Comau, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 27, 2012

358 N.L.R.B. 593 (N.L.R.B. 2012)

593
COMAU, INC.

358 NLRB No. 73
Comau, Inc. and Automated Systems Workers Local
1123, affiliated with Carpenters Industrial
Council, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America

Comau Employees Association and Automated Sys-
tems Workers Local 1123, affiliated with Car-
penters Industrial Council, United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of America. Cases 07–
CA–052614, 07–CA–052939, and 07–CB–016912
June 27, 2012
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS HAYES
AND GRIFFIN
On December 21, 2010, Administrative Law Judge
Geoffrey Carter issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondents, Comau, Inc. (Comau) and Comau Employees
Association (the CEA), and the Acting General Counsel
each filed exceptions, a supporting brief, an answering
brief, and a reply brief.1
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs2 and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,3 and conclusions
only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Or-
der.4
This matter arises out of Comau’s withdrawal of
recognition from the Automated Systems Workers Local
1123, affiliated with the Michigan Regional Council of

1 Comau also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and the Acting
General Counsel filed a brief in opposition to the motion.
2 On January 3, 2012, the Board issued a Decision and Order in
which it adopted the decision of the administrative law judge and or-
dered the Respondents to take the action set forth in the judge’s rec-
ommended Order. 357 NLRB 2294. The January 3, 2012 Decision
and Order stated that the CEA did not file exceptions to the judge’s
decision. Id. at 2294 fn. 1. However, the Board had received, but
through inadvertence was not aware of, the CEA’s exceptions and
briefs, which had been timely filed. Accordingly, on February 8, 2012,
the Board issued an unpublished order vacating the earlier Decision and
Order and stating that the Board would reconsider the case de novo and
issue a new decision and order at a later date.
3 Comau has implicitly excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
4 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order and substitute a
new notice to conform to the violations found. For the reasons stated in
his dissenting opinion in J. Picini Flooring, 356 NLRB 11 (2010),
Member Hayes would not require electronic distribution of the notice.
Carpenters (the ASW/MRCC), and recognition of the
CEA as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of a unit of employees at Comau’s Southfield and
Novi, Michigan facilities. For the reasons explained be-
low, we reverse the judge’s findings that Comau violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by withdrawing recog-
nition from the ASW/MRCC and that Comau and the
CEA violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) and Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2), respectively, by extending and ac-
cepting recognition, and by entering into a collective-
bargaining agreement containing a union-security clause
at a time when the CEA did not represent an uncoerced
majority of the employees in the bargaining unit. How-
ever, we affirm the judge’s findings that Comau and the
CEA unlawfully coerced employees to sign dues-
checkoff authorization forms.
For many years, unit employees at Comau’s Southfield
and Novi facilities were represented by an in-house un-
ion, originally called the PICO Employees Association
(the PEA) and later renamed the Automated Systems
Workers Union (ASW). In 2007, the ASW affiliated
with the Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters, Unit-
ed Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
(MRCC). In January 2008, Comau and the ASW/MRCC
began negotiations for a successor collective-bargaining
agreement. Healthcare was a contentious issue through-
out the negotiations. Comau proposed replacing the unit
employees’ existing healthcare plan with the same plan
that it provided to its nonunit employees. Under the plan
proposed by Comau, unit employees would be required
to pay premiums for the first time. The ASW/MRCC
proposed that Comau participate in a plan underwritten
by the MRCC, which could be offered to employees at
no cost. On December 3, 2008, Comau declared impasse
and announced that it was implementing its final offer.
Comau informed unit employees, however, that the new
healthcare plan would not become effective until March
1, 2009. Notwithstanding Comau’s declaration of im-
passe, the parties continued to meet and negotiate over
the ASW/MRCC’s healthcare proposal. Although the
parties made significant progress in the negotiations, on
March 1, Comau put into effect the healthcare plan in its
final offer.
On November 5, 2010, the Board issued a Decision
and Order reported at 356 NLRB 75 (Comau I), finding
that any impasse that existed over healthcare on Decem-
ber 3, 2008, when Comau announced that it was imple-
menting its final offer, was broken as a result of the par-
ties’ subsequent progress in negotiations. The Board
therefore found that Comau violated Section 8(a)(5) and
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

594
(1) of the Act by implementing the new healthcare plan
in the absence of an agreement or a bona fide impasse.
On December 22, 2009, while Comau I was pending
before the administrative law judge, Comau withdrew
recognition from the ASW/MRCC and granted recogni-
tion to the CEA, based on a disaffection petition signed
by a majority of the bargaining unit members. Comau
and the CEA subsequently negotiated a collective-
bargaining agreement, which by its terms is effective
from December 22, 2009, to April 13, 2013. The com-
plaint in this case followed.
The judge, applying the multifactor test set forth in
Master Slack Corp., 271 NLRB 78 (1984), found that the
unremedied unfair labor practice found in Comau I tend-
ed to undermine the ASW/MRCC in the eyes of the bar-
gaining unit employees and thereby tainted the disaffec-
tion petition. Accordingly, the judge found that Comau
could not lawfully rely on the petition to withdraw
recognition from the ASW/MRCC, and that, in so doing,
it violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The judge
further found that Comau and the CEA, respectively,
violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) and Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by extending and accepting recogni-
tion and entering into a collective-bargaining agreement.
On March 2, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit granted Comau’s
petition for review of the Board’s decision in Comau I
and vacated the Board’s finding that Comau committed
an unfair labor practice by unilaterally changing employ-
ees’ healthcare benefits. Comau, Inc. v. NLRB, 671 F.3d
1232.5 The court found that Comau and the
ASW/MRCC had bargained to impasse and that Comau
lawfully implemented the change in healthcare benefits
along with the other terms of its final offer. In light of
the court’s decision, we reverse the judge and find that
the disaffection petition was not tainted by the unilateral
change at issue in Comau I.
2. The Acting General Counsel alleged and litigated
an alternative theory for finding that Comau could not
lawfully rely on the disaffection petition to withdraw
recognition from the ASW/MRCC. The Acting General
Counsel alleged that the petition was tainted because it
was circulated by nonsupervisory lead employees acting

5 On March 8, 2012, Comau filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the basis that the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Comau I precludes adop-
tion of the judge’s findings and conclusions in this case. The Acting
General Counsel filed an opposition. We deny the motion. The court’s
decision has no bearing on the judge’s findings, discussed below, that
Comau and the CEA unlawfully coerced employees to sign dues-
checkoff authorization forms, nor does it have any bearing on the Act-
ing General Counsel’s allegation that the petition was tainted by the
involvement of individuals acting with the apparent authority of Co-
mau.
with the apparent authority of Comau. The judge found
it unnecessary to pass on this theory due to his finding
that the petition was tainted by the unilateral change in
healthcare benefits.6 Having reversed the judge on that
issue, we must address the Acting General Counsel’s
alternative theory.
As detailed in the judge’s decision, Comau’s South-
field and Novi facilities are divided into separate depart-
ments that are led by one or more supervisors. The de-
partments are further divided into work centers, each of
which has an assigned leader who is highly skilled and
experienced in the work of the center. The leaders are
part of the bargaining unit and the Acting General Coun-
sel does not allege that they are statutory supervisors.
The judge found, however, that the leaders act as inter-
mediaries between management and employees on the
shop floor. Managers determine the work that is as-
signed to each work center and communicate the infor-
mation to the leaders. Leaders then assign specific tasks
to individual employees and provide instructions about
how the tasks should be performed. Leaders may request
specific employees to be assigned to a project.7 Leaders
keep management informed about the status of projects
through reports and periodic meetings. If management
decides to authorize overtime for a project, leaders may
recommend employees to perform the overtime work and
notify the employees who have been selected by man-
agement to work the overtime hours. Employees wish-
ing to take a day off must obtain their leader’s signature
on an absentee form before the form is submitted to a
supervisor for final signature and approval. In some in-
stances, the leader is the only individual who signs an
absentee form. Leaders receive a slightly higher wage
(approximately $1 additional per hour) than other unit
employees.
Harry Yale, a toolmaker leader, prepared and circulat-
ed the disaffection petition. The petition requested that
Comau stop recognizing the ASW/MRCC and grant
recognition to the CEA as the employees’ collective-
bargaining representative. On December 15, 2009, Yale
placed the petition on his desk for employees to review
and sign during break periods and before and after work.
Yale also took the petition to other buildings where unit
employees worked. The employees in those buildings
passed the petition around, occasionally during working
time in violation of Comau’s no-solicitation rule. Addi-

6 The judge, however, made factual findings relevant to the theory.
Accordingly, the record is sufficiently developed so that a remand is
unnecessary.
7 At least one leader, James Reno, has also participated in the hiring
process by reviewing resumes and providing his opinion about the
applicants’ ability to operate boring mills.
COMAU, INC.

595
tionally, an unknown number of unit employees on
layoff or medical leave entered the facilities to sign the
petition.
Although the disaffection petition was generally circu-
lated with little discussion, employee Rich Mroz testified
that his group leader, Nelson Burbo, informed him of the
petition and asked if he was happy with the
ASW/MRCC. Mroz responded that he was not, but he
thought it was a bad time to change bargaining repre-
sentatives, due to the then-pending unfair labor practice
proceeding in Comau I. Subsequently, Leader James
Reno suggested that Mroz speak with Yale about the
petition. Mroz did so, asking Yale if other leaders or
Mroz’ brother, who also worked for Comau, had signed
the petition. Yale replied that they, and a majority of the
other unit employees, had signed. Mroz then signed the
petition. He testified that his decision to sign the petition
was influenced by his leaders’ support of the petition and
the fact that a majority of the bargaining unit employees,
including his brother, had signed it.
On December 22, 2009, Yale delivered the petition to
Human Resources Manager Fred Begle. Begle verified
the signatures and determined that a majority of the bar-
gaining unit employees had signed it. On the same day,
Comau withdrew recognition from the ASW/MRCC and
granted recognition to the CEA.
The Acting General Counsel contends that Yale, Reno,
and Burbo possessed apparent authority to act for Comau
when they circulated the disaffection petition, in light of
their duties and the manner in which the petition was
circulated—i.e., on working time and to off-duty em-
ployees who were permitted to enter the facilities.8 Co-
mau and the CEA maintain, on the other hand, that the
leaders were acting as agents of the CEA.9
The Board applies common law principles in determin-
ing whether an individual possesses apparent authority to
act for an employer. The Board summarized these prin-
ciples in Pan-Oston Co., 336 NLRB 305, 305–306
(2001):

Apparent authority results from a manifestation by the
principal to a third party that creates a reasonable belief
that the principal has authorized the alleged agent to
perform the acts in question. Southern Bag Corp., 315
NLRB 725 (1994) (and cases cited therein). Either the
principal must intend to cause the third person to be-
lieve the agent is authorized to act for him, or the prin-

8 The Acting General Counsel does not allege that Comau violated
Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act by actively soliciting, encouraging, or promoting
the petition.
9 Comau and the CEA further contend that an individual cannot be
an agent of an employer and a union at the same time.
cipal should realize that its conduct is likely to create
such a belief. Service Employees Local 87 (West Bay
Maintenance), 291 NLRB 82 (1988) (citing Restate-
ment 2d, Agency, § 27 (1958, Comment a)).
The Board’s test for determining whether an em-
ployee is an agent of the employer is whether, under
all of the circumstances, employees would reasona-
bly believe that the employee in question was re-
flecting company policy and speaking and acting for
management. Waterbed World, 286 NLRB [425,
426–427 (1987)] (and cases cited therein). The
Board considers the position and duties of the em-
ployee in addition to the context in which the behav-
ior occurred. Jules V. Lane, 262 NLRB 118, 119
(1982).

