Daniel Jeremy. Rich et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 3, 2019

13523621 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 3, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/523,621 06/14/2012 Daniel Jeremy Rich 21652-00204 4488
75564 7590 09/03/2019
DANIEL M. FITZGERALD (21652)
ARMSTRONG TEASDALE LLP
7700 Forsyth Boulevard
Suite 1800
St. Louis, MO 63105
EXAMINER
DEGA, MURALI K
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3697
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/03/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USpatents@armstrongteasdale.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte DANIEL JEREMY RICH and
RICHARD BARRY HUSA
____________________

Appeal 2018-003524
Application 13/523,621
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before STEPHEN C. SIU, JENNIFER L. McKEOWN, and
LINZY T. McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judges.

McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1–24. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

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BACKGROUND
This patent application “relates generally to methods and systems for
investigating fraudulent transactions.” Specification ¶ 1, filed June 14, 2012
(“Spec.”). Claims 1, 10, and 18 are independent. Claim 1 illustrates the
claimed subject matter:
1. A virtual analyst computer system for managing an
investigation of potentially fraudulent payment card transactions
by managing flow of data between a plurality of separate systems
including maintaining data security and data synchronization
therebetween, said virtual analyst computer system in
communication with an interchange network, said virtual analyst
computer system comprising:
[a] a memory device for storing data; and
[b] a processor in communication with said memory
device, said virtual analyst computer system programmed to:
[c] retrieve a case from a fraud scoring system, the
case representing at least one transaction initiated with a
payment card for processing over the interchange network
and designated as potentially fraudulent by the fraud
scoring system during processing of the at least one
transaction over the interchange network by calculating a
fraud score, wherein each case further represents an
approved transaction designated for fraud investigation,
and wherein the fraud scoring system is separate from the
virtual analyst computer system;
[d] provide the case to a contact management
system that is configured to investigate cases designated
as being potentially fraudulent, wherein the contact
management system is separate from the virtual analyst
computer system;
[e] receive a request from the contact management
system for cardholder card information, cardholder
contact information, and cardholder contact preferences
associated with an actual cardholder associated with the
payment card used in the at least one transaction
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represented by the case, wherein the cardholder card
information, cardholder contact information, and
cardholder contact preferences are provided by the actual
cardholder upon application for the payment card by the
actual cardholder;
[f] retrieve, from a cardholder management system,
the cardholder card information, the cardholder contact
information, and the cardholder contact preferences for the
case, wherein the cardholder contact preferences include a
contact window during which to contact the actual
cardholder using the contact information, wherein the
cardholder management system is separate from the
virtual analyst computer system, and wherein the
cardholder management system is separate from the
contact management system such that the contact
management system does not have direct access to the
cardholder card information, cardholder contact
information, and cardholder contact preferences;
[g] provide the cardholder card information,
cardholder contact information, and cardholder contact
preferences to the contact management system, wherein
the providing of the cardholder card information,
cardholder contact information, and cardholder contact
preferences causes the contact management system to
automatically initiate an investigation into the case,
wherein automatically initiating the investigation into the
case includes using a rule-based engine to process the
received cardholder contact preferences to automatically
attempt contact with the actual cardholder, using the
cardholder contact information, within the contact
window to request verification of the transaction from the
actual cardholder;
[h] receive investigation data from the contact
management system including results of the automatically
initiated investigation;
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[i] cause the fraud scoring system to update fraud
scoring algorithms with the received investigation data
such that the fraud scoring algorithms are up-to-date; and
[j] update an entry in the cardholder management
system corresponding to at least one of a card status and
cardholder information data based on the received
investigation data such that the entry in the cardholder
management system is up-to-date.
Appeal Brief 18–19, filed September 22, 2017 (“App. Br.”) (bracketed
letters added).
REJECTION
Claims Basis
1–24 § 101

DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection and Appellants’
arguments, and we disagree with Appellants that the Examiner erred. As
consistent with the discussion below, we adopt the Examiner’s reasoning,
findings, and conclusions on pages 2–8 of the Final Office Action mailed
April 12, 2017 (“Final Act.”) and pages 4–11 of the Answer mailed
December 15, 2017 (“Ans.”).
Section 101 Rejection
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof” is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the
Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to this section:
“Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)).
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To determine whether a claim falls within one of these excluded categories,
the Court has set out a two-part framework. The framework requires us first
to consider whether the claim is “directed to one of those patent-ineligible
concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If so, we then examine “the elements of
[the] claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine
whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78, 79 (2012)).
That is, we examine the claim for an “inventive concept,” “an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The Patent Office has revised its guidance about this framework. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, to decide
whether a claim is directed to an abstract idea, we evaluate whether the
claim (1) recites subject matter that falls within one of the abstract idea
groupings listed in the Revised Guidance and (2) fails to integrate the recited
abstract idea into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 51, 54. If the claim is directed to an abstract idea, as noted above, we
then determine whether the claim has an inventive concept. The Revised
Guidance explains that when making this determination, we should consider
whether the additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine,
conventional activity in the field” or “simply append[] well-understood,
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routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of the § 101
rejection. Appellants argue claims 1–24 together for this rejection, so as
permitted by 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal for this
rejection based on claim 1.
Abstract Idea
The Revised Guidance explains that the abstract idea exception
includes “certain methods of organizing human activity” such as
fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal
interactions, and managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions
between people. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. The Examiner
determined that claim 1 recites subject matter that falls within this abstract
idea grouping. See, e.g., Final Act. 3 (determining that “the claims are
directed towards retrieving and providing contact information of the
cardholder to a contact management system based on the identified potential
fraudulent transaction, to initiate an investigation”), 4 (explaining that the
abstract idea involves “contacting the user to authenticate a card transaction”
and citing buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
and Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)). For the reasons discussed
below, Appellants have not persuaded us that the Examiner erred.
Claim 1 recites “[a] virtual analyst computer system for managing an
investigation of potentially fraudulent payment card transactions” that
includes limitations [c]–[j] reproduced above. These limitations recite
managing an investigation of potentially fraudulent payment card
transactions by retrieving certain information from (and providing certain
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information to) various systems, including receiving investigation data that
contains the results of an investigation. See App. Br. 18–19. The limitations
also recite updating fraud scoring algorithms and an entry corresponding to
at least card status and cardholder information using the received
investigation data. See App. Br. 19.
Managing an investigation of potentially fraudulent payment card
transactions in the manner recited in limitations [c]–[j] is a commercial
practice that is not meaningfully different from other commercial practices
that courts have determined are abstract ideas. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at
219 (using a third party to mitigate settlement risk); Credit Acceptance
Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1054–56 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(processing an application for financing a purchase); Dealertrack, Inc. v.
Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (managing a credit
application); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366,
1370–73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (verifying the validity of a credit card transaction
over the Internet). Limitations [c]–[j] thus recite subject matter that falls
within the certain methods of organizing human activity abstract idea
grouping listed in the Revised Guidance. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52 (explaining that certain methods of organizing human activity
include commercial or legal interactions and fundamental economic
principles or practices). Claim 1 therefore recites an abstract idea.
Other aspects of claim 1 confirm that the claim recites an abstract
idea. Claim 1 recites a series of functions at a high level of generality
without specifying a particular way of performing the functions. See App.
Br. 18–19. For example, claim 1 recites that the virtual analyst computer
system “cause[s] the fraud scoring system to update fraud scoring algorithms
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with the received investigation data.” App. Br. 19. Claim 1 does not recite
how the claimed virtual analyst computer system performs this step; the
claim simply recites that it does so. This type of functional claim language is
often characteristic of claims that recite abstract ideas. See, e.g., Elec. Power
Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he
essentially result-focused, functional character of claim language has been a
frequent feature of claims held ineligible under § 101, especially in the area
of using generic computer and network technology to carry out economic
transactions.”). This is particularly true when, as here, the broad, functional
claim language involves collecting, transmitting, and processing data. See,
e.g., Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353 (determining that claims focused
“on collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the
collection and analysis” are directed to an abstract idea). “The purely
functional nature of the claim confirms that it is directed to an abstract idea,
not to a concrete embodiment of that idea.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v.
Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Appellants contend that the Examiner’s characterization of the
abstract idea is an “oversimplification” that is “untethered from the language
of the claims.” App. Br. 9; see also Reply Brief 1–2, filed February 15, 2018
(“Reply Br.”). But the Examiner’s characterization of the abstract idea tracks
the language of claim 1. See, e.g., Final Act. 3, 4. In any event, examiners
generally may characterize abstract ideas at different levels of abstraction
