Consolidated Communications d/b/a Illinois Consolidated Telephone Company

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 3, 2014

360 N.L.R.B. 1284 (N.L.R.B. 2014)

1284 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
360 NLRB No. 140
Consolidated Communications d/b/a Illinois Consoli-
dated Telephone Company and Local 702, In-
ternational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL-CIO. Cases 14–CA–094626 and 14–CA–
101495
July 3, 2014
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS JOHNSON
AND SCHIFFER
On November 19, 2013, Administrative Law Judge
Arthur J. Amchan issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions, a supporting brief, a reply
brief to the General Counsel’s answering brief, a reply
brief to the Charging Party’s answering brief, and an
answering brief to the Charging Party’s cross-exceptions.
The General Counsel filed an answering brief. The
Charging Party filed cross-exceptions, a supporting brief,
an answering brief to the Respondent’s exceptions, and a
reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs1 and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions3 as

1 We deny the Respondent’s request for oral argument, as the rec-
ord, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and the posi-
tions of the parties.
2 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings. In addition, the Respondent asserts
that the judge’s findings demonstrate bias. On careful examination of
the judge’s decision and the entire record, we are satisfied that the
Respondent’s contention is without merit.
We find it unnecessary to pass on the Union’s exception to the
judge’s failure to find that the Respondent lacked an honest belief that
the disciplined employees engaged in serious misconduct because such
a determination would not affect the outcome. See, e.g., Augusta Bak-
ery Corp., 298 NLRB 58, 58 (1990), enfd. 957 F.2d 1467 (7th Cir.
1992) (assuming, without deciding, that employer held an honest belief
that employees engaged in strike misconduct, the Board nonetheless
found their discharges unlawful because the General Counsel estab-
lished that the misconduct did not occur).
In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(3) by terminating employees Patricia Hudson and Brenda Weaver,
we find it unnecessary to rely on the judge’s speculation as to what
might have motivated Troy Conley’s testimony.
3 We have modified the judge’s conclusions of law to include our
additional finding that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) by reas-
signing and eliminating the job duties of Office Specialist-Facilities
Department, formerly held by employee Weaver, without providing the
Union sufficient notice and opportunity to bargain about the change.
The judge found it unnecessary to rule on this 8(a)(5) allegation be-
cause he found that Weaver’s termination was unlawful, and the Re-
modified below, and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified herein.4
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Insert the following Conclusion of Law 3.
“3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by re-
fusing to bargain collectively with the Union by unilater-
ally reassigning and eliminating the job duties of the unit
position of office specialist-facilities department, former-
ly held by Brenda Weaver, without giving the Union
sufficient notice and an opportunity to bargain about the
change.”
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Consoli-
dated Communications d/b/a Illinois Consolidated Tele-
phone Company, Mattoon, Illinois, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order as modified.
1. Insert the following as paragraph 1(b) and reletter
the subsequent paragraph.
“(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local 702,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL–
CIO, the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of the Respondent’s unit employees, by unilaterally reas-
signing and eliminating the job duties of office specialist-
facilities department without giving the Union sufficient
notice and an opportunity to bargain about the change.”
2. Insert the following for paragraph 2(f) and reletter
the subsequent paragraphs.
“(f) Before implementing any changes to the job du-
ties of office specialist-facilities department, notify, and
on request, bargain in good faith with Local 702, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL–CIO.”
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

spondent conceded that it must return her to her prior or similar posi-
tion if her termination was found to violate the Act. However, we find
that the judge’s make-whole order returning the position of office spe-
cialist in the facilities department to the status quo that existed at the
time of Weaver’s discharge does not fully remedy the Respondent’s
clear violation of Sec. 8(a)(5). The Respondent had a duty to notify
and bargain with the Union before implementing its decision to reas-
sign job duties and eliminate Weaver’s position, as they are mandatory
subjects of bargaining. See Finch, Pruyn & Co., 349 NLRB 270, 277
(2007).
4 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to
our findings and the Board’s standard remedial language. We shall also
substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as modified and in
accordance with Durham School Services, 360 NLRB 694 (2014).
ILLINOIS CONSOLIDATED TELEPHONE CO. 1285
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT discipline, terminate, refuse to recall, or
suspend you because of your union or concerted protect-
ed activities, including your participation in a legal
strike.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Local
702, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
AFL–CIO, the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of our unit employees, by unilaterally reassign-
ing and eliminating the job duties of office specialist-
facilities department without giving the Union sufficient
notice and an opportunity to bargain about the change.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order,
offer Patricia Hudson and Brenda Weaver full reinstate-
ment to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist,
to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to
their seniority or any other rights or privileges previously
enjoyed.
WE WILL make Patricia Hudson, Benda Weaver, Mi-
chael Maxwell, and Eric Williamson whole for any loss
of earnings and other benefits resulting from their dis-
charge or discipline, less any net interim earnings, plus
interest compounded daily.
WE WILL file a report with the Social Security Admin-
istration allocating backpay to the appropriate calendar
quarters.
WE WILL compensate Patricia Hudson, Brenda Weav-
er, Michael Maxwell, and Eric Williamson for the ad-
verse tax consequences, if any, of receiving one or more
lump-sum backpay awards covering periods longer than
1 year.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order,
remove from our files any reference to the unlawful dis-
charges of Patricia Hudson and Brenda Weaver, and WE
WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify them in writing that
this has been done and that the discharges will not be
used against them in any way.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order,
remove from our files any reference to the unlawful sus-
pensions of Michael Maxwell and Eric Williamson, and
WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify them in writing
that this has been done and that the suspension will not
be used against them in any way.
WE WILL restore to the position office specialist in the
facilities department those duties that were performed by
Brenda Weaver prior to her discharge.
WE WILL, before implementing any changes to the job
duties of office specialist-facilities department, notify,
and on request, bargain in good faith with Local 702,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL–
CIO.
CONSOLIDATED COMMUNICATIONS D/B/A
ILLINOIS CONSOLIDATED TELEPHONE CO.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/14–CA–094626 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
Paula B. Givens, Esq., for the General Counsel.
David C. Lonergan, Esq. and Robert T. Dumbacher, Esq. (Hut-
ton Williams LLP), of Dallas, Texas, and Atlanta, Georgia,
for the Respondent.
Christopher N. Grant, Esq. (Schuchat, Cook & Werner), of St.
Louis, Missouri, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ARTHUR J. AMCHAN, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Mattoon, Illinois, from August 19–23 and on Sep-
tember 17, 2013. IBEW Local 702, the Charging Party Union,
filed the charge in Case 14–CA–094626 on December 11,
2012, an amended charge on December 17, and the charge in
1286 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Case 14–CA–101495 on March 28, 2013. The General Coun-
sel issued a consolidated complaint on May 30, 2013.
The Charging Party Union went on strike on the evening of
Thursday, December 6, 2012. The Union offered to return to
work unconditionally on the evening of December 11. Most
strikers returned to work on Thursday, December 13. On De-
cember 13, Respondent, Consolidated Communications (CCI),
suspended four employees indefinitely for alleged misconduct
related to the strike. On December 17, it terminated the em-
ployment of two of these unit employees, Office Specialists
Brenda Weaver and Pat Hudson. It suspended the other two
employees, janitor Michael Maxwell and switchman Eric Wil-
liamson for 2 days. The General Counsel alleges that Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (the Act) in imposing this discipline on all four em-
ployees.
Hudson had worked for Respondent for 39 years and had re-
ceived no prior disciplinary action. Weaver had worked for
Respondent for 13 years and had not received any prior disci-
pline. Hudson and Weaver were terminated for alleged mis-
conduct in three incidents on December 10, 2010. The first
incident was allegedly harassing and intimidating nonunit em-
ployee Sarah Greider by trapping her in her car between their
cars as she left Respondent’s premises. The second was harass-
ing and intimidating nonunit employee Troy Conley in his work
van with their vehicles on the highway while he drove to a
work assignment. The third incident was allegedly intimidating
and harassing nonunit employee Kurt Rankin as he left Re-
spondent’s premises. The reasons given for termination in
documentation presented to Hudson and Weaver were work-
place violence and/or violation of company conduct and work
rules policies.
Maxwell was suspended for impeding, harassing, and intimi-
dating nonunit employee Leon Flood as he left Respondent’s
Taylorsville, Illinois garage on December 8. Eric Williamson
was suspended for 2 days for allegedly striking nonunit em-
ployee Dawn Redfern’s car mirror as she left Respondent’s
premises on the evening of December 10 and making an ob-
scene gesture directed at nonunit employee Tara Walters on the
morning of December 11.
In March 2013, Respondent eliminated the job previously
held by Brenda Weaver and distributed her duties to employees
in other positions. The General Counsel alleges that Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(3), (4), (5), and (1) in doing so.
The legal principles generally applicable to these disciplinary
measures are that the Board must first consider whether Re-
spondent proved that it had an honest belief that the disciplined
employee engaged in strike misconduct of a serious nature. If
Respondent meets this burden, the Board will find the disci-
pline lawful unless the General Counsel shows that the striker
did not engage in the alleged misconduct or that the conduct
was not serious enough for the employee to forfeit the protec-
tion of the Act. Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 NLRB 1044, 1046
(1984); Universal Truss, Inc., 348 NLRB 733 (2006), and cases
cited therein.1
The case law does not require much for Respondent to meet
its burden. Thus, in this case the critical issues are whether the
disciplined employees actually engaged in the alleged conduct,
whether their actions in fact rise to the level of misconduct and
whether their misconduct was serious enough to warrant dis-
charge in the cases of Hudson and Weaver or a 2-day suspen-
sion in the cases of Maxwell and Williamson.
On the entire record,2 including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel, Respondent, and the Charging Party
Union, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a corporation, is a telecommunications compa-
ny. It operates in several States. This case involves its facili-
ties in Mattoon, Illinois, which is located approximately half-
way between St. Louis and Indianapolis. Respondent derives
gross revenues in excess of $250,000. It purchases and re-
ceives goods valued in excess of $50,000 at its Illinois facilities
directly from places outside of Illinois. Respondent admits, and
I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Union and Respondent had a collective-bargaining
agreement that expired on November 15, 2012, covering ap-
proximately 175 unit employees.3 Contract negotiations con-
tinued after the expiration of the agreement. On December 5, a
company proposal was rejected by a vote of bargaining unit
employees, apparently due to dissatisfaction with the proposal
relating to health insurance issues. The next day, which was
the 22d bargaining session, Respondent informed the Union
that there would be no further bargaining sessions unless the
Union made concessions on pension issues. That evening bar-
gaining unit members voted to strike.
Friday, December 7, was the first full day of the strike. The
Union picketed 10 locations consistently. However, only three
of these locations have any relevance to this case. The Tay-
lorsville garage, the Rutledge Building in Mattoon, and the
corporate headquarters in Mattoon.4

