Complainant,v.Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Northeast Area), Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 11, 20140120130415 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 11, 2014) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Northeast Area), Agency. Appeal No. 0120130415 Hearing No. 520-2012-00202X Agency No. 1B-021-0003-11 DECISION Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant’s appeal from the Agency’s September 20, 2012 final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The Commission’s review is de novo. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the final order. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Full-Time Regular Mail Handler at the Agency’s Processing and Distribution Center in Boston, Massachusetts. Complainant suffered a work-related injury in October 1984, and has been working in a rehabilitation position within his restrictions with work hours of Monday through Friday 2:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. Complainant worked his regularly scheduled day on Christmas Eve December 24, 2010. Christmas Day was his scheduled day off; therefore, his designated holiday was Christmas Eve. For the holiday, Complainant was paid for four hours of regular Work Hours; four hours of workers’ compensation (OWCP) pay; four hours of Holiday Leave; and four hours of Christmas Work. Similarly, that next week, Complainant worked his regularly scheduled day on New Year’s Eve, December 31, 2010, and since his scheduled day off was New Year’s Day, his designated holiday was New Year’s Eve. For the holiday, Complainant was paid four hours Work Hours; four hours OWCP pay; four hours Holiday 0120130415 2 Leave; and four hours Holiday Work. Complainant believed that his pay was incorrectly calculated and that he was entitled to additional compensation. On January 4, 2011, the Agency issued Complainant a letter requesting that he provide updated medical documentation for his limited duty modified assignment by January 19, 2011. Complainant failed to provide the requested medical documentation prior to the deadline, but later submitted the information to his supervisor on March 17, 2011. Prior to receiving the documentation, the Health and Resource Management Specialist (HR1) sent Complainant’s manager a follow-up request for updated medical documentation cautioning Complainant that if he did not provide the requested updated documentation, his modified assignment could be terminated. As Complainant had provided the medical documentation, no action was taken. On April 26, 2011, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him and subjected him to a hostile work environment on the bases of disability, age (52), and in reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when: 1. On December 24, 2010, and December 31, 2010, he was required to work his holidays but only received holiday pay for the 4 hours he worked and not for the additional four hours he was paid by the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP); and 2. On March 22, 2011, he was advised by management that his Limited Duty Modified Assignment may be terminated on April 15, 2011. On May 12, 2011, the Agency dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Agency determined that claim (1) was a collateral attack on the OWCP process and that Complainant failed to establish that he suffered harm as to claim (2). Complainant appealed, and in Complainant v. U.S. Postal Serv. , EEOC Appeal No. 0120113211 (Nov. 3, 2011), the Commission reversed the Agency’s dismissal of claim (1), affirmed the Agency’s dismissal of claim (2) as to the bases of age and disability, and remanded the matter (claim (1) and reprisal in claim (2)) for further processing. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation (ROI) and notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing, but the AJ assigned to the case granted the Agency’s motion for summary judgment and issued a decision on September 14, 2012. In her decision, the AJ determined that the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, as to claim (1), Complainant’s supervisor (S1) affirmed that she relied on the Employee and Labor Relations Manual (ELM) and concluded that because Complainant only worked his regularly scheduled four hours on Christmas Eve, he was entitled to receive four hours of Holiday Leave and four hours of Christmas Work pay in addition to his regular four hours and four hours of OWCP. Likewise, on New Year’s Eve, 0120130415 3 she concluded that he was entitled to receive four hours of Holiday Leave and four hours of Holiday Work pay in addition to his regular four hours and four hours of OWCP. She did not conclude that he was entitled to additional compensation for hours not worked. With respect to claim (2), HR1 asserted that she requested the information pursuant to her responsibilities and the obligation of Complainant to periodically supply current medical information to the Agency to justify his limited duty assignment. In attempting to establish pretext, the AJ determined that Complainant failed to offer any evidence to support his contention that the Agency deliberately miscalculated his salary because of his age and disability. Further, the AJ added that Complainant was not challenging his obligation to provide medical documentation periodically to continue his limited duty assignment nor did he challenge the fact that he did not submit the documentation, due on January 18, 2011, until March 17, 2011. Complainant further acknowledged that no action was taken to terminate his limited duty assignment. The AJ noted that Complainant simply disagreed with the Agency’s actions. The AJ concluded that Complainant failed to show that the Agency’s reasons for its actions were pretextual and he failed to show that he was discriminated against as alleged. The Agency subsequently issued a final order fully implementing the AJ’s decision. The instant appeal followed. CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL On appeal, Complainant contends that the AJ erred in granting the Agency’s motion for summary judgment as he believes that there are material facts still in dispute. Complainant argues that the ELM was irrelevant in computing his pay for the days in question and that the Memorandum of Understanding of the collective bargaining agreement controlled. Further, Complainant claims that he never received the Agency’s January 2011 request for updated medical documentation and believes that it is reasonable to conclude that it was never sent. Finally, Complainant argues that the AJ fragmented his hostile work environment claim. Accordingly, Complainant requests that the Commission reverse the final order. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to grant summary judgment when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). An issue of fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non- moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp. , 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is “material” if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). 0120130415 4 Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n. 13. The burden then shifts to the Agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Tx. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). In the instant case, the Commission finds that the AJ properly issued summary judgment as the material facts are undisputed. The Commission agrees with the AJ that, assuming arguendo that Complainant established a prima facie case of discrimination and reprisal, Complainant failed to present evidence to rebut the Agency's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Specifically, as to claim (1), S1 confirmed that she relied upon the ELM in inputting Complainant’s pay for the two holidays in question. ROI, at 128. The relevant ELM provisions state: 434.4 Holiday Leave Pay 434.41 Policy 434.411 Holidays Observed Provisions for holiday observance are as follows: a. The following 10 days are observed as holidays:... (1) New Year's Day... (10) Christmas Day.... 434.412 Application On these holidays, eligible employees receive holiday leave pay for the number of hours equal to their regular daily work schedule, not to exceed 8 hours. Note: Holiday leave pay should not be confused with holiday-worked pay, holiday scheduling premium, or Christmas-worked pay. 434.43 Pay Computation for Holiday Leave Pay Provisions concerning pay computation are as follows: a. Eligible employees are paid for the holiday at their basic hourly rate for those hours equal to their regular daily working schedule, not to exceed 8 hours… 434.5 Holiday-Worked Pay 434.51 Policy Holiday-worked pay is paid to eligible employees for the hours worked on a recognized holiday or for the hours worked on the employee's designated holiday, except Christmas. Christmas-worked pay is paid to eligible employees for the hours worked on Christmas day or the day designated as the employee's Christmas holiday… 434.53 Pay Computation Provisions concerning pay computation are as follows: a. Eligible employees who are required to work on their holiday or designated holiday are paid (in addition to any pay for holiday leave to which they may be entitled) their basic hourly straight time rate for each hour worked up to. 0120130415 5 b. Eligible employees…who are required to work on Christmas day or their designated Christmas holiday are paid, in addition to authorized holiday leave pay and holiday- worked pay, Christmas-worked pay at 50 percent of their basic hourly straight-time rate. ROI, Ex. 7. As a result, Complainant was paid four hours of holiday leave; four hours of OWCP; four hours of holiday work; and, four hours of regular work hours. ROI, at 120, 144. Complainant’s manager asserted that when Complainant raised the matter, he confirmed with the Labor Relations, Human Resources, and Time Control departments, and all stated that Complainant had been paid correctly. Id . at 144. With respect to claim (2), HR1 affirmed that it was standard procedure to request updated medical documentation from rehabilitation employees on a yearly basis provided the employee had not already submitted it. ROI, at 164. HR1 stated that she forwarded a standard form letter to be sent to Complainant requesting updated medical documentation in March 2011, after he failed to comply with the first request in January 2011. Id . Complainant submitted the requested documentation, and no action was taken to terminate his assignment. In attempting to establish that the Agency’s reasons for its actions in claim (1) are pretextual, Complainant argued that the ELM was irrelevant in this matter and that the Memorandum of Understanding regarding holiday scheduling contained in the collective bargaining agreement controlled in this situation. While Complainant disagrees with the Agency's interpretation of the proper applicable pay policies, he has pointed to no evidence to support a finding that the Agency's motivation for its interpretation was discriminatory. Further, as to claim (2), Complainant contended that he did not receive the initial January 2011 letter requesting updated medical documentation which he believes shows that the Agency trumped up threats to terminate him. The Commission notes, however, that Complainant did not dispute that maintaining current medical documentation was a condition of his continuation in the limited duty assignment. In addition, Complainant did not dispute that no action was taken once he submitted the requested medical documentation. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Complainant, the Commission finds no evidence that Complainant's protected classes were a factor in any of the Agency's actions. At all times, the ultimate burden remains with Complainant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Agency's reasons were not the real reasons and that the Agency acted on the basis of discriminatory animus. Complainant failed to carry this burden. Further, to the extent that Complainant contends that he was subjected to a hostile work environment with respect to the matters herein, the Commission finds that finding of a hostile work environment is precluded by the Commission's determination that Complainant failed to establish that any of the actions taken by the Agency were motivated by discriminatory animus. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Service , EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (Sep. 21, 2000). As a result, the Commission finds no basis to disturb the AJ's summary judgment decision finding that Complainant was not subjected to discrimination as alleged. 0120130415 6 CONCLUSION After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the Agency's final order, because the Administrative Judge’s issuance of summary judgment was appropriate and a preponderance of the record evidence does not establish that discrimination occurred. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0610) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” 0120130415 7 means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610) If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File a Civil Action”). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations Date September 11, 2014 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation