Cullen-Thompson Motor Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 18, 1951

94 N.L.R.B. 1252 (N.L.R.B. 1951)

1252 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3. At all times 'since July 15, -1948, the Union has been the exclusive representa-
tive 'of the employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bar=
gaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
4. By failing and refusing , on or about July 28, 1949, and at all times there-
after, to bargain collectively with the 'Union as the exclusive representative of
the employees in the appropriate unit, Respondent has engaged in and is en-
gaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of
the Act.
5. By said acts Respondent has interfered with, restrained , and coerced its
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and has
engaged and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8 (a) (1) of the Act:
6. The aforesaid unfair labor' practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication in this volume.]
NEIL R. CULLEN, G. CULLEN, AND WARD J. THOMPSON, CO-PARTNERS
D/B/A CULLEN-TIIOMPSON MOTOR COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, DISTRICT LODGE 86. Case No. 30-
CA-130. June 18,1951
Decision and Order-
On March 26, 1951, Trial Examiner Howard Myers issued his In-
termediate Report in the above -entitled proceeding , finding that the
Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor
practices, and recommending that they cease . and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter the Respondents
filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report.
The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner '
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed . The Board has considered the Interme-.
diate Report,2 the Respondents ' exceptions , and the entire record in
' Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act , the Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to , a three-member panel [ Members Houston , Reynolds,
and Styles].
2 The Intermediate Report contains certain erroneous statements of fact , none of which
affects the Trial Examiner ' s ultimate conclusions or our concurrence therein. Accord-
ingly , we make the following corrections :
(1) Contrary to the Trial Examiner 's finding, the Respondents make no sales in
California. -
The Respondents question the Trial Examiner ' s finding that they are engaged in the
"distribution " of automobiles as implying that they are wholesale distributors , and not
retail dealers.
Clarifying the Trial Examiner 's finding, we find that the Respondents are in fact retail
dealers in new automobiles , and not wholesale distributors.
(2) The Trial Examiner found that on September 7, and during the balance of September
1950 , there were 33 persons in the unit found appropriate. However, 1 employee in the
unit ceased to be employed on September 29, 1950.
94 NLRB No. 194.
CULLEN-THOMPSON MOTOR COMPANY 1253
the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommen-
dations of the Trial Examiner.
Order
Upon the entire record in the case and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondents, Neil R. Cullen,
G. Cullen, and Ward J. Thompson, Co-partners doing business as
Cullen-Thompson Motor Company, their agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing, upon request, to bargain collectively with Inter-
national Association of Machinists, District Lodge 86, as the exclu-,
,sive .representative of all service and body department employees,
including painters, trimmers, radiator repairmen, and parts depart-
ment employees,, but excluding office; clerical, and supervisory em-
ployees as defined in the Act, at the Respondents' Denver, Colorado,
automobile sales establishment.
(b) In any other manner interfering with the efforts of the above
named union to bargain collectively with the Respondents.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with International Associa-
tion of Machinists, District Lodge 86, as the exclusive representative
of all the employees in the above-described appropriate unit, and, if
an understanding is reached,. embody such understanding in' a signed
agreement.
.(b) Post in their plant at Denver, Colorado, copies of the notice
attached hereto and marked "Appendix A." 3 Copies of said notice, to
be furnished by the Regional Director for the_Seventeenth'Region,
shall, after being duly signed by the Respondents, be posted by the
Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by
them for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondents to insure that
said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Seventeenth Region, Kan-
sas City, Missouri, in writing within ten (10) days from the date of
this Order what steps the Respondents have taken to comply herewith.
G
In the event that this Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of
`Appeals, there shall be inserted before the words : "A Decision and Order ," the words :
"A Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing."
1254 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Appendix A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION OF MACHINISTS, DISTRICT LODGE 86, as the exclusive rep-
resentative of our employees in the bargaining unit described.
herein.
WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with INTERNA--
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, DISTRICT LODGE 86, as the
exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit
described herein with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment, and, if an under-
standing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed
agreement. The bargaining unit is:
All our service and body.department employees, including
painters, trimmers, radiator repairmen, and parts depart-
ment employees, excluding office, clerical, and. supervisory
employees, as defined by the Act.
