Complainant,v.Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southwest Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Sep 4, 2014

0120130197 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 4, 2014)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

,
Complainant,

v.

Patrick R. Donahoe,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Southwest Area),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120130197

Hearing No. 460-2011-00150X

Agency No. 4G-760-0071-11

DECISION
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant’s appeal from the
Agency’s September 13, 2012 final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)
complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The Commission’s review is de
novo. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the final order.

BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as the Customer
Services Operations Manager at the Agency’s Benbrook Station in Fort Worth, Texas. In
2011, the Agency began downsizing and closing facilities. The Agency implemented a hiring
freeze to withhold EAS supervisor vacancies for displaced employees. This hiring freeze
resulted in a 30% vacancy of managerial positions in Fort Worth, including a shortage of 12-
14 supervisors daily. As a result, most managers worked 10-12 hours per day for six days a
week without any additional assistance.

Complainant believed that her station required one manager and one supervisor to run
successfully. The supervisor in Complainant’s unit (S1) was going out on leave for about six
weeks for foot surgery. As a result, on March 9, 2011, Complainant informed the Postmaster
that she needed supervisory assistance. The Postmaster informed Complainant that he would
try to find her help. The Postmaster asked the Fort Worth station managers to see if they had
any supervisors who could help Complainant. Several of the units did not have managers or
supervisors and were being run by craft employees.
0120130197

2
Complainant ran the unit for three weeks from open to close six days per week.
Complainant’s manager (M1) informed Complainant that management had been unsuccessful in
getting her help, but they were still looking. M1 was eventually able to find a supervisor to
cover for Complainant for one week so that she could have a day off.

On April 1, 2011, Complainant informed M1 that she was being taken off work pursuant to
her doctor’s orders. A supervisor from outside of Fort Worth (S2) was moved to Benbrook to
replace Complainant while she was out on sick leave. S2 ran the unit alone for about four
weeks until S1 returned from leave. S1 then ran the unit by herself for approximately seven
months from May 1, 2011 to around November 2011.

On August 8, 2011, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that the Agency
discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American) and sex (female) when from
March 11, 2011 through April 1, 2011, she was required to work six days per week and
beyond eight hours per day.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the
report of investigation (ROI) and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing, but the AJ assigned to the
case granted the Agency’s motion for summary judgment and issued a decision on August 27,
2012.

In the decision, the AJ assumed arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of
discrimination and determined that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its actions. Namely, Complainant’s lack of assistance arose from a systemic
problem as the city of Fort Worth suffered a staffing shortage of management officials due to a
hiring freeze. The Postmaster sought to find Complainant supervisory assistance, but due to
the staffing shortage, there was no assistance available. When Complainant went on leave, her
subsequent replacements similarly did not receive additional assistance. The AJ concluded that
Complainant failed to show that the Agency’s reasons for its actions were pretextual. As a
result, the AJ found that Complainant had not been discriminated against as alleged. The
instant appeal followed. Complainant filed the instant appeal without submitting any
arguments or contentions in support.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to grant summary judgment when he or she finds
that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). An issue of fact is
“genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-
moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip.
Corp.

, 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect
the outcome of the case.
0120130197

3
To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part
evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating
that she was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would
support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576
(1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n. 13. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Tx. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks

,
509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).
In the instant case, the Commission finds that the AJ properly issued summary judgment as the
material facts are undisputed. The Commission agrees with the AJ that, assuming arguendo
that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination, Complainant failed to
present evidence to rebut the Agency's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.
Specifically, the Postmaster affirmed that Fort Worth had a systemic staffing problem as a
result of downsizing, closing facilities, and the subsequent hiring freeze. ROI, at 58. The
Postmaster explained that the city was short 12-14 supervisors every day, and most managers
were working (and continue to work) 10-12 hour work days six days a week. Id. Further,
Complainant, as a salaried non-bargaining unit employee, was not entitled to additional
compensation under Agency policies. Agency’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. 1. The
Postmaster maintained that Complainant was one of their best and most experienced managers
and that, despite his attempts to find her help, he was unable to secure additional assistance for
her. Id. at 58. The Postmaster noted that S2 filled in for Complainant all alone for four weeks
until S1 returned from her foot surgery, and S1 has run Benbrook all alone since May 1, 2011.
Id

. at 56.
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Complainant, the Commission finds no
evidence that Complainant's protected classes were a factor in any of the Agency's actions. At
all times, the ultimate burden remains with Complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that the Agency's reasons were not the real reasons and that the Agency acted on
the basis of discriminatory animus. Complainant failed to carry this burden. As a result, the
Commission finds no basis to disturb the AJ's summary judgment decision finding that
Complainant was not subjected to discrimination as alleged.

CONCLUSION
After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted
on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM
the Agency's final order, because the Administrative Judge’s issuance of a decision without a
hearing was appropriate and a preponderance of the record evidence does not establish that
discrimination occurred.
0120130197

4
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION

(M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant
or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to
establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material
fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices,
or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of
Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within
twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See
29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R.
Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be
submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days
of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See

29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or
opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration
as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See

29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION

(S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within
ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil
action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency
head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department”
means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you
work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will
terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL

(Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an
attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you
0120130197

5
and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or
denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney
with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and
the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to
File a Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

Date
September 4, 2014