1 Respondent argues that these principles do not apply to Hudson
and Weaver’s conduct on the highway in the Conley incident. That
argument will be addressed herein.
2 The statement at Tr. 120, LL. 3–5, is mistakenly attributed to this
judge.
3 Respondent and the Union reached agreement on a new contract on
March 28, 2013, after the events pertaining to this case.
4 The Rutledge Building is more formally known as the Mattoon
service center or general warehouse. Respondent has two offices on
route 16, Charleston Avenue, which are about 1-1/2 a miles from
Rutledge. The corporate office is at Rt. 16 and 17th Street. The central
office (CO) is at Rt. 16 and 15th St. (the 1501 building).
ILLINOIS CONSOLIDATED TELEPHONE CO. 1287
The Michael Maxwell Incident at the Taylorsville
Garage on Saturday, December 8
On Saturday morning, December 8, about six employees
picketed Respondent’s garage in Taylorsville, Illinois. The
pickets walked back and forth across the entrance to the drive-
way of the garage parking lot. Sometime in the midmorning,
Leon Flood, one of Respondent’s IT systems analysts, left the
garage building in a company van. Frank Fetchak, a network
engineer called in from Pennsylvania to work during the strike,
rode in the passenger seat.
As the van approached the street, it stopped briefly in front
of the pickets, who were moving back and forth. Then Flood
inched forward and his van hit Michael Maxwell, one of the
pickets.5 Maxwell was moving when the van hit him. He fell
forward and braced himself by putting his forearm on the hood.
As Maxwell tried to regain his balance he was pushed towards
the driver’s side of the van. He gave Flood the finger and
yelled, “Fuck You!” at Flood.
Leon Flood apparently completed a CCI incident report on
December 8 and then spoke with Gary Patrem, CCI senior di-
rector of central services, on December 10. The immediate
supervisors of three of the disciplined employees in this case,
Maxwell, Hudson, and Weaver report to Patrem. Patrem in-
structed Flood to fill out a Huffmaster6 incident report, which
he did on December 11, 2012.
On December 12, Anna Bright, a human resources manager,
informed Union Representative Brad Beisner via email that the
Company would be issuing disciplinary actions to Maxwell, Pat
Hudson, and Brenda Weaver on December 13. Beisner imme-
diately emailed Bright requesting all pertinent information used
by CCI in investigating the three employees including, but not
limited to, written statements, video, pictures, identity of eye
witnesses, and police reports (GC Exh. 11).
On December 13, Patrem met with Maxwell and union rep-
resentatives. Patrem provided the Union with none of the doc-
umentation it requested. He informed Maxwell that he had
been accused of impeding, threatening, intimidating, and har-
assing CCI employees. Specifically, Patrem told Maxwell he
struck a company vehicle, proceeded to the front of the vehicle
and leaned on the hood for an extended period of time, and then
proceed to the driver’s window and verbally harassed him (GC
Exh. 23). Maxwell told Patrem that Flood drove aggressively
and had hit him.
CCI suspended Maxwell indefinitely. On December 16, CCI
informed Maxwell that he had been suspended for 2 days and
that he should report to work on Monday, December 17. On
December 17, Patrem gave Maxwell a document stating that he
had been suspended for violating Respondent’s policy regard-
ing workplace violence (GC Exhs. 12(a)–(c)). At the Decem-

5 Flood, who continues to work for Respondent, did not testify in
this proceeding. The incident report completed by Flood on December
11, 2012, is hearsay evidence and to the extent, if any, that it contra-
dicts Maxwell, I do not credit it. Frank Fetchak did not contradict
Maxwell’s testimony in any material way; thus, I credit Maxwell’s
account of the incident.
6 Huffmaster is the security company hired by Respondent during
the strike.
ber 17 meeting, Patrem told Maxwell that he had threatened
and intimidated Leon Flood and that he had impeded the pro-
gress of Flood’s vehicle. Respondent suspended Maxwell for
violating its workplace violence policy.
Maxwell did not threaten anyone or commit any acts of vio-
lence on December 8, 2012. He briefly impeded Flood’s pro-
gress in leaving the Taylorsville garage. However, he did so no
more than the other five picketers and was not suspended for
failing to move out of the way when Flood approached the
picket line. Since Respondent suspended Maxwell for offenses
he did not commit, I find it violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) as
alleged.
Sunday, December 9, 2012
On Sunday, December 9, Respondent held a meeting for in-
dividuals who would be working during the strike with repre-
sentatives from the Huffmaster Security Company. The meet-
ing was held at the Rutledge Building located at 2116 S. 17th
Street in Mattoon, in which Respondent set up a command
center for the strike. Attendance was not taken but many man-
agement employees and supervisors from Mattoon, company
workers called in from other locations, and nonunit employees
were at the meeting, including some of the 27 customer service
representatives who work in Mattoon.
A Huffmaster representative instructed the attendees as to
how to conduct themselves during the strike. The representa-
tive told the attendees that Huffmaster guards would be sta-
tioned at the picket lines and they should follow the guards’
instructions in crossing the picket lines. He also told employ-
ees to approach picket lines slowly and to keep their windows
rolled up. Respondent distributed Huffmaster’s written instruc-
tions (GC Exh. 21), to the individuals who attended the meet-
ing; others received the instructions via email.
The Huffmaster written instructions advised these workers to
report any damage to their vehicles to the police and to file a
police report. The instructions advised employees who are
followed when leaving company property to drive directly to
the nearest police facility or return to company property if it is
closer (GC 21, p. CCI-0020). These instructions also advised
CCI personnel to watch for cars that may be following them
when parking at a remote location. Huffmaster told employees
who thought they were being followed to drive the nearest po-
lice department or drive back to the parking location. The in-
struction also stated:
If you encounter any problems during the course of your
normal day, contact the local police department and Huffmas-
ter security personnel for instructions. File a report. [Id., at
CCI page 0019.]
In none of the instances in which the striking employees
were disciplined, did anyone contact the Mattoon police de-
partment or file a report with the police.
Monday, December 10, 2010
On Monday, December 10, numerous pickets began arriving
at the Rutledge site prior to 7:30 a.m. They gathered near the
north exit to the parking lot leading to South 17th Street, which
runs north to south. The south entrance to the lot was barricad-
ed, so that traffic had to enter and exit the Rutledge parking lot
1288 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
at the north exit. The pickets were making a lot of noise by
yelling and with air horns (deafening noise according to Police
Chief Branson) and some were shaking picket signs at people
entering the parking lot to report for work. Between 7:30 and
8:30 a.m., Jeffrey Branson, the chief of the Mattoon police
department, arrived at Rutledge. He found that picketers were
congregating in the roadway on 17th Street. He informed the
picketers and/or union officials that they could not do that; the
picketers complied and got out of the roadway. He also cau-
tioned a picketer who Respondent alleges was Eric Williamson,
about getting too close to cars.7
Several Huffmaster security guards were stationed at the
north entrance/exit and were controlling traffic into and out of
the Rutledge parking lot and were stopping traffic on 17th
Street to allow cars to exit the CCI lot . Branson went into the
Rutledge Building and met with Sam Jurka and Michael Croy,
two senior managers based in Mattoon. Croy called the Mat-
toon police frequently on Monday (Tr. 420). Croy is the direct
supervisor of Pat Hudson and Brenda Weaver, the two employ-
ees whose discharges are at issue in this case. There were a
number of people inside the building who were very upset.
Branson observed several female employees who were crying.
Croy was so angry that Branson tried to avoid talking to him;
preferring to speak with Jurka instead. Croy complained to
Branson about the speed at which cars were driving down 17th
Street. Respondent conducted a meeting for workers at the
Rutledge Building at about 8:30 a.m. because many were very
upset and angry about the behavior of the pickets (Tr. 999–
1000).
Pat Hudson/Brenda Weaver and the Sarah
Greider Incident
Nonstriker Sarah Greider is an employee communications
coordinator. She normally works at a corporate building at 121
South 17th Street. However, during the strike she reported to
the Rutledge Building. She attended the Huffmaster briefing
on December 9.
At about 10 a.m. on December 10, Greider left the Rutledge
Building to go to an 11 a.m. personal appointment in Cham-
paign, Illinois. As she exited the building, Greider called her
husband and put her phone on speaker (Tr. 1087). She rolled