The Board also emphasized in Pan-Oston that an employee
may be an agent of an employer for one purpose but not
another. 336 NLRB at 306.10
Applying these principles here, we find that the Acting
General Counsel, who bears the burden of proof, failed
to establish that Comau took any action from which em-
ployees could reasonably conclude that Yale, Reno, and
Burbo were reflecting company policy or speaking and
acting for Comau when they circulated the petition.
There is no evidence that Comau intended to cause em-
ployees to believe that it had authorized Yale, Reno, and
Burbo to circulate the petition or that Comau should have
realized that its conduct was likely to create such a belief.
Although it appears that Begle was informed by Yale on
an unknown date that the petition was circulating, there
is no evidence that Comau instigated or encouraged the
petition. Further, there is no evidence that Comau was
aware that some employees signed the petition during
working time in violation of Comau’s no-solicitation rule
or that it was aware that off-duty employees entered the
facility to sign the petition.11
Moreover, as indicated above, leaders are members of
the bargaining unit and for many years have held elected
or appointed positions in the PEA, ASW, ASW-MRCC,
and the CEA. Yale, for example, had served as secretary
of the PEA and the ASW, as a member of the
ASW/MRCC executive committee, and as a member of

10 See also Flying Foods, 345 NLRB 101, 104–105 (2005), enfd. 471
F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (employee was employer’s agent with re-
spect to his statements critical of the union during new employee orien-
tation seminars, but he was not shown to have been acting on behalf of
the employer when he solicited employees to sign a disaffection peti-
tion approximately 1 week later).
11 Flying Foods, supra, 345 NLRB at 105 (employee’s circulation of
petition in violation of no-solicitation rule in area where he could have
been observed by supervisor did not create apparent authority where
there was no evidence that any supervisor actually saw him).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

596
the ASW/MRCC bargaining committee during negotia-
tions in 2008. Darryl Robertson served as treasurer of
the ASW and a member of the ASW/MRCC bargaining
committee during the 2008 negotiations, and Leaders
Greg Sobeck, Steve Wizinsky, and Robert Wisniewski
have also held various elected or appointed positions
with the ASW/MRCC. In light of the leaders’ status as
unit employees and their history of serving as union offi-
cials with responsibility for representing employees in
labor relations matters, we cannot conclude that the em-
ployees would view the leaders’ circulation of the peti-
tion as having been undertaken at the behest of Comau or
in furtherance of Comau’s interests, as opposed to the
interests of the unit employees.12 Rather, we find that
employees would reasonably be able to distinguish be-
tween activities undertaken by the leaders in connection
with their limited agency to direct the work of others,
and activities undertaken in connection with their role as
unit employees or union officials.
In sum, we find that there is insufficient evidence that
the disaffection petition was tainted under either of the
theories advanced by the Acting General Counsel. Con-
sequently, Comau did not improperly rely on the disaf-
fection petition to withdraw recognition from the
ASW/MRCC and to recognize the CEA as the employ-
ees’ majority choice for collective-bargaining representa-
tive. We therefore dismiss the complaint allegations that
Comau violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by
withdrawing recognition from the ASW/MRCC, and that
Comau and the CEA, respectively, violated Section
8(a)(1), (2), and (3) and Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by
extending and accepting recognition, and by entering into
a collective-bargaining agreement containing a union-
security clause at a time when the CEA did not represent
an uncoerced majority of the employees in the bargaining
unit.

12 This factor sharply distinguishes this case from SKC Electric, Inc.,
350 NLRB 857 (2007), cited by the Acting General Counsel. In SKC
Electric, an individual in charge of overseeing the employer’s projects
circulated and filed a decertification petition. The Board found that,
even assuming the individual was not a statutory supervisor, the em-
ployees would reasonably believe he was speaking and acting for man-
agement in circulating the decertification petition in light of his duties
and the fact that he drove a company truck from jobsite to jobsite to
collect signatures during working time. In contrast to the present case,
the individual who circulated the petition in SKC Electric did not have
a history of representing unit employees in labor relations matters as an
appointed or elected union agent. SKC Electric is further distinguisha-
ble on the basis that the employer in that case materially assisted in the
creation, circulation, and filing of the petition. 350 NLRB at 861–862.
As indicated above, there is no evidence in this case that Comau assist-
ed in the creation, circulation, or filing of the petition or that it knew the
petition was circulated on working time.
3. We agree with the judge, for the reasons he set
forth, that Comau violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
threatening employees Nizar Akkari and Gasper Calan-
drino with discipline or discharge if they did not execute
dues-checkoff authorization forms for the CEA. We
further agree with the judge, for the reasons he gave and
for the additional reasons set forth below, that Comau
and the CEA violated Section 8(a)(1) and Section
8(b)(1)(A), respectively, by making statements and en-
gaging in other conduct that had a reasonable tendency to
coerce employee Jeffrey T. Brown to execute a dues-
checkoff authorization form.
An employer may not lead employees to believe that
the dues-checkoff authorization method of fulfilling fi-
nancial obligations to their union is compulsory. Roch-
ester Mfg. Co., 323 NLRB 260 (1997). The Board has
repeatedly held that “the Act guarantees to each employ-
ee the right to determine for himself, free from coercion,
whether he shall sign a checkoff authorization or not.”
Herman Bros., Inc., 264 NLRB 439, 442 (1982).13 “Any
conduct, express or implied, which coerces an employee
in his attempt to exercise this right clearly violates [the
Act].” Electronic Workers IUE Local 601 (Westing-
house Electric Corp.), 180 NLRB 1062 (1970).
The credited facts establish that, beginning in February
2010, CEA Treasurer Fred Lutz repeatedly asked Brown
to execute a dues-checkoff authorization form. The first
time Lutz asked, Brown said that he did not want to and
would not sign a dues-checkoff authorization form. Lutz
then informed Brown that he was going to provide Begle
with a list of all employees who did not sign the form.
Brown responded that he would sign if Begle gave him a
letter stating that his job was at risk if he did not. Lutz
approached Brown three more times. The final time,
Brown asked if he could pay his dues in cash. Lutz re-
plied that he would ask Begle. A few minutes later, Lutz
returned and told Brown that they both needed to speak
with Begle in Begle’s office. At the meeting, Begle
pointedly asked Brown why he did not want to execute a
dues-checkoff authorization form. Brown responded that
the Company was already into his paycheck enough.
Brown stated that he would rather pay his dues in cash,
and Begle responded that “he didn’t want [CEA offi-
cials] running around once a month collecting 20
bucks from everybody.” Brown then asked if he could
pay a full year of dues in cash. Begle appeared to like
the proposal, but Lutz asked Brown what would happen
if he was laid off in 6 months. The conversation contin-

13 Quoting Baggett Industrial Constructors, 219 NLRB 171, 172
(1975); Hope Industries, 198 NLRB 853, 856 (1972).
COMAU, INC.

597
ued for a few more minutes, and then Brown handed in a
signed dues-checkoff authorization form.
The judge found that, although Begle did not expressly
threaten Brown with adverse consequences if he failed to
sign a dues-checkoff authorization form (as he had when
threatening employee Akkari with termination if he
failed to sign the form), Begle’s statements and conduct
would reasonably tend to coerce Brown in the exercise of
his Section 7 rights in view of (1) Begle’s taking the un-
usual step of having a shop floor employee brought to his
private office to speak with him; and (2) his questioning
of Brown about his refusal to sign the form, while ex-
pressing doubts about the reliability of paying by other
means.14 The judge found, further, that Lutz’ presence at
the meeting served as the CEA’s endorsement of Begle’s
remarks and his treatment of Brown’s refusal to sign the
dues-checkoff authorization form as a point of concern.
The judge observed that, like Begle, Lutz questioned the
reliability of paying dues by means other than dues
checkoff. Accordingly, the judge found that Lutz’ state-
ments and conduct also had a reasonable tendency to
coerce Brown to sign the dues-checkoff authorization
form, and thus violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
We agree with the judge, for the reasons he states, that
Begle’s statements and conduct were coercive. We also
agree that the CEA, through Lutz, similarly coerced
Brown. As found by the judge, Lutz’ presence at the
meeting served to endorse Begle’s statements and con-
duct. It also provided the CEA with knowledge that
Brown’s authorization was coerced. The Board has long
held that a union violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) by accept-
ing money deducted pursuant to authorizations that it has
reason to know were coercively obtained, even if the
union was not directly responsible for the coercion. Ir-
win Industries, 304 NLRB 78 fn. 1 (1991) (adopting
judge’s finding that union violated 8(b)(1)(A) by accept-
ing checked-off dues while on notice that they had been
deducted pursuant to coerced authorizations), enfd. in
relevant part sub nom. Petroleum Workers v. NLRB, 980
F.2d 774, 778 fn. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Herman Bros., su-
pra,, 264 NLRB at 442 fn. 16 (holding that employer
violated 8(a)(1) by coercing employees to sign authoriza-
tion cards and further finding “[a]s a corollary to this
violation, . . . that [the union] violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
by accepting money deducted pursuant to the coercively

14 Member Hayes finds it unnecessary to pass on whether Begle
again violated Sec. 8(a)(1) through his statements and conduct towards
Brown because an additional finding would be cumulative and would
not materially affect the remedy.
obtained authorizations”); IBEC Housing Corp., 245
NLRB 1282, 1283 (1979) (same).15
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, we shall order them to
cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. We shall
order Comau to cease giving effect to the coercively ob-
tained authorization cards, upon the requests of Nizar
Akkari, Gasper Calandrino, and Jeffrey T. Brown. How-
ever, we shall not require the Respondents to reimburse
Akkari, Calandrino, and Brown for dues deducted pursu-
ant to the unlawfully obtained authorizations. Through-
out the relevant period, Comau and the CEA have been
parties to a collective-bargaining agreement covering
these employees. The agreement contains a union-
security provision that appears to comply with the re-
quirements of the Act. The agreement itself is presump-
tively valid in light of our dismissal of the complaint
allegations that Comau unlawfully extended, and the
CEA unlawfully accepted, recognition. Under these cir-
cumstances, because the employees were obligated to
pay dues by some method, a reimbursement order would
not be appropriate. Rochester Mfg., supra, 323 NLRB at
263 (no reimbursement required if affected employees

15 On June 9, 2010, Comau posted a notice informing employees that
the ASW had charged it with unlawfully coercing employees into sign-
ing dues-checkoff authorization forms. The notice stated that Comau
did not believe the charge to be accurate and went on to advise employ-
ees that they were not required to pay their dues through payroll deduc-
tion and that they were free to rescind their dues-checkoff authoriza-
tions and “deal with the CEA directly.” We agree with the judge that
the notice did not serve as an effective repudiation under the standards
enunciated in Passavant Memorial Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138
(1978). The notice did not specifically reference the threats of disci-
pline or the other coercive statements and conduct and it denied any
wrongdoing.
Member Hayes does not necessarily endorse all elements of the
Passavant test, but he agrees that Comau did not effectively repudiate
its threats of discipline or discharge to employees Nizar Akkari and
Gasper Calandrino if they refused to execute dues-checkoff authoriza-
tion forms.
However, even assuming arguendo that Comau, through Begle. co-
erced Brown to execute his dues-checkoff authorization, Member
Hayes would not find that Lutz’ involvement in the Begle-Brown meet-
ing is a sufficient basis for finding that the CEA violated Sec.
8(b)(1)(A). Moreover, although Member Hayes agrees with the cited
holding of Irwin Industries, he notes that there is neither an allegation
nor a finding in this case that the CEA violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) by
knowingly accepting coerced checked-off dues.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

598
were subject to a lawful union-security clause obligating
them to pay dues); Electronic Workers IUE Local 601
(Westinghouse Electric), supra, 180 NLRB at 1062–1063
(same).
ORDER
A. The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified and set forth in full below and orders that the
Respondent Employer, Comau, Inc., Southfield and
Novi, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Telling employees that they can be disciplined or
discharged if they do not sign dues-checkoff authoriza-
tion forms.
(b) Making statements or engaging in conduct that has
a reasonable tendency to coerce employees to sign dues-
checkoff authorization forms.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Cease giving effect to the checkoff authorizations
obtained through coercion from Nizar Akkari, Gasper
Calandrino, and Jeffrey T. Brown upon the request of
those employees.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facilities in Southfield and Novi, Michigan, copies of
the attached notice marked “Appendix A—Notice to
Employees.”16 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being signed
by Comau’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
Comau and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. In addition to physi-
cal posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or
an internet site, or other electronic means, if Comau cus-
tomarily communicates with its employees by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Comau to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, Comau has gone out of
business or closed the facilities involved in these pro-
ceedings, Comau shall duplicate and mail, at its own
expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees

16 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
and former employees employed by Comau at any time
since May 1, 2010.
(c) Post at the same places and under the same condi-
tions copies of the notice marked “Appendix B—Notice
to Members and Employees” as soon as they are for-
warded by the Regional Director for Region 7.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, deliver
to the Regional Director for Region 7 signed copies of
the attached notice marked “Appendix A—Notice to
Employees” in sufficient numbers to be posted by the
CEA in places where notices to its members are custom-
arily posted.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that Comau has taken to comply.
B. The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified and set forth in full below and orders that the
Respondent Union, Comau Employees Association
(CEA), Southfield, Michigan, its officers, agents, and
representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Making statements or engaging in conduct that has
a reasonable tendency to coerce Comau employees to
sign dues-checkoff authorization forms.
(b) Accepting and retaining moneys deducted from
employees’ pay as dues where it has knowledge that such
deductions were made pursuant to coercively obtained
dues-checkoff authorization forms.
(c) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its union offices and meeting halls copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix B—Notice to Members and
Employees.”17 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being signed
by the CEA’s authorized representative, shall be posted
by the CEA and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to
members and Comau employees are customarily posted.
In addition to physical posting of paper notices, notices
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, post-
ing on an intranet or an internet site, or other electronic
means, if the CEA customarily communicates with its
members by such means. Reasonable steps shall be tak-

17 See fn. 16, supra.
COMAU, INC.

599
en by the CEA to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Post at the same places and under the same condi-
tions copies of the notice marked “Appendix A—Notice
to Employees” as soon as they are forwarded by the Re-
gional Director for Region 7.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, deliver
to the Regional Director for Region 7 signed copies of
the attached notice marked “Appendix B—Notice to
Members and Employees” in sufficient numbers to be
posted by Comau in places where notices to employees
are customarily posted.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the CEA has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically
found.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT tell employees that they may be disci-
plined or discharged if they do not sign dues-checkoff
authorization forms.
WE WILL NOT make statements or engage in conduct
that has a reasonable tendency to coerce employees to
sign dues-checkoff authorization forms.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL cease giving effect to the dues-checkoff au-
thorization forms obtained through coercion from Nizar
Akkari, Gasper Calandrino, and Jeffrey T. Brown upon
the request of those employees.

