0120140690
05-29-2014
Complainant v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Pacific Area), Agency.
Complainant
v.
Patrick R. Donahoe,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Pacific Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120140690
Hearing No. 480-2013-00101X
Agency No. 1F-915-0003-12
DECISION
Complainant timely filed an appeal from the Agency's final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency's final order.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented are: (1) whether the EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) properly issued a decision without a hearing; and (2) whether Complainant established that the Agency's proffered explanation for its actions was pretext to mask discrimination based on national origin and age.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked at the Agency's International Service Center (ISC) in Los Angeles, California. Report of Investigation (ROI), at 50. On August 26, 2011, Complainant was promoted from a Maintenance Mechanic (MM), Level 7 to Mail Processing Equipment (MPE) Mechanic, Level 9. Id. at 52. After Complainant was promoted, a coworker (C1) filed a grievance, alleging that management incorrectly promoted Complainant instead of him. Id. at 60. In his grievance, C1 stated that he should have been promoted instead due to his seniority over Complainant. C1's seniority date is September 6, 2003; Complainant's is November 1, 2003. Id. at 82. C1 subsequently reached a grievance settlement wherein the Agency agreed to retroactively promote him to the MPE Mechanic, Level 9, position effective May 22, 2012. Id. at 60. Due to C1's promotion, the Agency returned Complainant to his MM Level 7 position. Id.
On July 30, 2012, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the bases of national origin (Hispanic)1 and age (50) when he was demoted from the MPE Mechanic, Level 9, position to the MM, Level 7, position.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. When Complainant did not object, the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency's February 27, 2013, motion for a decision without a hearing, and issued a decision without a hearing in favor of the Agency on October 22, 2013. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged.
Specifically, the AJ found that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, which Complainant failed to establish were pretext for discrimination. The AJ noted that Complainant did not dispute that maintenance positions are filled by seniority, and that C1 was senior to him. The AJ noted that Complainant's promotion was clearly in error because he was not the most-senior qualified applicant for the position. The AJ additionally noted that, although Complainant served in the MPE Mechanic, Level 9, position for 11 months, there is no evidence that Complainant's national origin or age was a factor in the Agency's decision to settle C1's grievance under the agreed-upon terms.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
The parties raise no contentions on appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency's final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from an Agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see also EEO Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), Chap. 9, � VI.B. (Nov. 9, 1999) (both an administrative judge's decision to issue a decision without a hearing and the decision on the merits of the complaint will be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and Agency's, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chap. 9, � VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
AJ's issuance of a Decision without a Hearing
We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.
If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).
After a review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate. The record has been adequately developed, Complainant was given notice of the Agency's motion to issue a decision without a hearing, he was given an opportunity to respond, he was given a comprehensive statement of undisputed facts, and had the opportunity to engage in discovery. For the reasons discussed below, we find that, even assuming all facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in his favor. Accordingly, we find that the AJ properly granted the Agency's Motion for a Decision without a Hearing.
Disparate Treatment
To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, a complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). A complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that be was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 804 n. 14. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, a complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products. Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993).
Upon review, we find that assuming, arguendo, that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination based on national origin and age, the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The Manager of Maintenance Operations (MMO) explained that a grievance was filed by C1, alleging that management incorrectly promoted Complainant to the MPE Mechanic, Level 9, position instead of him. ROI, at 60. The MMO further explained that he received the grievance settlement, agreeing to retroactively promote C1 to the MPE Mechanic, Level 9, position. Id. The MMO additionally explained that two employees cannot occupy the same position and management found that Complainant was incorrectly promoted. Id.
The burden now shifts to Complainant to establish that the Agency's nondiscriminatory reasons were pretext for discrimination. Burdine, at 254. In an attempt to show pretext, Complainant avers that the management officials responsible were Caucasian, and that another employee outside his protected classes was promoted.
Upon review, we find that Complainant has not established that the Agency's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were pretext for discrimination. There is no dispute that C1 filed a grievance alleging that management incorrectly promoted Complainant instead of him, which the Agency settled. There is also no dispute that C1 has seniority over Complainant. As such, the record reflects that Complainant was promoted in error. We can find no evidence that the Agency was motivated by discriminatory animus based on Complainant's protected classes. Therefore, we find that Complainant failed to establish that he was subjected to discrimination as alleged.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency's final order.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
May 29, 2014
Date
1 Although Complainant alleged discrimination on the basis of race (Hispanic), the Commission notes that it considers the term "Hispanic" to denote national origin rather than race.
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0120140690
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
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0120140690