7 Chief Branson also testified about talking to a picket, who was a
“hothead.” It is not at all clear to me that this was Williamson. The
chief’s description of this individual at Tr. 558 does not comport with
the picture of Williamson in Exh. R-10. The chief described the hot-
head as almost bald. In the photo of Williamson in Exh. R-10, from
which Branson identified Williamson, he is wearing a San Francisco
49ers cap and a hood. It was cold on December 10, about 30 degrees
Fahrenheit, and there is no evidence that Williamson took his cap and
hood off at any time that day. My recollection of Williamson, who
testified, is that he is not almost bald. Indeed, I have skepticism as to
the accuracy of Chief Branson’s testimony at Tr. 1113, identifying
Williamson as the person he spoke to on December 10.
I find that there is no probative value to the testimony of police of-
ficer Eric Finley. Finley did not see the incident for which Williamson
was disciplined. Williamson testified that he spoke to officer Scott
Robison after the incident. Officer Robison did not testify. Moreover,
the individual Finley identified as the person to whom he spoke, in Exh.
R-10(a) and (b); Tr. 1104, is not Williamson.
down her car windows a bit and told her husband that she
wanted him to listen to the pickets. As Greider approached
17th Street, a Huffmaster guard briefly stopped her car to allow
Pat Hudson to pass by the exit in her car (Tr. 1067). Then the
guard put his hand up and stopped Brenda Weaver, who was
behind Hudson, to allow Greider to exit the parking lot (Exh.
R-1; Tr. 309–311, 1067–1068, 1075–1077). Then the guard
allowed Weaver to proceed. For a distance of 135 to 165 feet,
Greider’s car was between Hudson’s and Weaver’s.
There is absolutely no basis for questioning the testimony of
Hudson and Weaver that they were on their way from Rutledge
to the corporate building to picket at the latter site. There is
absolutely no basis for concluding that Greider’s car ended up
between Hudson and Weaver’s vehicles other than by coinci-
dence and the traffic control actions of the Huffmaster guard.
There is no basis for concluding that Hudson and Weaver inten-
tionally blocked Greider’s car in.8
As soon as Greider noticed Weaver behind her, she became
angry and said to her husband, “You are not going to believe
what these bitches are doing to me” (Tr. 1079). Pickets were
next to Greider’s car on both sides of 17th Street and further
north (Tr. 1081). 17th Street, which is 22-feet wide and whose
pavement is unmarked, had been reduced to one lane. Greider
could not pass Hudson safely on 17th. Hudson was driving
very slowly. There is no evidence that she did so to harass or
annoy Greider. Greider put on her turn signal and turned left
into the first entrance to the parking lot of the Pilson Automo-
bile dealership, 135 to 165 feet from where she turned onto
17th Street. Greider was afraid Weaver was going to follow
her, but noticed that Weaver did not turn into Pilson’s.
After cutting through the Pilson’s lot, Greider turned right
onto Land Lake Boulevard (a/k/a Rt. 121/45) and drove to
Charleston Avenue (Rt. 16), the main road between Mattoon
and Charleston, Illinois. On Charleston Avenue she turned
right towards the East and Interstate 57, which is a north-south
highway. Greider turned north on I-57 and proceeded to
Champaign.
On Charleston Avenue, Hudson and Weaver passed Greider
driving east before Greider reached the Interstate. Although
she testified that she did not know whether Hudson and Weaver
saw her, Greider told her husband that the two unit employees
had followed her or caught up to her.
Greider called Respondent’s command center and reported
that Hudson and Weaver blocked her in, as soon as she got off
the phone with her husband (Tr. 1059). Greider’s coworker,
Jonell Rich, also a nonstriker, texted Greider that she saw what
Hudson did to her. When Greider returned from her appoint-
ment in Champaign, between 12:30 and 1 p.m., Gary Patrem
asked her to fill out an incident report (GC Exh. 16). She de-
scribed what happened to a group of people in the command
center including Patrem and Ryan Whitlock, Respondent’s
director of employee and labor relations on December 10 (Tr.
428–429, 1063).9 The next day, Greider also spoke to Re-

8 Greider conceded that Hudson may have been waiting for Weaver,
Tr. 1056–1057.
9 At Tr. 1062–1063, Greider indicated that she had discussions with
Whitlock when she returned to the Rutledge Building on December 10.
ILLINOIS CONSOLIDATED TELEPHONE CO. 1289
spondent’s chief executive officer, Robert Curry. Greider told
Curry that she was blocked in for a minute, for about 100 feet,
and may have told Curry that she thought she was being fol-
lowed (Tr. 1063–1064, 1077). She did not tell Curry that Hud-
son was starting and stopping in front of her.
Greider filled out a Huffmaster incident form on December
12 (GC Exh. 12). She listed Jonell Rich as a witness to this
incident. Nobody from management talked to Rich about the
Greider incident until February 14, 2013.10 In her report, Grei-
der stated that, “Pat refused to move or moved very slowly.”
She did not allege that Hudson was stopping and starting as she
did at Transcript 1057. There is no evidence that Greider made
such a claim at the command center in front of Gary Patrem
and Ryan Whitlock either (Tr. 283–287, 428–429). I find there
is no credible evidence that Hudson was stop/starting while in
front of Greider (see Exh. R-1 (a video); Tr. 309–316). To the
contrary, I find that the testimony of Greider and Jonell Rich to
this effect is solely the result on their animus towards Hudson,
arising at least in part from the strike.
Finally, as Respondent notes in footnote 25 at page 47 of its
brief, the conduct with which Hudson and Weaver are accused
is, according to the Mattoon police chief, a police matter. De-
spite this, neither Respondent nor Greider reported the incident
to the Mattoon police, even though Mike Croy called the city
police several times the same morning (Tr. 420).
I also rely on the fact that Bernice Dasenbrock, a witness
called by Respondent, testified that she saw Greider “in the
road, and she turned left and went into Pilson’s parking lot”
(Tr. 1202). Her testimony as to how much of the incident she
observed is somewhat ambiguous (Tr. 1184), but she certainly
did not notice Hudson or Weaver harassing Greider, or any-
thing else unusual.
In summary, I find that the record establishes there was abso-
lutely no misconduct by either Hudson or Weaver with regard
to Greider. In so finding, I also rely in part of the fact that
Greider did not file a police report as she had been instructed
prior to this incident.
Hudson/Weaver and the Troy Conley Incident
Prior to December 10, the Union advised the strikers that
they could picket at commercial sites at which replacement
employees were performing work. This was described to the
employees as “ambulatory picketing.” After Sarah Greider
turned into the Pilson’s Auto lot, Hudson, with Weaver behind
her, drove by a park where they believed some company work
trucks were parked. Not seeing any company vehicles they
drove down 14th Street with the intention of picketing the cen-