WE WILL NOT interfere with the efforts Of INTERNATIONAL AS-
SOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, DISTRICT LODGE 86, to bargain
collectively with us.-for the employees in the foregoing, unit.
CULLEN-THOMPSON MOTOR COMPANY,
Employer.
By ----------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
Dated --------------------
This notice must remain posted for sixty (60) days from the date
hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
William J. Scott, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Emory L. O'Connell, Esq., for the Respondents.
Messrs. Ernest M. Gibson and Wesley B. Jordon, for the Union.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge duly filed on October 20, 1950,' by International Association
of Machinists, District Lodge 86, herein called the Union, the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board, herein called, respectively, the General
Unless otherwise noted, all dates herein refer to 1950.
CULLEN-THOMPSON MOTOR COMPANY 1255
Counsel 'and the Board, by the Regional Director for the Seventeenth Region
(Kansas City, Missouri), issued his complaint on February 21, 1951, alleging
that Neil R. Cullen, G. Cullen, and Ward J. Thompson, co-partners, doing business
as Cullen-Thompson Motor Company, herein called the Respondents, had en-
gaged in and were engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within
the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act.
Copies of the complaint and the charge, together with notice of hearing
thereon, were duly served upon each Respondent and upon the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged, in substance,
that on and since September 7, 1950, the Respondents had refused to bargain
collectively with the Union although the Union was the duly designated collective
bargaining representative of,the Respondents' employees in a certain appropriate
unit.
On March 3, 1950, the Respondents filed an answer denying the commission
of the alleged unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Denver, Colorado, on March 13,
1951, before Howard Myers, the duly designated Trial Examiner. The Respond-
ents and the General Counsel were represented by counsel ; the Union by officials
thereof. All parties participated in the hearing and were afforded full oppor-
tunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce
evidence pertinent to the issues.
At the conclusion of the General Counsel's case-in-chief, counsel for the Re-
spondents rested his case and then moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
proof and for the further reason that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the Re-
spondents . Decision thereon was reserved. The motion is hereby denied. The
parties waived oral argument and also waived their right to file briefs and pro-
posed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation oethe witnesses,
the, undersigned makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Cullen-Thompson Motor Company, a co-partnership consisting of Neil R. Cullen,
his wife, Gertrude, and Ward J. Thompson, is engaged in, and at all times
material herein has been engaged in, the operation of an automobile agency deal-
ership and automobile repair and service shop in Denver, Colorado, for the sale,
service, and distribution of new Chrysler and Plymouth automobiles, accessories,
and parts under a franchise or dealer's agreement with Chrysler Corporation,'
Detroit, Michigan. The Respondents also operate a used car lot located across
the street from their new car showroom and service department. .
During 1950, the Respondents purchased from Chrysler Corporation new
Chrysler and Plymouth automobiles valued at $634,372.40. In addition, the Re-
spondents purchased accessories, parts, and supplies, from sources other than
Chrysler Corporation, valued at approximately $60,000.
During the same year, the Respondents sold new Chrysler and Plymouth auto-
mobiles valued at $850,717 and parts, accessories, and labor valued at approxi-
mately $216,000.
2 The Board on numerous occasions has found that Chrysler Corporation is engaged in
commerce within the meaning of the Act.
1256 DECISIONS OF. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
All the Respondents' sales are made either locally or within the State of Cali-
fornia. However, all their new automobiles are shipped either by rail or by
motor transport from the Detroit, Michigan, factory of Chrysler Corporation di=
rectly to the Respondents' plant in Denver, Colorado.
Counsel for the Respondents contended at the hearing that the complaint should
be dismissed because, among other reasons, the Respondents are not engaged in
commerce within the meaning of the Act, and even if so engaged, the Board
should not assert jurisdiction because of the local character of the Respondents'
business.
Upon the above admitted facts, the Act is plainly applicahln to the Respond-
ents and. the employees here involved. The test of the Act's applicability, laid
.down by the Supreme Court in the Jones & Laughlin case' and repeatedly reaf-
firmed and applied by that Court in subsequent decisions; is whether "stoppage
of . . . operations by industrial strife" would or may result in interruption of,
or interference with, the free flow of goods in interstate commerce and foreign
commerce.
The Respondents' new automobiles are 'purchased entirely -from Chrysler Cor-
poration and they are shipped directly from the Detroit, Michigan, factory of
Chrysler Corporation to the Respondents' plant. It is thus plain that a stoppage
of the Respondents' operations . would. immediately and directly operate to stop or
curtail the interstate movement of goods to the Respondents' plant and hence cur-
tail the interstate movement of goods from the aforesaid factory of Chrysler Cor-
poration. The jurisdictional test is thus completely satisfied as the applicable de-
cisions hold.
The fact that all the Respondents' sales are made locally or within the State of
Colorado is, of itself, of no importance. The flow of Commerce is the same, from
whichever end it is viewed, and the protective power of the Act does not vary by
.reason of the point from which the flow is viewed. N.; L. R. B. v. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 308 U. S. 241.
Furthermore, the Board in a very recent decision (Kelly A. Scott, 93 NLRB
654), involving an employer engaged in the business of distributing new automo-
biles at retail under a franchise or dealer agreement similar to the one under
which the Respondents operate, stated that the controlling fact
is that the franchise in question ultimately associates the Respondent with a
Nation-wide producer and distributor of automobiles, and that the franchise
provides certain controls as to the Respondents' capital requirements, place
of business , hours, service facilities, personnel, signs, and local area adver-
tising. Under the circumstances, we find that here, no less than in Baxter
Bros. case. (91 NLRB 1480), the Respondents' business is an integral part of
a multistate business , and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to
assert jurisdiction over the Respondent.5
301 U. S. 1.
Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N. L. R. B., 303 U. S. 453; Consolidated Edison Co. V.
IN. L. R. B., 305 U. S.. 197; N. L. R. B. v. Fainblatt, 306 U: S. 601; N. L. R. B. v. Bradford
Dyeing Assn., 310 U. S. 318.
5 See also Liddon White Truck Co.; Inc., 76 NLRB 1181; Bell-Wyman Company, 79
NLRB 1424; Puritan Chevrolet, Inc., 76 NLRB 1243; Adams Motors, Inc., 80 NLRB 1518;
Lawrence Holbrook, et al., 80 NLRB 1679; Valley Truck and Tractor Co., 80 NLRB 444;
Harrys Cadillac-Pontiac Company , et al. , 81 NLRB 1; Earl McMillian Company, 81 NLRB
639; Jack Taylor, et al ., 85 NLRB 1336; Rome Lincoln -Mercury Corp ., 86 NLRB 387;
Rowan Motor Co., 90 NLRB No. 156; Massachusetts Motor Car Co., Inc., 90 NLRB No. 186;
Baxter Bros., 91 NLRB 1480.
CULLEN-THOMPSON MOTOR COMPANY ° 1257
The Board's assertion of jurisdiction over this industry, moreover, has been
-specifically approved by the courts °
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that during all times material herein the
Respondents were, and now are, engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act. The undersigned further finds that it will effectuate the policies of the
Act for the Board to assert jurisdiction over the Respondents.
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
. International Association of Machinists, District Lodge S6, is a labor organiza-
tion admitting to membership employees of the Respondents.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The refusal to bargain collectitiely with the Union
1. The aplropriate unit'
The complaint alleged, the answer admitted,' and the undersigned finds that
all the employees in the Respondents' service and body shop departments, in-
cluding painters, trimmers, radiator repairmen, and parts departments em-
ployees, excluding office, clerical, and supervisory employees, as defined by the
Act, constitute, and at all times material herein constituted, a unit appropriate
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b)
of the Act with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
conditions of employment. The undersigned further finds that the said unit
insures to the Respondents' employees the full benefit of their right to self-
organization and collective bargaining and otherwise effectuates the policies of.
the Act.
2. The Union's majority status in the appropriate unit
At the hearing herein; there was introduced in evidence by the General Counsel
a list prepared by the Respondents containing the names of all the Respondents'
employees in the unit hereinabove found appropriate. The list shows that on
.September 22, the Respondents had in their employ 33 persons in the said unit.'