COMAU, INC.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf
with your employer
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT make statements or engage in conduct
that has a reasonable tendency to coerce Comau employ-
ees to sign dues-checkoff authorization forms.
WE WILL NOT accept and retain moneys deducted from
your pay as dues where we have knowledge that such
deductions are made pursuant to coercively obtained
dues-checkoff authorization forms.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or
coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.

COMAU EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

Sarah Pring Karpinen and Darlene Haas Awada, Esqs., for the
Acting General Counsel.
Thomas G. Kienbaum and Theodore R. Opperwall, Esqs., of
Birmingham, Michigan, for the Respondent Employer
(Comau).
M. Catherine Farrell and David J. Franks, Esqs., of Bloom-
field Hills, Michigan, for the Respondent Union (CEA).
Edward J. Pasternak, Esq., of Southfield, Michigan, for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEOFFREY CARTER, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Detroit, Michigan, from August 31–September 3,
2010, and from September 16–17, 2010. The charge in Case 7–
CA–52614 was filed on December 29, 2009, and was amended
on January 8, 2010. The charge in Case 7–CA–52939 was filed
on May 20, 2010, and was amended on July 8, 2010, and fur-
ther amended on July 23, 2010. The charge in Case 7–CB–
16912 was filed on May 20, 2010, and was amended on June 9,
2010, and further amended on July 8, 2010. The consolidated
amended complaint was issued on July 30, 2010, and alleges
that Comau, Inc. (Comau or Respondent Employer (RE)) vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3), and (5) of the Act by: failing and
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

600
refusing to bargain collectively and in good faith with the Au-
tomated Systems Workers Local 1123 (ASW, ASW/MRCC1 or
the Charging Party); dominating and interfering with the ad-
ministration of, and rendering unlawful assistance to, a labor
organization; discriminating against employees and thus en-
couraging membership in a labor organization; and interfering
with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. The consolidated
amended complaint also alleges that the Comau Employees
Association (CEA or Respondent Union (RU)) violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) of the Act by: restraining and coercing
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act; and attempting to cause Comau to discriminate against
its employees such that Comau would violate Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act.
Both Comau and the CEA filed timely answers denying the
alleged violations in the consolidated amended complaint.
This case follows on the heels of Case 07–CA–052106, de-
cided by Administrative Law Judge Paul Bogas on May 20,
2010, and adopted by the Board on November 5, 2010. See
Comau, Inc., 356 NLRB 75 (2010). During trial, I took judicial
notice of the legal and factual findings in Judge Bogas’ deci-
sion, and advised the parties that they could make any relevant
arguments about those findings (including the weight that the
findings should carry). Those findings became binding authori-
ty when the Board affirmed Judge Bogas’ rulings, findings, and
conclusions, and adopted his remedy and recommended Order
(with minor modifications to each that are not relevant to my
analysis).
On the entire record,2 including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs3 filed

1 The ASW/MRCC abbreviation is used for all time periods during
which the ASW was affiliated with the MRCC.
2 The trial transcript is generally accurate, but I make the following
corrections to clarify the record: (a) at Tr. 203–845, all references to
“Harry Hale” should read “Harry Yale”; (b) at Tr. 484, L. 23, “away”
should be “weight”; (c) at Tr. 601, L. 1, “Carey” should be “Harry”; (d)
at Tr. 643, L. 3, “not” should be “reflect”; (e) at Tr. 797, L. 19, “Kim
Kayka” should be “Jim Kayko.” In addition, at various points in the
transcript, the record did not record (or mislabeled) the Charging Par-
ty’s attorney’s (Ed Pasternak) responses to my inquiries about objec-
tions to exhibits. The record should reflect that I admitted the follow-
ing two exhibits into evidence over the Charging Party’s objection: RE.
Exhs. 12, 15. Finally, I note that while the exhibit files generally are
correct, I excluded Acting GC Exhs. 22 and 25–30 from the record
(those exhibits were erroneously placed in the admitted exhibits file).
3 I have also considered the posttrial motions filed by the parties.
The Acting General Counsel filed a motion to substitute the table of
contents and table of authorities in its posttrial brief. Given the fact that
the Acting General Counsel only seeks to make clerical corrections to
its brief, and given that no other party has opposed the motion, I will
grant the Acting General Counsel’s request and will include the revised
table of contents and table of authorities in the posttrial materials that
will be forwarded to the Board if any exceptions are filed.
On October 8, 2010, Comau filed a motion to supplement the record
with the transcript and exhibits from an October 5, 2010 deposition of
David Baloga in connection with a 10(j) petition that is currently pend-
ing in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan. The proffered records included cover sheets from the
ASW/MRCC’s meetings in 2008 (showing the number of members
by the Acting General Counsel, Respondent Employer, and
Respondent Union, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent Employer Comau operates plants in the Detroit,
Michigan area to design, build, sell, and install automated in-
dustrial systems. In 2009, Respondent Employer derived gross
revenue in excess of $1 million, and sold goods and provided
services valued in excess of $50,000 from its Michigan facili-
ties directly to customers located outside of Michigan. Re-
spondent Employer admits, and I find, that at all material times
it has been an employer engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. Respondent Union
admits, and I find, that at all material times it has been a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. I
also find that, at all material times, the Charging Party has been
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.4

who attended each meeting), and David Baloga’s posttrial deposition
testimony about those documents. The Acting General Counsel op-
posed Comau’s motion, and I denied Comau’s motion to supplement
the record in an order dated October 14, 2010.
In its posttrial brief, Comau (in part) asked me to reconsider my rul-
ing on its motion to supplement the record. See RE. Br. at 15. The
Acting General Counsel, meanwhile, filed a motion to strike sec. C of
Comau’s posttrial brief on the theory that Comau argued evidence that
is outside of the record. Given these filings, I have reviewed my deci-
sion to deny Comau’s motion to supplement the record, and I stand by
my decision to deny Comau’s motion to supplement. Comau made a
strategic decision during trial not to introduce the ASW/MRCC 2008
meeting attendance figures into evidence, and it cannot now introduce a
new issue at trial that it could have litigated in the original hearing. See
RE. Br. at 14; compare Winkle Bus Co., 347 NLRB 1203, 1211 fn. 4
(2006) (ALJ permitted the General Counsel to supplement the record
with an exhibit that, by prior agreement, the Respondent did not pro-
vide until after trial, and that corrected an error in another exhibit al-
ready admitted into the record). More important, however, the issue is
moot. As noted below, I have determined that although meeting at-
tendance figures may be relevant as a general matter to showing a
causal link between an unfair labor practice and a subsequent loss of
union support (see Master Slack Corp., 271 NLRB 78, 84 (1984), the
limited ASW/MRCC meeting attendance figures that were admitted
into evidence in this case are not sufficiently reliable for me to draw
any meaningful conclusions about whether the various attendance
fluctuations resulted from Comau’s unfair labor practice. See infra, fn
15.
Finally, I have decided to grant in part and deny in part the Acting
General Counsel’s motion to strike sec. C of Comau’s posttrial brief.
Baloga’s posttrial affidavit has not been admitted into the record, and
thus I will strike the portions of Comau’s brief that refer to the affida-
vit’s contents. See RE. Br. at 15. Similarly, I will strike the portions of
Comau’s brief that characterize the contents of RE. Exh. 11, because
the contents of that rejected exhibit were never placed on the record.
See RE. Br. at 14. The Acting General Counsel’s motion to strike is
denied as to the remaining portions of sec. C of Comau’s brief, because
the remaining portions of sec. C are arguments that Comau made in
anticipation of a contrary argument that the Acting General Counsel
might make in its own posttrial brief.
4 Both Comau and the CEA admit that from 2001 to March 2007, the
ASW (formerly known as the PICO Employees Association) was a
COMAU, INC.

601
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Facts
A. Comau’s Organizational Structure
Comau, Inc. designs and builds automated equipment (tool-
ing systems, robotic applications, etc.) for a variety of custom-
ers, including Chrysler, General Motors, and Ford Motor Com-
pany. Comau’s headquarters are located in Southfield, Michi-
gan, and additional facilities are located in Novi, Michigan.
(Tr. 102, 573–576.)
At each facility, Comau generally has departments that are
led by supervisors. Each department is separated into work
centers (or teams), each of which has an assigned “leader” who
(among other qualifications) is able to provide team and indi-
vidual leadership for the other employees in the work center,
and is highly skilled and experienced in the work that employ-
ees carry out in the work center.5 (Tr. 580, 594–595, 599; GC
Exh. at 45–52.) There are approximately 30 leaders in the bar-
gaining unit, each of whom receives a slightly higher wage
(approximately $1 additional per hour) for performing the lead-
er position.6 (Tr. 592–593.) Several leaders have simultane-
ously served as union officers. (Tr. 123–126, 384–385, 1044–
1045.)
When projects come to Comau, the design group outlines the
project as a whole, and then managers assign the work needed
to complete that project to one or more of the work centers.
(Tr. 590–591.) As the project proceeds, leaders receive instruc-
tions through an automated computer system, and then com-
municate those instructions to the individual workers on their
teams. (Tr. 600–601.)
Leaders perform a variety of functions in connection with
their role as the intermediaries between the employees in their
work centers and management. When they first receive work
assignments and the corresponding blueprints, leaders may
request specific employees to be assigned to their teams. (Tr.
601, 604, 1005.) Leaders also attend a project kickoff meeting
with a representative from management and the project manag-
er. (Tr. 609, 873, 1005.) Once the leader’s team is assembled,
the leader assigns specific tasks to individual employees. (Tr.
266–267, 606, 682, 874, 1140–1141.) As the team members
carry out their assignments, the leader facilitates the overall
project by consulting with the designers as needed, and provid-

labor organization within the meaning of the Act. Testimony presented
at trial demonstrated (without dispute) that the ASW continued its
status as a labor organization from March 2007 to the present. Tr. pp.
103–104, 367. On March 1, 2010, the ASW changed its affiliation
from the Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters (MRCC) to the
Carpenters Industrial Council (CIC). Notwithstanding this change, the
ASW continued its affiliation with the United Brotherhood of Carpen-
ters, and retained its same officers. Tr. 104.
5 Many of the shop floor employees also have several years of expe-
rience, though they have not taken on the role of leader. Tr. 602.
6 Before March 2001, leaders were identified as supervisors in the
collective-bargaining agreement. Tr. 969. That changed in March
2001 (at the Union’s request), when the new collective-bargaining
agreement was modified to describe leaders as employees who take on
the responsibility of individual and team leadership in particular areas.
Tr. 969–970; Respondent Union (RU.) Exh. 9 at 43–47.
ing instructions to the team members about new assignments,
work revisions and corrections, or about how specific tasks
should be performed. (Tr. 165, 189, 216–217, 270–272, 340–
341, 437–438, 445–446, 606, 1008.) Leaders also stay in con-
tact with management by attending weekly leader meetings and
periodic manpower meetings, and by providing verbal updates.
(Tr. 256, 424–425, 440–441, 608, 610–611.)7
Leaders also serve as the beginning and end points for com-
munication between employees on the shop floor and manage-
ment. Leaders generally initiate nonconformance reports to
advise management (via a computer database) about problems
or defects in work product that require additional time or mon-
ey to repair. (Tr. 697–700.) When management decides to
authorize overtime for a project, leaders may recommend em-
ployees to perform the overtime work, and leaders notify the
individual employees who have been selected to work the over-
time hours. (Tr. 167, 275–277, 443, 612–613, 689–690; GC
Exh. 5.) Similarly, employees wishing to take a day off must
first obtain their leader’s approval (and signature on an “absen-
tee report” form) before the paperwork is forwarded to the shop
foreman (or another supervisor) for final signature and approv-
al. (Tr. 272–273, 615, 618–619; Respondent Employer (RE.)
Exh. 14.) In some instances, employee leave requests have
been approved without obtaining the supervisor’s signature,
leaving the leader as the only individual to sign the request.
(Tr. 620–621; GC. Exhs. 40 (Grayson); 41 (Sobeck); and 42
(Constantine).)8
B. Union History at Comau
For a number of years (dating back to at least the 1980s), the
PICO Employees Association (PEA) served as the exclusive
collective bargaining representative for all full-time and regular
part-time production and maintenance employees, inspectors
and field service employees (hereafter, the bargaining unit) at
Comau (and at Comau’s predecessor, Progressive Tool and
Industries Co. (PICO)).9 (Tr. 102–103, 236, 861.) The PEA

