinstated at Laidlaw as
a result of the prior settlement and this raises a substantial
doubt as to whether he would have repeated this pattern at
Dattco.
Although there is a presumption that backpay is owed when
there is an illegal discharge or refusal to hire, I shall recom-
mend, in the circumstances of this particular case, that backpay
should start from the date that Clayton obtains the proper li-
cense and a B endorsement and that backpay run until such
time as the Respondent either offers to enroll him in its training
program or offers him employment.
Interest on any backpay owed shall be computed on a quar-
terly basis, less any net interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W.
Woolworth Co., 890 NLRB 289 (195), plus interest as com-
puted in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987).
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
APPENDIX A

Name Dattco
employment 6
Laidlaw
employment 7
1. Maria Rupert 1/9/98 No
2. Maria Angle 1/9/98 No
3. Mabel Vega 8 8/1/98 No
4. Ronald Woods 8/13/98–
10/2/98
8/27/97–5/22/98
5. Tomas Matos 8/19/98 In 1995
6. Celso Ortiz 8/19/98 8/23/96–
10/2/98 9
7. Antonio Rivera 8/19/98-
12/13/98
8/29/96–10/5/98
8. Justin Alabre 8/20/98 11/5/97–10/5/98

6 Unless otherwise stated, an employee listed was employed from the
date listed to at least 9/24/99, which is the date that GC Exh. 19 was
run. If an employee had an identical start and end date on GC Exh. 19
this means that the employee did not actually go to work for Dattco and
therefore is not listed on the exhibit. Also not listed is the dispatcher,
Yolanda Caraballo and any mechanics assigned to this facility.
7 Information regarding the dates of employment at Laid-
law/Vancom are taken from Laidlaw’s payroll records and from job
applications that employees filled out and submitted to Dattco.
8 The record indicates that Mabel Vega worked in the office but
acted from time to time as a substitute driver.
9 A number of employees are shown on Laidlaw’s records as having
terminated from that company in September or October 1998, after they
had started working for Dattco. I surmise that this simply means that
the person didn’t work during the summer for Laidlaw and that Laid-
law, after being advised that the employee in question was not return-
ing, put a date on its records for termination.

9. Wayne Bryce 8/20/98 7/25/96–10/5/98
10. Sylvester Burke 8/20/98 9/2/97–8/27/98
11. Maritza Serrano 8/20/98–
10/27/98
1995–1998 10
12. Rodney Baylor 8/20/98 No
13. Shirley Scott 8/20/98 No
14. Henry Bussey 8/20/98 1996–1997 11
15. Edelso Ibis 8/20/98–
12/14/98
1/6/98–10/5/98
16. Samalich Garcia 8/20/98 9/2/97–10/5/98
17. Jose Navarro 8/20/98 8/23/96–10/2/98
18. Elizabeth Jenkins 8/20/98–
6/22/99
10/8/96–98 12
19. Heriberto Quintana 8/20/98 8/28/96–10/2/98
20. Michael Alamo 8/20/98 5/11/98–9/17/98
21. Maria Bosque 8/20/98 9/19/95–10/23/98
22. Maria Nunez 8/20/98 8/20/97–9/3/98
23. Joseph Millington 8/20/98-
2/8/99
2/6/97–8/30/98
24. Justin Alabre 8/20/98 11/5/98–10/5/98
25. Crystal Brown/Byrd 8/20/98 8/28/96–10/5/98
26. Jesus Fernandez 8/20/98 8/10/93–? 13
27. Phillip Lewis 8/20/98 2/10/94–1/22/98
28. Julio Reyes 8/20/98 1/24/97–10/30/98
29. Aleida Serrano 8/20/98 8/23/96–1/2/97
30. Isaac Giles 8/20/98 9/89–9/98
31. Teresa Rodriguez 8/20/98–
6/29/99
10/9/97–1998 14
32. Everton White 8/20/98 10/1/97–10/30/98
33. Reginald Meyers 8/20/98 3/5/97–10/5/98
34. Sundel Ormbsy 8/26/98–
12/11/98
3/16/92–10/2/98
35. Rebecca Ramsey 8/27/98 No
36. Joann Gordon 8/27/98 9/23/96–10/5/98
37. Damaras Rodriguez 8/27/98–
5/7/99
No
38. Laren Wilson 8/27/98 10/8/96–9/21/98

10 The Laidlaw records show that she was employed in 1999 and the
records I have don’t indicate her prior dates of employment. She testi-
fied however that she was laid off by Laidlaw at the end of the 1997–
1998 school year.
11 Bussey’s job application lists last job before Dattco as being a cab
driver.
12 Laidlaw’s records show that Jenkins started on 10/8/98 but they do
not indicate her termination date. Her application to Dattco states that
she worked for Laidlaw until 1998 when laid off by that company.
13 Laidlaw’s records do not indicate a termination date and there is
no other evidence in the record to indicate if or when he left Laidlaw.
14 Laidlaw’s records list Teresa Rodriguez as starting on 10/9/97 but
do not give her termination date. Her application to Dattco states that
she worked from 11/97 to 1998 and does not indicate her termination
date.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 12

39. Verna Melius 8/27/98–
10/1/98
No
40. Francis Mathews 8/27/98 No
41. Sopheis Harrell 8/27/98–
4/16/00
6/95–7/97
42. Ivy McKinley 8/27/98–
6/24/99
Last worked Dec.
1996
43. Joseph Kitchens 8/27/98 10/9/96–10/5/98
44. Cornelle Flythe 8/31/98 9/4/96–10/5/98
45. Junior Martell 9/3/98 8/14/97–
9/17/9815
46. Lissette Sostre 9/3/98 8/19/97–10/5/98
47. Lydia Ferrer 9/3/98 ? 16
48. Catherine Williams 9/9/98–
4/15/99
1/20/95–5/22/98
49. Dwayne Foster 9/11/98 No
50. Noe Roman 9/14/98–
10/22/98
4/10/97–10/15/98
51. Braswell White 9/14/98 No

15 Laidlaw’s records list two employment periods for Martell; Au-
gust 14–15, 1997, and July 27–September 17, 1998. His job applica-
tion also lists other employers during the same year. This indicates to
me that he probably worked for Laidlaw during the summer of 1997
and 1998.
16 The Laidlaw records in evidence show her as being employed
from August 27–December 3, 1998.
52. Ernest Bosh 9/14/98 Last worked
11/1/96
53. Ana Declet 9/14/98 Last worked 7/97
54. Melissa Leggett 9/21/98 9/16/91–10/5/98
55. Sheila Davis 9/21/98 7/11/97–10/5/98
56. Limaris Cumba 9/21/98–
6/18/99
8/13/97–10/21/98
57. Sherwood Dickson 9/21/98–
5/19/99
10/20/97–10/5/98
58. Mary Brown 9/21/98–
6/21/99
10/9/96–10/1/98
59. Francisco Ramos 9/21/98 No
60. Mark Williams 9/28/98–
10/16/96
8/23/96–10/31/97
61. Carolyn McCray 10/5/98–
6/24/99
9/4/96–10/23/98
62. Bahadur Singh 10/6/98–
6/18/99
No
63. Jose Del Rio 10/13/98–
10/28/98
1/7/97–4/9/97
64. Luis Ingles 10/19/98 4/10/97–10/29/98
65. Lourdes Contreras 10/22/98–
10/28/98
7/97–7/98
66. Melissa Howard 10/22/98–
10/26/98
12/26/96–6/19/98