At Tr. 1073–1074, she testified that Whitlock was in the area when she
was describing the incident to others. This comports with Whitlock’s
testimony.
10 I give no weight to Rich’s testimony regarding the Greider inci-
dent. In addition to the fact that she was first interviewed 2 months
after the incident, her testimony is inconsistent on material matters. It
is also clear that with respect to the Greider incident and the Rankin
incident, Rich’s recollection is either inaccurate or incomplete. As to
inconsistency, at Tr. 1120, Rich testified that she did not know if Hud-
son came to a complete stop in front of Greider, Tr. 1120, and then
changed her testimony at Tr. 1135–1137.
tral office, the 1501 building, at Charleston Avenue and 15th
Street. This is about 1-1/2 miles from Rutledge. Hudson then
noticed a company van driving east on Charleston Avenue. She
decided to turn right and follow the van rather than turn left
towards Respondent’s central office. Weaver followed Hudson
in her automobile.
Hudson testified that she intended to follow the truck to de-
termine whether it was going to a commercial worksite. If so,
she testified that she intended to inform union officials so that
they could decide whether or not to picket at that site.
Once Hudson and Weaver turned east onto Charleston Ave-
nue, after another 1-1/2 miles they passed Greider. Shortly
thereafter they passed under I-57 and caught up to the van
which was driven by Troy Conley, Respondent’s director of
network engineering, near a BP gas station. Conley and his
passenger, Larry Diggs, a manager from Texas, were on their
way to repair a commercial wireless tower in Charleston. The
parties stipulated that it is about 3 miles from the BP station to
the Road 1200 E, where Conley testified he turned south off of
Route 16.
Since this is the only incident by which Respondent could
possibly justify the discharge of Hudson and Weaver, it is im-
portant to analyze the testimony of the four individuals with
firsthand knowledge, particularly where it conflicts. While I
recognize that the testimony of Hudson and Weaver is self-
serving and thus should be approached with some degree of
caution, the same is also true with regard to Troy Conley, and
to some extent Larry Diggs.
Respondent asserts that the fact that neither Hudson nor
Weaver made any statements in their defense at the suspension
and termination meetings in December should be weighed
against them in making credibility determinations.11 Despite
the fact that Respondent provided little in the way of specifics
at the suspension meetings, I question whether it was wise for
Hudson and Weaver to remain silent. However, their silence
has very little relevance in resolving credibility. The credibility
issues can be resolved largely on the basis of the testimony of
Respondent’s witnesses, their consistency with the contempo-
raneous reports they filed and the consistency of Respondent’s
witnesses with each other.
Conley is a manager who understands that his employer ter-
minated Hudson and Weaver and that his employer would very
much like them to remain terminated. Moreover, it is quite
clear that many of Respondent’s managers were very angry
about the strike and the conduct of the strikers at Rutledge.
Conley is likely to have been angry about the fact that Hudson
and Weaver were following him.
Witness Testimony and Credibility Resolutions
Conley testified that he first noticed Weaver, who had passed
Hudson, three quarters to a half-mile east of the BP station
which is located just east of I-57, at the intersection of Route 16
and Miller Road. However, he also testified that it was a half a

11 Weaver denied noticing Grieder’s car in front of her at her termi-
nation meeting on December 17. I credit that testimony because there
was no reason for her to notice which car the Huffmaster guard let out
of the parking lot in front of her.
1290 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
mile or less than that (Tr. 874–875). This is about 1-1/2 miles
from where Hudson and Weaver began to follow him.
Where Conley first saw Weaver is significant in determining
how far and for how long he was “trapped” behind Hudson, or
alternatively, merely prevented from passing Hudson and
Weaver (assuming this was the case). Both Hudson and Weav-
er testified that they passed Conley near the Sarah Bush Hospi-
tal or even further east on Charleston Avenue.12 If Conley did
not see Weaver for three quarters or a half a mile and then a
minute passed before he saw Hudson, as he testified at Tran-
script 877–878, this would indicate that Hudson and Weaver’s
testimony is more accurate than Conley’s. I credit Hudson and
Weaver that Hudson passed Conley in the area of the Sarah
Bush Hospital or further east.
Conley testified that Weaver honked at him, signaled, and
then got into the right lane in front of him. He noticed a picket
sign in her car. According to Conley, Weaver did not loiter
next to him and got into the right lane at a safe distance in front
of him.13 At this time, Conley did not see Hudson (Tr. 877).
This leads me to conclude that he could have passed Weaver at
this point, if he chose to do so. Charleston Avenue at this point
is a divided highway with two lanes in each direction (see Jt.
Exhs. 9A & B).
Conley testified that less than 1 minute later, Hudson passed
him (Tr. 877–878), motioned to Weaver and that both Hudson
and Weaver slowed down. Conley stated he moved into the left
lane but that Hudson stayed in the left lane and thus he could
not pass. Then he went back into the right lane behind Weaver.
Conley does not know the speed at which any of the cars were
travelling. He conceded that Weaver and Hudson could have
been travelling at the speed limit. The speed limit on Rt. 16 east
of I-57 is 55 mph in most places, but is 45 or 50 mph near a
stop light at Loxa Road (which might explain why Hudson and
Weaver slowed down) (Tr. 322). Conley is not sure that he
ever put on his brakes at this point (Tr. 882). At one point on
Route 16, Conley was driving at 69 miles per hour; 14 mph
over the speed limit. Thus, it is possible that Hudson was driv-
ing at the speed limit or over it when Conley slowed down
behind her, if he did so (Tr. 583–584).
On cross-examination, Conley was somewhat tentative about
where Hudson first pulled parallel to Weaver. In response to
the General Counsel, Conley testified that he did not think this
occurred as far east as the Sarah Bush Hospital, which would
be about 1-1/2 miles at most from where he testified that he

12 Hudson’s and Weaver’s testimony differs from Conley’s regard-
ing the location where they passed Conley. They both testified, as did
Conley, that they caught up to Conley’s truck near the BP station at
Miller Road. Both testified that Weaver passed Conley near Sarah
Bush Hospital or further east, Tr. 613, 780. The airport entrance and
Sarah Bush are located fairly close to one another about 1-1/2 miles
east of the BP station; one half mile west of Loxa Road (County Road
1100 E) and 1-1/2 miles west of County Road 1200 E. The airport
entrance is on the right as one drives east; Sarah Bush is on the left.
13 When testifying, Conley apparently abandoned his contention that
Weaver “cut in front” of him as he wrote in his Huffmaster statement.
Alternatively, when he used the word “cut” in that statement he meant
nothing more than Weaver and Hudson changed lanes in front of him,
GC Exh. 16; Tr. 877.
turned south (Tr. 881–883, 888). However, if Conley was
boxed in west of Sarah Bush, he could have avoided travelling
behind Hudson and Weaver by turning north into the road lead-
ing to Sarah Bush, south into the Airport Road or a little further
east on Loxa Road, either north or south (Tr. 905–912).
At some point, according to Conley, three cars came up be-
hind Hudson in the left lane and she moved into the right lane
to allow them to pass her. Conley testified that he signaled left,
moved back into the left lane, but could not pass because Hud-
son moved back into the left lane. She denies this (Tr. 780–
786). Hudson testified that she passed Conley and Weaver and
then moved into the right lane in front of Weaver. Further, she
testified that she did not move back into the left lane and that
Conley did not try to pass her before he turned south. I credit
Conley to the extent that at some point he was in the left lane
on Route 16 behind Hudson.
Conley testified he applied his brakes when getting behind
Hudson in the left lane, but did not slam them on. He does not
recall whether or not Hudson signaled before moving back into
the left lane (Tr. 892). Conley did not believe Hudson nearly
caused an accident when she moved back into the left lane.
Conley’s passenger, Lawrence Diggs, testified that when
Hudson pulled back into the left lane, Conley had not begun to
try to pass Weaver (Tr. 966–967). This corroborates the testi-
mony of Hudson and Weaver that Hudson never “cut off” Con-
ley. I credit Hudson that she did not do so.
Conley testified that he got back into the right lane prior to
Loxa Rd. (County Road 1100) and turned right (south) on Road
1200 E.14 He did not see Hudson or Weaver after that.
Conley does not know how long he was in the left lane be-
hind Hudson (Tr. 888). Similarly, Lawrence Diggs did not
offer any testimony as to how long or for what distance Conley
was behind Hudson in the left lane or was prevented from pass-
ing. Diggs also did not corroborate (or refute) Conley’s testi-
mony that Conley had to drive an extra 4.97 miles to reach the
jobsite. However, if, as Conley testified, he got back into the
right lane prior to Loxa Road, Conley could have turned right

