Complainant,v.Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southwest Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Jan 22, 2015

0120132612 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 22, 2015)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

,
Complainant,

v.

Patrick R. Donahoe,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Southwest Area),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120132612

Hearing No. 460-2011-00164X

Agency No. 1G-771-0018-11

DECISION
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant’s appeal from the
Agency’s May 23, 2013 final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO)
complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and Section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. The
Commission’s review is de novo. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the
final order.

BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Maintenance
Mechanic at the Agency’s Processing and Distribution Center in Houston, Texas. On April
13, 2011, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against
him on the bases of race (African-American) and color (Black) when1

:

1 In his formal complaint, Complainant alleged disability as a basis of discrimination; however,
in his affidavit, Complainant indicated that he did not have any physical or mental conditions
or impairments that he believed were factors in his discrimination complaint. Accordingly,
neither the Agency’s investigation nor the AJ’s decision included disability as a basis of
discrimination. Complainant did not challenge the dismissal of this basis before the AJ or on
appeal; therefore, the Commission will not address it in this decision.
0120132612

2
1. Since on or around January 16, 2011, and continuing, he has not been paid higher
level for Locksmith work; and

2. Since on or around January 16, 2011, and continuing, he has not been sent to
training to repair locks.2

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the
report of investigation (ROI) and notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing, but the AJ assigned to the
case granted summary judgment in favor of the Agency and issued a decision on May 9, 2013.

In the decision, the AJ assumed arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of
discrimination and found that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
its actions. As to claim (1), the AJ determined that there was no dispute that the Agency does
not have a Locksmith position at the facility, and there never has been such a position.
Moreover, the record revealed that no one has been paid for higher-level Locksmith work. In
order to earn higher-level pay, an employee must perform higher-level work. The AJ found
that there was no higher-level pay associated with working on locks. In fact, like
Complainant, the other Maintenance Mechanics also worked on locks, which was within their
job description.

With respect to claim (2), the AJ determined that there was no dispute that the only training
related to locks offered to those in Complainant’s position was Course No. 5560608.
Moreover, there was no dispute that Complainant attended Course No. 5560608 training in
1999. Likewise, the record revealed that two of Complainant’s identified comparators who
hold the same position as Complainant each attended the Course No. 5560608 class. The
record is devoid of evidence that additional training related to locks was provided to the other
Maintenance Mechanics. In fact, the record revealed the opposite. Course No. 5560608 was
the only course offered by the Agency which was related to working on locks. Additionally,
the record revealed that none of the Maintenance employees have attended any non-Postal
schools designated for Locksmiths, and there has never been a Postal school designated for
Locksmiths.

The AJ concluded that Complainant failed to show that the Agency’s reasons for its actions
were pretextual. As a result, the AJ found that Complainant had not been discriminated
against as alleged. The Agency subsequently issued a final order fully implementing the AJ’s
decision. The instant appeal followed.

2 The Agency dismissed an additional claim occurring in November 1996, as untimely pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(a)(2). Complainant did not challenge the dismissal of this claim
before the AJ or on appeal; therefore, the Commission will not address the claim in this
decision.
0120132612

3

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, Complainant contends that Agency management officials were not truthful in their
statements. Complainant argues that he performs highly-skilled labor, and that he is the only
employee who works on locks. Accordingly, Complainant requests that the Commission
reverse the final order.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to grant summary judgment when he or she finds
that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). An issue of fact is
“genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-
moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip.
Corp.

, 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect
the outcome of the case.
Disparate Treatment

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part
evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating
that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support
an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978).
Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n. 13. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Tx. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks

,
509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).
In the instant case, the Commission finds that the AJ properly issued summary judgment as the
material facts are undisputed. The Commission agrees with the AJ that assuming arguendo
that he established a prima facie case of discrimination, Complainant failed to present evidence
to rebut the Agency's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. More specifically,
as to claim (1), Complainant’s supervisor (S1) stated that Complainant was not paid higher-
level pay for Locksmith work because Complainant repaired key locks and door knobs as part
of his regular duties. ROI, at 68. The Tour 2 Maintenance Operations Manager (M1)
confirmed that the Agency did not have a Locksmith position, and that all Maintenance
employees worked on locks as needed and as their skills allowed. Id. at 93. Complainant’s
third-level supervisor (S3) added that changing or repairing door latches and locks is semi-
skilled corrective maintenance work associated with the upkeep and operation of building
equipment, and is not complex maintenance work. Id. at 78. Further, M1 noted that higher-
level work would be the duties of a Building Equipment Mechanic, which includes
0120132612

4
troubleshooting and complex maintenance work on building equipment. Id. Thus, M1
confirmed that Complainant’s work on doors and locks did not warrant higher-level pay. Id

. at
81.
Finally, regarding claim (2), management maintained that there was no Locksmith training
available. ROI, at 69. M1 noted that the Agency offered a security equipment training course
at its training facility in Oklahoma, and Complainant attended that course in 1998 or 1999. Id.
at 94. M1 stated that Complainant has been to the only class even remotely related to locks
which the Agency offers. Id

.
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Complainant, the Commission finds no
evidence that Complainant's protected classes were a factor in any of the Agency's actions. At
all times, the ultimate burden remains with Complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that the Agency's reasons were not the real reasons and that the Agency acted on
the basis of discriminatory animus. Complainant failed to carry this burden. As a result, the
Commission finds that Complainant has not established that he was subjected to discrimination
as alleged.

CONCLUSION
After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted
on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM
the Agency's final order, because the Administrative Judge’s issuance of summary judgment
was appropriate and a preponderance of the record evidence does not establish that
discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION

(M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant
or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to
establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material
fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices,
or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of
Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within
twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See
29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R.
Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be
submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity
0120132612

5
Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days
of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See

29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or
opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration
as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See

29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION

(S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within
ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil
action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency
head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department”
means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you
work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will
terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL

(Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an
attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you
and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or
denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney
with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and
the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to
File a Civil Action”).
FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

Date
January 22, 2015