without affecting the patent-eligibility analysis. See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth,
Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240–41 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that “[a]n abstract
idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction” and
determining that “[t]he Board’s slight revision of its abstract idea analysis
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does not impact the patentability analysis.”). That is the case here.
Regardless of the level of generality one uses to describe the abstract idea,
the result is the same—claim 1 recites an abstract idea.
Because we determine that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we next
consider whether claim 1 integrates the abstract idea into a practical
application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. In doing so, we
consider whether there are any additional elements beyond the abstract idea
that, individually or in combination, “integrate the [abstract idea] into a
practical application, using one or more of the considerations laid out by the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54–55.
The additional elements in the claimed virtual analyst computer
system include “a processor” and “a memory device.” App. Br. 18–19. The
written description makes clear that these elements encompass generic
computer components that perform generic functions. For example, the
written description explains that “[t]he term processor, as used herein, refers
to central processing units, microprocessors, microcontrollers, reduced
instruction set circuits (RISC), application specific integrated circuits
(ASIC), logic circuits, and any other circuit or processor capable of
executing the functions described herein.” Spec. ¶ 68. The written
description also explains that memory area 210 includes “any device
allowing information such as executable instructions and/or written works to
be stored and retrieved.” Spec. ¶ 43. Using generic components that perform
generic functions to execute an abstract idea is not a practical application of
the abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24 (“[W]holly generic computer
implementation is not generally the sort of ‘additional featur[e]’ that
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provides any ‘practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting
effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.’” (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77)).
Appellants’ arguments have not persuaded us otherwise. Appellants
contend that claim 1 “‘focus[es] on a specific means . . . that improves the
relevant technology’ by essentially automating the fraud investigation
process, and centralizing data management and transmission responsibilities
in a single virtual analyst system.” App. Br. 10. According to Appellants, the
claimed system “maintains data security between separate computing
systems and reduces processing and storage requirements of each of those
separate computing systems.” App. Br. 10.
We disagree. First, using generic computer components to automate a
manual fraud investigation process does not represent a technological
improvement. The written description explains that in prior art systems
“[o]nce a transaction is designated as a fraudulent transaction, in at least
some known cases, a human analyst investigates the case to determine
whether further steps should be taken.” Spec. ¶ 2. The claimed invention
uses a generic processor and memory to automate this manual process. See,
e.g., App. Br. 9 (“Accordingly, the presently claimed embodiments describe
an inventive system that resolves the problem of requiring human
intervention in a fraud investigation . . . .”), 12 (“Absent the system and
methods of the pending claims, . . . investigation of potential fraud cases
must be performed by a human analyst . . . .”), 18–19 (claim 1); Spec. ¶ 67
(“The above-described methods and systems provide for automatic
investigation of fraudulent transactions by a payment card issuer
processor.”). The Federal Circuit has “made clear that mere automation of
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manual processes using generic computers does not constitute a patentable
improvement in computer technology.” Credit Acceptance Corp., 859 F.3d
at 1055. Nor do the broadly recited communications to and from various
computer systems amount to a technological improvement. See, e.g., Credit
Acceptance Corp., 859 F.3d at 1055 (“The invention’s ‘communication
between previously unconnected systems—the dealer’s inventory database,
a user credit information input terminal, and creditor underwriting servers,’
does not amount to an improvement in computer technology.” (citation
omitted)).
Second, Appellants have not shown that the system recited in claim 1
provides all of the asserted improvements. For example, Appellants
repeatedly assert that the claimed system saves processing time and
computer resources. See, e.g., App. Br. 10, 14, 15. But Appellants have not
provided persuasive evidence to support this assertion. See, e.g., App. Br.
10, 14, 15. Simply asserting that the claimed system provides these benefits
does not establish that the system does so. This inadequately supported
assertion thus has not persuaded us that the Examiner erred. Cf. In re
Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974) (determining that an
appellant’s argument failed to negate the Board’s conclusion because the
appellant offered “no competent evidence” in support of the argument).
Appellants also contend that claim 1 is similar to the patent-eligible
claims in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2016). See App. Br. 10–11. According to Appellants, like the
claims in McRO, “it is the specific ordered combination of recited rules,
rather than merely implementing the method on a computer, that produces
the improvement realized by the claimed invention.” App. Br. 10–11
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(emphasis omitted); see also Reply Br. 3–4. But the claims in McRO
incorporated “specific,” “limited” rules that improved computer animation.
McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314–16. Instead of incorporating similar specific,
limited rules, claim 1 recites a series of broadly worded functions without
meaningfully limiting how the claimed invention performs the functions. See
App. Br. 18–19. Claim 1 is thus distinguishable from the claims in McRO.
Inventive Concept
Finally, we consider whether claim 1 has an inventive concept, that is,
whether the claim has additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the
claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78, 79). As discussed above, this requires us to evaluate
whether the additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine,
conventional activity in the field” or “simply append[] well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
As noted above, the additional elements for the claimed virtual analyst
computer system include “a processor” and “a memory device.” App. Br.
18–19. The Examiner determined that these elements perform “generic
functionalities [that] are well-understood, routine and conventional.” Final
Act. 4.
The record before us adequately supports this determination. The
written description describes the processor, memory, and the functions that
they perform in a general fashion with few technical details, indicating these
components and functions were well known to those of ordinary skill in the
art. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 42–43, 59, 62–68; see also Hybritech Inc. v.
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Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[A]
patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art.”);
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile interface is so lacking in implementation
details that it amounts to merely a generic component (software, hardware,
or firmware) that permits the performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to
retrieve the user-specific resources.”). This is sufficient to support the
Examiner’s determination. See USPTO, Memorandum on Changes in
Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent
Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) 3 (Apr. 19,
2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/memo-berkheimer-20180419.PDF (explaining that a specification that
describes additional elements “in a manner that indicates that the additional
elements are sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to
describe the particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a)” can show that the elements are well understood, routine, and
conventional). Regardless, most of the limitations in claim 1 recite that the
processor sends or receives data. See App. Br. 18–19. Sending and receiving
data are well-understood, routine, and conventional processor functions. See,
e.g., buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with
no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”).
Appellants disagree and contend that claim 1 has an inventive concept
because the claim recites an “ordered combination . . . [that] manages a
plurality of disparate computing systems to automatically implement a fraud
investigation while maintaining separation and security of data.” App. Br.
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12. But this is part of the identified abstract idea, and the abstract idea itself
cannot provide an inventive concept. See Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG
LLC, 921 F.3d 1084, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The abstract idea itself cannot
supply the inventive concept, ‘no matter how groundbreaking the advance.’”
(quoting SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1170 (Fed. Cir.
2018)). In any event, using conventional computer components to automate
a previously manual process does not provide an inventive concept. See
Credit Acceptance Corp., 859 F.3d at 1056 (explaining that “merely
‘configur[ing]’ generic computers in order to ‘supplant and enhance’ an
otherwise abstract manual process is precisely the sort of invention that the
Alice Court deemed ineligible for patenting”).
Appellants next argue that claim 1 is analogous to the claims in
BASCOM Global Internet Services., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). App. Br. 11–12. Appellants contend that, like the
claimed invention in BASCOM, “the specific arrangement and distribution of
functionality provided in the pending claims facilitates” automatic fraud
investigation. App. Br. 12.
We disagree. In BASCOM, the claims recited a specific technological
solution that “improve[d] the performance of the computer system itself.”
BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350–51. In contrast, claim 1 recites broad,
functional steps without meaningfully limiting how the claimed system
performs the steps. See App. Br. 18–19; see also Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC
v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (distinguishing
BASCOM because “[t]he specificity of the technical solution provided by the
claims in BASCOM stands in sharp contrast to the absence of any such
specific technical solution in the claims of the ’379 patent”). And although
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Appellants assert that the system recited in claim 1 improves the functioning
of a computer by saving processing time and computer resources, as
discussed above, Appellants have provided no persuasive evidence to
support this assertion. At bottom, claim 1 simply recites an abstract idea
“along with the requirement . . . to perform it on a set of generic computer
components.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350. That is not enough to provide an
inventive concept. See BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1349 (“An inventive concept
. . . cannot simply be an instruction to implement or apply the abstract idea
on a computer.”).
Appellants also contend that claim 1 is analogous to claims 2 and 3 of
Example 35 of Patent Office’s subject matter eligibility examples. See App.
Br. 13–14; Reply Br. 2. Appellants argue that claim 1 “include[s] a
combination of limitations that operate in a non-conventional and non-
generic way to leverage transaction information to enhance fraud detection
and investigation” similar to claims 2 and 3 of Example 35. App. Br. 14
(emphases omitted). We disagree. Appellants again rely on aspects of the
abstract idea recited in claim 1 to provide an inventive concept, see App. Br.
14, but as explained above, an abstract idea cannot provide an inventive
concept, see Trading Techs., 921 F.3d at 1093. Regardless, unlike claim 1,
which recites a series of functions at a high level of generality, claims 2 and
3 of Example 35 recite a specific, discrete implementation of an abstract
idea. See USPTO, Subject Matter Eligibility Examples: Business Methods
5–11 (December 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/ieg-bus-meth-exs-dec2016.pdf. Claim 1 is thus distinguishable from claims
2 and 3 of Example 35.
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Appellants’ remaining arguments are equally unpersuasive.
Appellants contend that “the unconventional nature of the ordered
combination in . . . [claim 1] is evidenced by the acknowledged allowability
of the claims over the prior art.” App. Br. 12; see also Reply Br. 4–5. Even
assuming claim 1 is novel and nonobvious, that does not establish that claim
1 is patent eligible. See SAP, 898 F.3d at 1163 (“We may assume that the
techniques claimed are ‘[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant,’ but
that is not enough for eligibility. Nor is it enough for subject-matter
eligibility that claimed techniques be novel and nonobvious in light of prior
art, passing muster under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.” (citation omitted)).
Appellants also assert that claim 1 does not preempt the identified abstract
idea and thus “[t]he subject matter eligibility” of claim 1 is “further
confirmed.” App. Br. 15. But “[w]hile preemption may signal patent
ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,
788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
In sum, the recited additional elements, considered individually or in
an ordered combination, “simply append[]well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. We therefore
determine that claim 1 does not recite an inventive concept.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea
and does not have an inventive concept. We therefore sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 under § 101.

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DECISION
Claims
Rejected Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–24 § 101 1–24
Outcome 1–24

No period for taking any action in connection with this appeal may be
extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv),
41.50(f), 41.52(b).

AFFIRMED