7 To carry out these responsibilities, leaders are provided some
equipment that is not generally provided to other employees on the
shop floor. Specifically, leaders have desks on the shop floor, tele-
phones, and have computers with password access requirements. Tr.
264, 647–648, 653, 701, 995, 999–1000, 1006, 1008–1010.
8 Occasionally, Comau has called upon individual leaders to take on
specific additional responsibilities. For example, in connection with its
hiring decisions, management asked Leader James Reno to review
applicant résumés and provide his opinion about the applicant’s ability
to operate the company’s boring mills. Tr. 658–659, 669; GC Exhs.
46–48. In another instance, Leader Nelson Burbo communicated with
an outside vendor to arrange a meeting about options for upgrading the
Company’s equipment. Tr. 695; GC Exh. 50.
9 During the relevant time period, the bargaining unit was defined as:
“[a]ll full-time and regular part-time production and maintenance em-
ployees, inspectors and field service employees, employed by [Comau]
at and out of its facilities located at 20950, 21000, and 21175 Telegraph
Road, Southfield, Michigan; and 42850 West Ten Mile Road, Novi,
Michigan; and machinists currently working at its 44000 Grand River,
Novi, Michigan facility who formerly worked at its facility located at
21175 Telegraph Road, Southfield, Michigan; but excluding all office
clerical employees, and guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.”
Comau, 356 NLRB at 76 fn. 2. The current bargaining unit is substan-
tially similar, though the language was modified slightly after Comau
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

602
was not affiliated with a larger union—instead, it was solely
composed of Comau employees. In 2004, the PEA changed its
name to the ASW, but otherwise maintained its leadership,
bylaws and overall structure. (Tr. 140, 757, 862.)
In 2007, the ASW began exploring the possibility of affiliat-
ing with a larger union. After gauging the interest of various
larger unions in such an affiliation, the ASW decided to affili-
ate with the Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters, United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (the
MRCC).10 (Tr. 103; GC Exh. 34.) Proponents of the merger
hoped that the affiliation with the MRCC would (among other
things) enhance the ASW’s bargaining strength, and also in-
crease training and job opportunities for members of the bar-
gaining unit. (Tr. 762–763, 1012, 1051, 1117; RU. Exh. 2; RE.
Exh. 13 (pp. 590–592).) On the other hand, opponents of the
merger expressed concerns about the substantial increase in
union dues (an increase from $20 per month to the ASW, to
$20 per month (to the ASW) plus an additional 2 percent of all
wages (excluding vacation) per month to the MRCC), how the
balance in the ASW treasury (approximately $250,000) would
be handled, and the wisdom of associating with a union of car-
penters given that the ASW bargaining unit was composed of
machinists, and given that the MRCC already had several
members laid off. (Tr. 723–724, 863–867, 974, 1013–1014,
1017–1018, 1111.)
The ASW bargaining unit voted to approve the merger with
the MRCC, effective March 31, 2007. (Tr. 103, 867.) In con-
nection with the merger, the ASW underwent the following
changes: (a) executive board members Pete Reuter and Darrell
Robertson terminated their employment with Comau and be-
came full-time employees of the MRCC (they also continued to
serve on the ASW/MRCC’s executive board); and (b) the ASW
became subject to the MRCC’s bylaws. (Tr. 142, 764–765,
769–770, 1018–1019.)11
C. Contract Negotiations—2008–2009
In 2008, the ASW and Comau began negotiations for a new
collective-bargaining agreement, since the existing agreement
(effective from March 7, 2005, to March 2, 2008) was due to
expire. (Tr. 809–810; GC Exh. 32.) The parties extended the
collective-bargaining agreement through December 21, 2008,
while negotiations proceeded. (Jt. Exh. 2.) The issue of health
insurance coverage became a sticking point between the parties.
Comau, 356 NLRB at 77. Under the previous collective-
bargaining agreement, incumbent unit employees were not
required to pay any premiums for the company-provided
healthcare coverage. Although Comau used a self-insured
health plan, the coverage was provided through Blue
Cross/Blue Shield (Blue Cross). Under Comau’s proposed
contract, Comau would still be self-insured and coverage would
still be provided through Blue Cross, but the unit employees

recognized the CEA as the unit’s collective-bargaining representative.
GC Exh. 1(bb) at 2.
10 The MRCC is also referred to as the Millwrights. Tr. 355–356.
The terms were used interchangeably during the trial.
11 The ASW/MRCC still maintained its old bylaws, but to the extent
that those conflicted with the bylaws of the MRCC, the MRCC bylaws
controlled.
would be required to pay health insurance premiums for cover-
age. Id.
The amounts of the proposed employee premiums were sig-
nificant. Comau’s last best offer provided that each employee’s
premium payment would be between $57.28 and $453.05 per
month, depending on the level of benefits chosen, the type of
coverage (individual, two-person, or family), and the extent of
the cost increases during the term of the contract. The employ-
ees could also pay an additional $321.04 to $507.26 per month
to obtain coverage for a child between 19 and 25 years of age.
Comau’s new plan also reduced the employees’ coverage in
some respects. Id.
At a December 3, 2008 bargaining session, Comau declared
that the parties were at impasse, gave 14 days notice that it was
canceling the contract extension, and stated that it would im-
pose its last best offer on December 22 when the prior contract
ceased to apply. During this same timeframe, Comau sent a
letter to bargaining unit employees to describe the key changes
that would be imposed on December 22. In addition to notify-
ing the unit about new rules regarding tardiness, seniority, over-
time pay and other issues, Comau also notified employees that,
effective March 1, 2009, it would no longer offer the existing
health insurance plans, but would instead offer healthcare cov-
erage though other, employee-paid premium-required, medical
plans. Comau, supra at 4; (see also Jt. Exhs. 1, 2).
Notwithstanding Comau’s declaration of impasse, Comau
and the ASW continued to negotiate about health insurance.
Specifically, from December 8, 2008, through March 20, 2009,
the parties (using healthcare insurance subcommittees) met on
approximately 10 occasions for negotiations regarding
healthcare insurance. Each party’s subcommittee had the au-
thority to enter into tentative agreements regarding employee
health insurance, subject to final approval by the union mem-
bership (as to the ASW) and by Comau’s full negotiating com-
mittee and/or upper management. Comau, supra at 5. Among
other proposals, the subcommittees discussed the
ASW/MRCC’s suggestion that Comau stop paying to finance
its own self-insured health insurance plan and instead make
contributions to help cover the cost of insuring unit employees
under a health insurance plan provided through the MRCC.12
Id. In particular, the parties discussed the amount that Comau
would pay to the MRCC plan for the employees’ health insur-
ance on a weighted average per-employee basis. Id. Comau
initially offered (on December 8, 2008) to pay a weighted aver-
age of $766 per employee/per month, and on December 18,
2008, increased its contribution offer to $820 per employee/per
month. Id.
Any prior impasse regarding healthcare ceased to exist on
January 7, 2009, when Comau made a written proposal that
significantly increased the per-employee contribution that Co-
mau was offering to make to provide coverage under the

12 The anticipated benefit of this proposed arrangement would be
that unit employees would be spared the cost of paying for health insur-
ance premiums, while Comau would realize a savings in cost since its
contributions to the MRCC healthcare plan would be lower that the
amount that Comau was paying to maintain its self-insured healthcare
plan.
COMAU, INC.

603
MRCC health insurance plan. Comau, supra at 9. Not only did
Comau increase its contribution offer on January 7, 2009 (the
weighted average is not known)—it again increased its contri-
bution offer (in response to an ASW counteroffer) on February
5, 2009 (to a weighted average of $835 per employee per
month).13 Id. at 5 fn. 13. Meanwhile, Comau continued to
prepare for implementing its new health insurance plan (as
outlined in the imposed last best offer) in January 2009, as it
met with unit employees to discuss the plan and complete the
paperwork needed to enroll employees in the plan. Id. at 4; (Tr.
937, 941).
D. Early 2009—Employees Circulate a Decertification
Petition and Comau Unilaterally Implements Its
New Health Insurance Plan
In the weeks after Comau announced that it would be impos-
ing its last best offer, employees began to voice their unhappi-
ness with the ASW/MRCC. The prospect of paying significant
health insurance premiums was a prominent concern, since the
new premiums would be yet another deduction from employee
paychecks. (Tr. 186–187, 399–400, 772, 817, 833–834, 1151–
1152; RE. Exh. 13, pp. 542, 554–555, 561–562, 568, 576–577,
586, 595.) However, other latent discontent with the
ASW/MRCC also rose to the surface, as various employees
believed (in different degrees) that the ASW/MRCC: was not
effective in attempting to negotiate a new contract (Tr. 186–
187, 1117–1118); charged unduly high dues that came with
little or no resulting benefit to the bargaining unit (Tr. 400, 740,
773, 1110, 1157; RE. Exh. 13, pp. 554–555, 571, 578, 613);
failed to deliver on its promises to provide bargaining unit
members with training and job placements (Tr. 825, 1050,
1110–1112, 1133, 1153, 1195–1196; RE. Exh. 13, pp. 592–
593, 604, 610–612); did not protect bargaining unit members
from losing job openings at Comau to contractors or members
of other unions (Tr. 776–778, 1203–1204; RE Exh. 13, pp.
529–530, 610–611); and improperly claimed the entire balance
of the ASW dues account (approximately $250,000) at the time
of the March 2007 merger (Tr. 741–742, 1111).
In January 2009, the ASW/MRCC executive committee (mi-
nus Darrell Robertson and Pete Reuter) met to discuss how to
respond to the concerns expressed by various members of the
bargaining unit about the ASW/MRCC. (Tr. 375, 774, 778–
779.) After some discussion, the executive committee re-
searched the process for decertifying the ASW/MRCC (includ-
ing consulting with an NLRB employee and obtaining materials
from the NLRB website), and committee members Dave Balo-
ga and Dan Malloy prepared a decertification petition. (Tr.
376–377, 780–781, 1021–1022.)
On February 18, 2009, employee Frederick Lutz signed a
written request that the ASW executive committee initiate de-
certification proceedings from our ASW 1123/UBC/MRCC
representation. (RU. Exh. 1; Tr. 726–727.) Based on that re-
quest, the executive committee members began gathering em-
ployee signatures (including their own) on the decertification

13 Negotiations continued from this point until March 20, 2009. The
ASW essentially agreed to the $835 per employee/per month contribu-
tion amount that Comau offered, but other issues remained unresolved.
Comau, supra at 5–6, 9.
petition, and also on individual forms authorizing the CEA to
serve as the bargaining unit’s collective-bargaining representa-
tive. (Tr. 782, 787, 1023; RU. Exhs. 3, 8.) However, later in
February 2009, the executive committee transferred the respon-
sibility of circulating the petition to employee Willie Rushing,
after being warned (by Pete Reuter) that any executive commit-
tee member who circulated the petition could (among other
things) be sued or disciplined by the ASW/MRCC. (Tr. 787–
788, 790–791, 879–880, 940–941.) Once Rushing received the
petition and the accompanying authorization for representation
forms, he turned the materials over to unit employees who
passed the materials around in Comau’s facilities to obtain
additional signatures.14 (Tr. 880–881, 886.) Bargaining unit
employees who signed the decertification petition in February
2009 were aware that the new health insurance plan and premi-
ums would take effect on March 1, 2009. (RE. Exh. 13, pp.
554–555, 557–558, 560, 574, 585.)
On March 1, 2009, Comau unilaterally implemented the new
health insurance plan contained in its imposed last best offer.
Comau, supra at 9. As the Board has found, Comau’s unilateral
action was an unfair labor practice because the ASW/MRCC
had not agreed to the health insurance plan, and because the
previously declared impasse (declared by Comau in December
2008) was subsequently broken by (at the latest) January 2009
when Comau and the ASW/MRCC resumed negotiations about
employee health insurance. Id.
In the 9 days that followed Comau’s unlawful unilateral ac-
tion, 3415 additional employees signed and dated the decertifi-
cation petition. (RU. Exh. 3.) In addition, employee discontent
with the ASW/MRCC intensified.16 As Daniel Malloy testi-