14 I take judicial notice of Google Maps, which were introduced and
relied upon by Respondent, Tr. 868; R. Exh. 6. Google Maps, which
are much clearer than the one introduced as R. Exh. 6 show that Loxa
Road is also County Road 1100. They also show that Old State Rd.
intersects with County Road 1100 south of Rt. 16 and that one can
drive back to Rt. 16 and towards Charleston by going south on Loxa
and then heading to the northeast on Old State Road.
Google Maps also show that one can turn left at County Road 1050
E that leads to Sarah Bush Hospital and then turn right on Dewitt Ave-
nue (County Road 800 N) to get to Loxa Road north of Rt. 16. A driver
would then have to turn south on Loxa to return to Rt. 16 or drive fur-
ther south to pick up Old State Road to Charleston.
There is also an airport road on the south side of Rt. 16, which
would allow a driver to essentially pass a bottleneck on Rt. 16 at some
points and come out further east on Rt. 16. Thus, there was no need for
Conley to remain boxed in by Hudson and Weaver if Hudson got into
the left lane much west of Sarah Bush.
Weaver testified as Conley did, that he turned south on County Road
1200, Tr. 659–662; Hudson testified Conley turned at Loxa, Tr. 789.
Respondent’s GPS records might show which is correct, Tr. 384. Re-
gardless, I find there is no credible evidence that Conley was stuck
behind Hudson and Weaver for several miles.
ILLINOIS CONSOLIDATED TELEPHONE CO. 1291
or left (north or south) on Loxa rather than continue on Route
16 for another mile to County Road 1200 E, as he testified.
Conley completed a Huffmaster report (Exh. 16.) Unlike the
other Huffmaster reports in this record, Conley’s is undated.
Conley testified that he “believes” he was directed to fill out
this report on December 11.15 In that report, he states:
Traveling eastbound on Hwy 16 between Mattoon and
Charleston car # 1 (Plate Weave 9) approached in passing
lane honking horn (pick sign on passenger side seat) and cut
in front of company truck and slowed speed. Another car ap-
proached (Driver Pat Hudson) and paralled [sic] the first car,
both slowing. I proceeded to pass with other traffic and (Pat
Hudson) car # 2 cut back in front of me slowing down creat-
ing a blockade to the front. After several miles, I turned south
on county road and rerouted to Charleston.16
In this account, Conley did not specify on which county road
he turned south. Similarly, there is nothing in his statement
about driving 4.97 miles out of the way to get to the cell tower.
I find that Hudson prevented Conley from passing him by stay-
ing in the left lane, for a mile or less and not more than 1 mi-
nute. If Conley had been blocked in for any significant period
of time, Lawrence Diggs would remember this. The fact that
he does not leads me to credit Hudson and Weaver that they did
not block Conley in for any significant distance or period of
time.
A major reason I credit Hudson and Weaver over Conley is
the fact that Conley did not bother to report this incident to the
police as he had been instructed. Conley testified that he called
Sam Jurka after the incident on the telephone (Tr. 871–872).
Thus, Conley could have called the police or had Diggs call the
police if Hudson and/or Weaver were doing anything danger-
ous or illegal. In making credibility resolutions regarding this
incident, it is very significant that Conley did not contact the
police. Jurka did not testify and there is no evidence as to what
Conley told Jurka. Jurka apparently did not take any notes. It
is also significant that Jurka did not call the police. The fact
that he did not do so is notable because he was working the

15 I have doubts as to when Conley filled out his Huffmaster report.
Conley “believes” he did so on December 11, Tr. 894. Patrem “be-
lieves:” he directed Conley to fill out the report, Tr. 329, but also testi-
fied that he did not interview, or talk to Conley directly, Tr. 305–306,
317–319. Patrem is also unaware of any other manager speaking to
Conley, Tr. 330.
Conley testified that he believes that Jurka, who did not testify, told
him to fill out the report on December 10, Tr. 895. Conley’s incident
report was presented to Hudson, Weaver, and the Union at the termina-
tion meetings on December 17.
16 In this account, Conley did not contend that Weaver and Hudson
drove parallel to each other “for some time” as asserted in R. Br. at p.
30, or by Conley in response to a leading question at Tr. 865–866. He
also did not assert that he tried to pass Hudson twice as he did at Tr.
866. Diggs testified to only one attempt by Conley to pass Hudson, Tr.
957, 964–968. I do not credit Conley’s testimony that he tried to pass
Hudson twice.
Lawrence Diggs also had no recollection of how long it was before
Hudson pulled in front of Weaver in the right lane. I do not credit
Conley’s testimony regarding the period of time that Hudson and
Weaver were parallel to each other.
morning of December 10 with Mike Croy, who called the po-
lice on numerous occasions. If Conley related to Jurka that
Hudson and Weaver were endangering him and/others on
Highway 16; one would think Jurka or Conley would call the
Mattoon police since they had Hudson and Weaver’s license
plate numbers (GC Exh. 16).
Conley also testified that he spoke to Gary Patrem twice
about the incident twice prior to Hudson and Weaver’s dis-
charge (Tr. 894–895). Patrem testified that he never discussed
the incident with Conley or Diggs (Tr. 317–318). This raises
some doubt as to the recollections and/or credibility of one or
the other, or both. If Conley did discuss the incident with
Patrem, there is no evidence as to what was said.
Conley and HR Director Whitlock had a discussion about
this incident apparently prior to Hudson and Weaver being
discharged (Tr. 900–903, 430–438). Whitlock’s account,
which appears to be inaccurate in at least so far as Larry Diggs’
presence is concerned, contains nothing about how long or how
far the incident lasted, which road Conley turned off onto and
the route Conley took to get to the worksite. There is no writ-
ten record of any communication between Whitlock and Con-
ley. Nobody apparently advised Conley to contact the police
per the Huffmaster instructions.
Lawrence Diggs’ Testimony
Lawrence Diggs, a manager from Texas, was Conley’s pas-
senger. Diggs returned to Texas on Friday, December 14. He
testified that he spoke to nobody in management about the inci-
dent between December 10, 2012, and late July or August 2013
(Tr. 959–960, 968–969). This contradicts Ryan Whitlock’s
testimony at Transcript 428. Diggs never saw Conley’s inci-
dent report, which lists him as a witness, nor was he present if
Conley spoke to Gary Patrem and Ryan Whitlock in December.
The fact that nobody from management interviewed Diggs or
took a statement from him undercuts Respondent’s contentions
as to how serious it considered the alleged misconduct of Hud-
son and Weaver.
Diggs did not testify about the most disputed facts regarding
this incident, which are where on Route 16 Conley was pre-
vented from passing, how long he was prevented from passing
and where he turned south to get off of Route 16. I find this
very significant in making a credibility resolution between
Conley on the one hand and Weaver and Hudson on the other.
If something very usual happened, such as Weaver and Hudson
driving for 1-1/2 miles in a manner that Conley could not pass
them, I would think that Diggs, a witness favorably disposed to
Respondent would remember it. Thus, I conclude that this did
not happen.
There is also probative value to Diggs’ testimony in that he
did not recall seeing Weaver’s brakes lights when she pulled
into the right lane in front of Conley and his concession that
Weaver and Hudson may have been driving at the speed limit.
In summary, this record establishes that Weaver engaged in
absolutely no misconduct with regard to Conley. Assuming
there was misconduct, it was, insubstantial: honking, passing
Conley, and switching into the right lane in front of him. Simi-
larly, misconduct by Hudson, if any, provides no justification
for Hudson’s discharge. Neither Hudson nor Weaver commit-
1292 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ted an act of violence, nor has Respondent demonstrated that
either violated any company policy regarding employee con-
duct.
Hudson/Weaver and the Kurt Rankin Incident
After Hudson and Weaver lost sight of Conley they returned
to the corporate building. Weaver parked and got into the back
seat of Hudson’s car. Another employee got into the front pas-
senger seat. Hudson then drove south on 17th Street past the
Rutledge Building waving and greeting the pickets at that site.
She then turned around and headed north.
As Hudson drove north, at about 11:36 a.m., Kurt Rankin,
Respondent’s director of network operations, was approaching
the north exit of the Rutledge parking lot in his vehicle. He had
just left a meeting at Rutledge and was on his way to 1501
Charleston, where he normally works.
Huffmaster guards were controlling traffic in and out of the
lot and on 17th Street near the exit. A Huffmaster guard held
Rankin up while Hudson passed the exit. Then Rankin turned
right behind Hudson, who was driving very slowly. There were
pickets on both sides of 17th Street with barely enough room
for two cars abreast. There were also people on the roadway on
17th Street. A four-wheel drive vehicle with picketers in the
back approached Hudson from the north and stopped beside
Rankin’s vehicle as he drove north.
There is no evidence that Rankin could not have turned into
the Pilson’s lot and cut through to Landlake Boulevard as Grei-
der had done about an hour previous to this incident. Instead he
drove past two entrances to the lot and then sped past Hudson
on her left on 17th Street.
On December 10, Rankin returned to the Rutledge Building
and requested a Huffmaster incident report. He filled it out,
and then reviewed it with Phillip Donahue of Huffmaster on
December 12. He did not talk to anyone in management about
the incident.
On the cover of the incident report (GC Exh. 16), Rankin
listed two suspects, Hudson and Weaver. The latter was men-
tioned because he saw Weaver in the back seat of Hudson’s
vehicle. Contrary to Respondent’s assertion in discharging
Weaver, it is 100-percent certain that she was not in a vehicle
behind Rankin.17 Rankin’s description of the incident in his
Huffmaster report, which is the only evidence relied upon by
Respondent in terminating both employees in part for this event
is as follows:
When pulling out of company parking lot a vehicle pulled in
front of my vehicle and a vehicle was behind me blocking me
on a one lane path unable to pull forward or backwards. The
vehicle proceeded to move very very slow and at some times
stopped when strikers continued to yell, scream and whistle. I
was unable to pass the vehicle in order to get out of the com-