On behalf of the General Counsel there were offered and received in evidence 19
signed cards expressly authorizing the Union to represent the signers thereof
for collective bargaining purposes. The authenticity of the signatures appearing
on the cards was not challenged.
The undersigned has compared the names appearing; on the aforesaid, cards
with the list submitted by the Respondents and received in evidence and finds
that as of September 7, 18 employees in the appropriate unit had signed
cards designating the Union as their collective bargaining representative.' Ac-
cordingly, the undersigned finds that on September 7, and at all times thereafter,
the Union was the duly designated collective bargaining representative of the
9N. L. R. B. v. M. L. Townsend, 185 F. 2d 378 (C. A. 9) ; N. L. R. B. v. Henry Levaur,
Inc., 115 F. 2d 105 (C. A. 1) ; Williams Motor Co. v. N. L. R. B., 128 F. 2d 960 (C. A. 8) ;
N. L. R. B. v. J. C. Lewis Motor Co., Inc., 180 F. 2d 254 (C. A. 5). -
7 The answer averred, "if the respondent should be held subject to the said Act" then
the alleged unit is appropriate.
8 The Respondents and the General Counsel stipulated, and the undersigned finds, that
on September 7, and during the balance of September 1950, the persons whose names
appear upon the aforesaid list were in the Respondents ' employ.
9 Ten cards were dated August 22 , 1 August 25 , 3 September 1, 3 September 6, and
1 September 21.
1258 - DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
majority of the Respondents' employees in the appropriate unit. Pursuant to
Section 9 (a) of the Act, the Union was, therefore, the exclusive representative
of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of
employment.
3. The refusal to bargain
Wesley B. Jordon, a Grand Lodge representative of the Union, testified cred-
ibly and without contradiction 1° that on September 7, he called at the Respond-
ents' place of business-and conferred with Ward J. Thompson, one of the re-
spondents herein ; that he informed Thompson that the Union represented the
majority of the Respondents' service, body, and parts department employees,
offered to submit for Thompson's inspection the authorization cards signed by
the majority of the said employees which cards he had with him, and then
requested Thompson to recognize the Union as the collective. bargaining repre-
sentative of those employees ; that Thompson stated that under the circumstances
tie saw no reason why the Respondents should not recognize and -bargain with
the Union on behalf of the said employees, but before doing so he desired to
confer with Neil R. Cullen who was then temporarily absent from the city ; that
lie arranged with Thompson to,telephone the latter within a few days to ascer-
tain what decision, if any, the Respondents had reached with respect to his
demands ; that he telephoned Thompson on September 9, and was informed that
Cullen was still absent from the city ; and that on September 13, during a tele-
phone conversation, Thompson suggested that he discuss the matter with the
Respondents' attorney, Emory L. O'Connell.
Jordon further testified credibly that on- September 18, the Union filed with
the Board a petition for investigation and certification of representatives ; that
on September 29, he, a field examiner of the Board, and Rev. John Ryan con-
ferred with O'Connell at O'Connell's offices ; that the purpose of the meeting was
to ascertain certain commerce facts concerning the Respondents' business and
also to ascertain whether the Respondents would enter into a consent election
agreement ; that O'Connell refused to enter into any such agreement, adding
that even if the Board certified the Union as the exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the employees here involved the Respondents would not bargain
with the Union as such representative because the Respondents are not .in
commerce within the meaning of the Act and. hence the Board has no jurisdiction
over them; . and that because of O'Connell's aforesaid statement, the Union
withdrew its petition for certification and then filed the charge which is the
basis of this proceeding.:
B. The concluding findings
The Respondents concede that they refused to bargain with the Union as the
exclusive bargaining representative of their employees in the appropriate unit,
and rely, to justify their refusal, (1) upon the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the
Board and (2) upon the proposition that the Union should not have been
permitted to withdraw its representation petition because once such a petition
is filed the question of representation must be resolved by a secret ballot election
conducted under the auspices of the Board.