14 While the petition circulated, ASW/MRCC executive committee
members who signed the petition subsequently redacted their names
and signatures from the petition, citing ongoing concerns that the ASW
would take action against them for participating in the decertification
effort. Tr. 886–887, 1048, 1173, 1181.
15 The decertification petition in the record has been redacted to
eliminate the names and addresses of the employees who signed the
document (thus leaving only the date of signature). Tr. 886–887. To
the extent that ASW/MRCC executive committee members signed the
petition, those signature lines were fully redacted (by members of the
ASW/MRCC) to obscure the entries in full, including the date of signa-
ture. The count (34) of signatures entered on or after March 1, 2009,
referenced herein does not include any of the fully redacted entries
(whether made by the executive committee or otherwise) on the peti-
tion. The petition as a whole contains 105 signatures (again, excluding
the 13 fully redacted entries), most of which were entered on February
19, 2009. RU. Exh. 3. I note that although I am not including the 13
redacted petition entries in my calculations (since the redactions ren-
dered the entries null and void), my analysis would remain the same
even if the 13 redacted entries were counted.
16 The Acting General Counsel presented the cover sheets of
ASW/MRCC meeting minutes to demonstrate the change in
ASW/MRCC meeting attendance in this time period (and to suggest
that the decline in attendance was caused by the March 1 unfair labor
practice). The cover sheets reflect the following attendance figures:
January 7, 2009 (62 members attended); January 22, 2009 (69 mem-
bers); February 4, 2009 (45 members); February 24, 2009 (50 mem-
bers); March 4, 2009 (35 members); April 1, 2009 (29 members); May
6, 2009 (26 members); June 3, 2009 (32 members); July 1, 2009 (32
members); August 5, 2009 (29 members); September 2, 2009 (28
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

604
fied, while members of the bargaining unit were upset in De-
cember 2008 when Comau imposed its last best offer, once the
health care premium money came out of the checks in March
2009, the bargaining unit employees “wanted to fry us. They
wanted to fry the committee, they wanted to fry Pete [Reuter]
and Darrell [Robertson]. . . . because we were promised all
along that . . . they would work to keep us from having to pay
anything.” (Tr. 833.)
Rushing returned the completed decertification petition and
authorization for representation forms to Dan Malloy. (Tr.
887.) Initially, Malloy (with the agreement of others) decided
to delay filing the petition in hopes that the ASW/MRCC would
deliver on some new promises (by Reuter) to place employees
who had been laid off from Comau in other jobs. (Tr. 793–794,
888, 1025; RE. Exh. 13, pp. 602–603.) When those job place-
ments did not materialize, Rushing retrieved the petition from
Malloy and filed the decertification petition with the NLRB on
or about April 14, 2009. (Tr. 888.)17
E. Employee Discontent Persists as Employees Await
Action on Decertification Petition
In May 2009, Rushing met with MRCC director Doug Buck-
ler to discuss the rationale for the decertification petition. Con-
sistent with the concerns expressed by other employees, Rush-
ing told Buckler (and also Reuter) that he was unhappy with:
the MRCC’s failure to provide training in skilled trades that it
promised; the fact that the MRCC issued him a journeyman
card that was limited to the ASW, and thus had little to no val-
ue in making him eligible for other jobs; the high cost of
MRCC union dues; the transfer of the ASW dues account bal-
ance to the MRCC; and the quality of the MRCC health insur-
ance that the ASW/MRCC proposed in negotiations (belatedly,
in Rushing’s view) as an alternative to Comau’s health insur-
ance plan. (Tr. 914–921.) Rushing also continued to monitor
the status of the decertification petition periodically at the
NLRB because he was getting pressure from bargaining unit
employees, particularly when employees received another
paycheck with ASW/MRCC union dues deducted. (Tr. 891.)
F. December 2009 Disaffection Petition
On November 19, 2009, Comau, the ASW and Rushing par-
ticipated in a Saint Gobain hearing before Judge Bogas in Case
7–RD–3644 regarding decertification petition and pending

members); and November 3, 2009 (12 members). See GC Exhs. 9–13,
15–21. I have given limited weight to these meeting attendance figures
because while the numbers do show a downward trend in 2009, the
record does not include attendance figures from 2008. Without the
comparison data from 2008, I cannot rely on the meeting attendance
figures to conclude with any confidence that attendance declined be-
cause of (among other possibilities) Comau’s unfair labor practice on
March 1, routine fluctuations that occur every year, or because of a
spike in attendance (and then a return to normal levels) after Comau
imposed its last best offer in December 2008.
17 The parties have stipulated that on December 22, 2009, there were
178 employees in the bargaining unit. There was no stipulation pro-
posed or offered about the unit’s membership on April 14, 2009. How-
ever, the evidence in the record indicates that the bargaining unit in-
cluded between 234 and 237 employees as of April 14, 2009. RE. Exh.
13, pp. 527, 600.
charges. (See RE. Exh. 13); see also Saint Gobain Abrasives,
Inc., 342 NLRB 434 (2004). The decertification petition ulti-
mately stalled.
In late 2009, Rushing obtained the contact information for a
consulting firm to seek assistance with the pending decertifica-
tion petition. (Tr. 894–895, 1026.) Rushing passed the con-
sultant’s information on to Harry Yale.18 (Tr. 895.) With the
consultant’s assistance, Yale prepared a disaffection petition
(a/k/a “Dana” petition), as well as a revocation of dues-
checkoff authorization form. (Tr. 1027; RU. Exhs. 6, 7.) Each
page of the disaffection petition contained the following lan-
guage at the top of the page:

We, the employees of Comau, Inc. in the bargaining unit of
the Automated Systems Workers Local 1123 (a Division of
the Michigan Regional Council of Carpenters) declare by our
signatures below that we no longer want to be represented by
that Union, and we request that Comau, Inc. immediately stop
recognizing that Union as our collective bargaining repre-
sentative.

We no longer want to be represented by the Automated Sys-
tems Workers Local 1123 (a Division of the Michigan Re-
gional Council of Carpenters) because of the excessive dues
that Union charges us each month and because it has not
come through on its promises to increase job opportunities for
us—and not because Comau, Inc. in the last year or so unilat-
erally implemented new terms of employment for us includ-
ing the Company health care plan.

We also declare by our signatures below that we want to be
represented by the Comau Employees’ Association, and we
request that Comau, Inc. immediately begin recognizing the
Comau Employees’ Association as our collective bargaining
representative.

(RU. Exh. 6.)
On December 15, 2009, Yale placed copies of both the disaf-
fection petition and revocation of dues-checkoff forms in bind-
ers, and placed the materials on his desk at Comau for employ-
ees to review and sign on their break time.19 (Tr. 897–898,
1029–1030.) On his own time, Yale also took the binders to
other Comau facilities in the area for members of the bargain-
ing unit to review and sign the petition and dues-checkoff revo-
cation form. Id. At each facility, employees generally passed
the materials around for review, but occasionally did so during
work time. (Tr. 1065–1066, 1112, 1124, 1140.) The petition
generally was circulated without much discussion, other than
describing the petition as a document about getting out of the

18 Yale served as an ASW/MRCC executive committee member un-
til July 2009, when he lost his bid for reelection to the committee.
19 In this same time period, several employees objected to the fact
that MRCC dues were deducted from their annual holiday check. By
tradition, Comau closes its facilities for a period of time in December,
and issues its employees a holiday check for a predetermined number
of hours as a bonus payment. Tr. 898. Although MRCC dues were
deducted from holiday checks in 2007 and 2008, several employees
objected when MRCC dues were deducted from holiday checks in
2009, and expressed frustration that the April 2009 decertification
petition remained unresolved. Tr. 899, 903, 1217–1219; GC Exh. 55.
COMAU, INC.

605
Union. (Tr. 158, 1124, 1153–1154.) Some employees testified
that they did read the language at the top of the disaffection
petition before they signed the document. (Tr. 1116, 1133–
1134, 1142, 1202–1203.)
Employee Rich Mroz, however, had a somewhat different
experience with the disaffection petition. As Mroz explained,
initially one of his leaders (Nelson Burbo) at the Novi facility
approached him and advised him about the disaffection petition
that was circulating. Burbo then asked Mroz if he was happy
with the ASW/MRCC, to which Mroz responded that although
he was not happy with the Union, he thought it might be a bad
time to get out of the Union in light of the ongoing dispute with
Comau about health insurance benefits. (Tr. 158–159.) On
another day, another leader (James Reno) invited Mroz (who
was on his worktime) to speak to Yale, who was visiting the
facility. Mroz agreed to speak with Yale, and reiterated his
concern that it might be a bad time for the disaffection petition.
Yale did not disagree with that opinion, but asserted that the
MRCC was not going to get anywhere with its efforts to recov-
er the money that members of the bargaining unit spent to pay
the new health insurance premiums. (Tr. 160–161.) Mroz also
asked if his leaders signed the petition,20 to which Yale replied
that Mroz’ leaders did sign the petition, as did a majority of
employees in the unit. (Tr. 162.) Mroz agreed to sign the peti-
tion after confirming that his brother also signed the document,
but noted that the information he received from Yale did influ-
ence his decision to sign. (Tr. 162–163, 192.)
On or about December 21, 2009, Yale received the complet-
ed disaffection petition and revocation of dues-checkoff author-
ization forms.21 (See RU. Exh. 6 (final signatures dated De-
cember 21, 2009).) Yale notified Comau human resources
director Fred Begle on December 21 or 22 that he planned to
give him the documents, and actually delivered the materials to
Begle on December 22, 2009. (Tr. 1076, 1085, 1088; RE. Exh.
1 at 12.) Begle accepted the petition, and advised Yale that he

20 Mroz expressed concern about going against the opinion of his
leaders about the petition, and thus running the risk of the leaders tak-
ing an adverse action against him as a result. Tr. 162–163, 165.
21 Other than the acts of its alleged agents (Yale, Burbo and Reno) as
described herein, there was limited evidence that Comau facilitated or
participated in the circulation of the disaffection petition. Baloga testi-
fied that he saw two employees on layoff status approach the binder
with the petition, but the record does not show that Comau gave those
individuals access to the shop floor (as opposed to an employee using
his or her own scan card to allow access, or a Comau clerical employee
allowing access without management’s knowledge). Tr. 286–288,
628–629, 949. Similarly, while Baloga testified that Comau generally
enforced rules for when materials can be circulated on the shop floor,
there is no evidence that Comau officials knew the disaffection petition
was being circulated before December 21, 2009, and decided not to
enforce the rules for circulating such materials. Tr. 284–285, 353. I
have considered an excerpt from Comau’s position paper (read by the
Acting General Counsel into the record as an admission by a party
opponent) on the latter issue, and do not find a basis to conclude that
Comau was aware that the disaffection petition was being circulated
before the petition was nearly (if not fully) completed. See RU. Exh. 6
(indicating that most employees signed the petition on or before De-
cember 18, 2009, shortly after the document began circulating).
(Begle) would verify the signatures on the petition.22 (Tr. 1032,
1085, 1088.) Begle then compared the signatures on the disaf-
fection petition with sample signatures obtained from individu-
al employee files, and determined that 103 members of the
bargaining unit (out of a total of 178 employees in the unit)
signed the disaffection petition. (Tr. 964–965, 1076–1078; RE.
Exh. 1 at 27.)
On December 22, 2009, after verifying the signatures on the
disaffection petition, Comau notified the bargaining unit that a
majority of employees in the unit requested that Comau with-
draw recognition from the ASW/MRCC Union and instead
recognize the Comau Employees’ Association (CEA) as the
unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative. (Jt. Exh.
4; see also Jt. Exh. 5.) Accordingly, effective December 22,
2009, Comau withdrew recognition from the ASW/MRCC,
stopped withholding ASW/MRCC dues from the paychecks of
unit employees, and immediately recognized the CEA as the
unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative. Id.
G. The CEA Becomes the Unit’s Collective-Bargaining
Representative
In February 2010, the CEA elected the following individuals
as its officers: Yale (president); Rushing (secretary); Jeffrey H.
Brown (vice president); Fred Lutz (treasurer); Jim Morabito
(committeeman); Chris Economides (committeeman); and Jim
Kayko (committeeman). (Tr. 729; 907–908; 981; 1038; 1174–
1075.) The CEA and Comau subsequently negotiated a new
collective-bargaining agreement that was then ratified by the
CEA membership in April 2010. (Tr. 217–218, 907–908, 1040;
Jt. Exh. 3 (noting that the contract was effective from Decem-
ber 22, 2009 through April 13, 2013).) The collective-
bargaining agreement included the following union-security
clause:

a) Seniority employees shall be required, as a condition of
continued employment, to become dues paying members of
the [CEA]. Dues will be collected by the Company the last
week of each month by payroll deduction. Any uncollected
dues for the current month will be reported to the CEA by the
Company. The CEA will then specify which of those uncol-
lected dues must be collected from the November vacation
pay check each year or as soon as administratively possible.
The Company will remit payment of collected dues to the
CEA by wire transfer, to the CEA bank account, within seven
(7) days or as soon as possible as it becomes administratively
possible.

b) In addition to the above, non-seniority employees with
more than thirty (30) days service shall be required, as a con-
dition of continued employment, to become dues paying
members of the association.