17 Quite surprising for witnesses who wish to be credited, both Gary
Patrem and Ryan Whitlock testified that they still believe that Weaver
was in an automobile behind Rankin, Tr. 238–239, 444.
None of Respondent’s other witnesses to this incident saw any vehi-
cle behind Rankin. Respondent’s witness, Tara Walters, testified that
she did not see Hudson stop/start as alleged by Rankin, Tr. 1032; Exh.
R-1, the Huffmaster video, doesn’t show this either although it cuts off
while Rankin was still behind Hudson on 17th Street, Tr. 242, 252, 277.
promising situation. I felt totally threatened, vulnerable and
trapped. It was only when there were no vehicles on the side
of the roadway that I was able to pass the vehicle.
At trial, Rankin added some details not contained in his
statement. He testified that strikers signaled to Pat Hudson to
get in front of him, a contention for which there is no evidence
other than his testimony. I find this to be untrue. It is clear that
Hudson was in front of Rankin only because the Huffmaster
guard prevented him from turning onto 17th Street in front of
her.
Rankin testified that Hudson moved to the left of the road to
block him from passing. This is also an allegation not con-
tained in his statement, which I do not credit as a result. On the
other hand, Rankin’s testimony that he passed Hudson’s vehicle
only when there were no cars on the side of the street supports
her testimony that she was driving very slowly because of the
parked cars and people in the street; not to harass Rankin.
The record establishes that neither Hudson nor Weaver
committed any act of workplace violence regarding Rankin, nor
did they violate any CCI policy regarding employee conduct.
In so finding, I rely in part of the fact that no police reports
were filed for their conduct, such as stop/starting in front of
vehicles, which is clearly illegal.
Respondent’s Other Witnesses to the Rankin Incident
Tara Walters, Jonell Rich, and Bernice Dasenbrock testified
that they observed this incident from the second floor of the
Rutledge Building (Tr. 1028, 1122–1122, 1178). Walters did
not see Hudson swerve (Tr. 1049). Assuming Hudson’s car
moved laterally there is no basis for concluding she did so to
harass Rankin. It is just as likely that she did so to avoid hitting
cars, people or in reaction to the truck coming towards her from
the north. Neither Walters nor Jonell Rich saw anything that
prevented Rankin from turning into the Pilson’s lot, as Greider
did an hour earlier to avoid travelling behind Hudson (Tr. 1035,
1137–1138).
However, neither Walters, nor Rich, nor Dasenbrock are par-
ticularly reliable witnesses as to what transpired. Not one of
them remembered the truck or car passing Hudson and Rankin
going south. Rankin, Weaver, and Hudson all testified that this
occurred while Rankin was behind Hudson or trying to pass
(Tr. 466–467, 622, 790). Dasenbrock’s testimony that Hudson
stopped and blocked Rankin at the exit to the parking lot (Tr.
1186–1189) is clearly inaccurate. The video evidence (Exh. R-
1), clearly shows this did not occur. Dasenbrock and Rich’s
testimony regarding the Rankin incident is inconsistent in sev-
eral material respects.
Moreover, Rich was not interviewed about it by anyone until
February 14, 2013, and then only about the Greider incident
(Tr. 1144). In fact, there is no credible evidence as to when
anyone discussed the Rankin incident with any one of the three
women. This raises doubt in my mind as to what they actually
remember or observed about the Rankin incident. Gary
Patrem’s testimony is that he discussed the Greider incident
with Rich, Walters, and Dasenbrock; there is no evidence as to
when anybody from management first discussed the Rankin
incident with them (Tr. 351–353, 441–442).
ILLINOIS CONSOLIDATED TELEPHONE CO. 1293
Rankin did not identify any witnesses to his encounter with
Hudson on his Huffmaster report, whereas Greider identified
Rich. Rankin also did not orally identify Walters, Rich, or
Dasenbrock as witnesses to the incident (Tr. 457–458). In the
termination meeting for Weaver on December 17, Gary Patrem
discussed Rich as a witness to the Greider incident, not the
Rankin incident (GC Exh. 23). His testimony indicates that he
only relied on Rankin’s Huffmaster report in factoring in the
Rankin incident in determining that Hudson and Weaver had
engaged in misconduct regarding Rankin (Tr. 353). Ryan
Whitlock’s testimony also indicates that Respondent’s infor-
mation about the Rankin incident as of December 17, was lim-
ited to Rankin’s Huffmaster report and Huffmaster’s video
recording of part of the incident (Tr. 442).
Dasenbrock’s testimony at Transcript 1200–1201, that she
spoke to Patrem about the Rankin incident in the presence of
Tara Walters on December 10 is not corroborated by any other
of Respondent’s witnesses. I do not credit this testimony. The
Charging Party’s brief at page 23 is incorrect in stating that
Tara Walters testified that she spoke to Gary Patrem about the
Rankin incident. To the contrary, Walters testified that she
spoke about it, “just with the girls in my pod” (Tr. 1028).
In its January 4, 2013 response to the Union’s information
request of December 17, Respondent did not identify any wit-
nesses to any of the incidents other than those identified in the
Huffmaster reports (Exhs. U-1 and 2).
Gary Patrem told the Union at the suspension or termination
meetings that Rich, Walters, and Dasenbrock were witnesses to
the Greider incident, and apparently did not mention that they
witnessed the Rankin incident (Tr. 288–289). However, Wal-
ters testified that she did not see the Greider incident, and
Dasenbrock testified she only saw part of it and never spoke to
Patrem about it (Tr. 1028, 1184, 1203).
It is not uncommon for witness to testify about events that
occurred months previously. However, Walters, Rich, and
Dasenbrock were not participants in the Rankin incident, which
lasted for a very brief period and it did not affect them person-
ally. Many of the customer service representatives were very
upset about the conduct of the strikers. Rich was certainly one
of those, give her assumptions about Pat Hudson’s motives
while driving in front of Greider and Rankin. By the time of
anyone talked to Walters about the Rankin incident, she cer-
tainly was upset about her encounter with Eric Williamson on
December 11.
Incidents for which Eric Williamson was Suspended
for 2 Days
Contact with Dawn Redfern’s Car Mirror
Eric Williamson is a switchman who had been working for
CCI for 12 years prior to December 2012. Respondent had not
disciplined him prior to December 13, 2012. During the strike,
Williamson picketed every day for 12 hours 6:30 a.m. to 6:30
p.m., except Sunday, December 9, when he was on the picket
line for about 7 hours. On Friday, he picketed at the corporate
headquarters, but on subsequent days he was picketing at the
Rutledge Building.
On the evening of December 10, workers at the Rutledge
Building were advised to leave the parking lot in a caravan.
Customer Service Representative Dawn Redfern was fifth in
line when the caravan started to pull out of the parking lot at
about 5 p.m. Picketers were standing very close to the cars as
they exited the lot.
As Redfern turned right onto 17th Street, she heard a loud
smack. Redfern stopped, turned on the interior light, and rolled
down the window. She noticed that the mirror on the passenger
side of her car had folded in.
She addressed a picket, later identified as Eric Williamson,
and said that he had hit her car. Williamson responded that
Redfern had hit him. It is not clear whether Williamson moved
closer to the car as Redfern turned, or whether Redfern turned
more sharply than other cars. In any event, there is no evidence
that Williamson intentionally struck the mirror. Redfern never
told anyone that she thought that Williamson struck her mirror
intentionally. In fact, she testified that Williamson could have
come in contact with her mirror accidently.
A Huffmaster guard advised Redfern to continue driving.
She called her supervisor and a coworker about the incident and
they agreed to meet at a CITGO gas station. At the gas station,
Redfern checked her car for damage and saw none. When she
arrived at her house, Redfern’s husband folded the mirror back
into place.
Redfern’s supervisor advised her to call management at the
Rutledge Building. She did so and spoke to Sam Jurka, who
advised her to report the incident to the police. Redfern did not
do so. On December 11, Redfern met Gary Patrem, who drove
her to work. They discussed the mirror incident. Redfern told
Patrem that there was no damage to her car.
Obscene Gesture
On Tuesday, December 11, Tara Walters, another customer
service representative, arrived at work at about 7:20 a.m. She
looked towards a group of picketers and saw Eric Williamson
grab his crotch.18 Williamson was facing her but far enough
away that Walters could not tell if he made eye contact with her
(Tr. 1038).
Walters did not report the incident to management. She did
mention it to coworkers on Tuesday. On Wednesday, Decem-
ber 12, Walters’ supervisor, Mary Beth White, asked Walters if
she wished to fill out an incident report. Walters answered
affirmatively. She filled out a Huffmaster report in which she
stated, “Eric Williamson, a picketer, grabbed his crotch towards
me.” Walters also filled out a CCI report stating that William-
son turned and grabbed his crotch (GC Exh. 13).
Walters’ testimony at trial was somewhat inconsistent as
whether Williamson was intentionally making an obscene ges-
ture directed towards her.
At Transcript 1024, Walters testified that Williamson
“grabbed himself, lifted up as a mean, hateful gesture.” She
testified further that she thought so because “it was the de-
meanor. It was a big handful of crotch, and the way he lifted it
up. He wasn’t shifting it to the side.”