10 The Respondents called no witnesses.
11 The request to withdraw the aforesaid petition is dated October 20; the Regional
Director approved the withdrawal on October 23, and notified the Respondents on the
same day of his action ; the charge was filed on October 23.
CULLEN-THOMPSON MOTOR COMPANY 1259
As to (1), since the record conclusively shows that the Respondents' operations
affect commerce under Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, this contention is without
.merit.
As to (2); it is well established that neither the employer nor his employees
have the right to demand that the Board conduct an election. The Congress left
to the Board the discretion to determine how and when the bargaining status of
-employee representatives should be ascertained 12 Obviously, the Board cannot
be compelled to conduct an election after it had been informed, as here, that the
-employer will not honor its certification and will not bargain collectively with the
certified representative. In such -circumstances, the courts have uniformly and
repeatedly held that the Board may otherwise determine the bargaining repre-
sentative designated by the employees." Accordingly, the undersigned finds no
.merit to this contention of the Respondents 14
Upon the entire record in the case, the undersigned concludes and finds that by
failing and refusing to recognize the Union on and after September 29, 1950,n as
the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all the employees in the
appropriate unit, the Respondents have refused, and now are refusing, to bargain
collectively within the meaning of the Act. By such refusal the Respondents
violated, and are violating, Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act, thereby inter-
fering with, restraining, and coercing their employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 thereof.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondents set forth in Section III, above, occurring in
connection with the operations of the Respondents described in Section I, above,'
have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce
among the several States, and such of them as have been found to constitute
unfair labor practices tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY'
Having found that Respondents have engaged in unfair labor practices, it will
be recommended that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondents have refused to bargain, in violation of
Section 8 (a) (5) and. (1) of the Act,'the' und'e'rsigned will recommend that the
Respondents cease and desist from engaging in such conduct . The undersigned
will further recommend that the Respondents, upon request, bargain collectively
with the Union as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the unit
hereinabove found appropriate.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
the case, the undersigned makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAw
1.. International Association of Machinists, District Lodge 86, is a labor organ-
ization , within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
v N. L. R. B. v. Falk Corp ., 308 U . S. 453; N. L. R. B. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 309
U. S. 206; Southern S. S. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 316 U. S. 31.
13 See Franks Bros. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 321 U. S. 702; Bradford Dyeing Assn. v.
jN. L. R. B., 310 U. S. 318 ; International Assn. of Machinists v. N. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 72;
Joy Silk Mills , Inc. v. N. L. R.,B., 185 F. 2d 732 (C. A. D. C.).
14 The Respondents ' misconception of the applicability of the law is no defense. Great
Atlantic and Paciftc Tea Company, 81 NLRB 1052.
lE The date of the conference in O'Connell 's offices.
1260 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2. All the Respondents' service and body departments employees, including
painters, trimmers, radiator repairmen, and parts department employees, exclud-
ing office, clerical, and supervisory employees, constitute it unit appropriate for
the purpose of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the
Act.
3. International Association of Machinists, District Lodge 86, was on Septem-
ber 7, 1950, and at all times relevant thereafter has been, the exclusive represen-
tative of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.
within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
4. By refusing on September 29, 1950, and thereafter, to bargain collectively
with International Association of Machinists, District Lodge 80, as the exclusive
representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit, the Respondents have
engaged in, and are engaging in, unfair labor practices, within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
5. By the said refusal the Respondents interfered with, restrained, and coerced
their employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,
and thereby engaged in, and are engaging in, unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication in this volume.]
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MACHINISTS
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA , A. F. L.
AND ITS LOCAL 743 and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS.
Cases Nos . 21-CA-6,34 and 21-CB-253. June 18, 1151
Decision and Order
On March 13, 1951, Trial Examiner Howard Myers issued his In-
termediate Report in the above-entitled proceedings, finding that the
Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist there-
from and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of
the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent
Millwrights and the Respondent Company filed exceptions to the
Intermediate Report, and the Respondent Company filed a brief. The
Respondent Millwrights also requested oral argument. This request
is hereby denied because in our opinion the record, exceptions, and
brief adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-mem-
ber panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Murdock and Styles].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
94 NLRB No. 193.