(Jt. Exh. 3 at 1–2.)23

22 Begle asked Yale to keep the revocation of dues-checkoff authori-
zation forms while the signatures on the petition were being authenti-
cated. Yale delivered the revocation of dues-checkoff forms to Begle
on January 11, 2010. Tr. 1032–1033.
23 The 2005–2008 collective-bargaining agreement between the
ASW and Comau contained a similar provision. GC Exh. 32 at 2.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

606
H. The CEA Asks Employees to Sign Dues-Checkoff
Authorization Forms
In May 2010, CEA committeemen distributed union dues-
checkoff authorization forms for employees to sign to authorize
Comau to collect dues by automatic payroll deduction. (Tr.
982–983; RE. Exhs. 6, 9(a).) Several employees signed the
form without objection. (Tr. 983.) However, some employees
(at least initially) declined to sign the form.24 One such em-
ployee was Nizar (Bill) Akkari, a machinist who was working
at the Novi facility. (Tr. 215–216.) In May 2010, Akkari was
approached on two occasions by Jim Kayko, who asked Akkari
if he was willing to sign the dues-checkoff authorization form.
Akkari refused on both occasions. (Tr. 220–221, 986–987.)
After the second refusal, Kayko advised Akkari that he would
probably need to speak to Fred Begle about the issue. (Tr. 221,
988.) During Akkari’s next shift at work, the night-shift super-
visor (Matthew Parsons) notified Akkari that Begle was at the
Novi facility and wished to speak with him. (Tr. 222.) Akkari
accordingly met with Begle (and Parsons) in an available of-
fice, and Begle advised him that he would be terminated if he
did not sign the dues-checkoff authorization form.25 Begle did
not offer Akkari any option to pay union dues by any other
means besides automatic payroll deduction. (Tr. 223–224,
227.) Akkari relented and signed the dues-checkoff authoriza-
tion form.26 (Tr. 218–219; GC Exh. 37.)

24 In connection with this issue, the Acting General Counsel present-
ed a chain of emails provided by ASW/MRCC President Darrell Rob-
ertson. See GC Exh. 6. Part of that exhibit includes an email sent on
May 14, 2010, by Comau administrative assistant Jill Opasik to various
Comau personnel (including Fred Begle, Duane Jerore, and James
Kayko). Opasik’s email listed employees who had not signed a dues-
checkoff authorization form, and stated that the employees could be
terminated if they did not sign the form by May 18, 2010. Id. at 2.
Another portion of the email chain suggests that Jerore forwarded
Opasik’s email to five employees (Al Redd, Ronald Krieger, Gary
Hilliker, James Wheeler, and Robert Fox). Id. at 1. However, in the
text of Jerore’s message, he referred the employees to a notice that was
apparently attached to his e-mail, but was not entered into the trial
record. Id.
I have given little weight to GC Exh. 6 for the following reasons: (a)
no testimony was offered about Opasik’s role with Comau or her au-
thority to speak for Comau as an agent, and thus the content of her
email is hearsay; and (b) the Acting General Counsel did not call any of
the five employees who purportedly received Jerore’s forwarded mes-
sage to testify as witnesses during the trial, and thus the record contains
no information (beyond the uncorroborated exhibit itself) about what
information these employees ultimately received from Jerore.
25 I have credited Akkari’s account of this conversation. Begle was
present in the courtroom during Akkari’s testimony (as one of Comau’s
designated assistants), and did not dispute Akkari’s account when he
later testified as one of Comau’s witnesses. Tr. 1084. I have consid-
ered the fact that Comau impeached Akkari’s testimony on a narrow
point, insofar as Akkari incorrectly asserted that he never before was
required to sign a dues-checkoff authorization form (compare Tr. 231
with RE. Exhs. 19–20), but that limited impeachment did not under-
mine the credibility of Akkari’s overall testimony, which was corrobo-
rated by other witnesses and was not contradicted by Begle.
26 Dave Baloga also testified that Kayko approached him about sign-
ing a dues-checkoff authorization form. According to Baloga, he reluc-
tantly signed the form after being told that the contract prevented him
Employee Gasper Calandrino reported a similar experience
at the Jefferson North Assembly Plant, one of Comau’s field
service locations.27 (Tr. 410.) In May 2010, Site Supervisor
Duane Jerore advised Calandrino that he should review a dues-
checkoff authorization form, sign it, and return the form to him.
Calandrino complied with Jerore’s request, but since he did not
want dues deducted from his paycheck (preferring instead to
pay dues in person and receive a receipt), Calandrino wrote on
the form, “I do not authorize the company to payroll deduct.”
(Tr. 413.) Jerore agreed to turn the annotated form in to Fred
Begle,28 but advised Calandrino that “[y]ou could be disci-
plined or up to a discharge on something like that,” and added
that “chances are we’ll probably get a phone call from Fred.”
(Tr. 414.)
The next day at work, Calandrino received a message that he
needed to see Jerore in the office. Jerore told Calandrino that
before he began his shift, they needed to call Begle about the
dues-checkoff authorization form. (Tr. 415.) In the ensuing
telephone conversation with Begle, Calandrino confirmed that
he did not wish to authorize payroll deduction for dues, again
noting his preference for having a receipt for individual pay-
ments. Begle responded by stating that payroll deduction is
more convenient, and then asked Calandrino if he was aware of
the consequences, which included being disciplined or termi-
nated if his dues were late or went into arrears. Begle added
that Calandrino had been a good employee and had been at
Comau for a long time, and stated that he would hate to see
disciplinary action or discharge happen if Calandrino did not
keep up with his dues payments. (Tr. 416–417.) Feeling pres-
sured, Calandrino signed a new dues-checkoff authorization
form.29 (Tr. 417; GC Exh. 35.)
Jeffrey T. Brown testified about his experience with the
dues-checkoff authorization form at Comau’s Southfield com-
plex (specifically, at the Arlens facility, one of the three build-
ings at the complex). (Tr. 490, 495–500.) CEA Treasurer Fred
Lutz first approached Jeffrey T. Brown about signing a dues
authorization form in February 2010, prompting Brown to ad-
vise Lutz that he did not want to, and would not, sign the form.
(Tr. 496.) Lutz told Brown that he was going to provide Begle

from simply paying dues in cash at union meetings. Tr. 290; GC Exh.
38. Kayko, meanwhile, testified that Baloga simply signed the form
when asked to do so, saying, I might as well. Tr. 989; see also Tr. 447
(Christopher Bloodworth testimony that in February 2010, Jeffrey H.
Brown approached both him and Baloga about the dues-checkoff au-
thorization form. Both Bloodworth and Baloga refused to sign the form
at that time); Tr. 982–983 (describing Kayko’s efforts to ensure that he
asked employees about the dues-checkoff authorization form “in the
right way”). The limited testimony offered about Baloga’s exchange
with Kayko was equally credible and plausible, and thus I have afford-
ed the testimony equal weight.
27 Periodically, Comau assigns employees to off-site locations to
work on projects. The assignments are field service assignments. Tr.
411.
28 It is not clear what happened to the form that Calandrino annotat-
ed. No annotated form was presented at trial or entered into the trial
record.
29 Calandrino’s testimony was uncontradicted, even though Begle
was present in the courtroom for his testimony and later testified for
Comau. Tr. 1084.
COMAU, INC.

607
with a list of all employees who did not sign the dues-checkoff
authorization form, and Brown responded that if Begle gave
him a letter that his job was at risk if he did not sign, then
Brown would sign the form. Id.
Lutz again approached Jeffrey T. Brown about the dues-
checkoff authorization form in May 2010. Brown accepted the
form, but did not sign it. (Tr. 496, 734.) Lutz checked back
with Brown twice more about the form, and on the second visit,
Brown asked about the possibility of paying dues in cash. Lutz
responded that he (Lutz) would have to speak with Begle about
that, and a few minutes later, returned to Brown and advised
him that they both needed to speak with Begle in Begle’s office
(located in the Comau Center, another building at the South-
field complex). (Tr. 497–498, 735.) At the meeting with
Begle, Begle asked Brown why he did not wish to sign the
dues-checkoff authorization form, and Brown explained that he
preferred to pay in cash since the Company was into his
paycheck more than enough already. (Tr. 498–499.) Begle
initially expressed some reservations about having CEA offi-
cials collect $20 in cash every month from various employees,
but liked Brown’s proposal that he pay a full year of dues in
cash ($240). Lutz, however, asked Brown what would happen
if he was laid off in 6 months. Unsure of the intent behind
Lutz’ question, Brown did not respond. (Tr. 499.) After some
additional chitchat, Brown decided he was done with the con-
versation and handed over a signed dues-checkoff authorization
form.30 (Tr. 499; GC Exh. 36.)
I. Comau and the CEA Attempt to Clarify Their
Positions About Dues-Checkoff and Other Methods
of Paying CEA Dues
On June 9, 2010, Comau (through Begle) posted a notice to
the bargaining unit about the dues-checkoff authorization
forms. The notice stated:

The ASW has charged that our employees have been coerced
into signing dues authorization forms. We have investigated
this allegation and do not believe it to be factually accurate.
Just to be sure that everyone understands their rights, howev-
er, we want to confirm the following:

While the contract contains a requirement that employees be-
come dues paying members, the contract does not require that

30 I have credited Brown’s version of the conversation. Begle testi-
fied at trial, but did not challenge Brown’s account of their conversa-
tion. Tr. 1084. Lutz also testified, but stated on direct that he did not
remember the whole conversation with Begle. Tr. 737. However, Lutz
answered, yes when asked to affirm the accuracy of closed/leading
questions about the conversation with Begle during cross examination.
Tr. 748. Lutz’ demeanor and answers were tentative and uncertain, and
generally indicated that Lutz was having trouble remembering the
details of the interactions that he had with Brown and other employees
in the relevant time period. Finally, Brown’s credibility was bolstered
by the corroborating testimony that employee Chris Bloodworth offered
about his own interaction with Lutz. According to Bloodworth, Lutz
approached him at the Arlens facility and stated that Begle wanted Lutz
to bring Bloodworth over to talk about the dues-checkoff authorization
form. Not wanting to cause any problems with his job status, Blood-
worth agreed to sign the form. Tr. 449. Lutz was not questioned about
his interaction with Bloodworth.
dues be paid through a payroll deduction authorization, with
dues to be withheld by the Company from your paycheck. It
is up to you whether you wish to authorize payment of your
dues in that manner.

In the event anyone signed a dues deduction authorization
form under the mistaken assumption that the Company re-
quired this, you should feel free to rescind the authorization
and deal with the CEA directly. In that event, please so indi-
cate to me in writing.

(RE. Exh. 9(b).) Two employees subsequently rescinded their
dues-checkoff authorization forms based on Comau’s notice,
and received refunds from Comau for any dues that were paid
by undesired payroll deductions. (Tr. 1083–1084.)
Akkari admitted that he saw Comau’s notice about the dues-
checkoff authorization forms after it was posted, and he admit-
ted that he did not request that Comau rescind the authorization
form that he signed. (Tr. 229; see also Tr. 501 (Jeffrey T.
Brown also saw the letter).) Akkari explained, however, that he
did not take Comau up on its June 9, 2010 offer because he felt
like Comau was playing games, and because he saw the CEA’s
letter of understanding posted on the Novi shop floor stating
that the only acceptable method for paying dues (other than
payroll deduction) was by certified cashier’s check. (GC Exh.
2; Tr. 230, 242–244; see also Tr. 502 (Jeffrey T. Brown saw the
CEA’s letter of understanding posted at the Arlens facility).)
CEA’s letter of understanding stated:

Subject: union dues by means other than direct deposit.

1.) Certified cashiers check, is the only acceptable
method of payment. Made out to the Comau Employees
Association.
2.) Payment must be received by the end of the 3rd
week of every month (Friday is considered the last day of
the work week).
3.) Payment must be hand delivered to the union pres-
ident, vice-president or treasurer. (Mailing is not accepta-
ble)
President: Harry Yale
Vice-President: Jeff H. Brown
Treasurer: Fred Lutz
4.) Late payments will not be accepted as a general
practice, and disciplinary action will be instituted, up to
and including discharge. As per the union by-laws gov-
erning dues payments, and as stated in our labor agree-
ment (Section # 3.2).
5.) If there is an acceptable reason for a late payment
(field service, etc.) the $10.00 late fee will still be applied.
6.) If these terms are not acceptable, then direct deposit
is the only other means of payment.

(GC Exh. 2.) Before the letter of understanding was posted,
Yale sent it to Begle for review. (GC Exh. 53 (email sent on
May 21, 2010).)
On June 18, 2010, Harry Yale sent an email to Jim Kayko
(and cc’ed to Fred Begle) to instruct Kayko to deliver a copy of
the letter of understanding to an employee (Ken Skrbalo) who
rescinded his dues-checkoff authorization. (GC Exh. 54.) Per
Yale’s email, if Skrbalo did not pay his dues by the following
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

608
Friday, “we will start the proceedings as stated in the contract
and by-laws.” Id. Notwithstanding the terms stated in the letter
of understanding, Yale ultimately permitted Skrbalo to pay his
dues for the year by personal check.31 (Tr. 1059–1060.)
J. The Board Rules that Comau Committed an
Unfair Labor Practice by Unilaterally Implementing
its Healthcare Plan on March 1, 2009
On November 5, 2010, the Board affirmed Judge Bogas’ rul-
ings, findings and conclusions in Case 07–CA–052106. Co-
mau, 356 NLRB 75 (2010). In particular, the Board adopted
Judge Bogas’ finding that Comau violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) by unilaterally implementing a new health insurance plan in
the absence of an agreement or a bona fide impasse with the
ASW/MRCC. Id. at 1 fn. 5.
Discussion and Analysis
A. Comau’s Decision to Withdraw Recognition from
the ASW and Recognize the CEA
1. Complaint allegations and asserted legal theories
The principal issues in this case turn on whether Comau ran
afoul of the Act when (on December 22, 2009) it withdrew
recognition of the ASW/MRCC as the bargaining unit’s exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative, and recognized the
CEA as the unit’s new representative.
The complaint specifically alleges that Comau: failed to bar-
gain collectively and in good faith with the ASW when it with-
drew recognition from the ASW (in violation of Sec. 8(a)(5)
and (1)); dominated, interfered with and rendered unlawful
assistance to the CEA when, in the absence of the support of an
uncoerced majority of employees, Comau recognized the CEA
as the unit’s exclusive bargaining representative, entered into a
collective-bargaining agreement with the CEA that contained a
union-security clause, and deducted CEA union dues from em-
ployee wages pursuant to the union-security clause (in violation
of Sec. 8(a)(2) and (1)); and discriminated against employees
regarding hiring and the terms and conditions of employment
(and unlawfully encouraged membership in the CEA) by enter-
ing into a collective-bargaining agreement with the CEA that
contained a union-security clause (in violation of Sec. 8(a)(3)
and (1)). (GC Exh. 1(v), pars. 24–26.)
As for the CEA, the complaint alleges that at a time when the
CEA did not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in
the unit, the CEA: unlawfully obtained recognition from Co-
mau as the unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative
(in violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A)); and attempted to cause Comau
to discriminate against its employees via the CEA collective-
bargaining agreement and union-security clause (in violation of
Sec. 8(b)(2) of the Act. (GC Exh. 1(v), pars. 28–29.)
At trial, the Acting General Counsel offered two legal theo-
ries to support the allegations in the complaint regarding Co-
mau’s decision to withdraw recognition from the ASW/MRCC.
First, the Acting General Counsel asserted that the December

31 Yale asserted that the CEA never enforced the terms of its letter of
understanding. Tr. 1059–1060. There is no evidence, however, that the
CEA advised the bargaining unit as a whole of any decision not to
enforce the letter of understanding.
2009 disaffection petition that Comau used to conclude that the
ASW did not represent a majority of employees in the unit was
tainted by Comau’s prior unfair labor practices (specifically,
Comau’s March 1, 2009 implementation of its new health in-
surance plan). Second (and in the alternative), the Acting Gen-
eral Counsel asserted that the disaffection petition was tainted
because certain individuals (Harry Yale, James Reno, and Nel-
son Burbo) who circulated it did so with the apparent authority
of Comau. As described below, I find that the Acting General
Counsel has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence
that the disaffection petition was tainted by a prior unfair labor
practice.32
2. The December 2009 disaffection petition was tainted
by Comau’s March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice
A union is irrebuttably presumed to continue to enjoy the
support of a majority of the unit employees while a collective-
bargaining agreement is in effect. Lee Lumber & Building
Material Corp., 322 NLRB 175, 176 (1996). After the contract
expires, the union still is presumed to enjoy majority status, but
the presumption is rebuttable. In such a situation, an employer
may rebut the presumption and withdraw recognition if it can
show that the union in fact no longer has the support of a ma-
jority of the unit employees. Id. at 176–177; Champion Home
Builders Co., 350 NLRB 788, 791 (2007); see also Levitz Fur-
niture Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB 717, 725 (2001) (overrul-
ing precedent that also allowed an employer to withdraw
recognition from a union based on a good-faith doubt about the
union’s continued majority status).33
However, an employer may not lawfully withdraw recogni-
tion from a union where it has committed unfair labor practices
that are likely to affect the union’s status, cause employee dis-
affection, or improperly affect the bargaining relationship.
Champion Home Builders, 350 NLRB at 791. Not every unfair
labor practice will taint evidence of a union’s subsequent loss
of majority support; in cases involving unfair labor practices
other than a general refusal to recognize and bargain, there
must be specific proof of a causal relationship between the
unfair labor practice and the ensuing events indicating a loss of

32 Because I have found that the disaffection petition was tainted by
the unfair labor practice that Comau committed on March 1, 2009, I
need not rule on the Acting General Counsel’s alternative theory that
the petition was tainted because it was circulated by employees who
were Comau’s agents. However, I note that I have made findings of
fact (including credibility findings) that are relevant to that theory,
should further analysis be necessary.
33 While Comau has argued that it was legally obligated to withdraw
recognition from the ASW/MRCC when it received the December 2009
disaffection petition, the Board has clearly stated that an employer with
objective evidence (such as a disaffection petition) that a union has lost
majority support withdraws recognition at its peril. Levitz Furniture
Co. of the Pacific, 333 NLRB at 725 (noting that an employer in that
circumstance runs the risk of being found to have violated Sec. 8(a)(5)
if it is later shown that the union had not lost majority support). The
Board also explained that as an alternative to simply withdrawing
recognition based on the objective evidence, an employer lawfully may
file an RM petition for an election and continue to recognize the in-
cumbent union while the election proceedings are ongoing. Levitz,
supra at 724.
COMAU, INC.

609
support. Lee Lumber, 322 NLRB at 177. In determining
whether a causal relationship exists between unremedied unfair
labor practices and the loss of union support, the Board consid-
ers the following factors: (1) the length of time between the
unfair labor practices and the withdrawal of recognition; (2) the
nature of the violations, including the possibility of a detri-
mental or lasting effect on employees; (3) the tendency of the
violation to cause employee disaffection; and (4) the effect of
the unlawful conduct on employees’ morale, organizational
activities, and membership in the union. Champion Home
Builders, 350 NLRB at 791 (citing Master Slack Corp., 271
NLRB 78, 84 (1984)).34
In this case, a few preliminary facts are clearly established.
The Board has determined that Comau committed an unfair
labor practice on March 1, 2009, when it violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by changing employees’ healthcare benefits
without the ASW/MRCC’s consent and in the absence of a
bona fide impasse. Comau, 356 NLRB at 85. In addition, there
is no dispute that the ASW/MRCC had actually lost majority
support by December 22, 2009, as indicated by the fact that a
majority of the employees in the bargaining unit (103 employ-
ees out of 178 in the unit at the time) signed a December 2009
disaffection petition stating that they no longer wished to be
represented by the ASW/MRCC. (See RU Exh. 6.) Finally, it
is undisputed that Comau recognized the CEA as the bargaining
unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative on De-
cember 22, 2009, and subsequently entered into and adhered to
a collective-bargaining agreement with the CEA that included a
union-security clause. See findings of fact (FOF), above, sec-
tion II(G).
The question in dispute is whether there is a causal relation-
ship between the March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice and the
loss of majority support for the ASW/MRCC that was evident
on December 22, 2009. To examine that issue, a review of the
operative facts is warranted. Comau declared impasse in De-
cember 2008, and based on that impasse, imposed its last best
offer (including the new health insurance plan, which would
take effect on March 1, 2009) on December 22, 2008. See
FOF, above, section II(C). The impasse regarding employee
health insurance coverage was broken on January 7, 2009. Id.
Comau, however, continued to prepare employees for the effec-
tive date of the health insurance plan set forth in Comau’s im-
posed last best offer. Id. In February 2009, employees began

34 The Master Slack test is an objective test aimed at evaluating
whether a causal relationship exists between unremedied unfair labor
practices and subsequent loss of union support. See Saint Gobain
Abrasives, 342 NLRB at 434 fn. 2 (noting that it is not relevant to ask
individual employees why they chose to reject the union); AT Systems
West, 341 NLRB 57, 60 (2004) (subjective state of mind of the em-
ployees is not relevant). During trial, I permitted Comau and the CEA
to present evidence about the objective circumstances that may have
caused employee disaffection independent of the March 1, 2009 unfair
labor practice. However, I did not permit the CEA to call (as it pro-
posed) between 20 to 90 witnesses to testify about their subjective
reasons for signing the December 2009 disaffection petition, because
the witness’ subjective reasons are not relevant to the inquiry, and the
witnesses’ expected testimony about the objective circumstances was
cumulative.
circulating a petition to decertify the ASW/MRCC. See FOF,
above, section II(D). While employees had a variety of reasons
to be unhappy with the ASW/MRCC and therefore sign the
petition,35 the unilaterally imposed healthcare plan was promi-
nent among those reasons. Of the 103 employees that ultimate-
ly signed the decertification petition, all did so on or after Feb-
ruary 19, 2009 (i.e., within days of the March 1 effective date
of the healthcare plan), and 34 did so on or after March 1, 2009.
Id. Once the unilaterally imposed healthcare plan took effect,
bargaining unit discontent with the ASW/MRCC reached a new
high, and carried forward36 to December 2009, when Harry
Yale prepared and circulated the disaffection petition that Co-
mau relied on when it withdrew recognition from the
ASW/MRCC on December 22, 2009. FOF, above, sections
II(E), (F).
Turning to the relevant factors, 9 months passed between the
March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice in this case and Comau’s
December 22, 2009 decision to withdraw recognition from the
ASW/MRCC. That length of time does not, per se, preclude a
finding of a causal relationship. See, e.g., AT Systems West,
341 NLRB 57 (2004) (unfair labor practice was within 9
months of the withdrawal of recognition that it caused); Co-
lumbia Portland Cement v. NLRB, 979 F.2d 460, 465 (6th Cir.
1992) (same, but with a passage of 1 year). More important,
the facts of this case show that the March 1, 2009 unfair labor
practice had a more immediate effect on the bargaining unit, as
the bargaining unit unhappiness with the new health insurance
premiums drove (at least in part) the contemporaneous decerti-
fication petition that employees signed in February and March
2009, and filed in April 2009. Thus, the December 2009 disaf-
fection petition was essentially an effort to renew the spring
2009 decertification movement that started just before the uni-
laterally imposed healthcare plan (unlawfully) took effect.
The evidentiary record and applicable case law also show
that the nature of the unfair labor practice here included the
possibility of a detrimental and lasting effect on employees, as
well as a tendency to cause employee disaffection (factors 2
and 3). The fact that Comau imposed the new health care plan
and its accompanying employee-paid premiums unilaterally is
particularly significant. It is well established that when an em-
ployer makes unilateral changes to terms and conditions of

35 Those reasons include employee impressions that the
ASW/MRCC: was not effective in attempting to negotiate a new con-
tract; charged unduly high dues that came with little or no resulting
benefit to the bargaining unit; failed to deliver on its promises to pro-
vide bargaining unit members with training and job placements; did not
protect bargaining unit members from losing job openings at Comau to
contractors or members of other unions; and improperly claimed the
entire balance of the ASW dues account (approximately $250,000) at
the time of the March 2007 merger.
36 Employee discontent about the health insurance plan was kept
alive by a variety of factors, including: the ongoing, significant deduc-
tions from employee paychecks to pay the premiums required for the
unilaterally imposed health insurance plan; meetings with the
ASW/MRCC about the decertification petition that touched on health
insurance (among other issues); and the November 19, 2009 St. Gobain
hearing in Case 7–RD–3644 in which several employees testified (and
were reminded of the fact) that the new health insurance (and its cost)
was among their concerns when they signed the decertification petition.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

610
employment, those changes harm the union’s status as the bar-
gaining representative because the employer’s actions under-
mine the union in the eyes of the employees and give the im-
pression that the union is powerless. Priority One Services,
331 NLRB 1527, 1527 (2000) (collecting cases); see also Goya
Foods of Florida, 347 NLRB 1118, 1120–1121, 1123 (2006)
(unilateral changes to working conditions are likely to have an
impact on union support); Penn Tank Lines, 336 NLRB 1066,
1067–1068 (2001) (unilateral changes to terms and conditions
of employment minimize the influence of organized bargaining
and show employees that their union is irrelevant, thereby cre-
ating a clear possibility of a detrimental or long lasting effect
on employee support for the union). The Board also has recog-
nized that unilateral increases in employee health insurance
premiums can undercut the union’s ability to function as the
employees’ bargaining representative, because the unilateral
changes substantially affect all unit employees and directly
impact employee compensation, one of the fundamental sub-
jects of bargaining. Priority One Services, supra (discussing
the effect of a 9.5-percent increase in health insurance premi-
ums). The unilateral change to employee health care at issue in
this case was even more significant than the change discussed
in Priority One Services, because instead of a percentage in-
crease to premiums that employees were already paying (as in
Priority One), Comau’s unilaterally changed employee health
insurance premiums from zero (since Comau paid all costs
under the 2005–2008 contract) to hundreds of dollars per month
in some cases.
Finally, the record shows that Comau’s unilateral change to
its employee health insurance plan had an adverse effect on
employee morale, and on the ASW/MRCC’s organizational
activities and membership. The new health care plan played a
significant role in motivating employees to sign the spring 2009
decertification petition37—indeed, all employees signed within
days (on either side) of the effective date of the new health
insurance plan, and 34 employees signed after March 1, 2009.38