18 Williamson denies doing so. He testified that he yelled scab when
Walters parked and that is all, Tr. 712–716. Williamson and Walters
were casual acquaintances outside of work. I find that Walters did not
make this incident up and she saw Williamson move his hand to his
crotch.
1294 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
However, on redirect by Respondent’s counsel, Walters
backed off from her testimony on direct:
Q. You understand all the questions about looked at,
looked towards, looked in the direction?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you understand, do you see a distinction be-
tween the three?
A. No, because I can say we did not make eye contact.
Q. Okay.
A. I know that for sure. He was looking in my direc-
tion. I was the only one out there, so I would say he was
looking at me, but he could have been looking past me.
Q. Okay.
Q. BY JUDGE AMCHAN: Are you sure that the gesture
was directed at you?
A. I cannot be positive, but I was the only one in my
area where he was looking at. [Tr. 1048–1049.]
Nevertheless, since Williamson testified that he addressed
the epithet “scab” at Walters, I find that he grabbed his crotch
as a hostile gesture directed at her.
On December 18, Respondent informed Williamson that he
was receiving a 2-day suspension for workplace violence and
sexual harassment.
Alleged 8(a)(5) Violation: Unilaterally Combining
the Position of Office Specialist in the Fleet
Department (Hudson’s position) with the Position of
Office Specialist in the Facilities Department
(Weaver’s Position)19
In January or February 2013, Respondent decided to fill Pat
Hudson’s job as office specialist in the fleet department, but not
Weaver’s job in the facilities department. A unit employee,
Heather Winkleblack, was awarded the job in the fleet depart-
ment. The Union was not notified until February 26 that Re-
spondent was not filling the position of office specialist in the
facilities department. Respondent assigned some of the duties
formerly performed by Weaver to Winkleblack. Respondent
did not provide the Union with advance notice or an opportuni-
ty to bargain about its decision not to fill Weaver’s position,
which reduced the number of bargaining unit members by one.
The collective-bargaining agreement that expired in November
2012 did not require Respondent to replace a terminated em-
ployee.
On March 1, the Union demanded in writing a return to the
status quo and bargaining over the change (Jt. Exh. 2). On
April 18, 2013, Respondent advised the Union that it was trans-
ferring some of Weaver’s former duties outside the bargaining
unit on June 19.
Respondent concedes at page 64 of its brief that it must re-
turn Brenda Weaver to her prior or similar position if her ter-
mination is found to violate the Act. In light of the fact that I
do find that her termination violated the Act, I find it unneces-
sary to rule on whether Respondent otherwise violated the Act
in not filling her position and transferring her duties to other
employees.

19 This is also alleged as an 8(a)(3) and (4) violation.
Legal Analysis
Upon unconditional offers to return to work, former econom-
ic strikers are entitled to reinstatement to their former or sub-
stantially equivalent positions. One exception to this rule is
that an employer may refuse to reinstate a former striker if the
employer has a good-faith belief that the former striker engaged
in strike misconduct that may reasonably tend to coerce or in-
timidate employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights,
including their right to refrain from striking or from supporting
the strikers, Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 NLRB 1044 (1984),
affd. 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1105
(1986).
Initially, the General Counsel must show that employee was
a striker and that the employer took action against the employee
for conduct related to the strike, Avery Heights, 343 NLRB
1301, 1302 (2004). The burden has been met with regard to the
all the allegations in this case. While there is no issue in this
regard concerning Maxwell and Williamson, there may be with
regard to Hudson and Weaver. However, I credit their testimo-
ny that they followed Troy Conley in order to determine
whether he was going to perform bargaining unit work at a
commercial site, so that the Union could decide whether to
picket that worksite.
While it is peculiar that Hudson and Weaver would get
ahead of Conley if they were following him to a worksite, they
were keeping track of him in their rear view mirrors. I con-
clude that their conduct was strike related and protected, Team-
sters Local 807 (Schultz Refrigerated Service), 87 NLRB 502
(1949).
Respondent argues that the conduct of Hudson and Weaver
was not strike related and is outside of the Board’s purview.
However, the fact that Respondent did not contact the police
but rather dealt with this incident only through the procedures
that it had established to deal with strike misconduct (filing a
report with Huffmaster) belies this assertion. Finally, I would
note that the Board has analyzed alleged driver conduct away
from the picket line no differently than alleged misconduct at
the picket line in a number of cases, including Consolidated
Supply Co., 192 NLRB 982, 988–989 (1971); Otsego Ski-Club,
217 NLRB 408 (1975); Gibraltar Sprocket Co., 241 NLRB
501, 502 (1979);20 and Federal Prescription Service, 203
NLRB 975, 993 (1973), which are discussed in more detail
below.
Once the General Counsel has shown that an employee or
employees have been disciplined for strike-related conduct, the
burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that it had a hon-
est belief that that the employee engaged in misconduct. As
noted in Avery Heights, supra at 1303, Board precedent estab-
lishes “a relatively low threshold” for the employer on this
issue. Basically, any information linking the misconduct to the
accused employee will satisfy the employer’s burden. It need
not even interview that employee. It is also not clear whether
the employer must show that it had an honest belief that the
misconduct was serious enough to warrant the discipline im-
posed. I need not spend a lot of time on this issue because with
regard the all the instances in this case I find that the miscon-

20 Cited in the Union’s brief as Advanced Pattern & Machine Corp.
ILLINOIS CONSOLIDATED TELEPHONE CO. 1295
duct either did not occur, or was not sufficiently egregious to
warrant the discipline imposed.
However, there are serious issues as to whether Respondent
had an honest belief that Weaver engaged in any misconduct.
It did not even interview Rankin, who would have told man-
agement that Weaver was a passenger in the car in front of him;
not the driver of any car which might have been behind him.
Had it examined its own video evidence, it would have deter-
mined that Weaver was behind Greider because the Huffmaster
guard stopped Weaver before Greider exited the parking lot.
Had it interviewed Conley and Diggs, management would have
known that Weaver did nothing more than pass Conley and pull
into the right lane.
With regard to Williamson and the mirror incident, Re-
spondent could easily have determined by interviewing Dawn
Redfern that she had no reason to believe that Williamson con-
tacted her car mirror intentionally.
With regard to Maxwell, had Respondent bothered to talk to
its employee Frank Fetchak, it would have determined that
there was no reason to conclude that Mike Maxwell intentional-
ly struck Leon Flood’s van and no reason to believe that Max-
well threatened Flood.
Finally, one can question whether Respondent had a good-
faith belief that the conduct of Hudson and Weaver warranted
discipline in inhibiting the travel of Greider and Rankin for a
distance of a couple of hundred feet. There is no evidence of
harassment in the Huffmaster videos, or in the Huffmaster
statements of Greider and Rankin, which is all Respondent
relied upon in disciplining the two women for these incidents.
Assuming that Respondent met its burden of showing an
honest good-faith belief as to all these instances of misconduct,
I find that the General Counsel met its burden of proving that
the misconduct either did not occur or was insufficiently egre-
gious to forfeit the protections of the Act, to wit:
Mike Maxwell did not intentionally strike Leon Flood’s ve-
hicle and did not threaten or intimidate Leon Flood. Flood
inched forward and struck Maxwell. While Maxwell impeded
Flood’s exit from the Taylorsville parking lot for a very short
period of time, he did not engage in the conduct for which he
was suspended.
Brenda Weaver engaged in no misconduct at all. She was
behind Greider only because the Huffmaster guard held her up
to allow Greider to exit the Rutledge parking lot. Weaver’s
only involvement in the Rankin incident was sitting in the back
seat of Hudson’s car, which was in front of Rankin. Her in-
volvement in the Conley incident was following him on Route
16, Charleston Boulevard, passing him and moving into the
right lane in front of him. There is no credible evidence that
she did anything threatening or dangerous. While Conley may
have been intimidated by the fact that strikers were following
him to his worksite, they had a protected right to do so. The
Board has held, in circumstances far more egregious than the
instant matter, that simply following a nonstriker, in the ab-
sence of violence, is insufficient to deprive a striker of the pro-
tections of the Act, Gibraltar Sprocket Co., 241 NLRB 501,
502 (1979).
In Gibraltar Sprocket, the striker followed a nonstriker from
the employer’s plant, pulled alongside the nonstriker’s car and
motioned to him to pull over. The nonstriking employee called
the police who came and talked to him. When he left the police
officer, the nonstrikers followed him again. On the way back to
the employer’s facility, the striker threw an empty beer can in
the direction of the car of the employer’s vice president, which
missed. The Board found that the striker’s misconduct was not
sufficiently serious to warrant his termination and the employ-
er’s refusal to reinstate him. The Board noted that the record
did not indicate that the striker drove dangerously close to the
nonstriker or attempted to force him off the road. It also em-
phasized the lack of violent action on the part of the striker.
A similar case is Otsego Ski-Club, 217 NLRB 408, 409 fn. 4,
410, 413 (1975). Strikers in that case followed a supervisor’s
car on 2 days, honking the horn. There was a dispute as to how
close they came to the supervisor’s car, but they never drove
alongside it or forced it off the road. Like Hudson’s conduct,
the strikers’ conduct may have been annoying, but the Board
found it was insufficiently aggravated to warrant their dis-
charge for misconduct. Indeed, Member Fanning wrote a con-
curring opinion in part to emphasize this point.
In Federal Prescription Service, 203 NLRB 975, 993 (1973),
the Board at page 976 footnote 4, agreed with the judge that
two employees, who followed a nonstriker away from the strike
line and to her home, did not engage in conduct that rendered
them unfit for further employment.
In Consolidated Supply Co., 192 NLRB 982, 988–989
(1971), the Board concluded that following an employer’s truck
or blocking it momentarily did not forfeit the protection of the
Act, where as in the instant case, the striker did not endanger
nonstriking employees.
Pat Hudson engaged in no misconduct with regard to Greider
or Rankin. If she engaged in misconduct with regard to Con-
ley, by preventing him from passing her, even if this was for 1-
1/2 minutes and for 1-1/2 miles, this conduct was not egregious
enough to warrant her termination, particularly in light of the
fact that she was a 39-year employee with no prior disciplinary
record.
Moreover, Respondent terminated Hudson for three inci-
dents; not solely the Conley incident. With regard to the Grei-
der and Rankin incidents, I find there was absolutely no mis-
conduct by Hudson. Even assuming some degree of miscon-
duct by Hudson in the Conley incident, any ambiguity as to
whether it was serious enough to forfeit the protection of the
Act should be resolved against Respondent.
Williamson engaged in no misconduct by coming into con-
tact with Dawn Redfern’s mirror. He did engage in misconduct
by grabbing his crotch and making an obscene gesture directed
at Tara Walters.
Once the Employer has established a good-faith belief of
striker misconduct, the burden shifts to the General Counsel to
show that the striker did not engage in the misconduct or that it
was not serious enough to deny the discriminatee the protection
of the Act, Clear Pine Mouldings, supra. I also conclude that
the General Counsel may prove that although misconduct oc-
curred, it was not serious enough to warrant the level of disci-
pline imposed.
The instances in which the Board has found that strikers
have forfeited the protection of the Act in almost all cases in-
1296 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
volve violent acts or threats of violent acts, which may reason-
ably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of
their Section 7 rights. In Clear Pine Mouldings, supra, strikers
carried clubs, tire irons, baseball bats, and ax handles. One
striker in fact swung a club at a nonstriker. In Detroit Newspa-
pers, 340 NLRB 1019, 1028, 1030 (2003), the employer was
found to have legally discharged one employee for vandalizing
its property and another for taking part in an assault.
On the other hand, the Board has found employee miscon-
duct not sufficiently egregious to forfeit the protection of the
Act by hitting a foreman’s car with cardboard picket signs in a
brief incident not resulting in damage, Medite of New Mexico,
Inc., 314 NLRB 1145–1147 (1994).
There is no case that supports a discharge for the type of
conduct engaged in by the discriminatees in this case. Even
Williamson’s gesture does not justify his suspension. The
Board’s decisions in Briar Crest Nursing Home, 333 NLRB
935, 937–938 (2001); Callope Designs, 297 NLRB 510, 521
(1989); Universal Truss, 348 NLRB 733, 780–781 (2006); and
General Chemical Corp., 290 NLRB 76, 83 (1988), lead to the
conclusion that for a striking employee to forfeit the protection
of the Act, an implied threat of bodily harm must accompany a
vulgar or obscene gesture. Williamson’s gesture certainly does
not meet this standard.21
Williamson is an outside switchman and Walters is an office-
bound customer service representative. While his gesture was
totally uncalled for, and very unpleasant, it is difficult to see
how it could have been perceived as an implied threat of vio-
lence or even future mistreatment (whatever that means) or
have discouraged Walters from continuing to report to work
during the strike. The cases cited by Respondent, Romal Iron
Works Corp., 285 NLRB 1178, 1182 (1987), and Bonanza Sir-
loin Pit, 275 NLRB 310 (1985), involve employer threats of
retaliation to employees, couched in obscene language. These
cases are not relevant to issues of striker misconduct.
Williamson’s suspension was based on two incidents, one of
which I find did not constitute misconduct. Therefore, even
assuming that Williamson’s conduct forfeited the protection of
the Act, I conclude that it is Respondent’s burden under the
Wright Line22 doctrine to establish that it would have suspended
Williamson solely on the basis of the Tara Walters incident. It
has not done so, therefore, I find that his suspension violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by discharg-
ing Brenda Weaver and Patricia Hudson on December 17,
2012.

21 Williamson’s gesture cannot be legitimately characterized as
“sexual harassment.” In Title VII cases, a plaintiff generally cannot
prevail on the basis on a single incident not involving physical contact,
e.g., Pomales v. Cellurlares Telefonica, 441 F.3d 79 (lst Cir. 2006).
The record, herein, of course is barren as to whether Respondent has
ever applied it sexual harassment policy, see GC Exh. 13, to a single
incident not involving physical contact.
22 Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (lst Cir.
1981); La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 337 NLRB 1120, 1123–1124 (2002)
2. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by suspending
Michael Maxwell and Eric Williamson in December 2012.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
The Respondent, having discriminatorily discharged em-
ployees, must offer them reinstatement and make them whole
for any loss of earnings and other benefits. Backpay shall be
computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB
289 (1950), with interest at the rate prescribed in New Hori-
zons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed
in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010).
Respondent shall file a report with the Social Security Ad-
ministration allocating backpay to the appropriate calendar
quarters. Respondent shall also compensate the discriminatee(s)
for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving one or
more lump-sum backpay awards covering periods longer than 1
year, Latino Express, Inc., 359 NLRB 518 (2012).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended23
ORDER
The Respondent, Consolidated Communications, Inc., Mat-
toon and Taylorsville, Illinois, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging, disciplining, refusing to recall, or otherwise
discriminating against any employee for engaging in union or
protected concerted activities, including participation in a
strike.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, offer
Brenda Weaver and Patricia Hudson full reinstatement to their
former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or any
other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
(b) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, re-
scind the December 2012 suspensions of Michael Maxwell and
Eric Williamson.
(c) Make Brenda Weaver, Patricia Hudson, Michael Max-
well, and Eric Williamson whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against
them, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the deci-
sion.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, re-
move from its files any reference to the unlawful discharges of

23 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
ILLINOIS CONSOLIDATED TELEPHONE CO. 1297
Patricia Hudson and Brenda Weaver and the unlawful suspen-
sions of Michael Maxwell and Eric Williamson, and within 3
days thereafter notify the employees in writing that this has
been done and that the discharges and suspensions will not be
used against them in any way.
(e) Return the position of office specialist in the facilities de-
partment to the status quo that existed at the time of Brenda
Weaver’s discharge.
(f) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment rec-
ords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(g) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cilities in Mattoon and Taylorsville, Illinois, copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix.”24 Copies of the notice, on

24 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition to
physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distribut-
ed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an
internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent
customarily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these pro-
ceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the
facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since December 13, 2012.
(h) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.