37 As part of their defense, the Respondents maintain that employee
disaffection with the ASW/MRCC preceded the March 1, 2009 unfair
labor practice. The record does show that before March 1, 2009, there
was some employee discontent with the ASW/MRCC about issues such
as high union dues, the ASW/MRCC’s failure to provide training and
job placements, and the ASW/MRCC’s failure to protect bargaining
unit members from losing Comau job opportunities to workers that did
not belong to the bargaining unit. Several of those sources of discon-
tent, however, had been present since the ASW/MRCC merger in
March 2007, but were tolerated to some degree with the hope that in the
end, the merger would be beneficial. More important, even though
there were other reasons for bargaining unit employees to be unhappy
with the ASW/MRCC, the fact remains that Comau’s unilateral imposi-
tion of the health insurance plan had a reasonable tendency to (and did,
in fact) cause employee disaffection with the ASW/MRCC.
38 The Respondents contend that the Acting General Counsel is lim-
ited to arguing events that occurred on or after March 1, 2009, the day
that the health insurance plan took effect (and thus the date of the unfair
labor practice). While it is true that March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice
is the only one at issue, the facts about that unfair labor practice are not
limited to March 1 and after, particularly on the issue of whether a
causal relationship exists between the unfair labor practice and the loss
of union support. Simply put, this is not a case where the unfair labor
In addition, as witness Daniel Malloy explained, members of
the bargaining unit were upset when Comau imposed its last
best offer (in December 2008), but when the health insurance
premiums began coming out of employee paychecks in March
2009, employees wanted to fry the ASW/MRCC leadership
because it failed to deliver on its promise to protect employees
from having to pay the premiums.39 Those sentiments persisted
for the rest of 2009, as employees pursued the decertification
petition with the Board (particularly after receiving yet another
paycheck with unwanted deductions), questioned the
ASW/MRCC’s efforts to address the issue of employee
healthcare at meetings, and ultimately renewed the effort to get
rid of the ASW/MRCC by circulating the December 2009 dis-
affection petition.40

practice occurred on a specific date and took everyone by surprise. To
the contrary, Comau announced the March 1, 2009 health insurance
plan effective date in December 2008, and held meetings in January
2009 to prepare employees for the change. Thus, the new health insur-
ance plan (which ultimately was found to be an unfair labor practice)
was on the minds of employees at least by January 2009, after the im-
passe had been broken and before the decertification petition began
circulating. To the extent that the Respondents suggest that they were
not given an opportunity to litigate this issue (employee sentiment
before March 1, 2009), I note that the record demonstrates that the
contrary is true. The Respondents presented extensive testimony about
factors that could have caused employee disaffection before March 1,
2009 (to support their defense that employee discontent preceded the
unilateral change to the employee health insurance plan), and the par-
ties offered exhibits (most without objection) relating to events that
occurred before March 1, 2009. See, e.g., RE. Exh. 13 (transcript of
the November 19, 2009 St. Gobain hearing regarding the decertification
petition circulated in February and March 2009).
That being stated, the fact remains that even if the causation analysis
were limited to events that occurred on or after March 1, 2009, there is
ample evidence that links the March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice with
the loss of support for the ASW/MRCC leading up to the December
2009 disaffection petition. See discussion accompanying this footnote,
supra.
39 The Respondents suggest that employee discontent about the
health insurance plan did not arise until March 6, 2009, the actual date
that the first premiums were deducted from their paychecks. See RE.
Br. at 11. The purpose of that argument is to suggest that employees
who signed the decertification petition between March 1 and March 5
(28 employees out of the 34 that signed the petition on or after March
1) were not aware of the March 1 unfair labor practice because the first
health insurance premiums were not deducted from their paychecks
until March 6. I do not find this argument to be persuasive. First, the
Board has ruled that the unfair labor practice occurred on March 1,
2009, and that ruling is binding for purposes of my analysis. Second,
as discussed above, the March 1, 2009 effective date of the health in-
surance plan was well publicized, and naturally was on the minds of
employees for some time. Once March 1 arrived, the health insurance
plan took effect, and there was no question that health insurance premi-
ums would be deducted from employee paychecks. Just as a reasonable
employee would be aware of a forthcoming reduction in wages, I find
that a reasonable employee would have been aware of the forthcoming
new healthcare premiums both when the decertification petition was
circulated in late February 2009, and when the new health insurance
plan took effect on March 1, 2009.
40 I have considered the fact that that December 2009 disaffection
petition included language at the top of each page stating that the em-
ployees who signed the petition were not motivated to do so by Co-
COMAU, INC.

611
Thus, all of the factors outlined in Master Slack demonstrate
that Comau’s unilateral implementation of its new employee
health insurance plan on March 1, 2009, had a causal relation-
ship to the loss of support for the ASW/MRCC and in turn, the
December 2009 disaffection petition.41 The disaffection peti-
tion therefore was tainted by the March 1, 2009 unfair labor
practice, and it was unlawful for Comau to rely upon the De-
cember 2009 disaffection petition as its basis for withdrawing
recognition from the ASW/MRCC.
Based on my finding that the December 2009 disaffection
petition was tainted by the March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice,
I find that Comau committed the following violations:

By withdrawing recognition from the ASW/MRCC on De-
cember 22, 2009 and subsequently refusing to bargain with
the ASW/MRCC, Comau violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act. AT Systems West, 341 NLRB 57, 61 (2004).

mau’s unilateral implementation of the health insurance plan. As a
preliminary matter, the fact that the drafters of the petition thought such
a disclaimer was necessary supports my finding that the health insur-
ance plan and the accompanying premiums remained points of concern
for bargaining unit employees. More important, the petition language
cannot immunize the petition from the effects of the March 2009 unfair
labor practice that the Board found in the earlier Comau case, 356
NLRB at 86–87. As indicated above, see fn. 34, supra, the Master
Slack causation test is an objective, not a subjective, test that evaluates
(among other things) the tendency of the violation to cause employee
disaffection, and whether the nature of the violation includes the possi-
bility of a detrimental or lasting effect on employees. The subjective
views of employees about a past unfair labor practice and its effects are
not relevant to the Master Slack inquiry.
41 The cases that Comau and the CEA cited in arguing that Comau’s
March 1, 2009 unfair labor practice did not cause the ASW/MRCC to
lose support are distinguishable. See RE. Brief at 34–35; RU. Br. at
20–23. Specifically, the decisions that the Respondents cited (as exam-
ples of cases where the Board or the federal court of appeals held that
prior unfair labor practices did not have a causal relationship to the loss
of union support) are fact-driven decisions that bear little similarity to
this case. See Champion Home Builders, 350 NLRB at 791–792 (no
causal relationship found where all but one of the unfair labor practices
occurred 5–6 months before the disaffection petition, and the record did
not show that employees knew about the more recent violation; the
nature of violations did not support a finding of taint because they were
isolated and/or brief events; the record did not show that the violations
had a tendency to cause employee disaffection towards the union; and
the record did not show that the scheduling disputes had an adverse
effect on employee morale, organizational activity or union member-
ship); Garden Ridge Management, 347 NLRB 131, 134 (2006) (same,
regarding the effect of a bargaining session scheduling dispute); Master
Slack, 271 NLRB at 84–85 (same, where the unfair labor practices were
committed 8–9 years before the withdrawal of recognition and backpay
issues were still being litigated, and there was limited evidence that the
backpay dispute had an adverse effect on employee morale, organiza-
tional activity or union membership); Pleasantview Nursing Home v.
NLRB, 351 F.3d 747, 764 (6th Cir. 2003) (same, regarding the effect of
an employer’s breach of its duty to collect union initiation fees and its
unilateral decision to increase the wages of 6 employees in the 78-
employee bargaining unit); see also Saint Gobain Abrasives, 342
NLRB at 434 (cited by the CEA, and only standing for the proposition
that a hearing is necessary to determine whether the employer’s unilat-
eral change to employee health insurance had a causal nexus to em-
ployee disaffection).
By extending recognition to the CEA and entering into a col-
lective bargaining agreement with the CEA when the CEA
did not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the
bargaining unit, Comau interfered with the formation and ad-
ministration of a labor organization in violation of Section
8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act. AM Property Holdings Corp., 352
NLRB 279, 281 f n. 10 (2008); AT Systems West, supra at 62.

By giving effect to the union security clause in its collective
bargaining agreement with the CEA at a time when the CEA
did not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the
bargaining unit, Comau encouraged membership in a labor
organization and discriminated against employees regarding
hiring and the terms and conditions of employment, in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Caldor, Inc., 319
NLRB 728, 739 (1995).

I also find that the CEA committed the following violations in
connection with Comau’s withdrawal of recognition of the
ASW/MRCC and recognition of the CEA:

By accepting recognition from Comau and by entering into a
collective-bargaining agreement with Comau when it did not
have the uncoerced support of a majority of employees in the
bargaining unit, the CEA violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act. Ladies Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 732
(1961); United Workers of America, 352 NLRB 286, 286
(2008).

By maintaining a union security clause in its collective bar-
gaining agreement with Comau at a time when the CEA did
not represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the bar-
gaining unit, the CEA caused and attempted to cause Comau
to violate Section 8(a)(3) by encouraging membership in a la-
bor organization and discriminating against employees re-
garding hiring and the terms and conditions of employment.
Through these actions, the CEA violated Section 8(b)(2) of
the Act. Rockville Nursing Center, 193 NLRB 959, 965
(1971).
B. Comau’s and the CEA’s Conduct in Asking Employees
to Sign Dues-Checkoff Authorization Forms
1. Complaint allegations
In addition to the larger issues (discussed above) related to
Comau’s decision to withdraw recognition from the
ASW/MRCC and recognize the CEA as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative for the bargaining unit, the Act-
ing General Counsel also alleged that both Comau and the CEA
violated the Act when they asked employees to sign dues-
checkoff authorizations for paying CEA dues.
Specifically, the complaint alleged that in May 2010, Comau
threatened employees at the Jefferson North, Novi, and South-
field facilities with termination if they failed to authorize auto-
matic dues-deduction payments to the CEA (in violation of Sec.
8(a)(1) of the Act). (GC Exh. 1(v), pars. 19, 27.) The com-
plaint also alleged that in May 2010, the CEA threatened em-
ployees at the Novi and Southfield facilities with loss of em-
ployment if they failed to authorize automatic dues deduction
payments to the CEA (in violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act). (GC Exh. 1(v), pars. 23, 28.)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

612
2. Both Comau and the CEA violated the Act by conduct
that reasonably could coerce employees to sign
dues-checkoff authorization forms
There is no dispute that under a collective-bargaining agree-
ment that contains a valid union-security clause, an employee
may be required to pay union dues as a condition of employ-
ment, and may be discharged for failing to pay the required
dues. Longshoreman ILA Local 1575 (Puerto Rico Marine
Management), 322 NLRB 727, 729 (1996). However, a union
may not compel union members to execute dues-checkoff au-
thorizations as a condition of their employment; nor can a un-
ion threaten to cause employees to be discharged if they fail to
execute dues-checkoff authorizations, because the execution of
a dues-checkoff authorization is entirely voluntary. Id. at 729–
730 (noting that a union’s threat to cause discharge under these
circumstances would violate Sec. 8(b)(1)(A)). More generally,
a union violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act if it engages in
conduct that may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate em-
ployees in the exercise of Section 7 rights. Culinary Workers
Local 226 (Casino Royale, Inc.), 323 NLRB 148, 159 (1997).
Similarly, an employer may not lead employees to believe
that the dues-checkoff authorization method for fulfilling their
financial obligations to their union is compulsory. Rochester
Mfg. Co., 323 NLRB 260, 262 (1997). An employer that di-
rects employees to sign dues-checkoff forms authorizing deduc-
tion of dues under the threat of losing their employment has
interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exer-
cise of their protected Section 7 rights, in violation of Section
8(a)(1). Id. An employer also violates Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act if the employer’s conduct or statements have a reasonable
tendency to interfere with, restrain, or coerce union or protected
activities. Yoshi’s Japanese Restaurant & Jazz House, 330
NLRB 1339, 1339 fn. 3 (2000) (noting that the employer’s
subjective motivation for the statements is not relevant); see
also Park N’ Fly, Inc., 349 NLRB 132, 140 (2007).
a. Comau violations
In this case, the facts demonstrate that in May 2010, Comau
management personnel spoke with three employees who initial-
ly declined to sign dues-checkoff authorization forms: Gaspar
Calandrino (Jefferson North field service location); Nizar Ak-
kari (Novi facility); and Jeffrey T. Brown (Southfield facility).
Comau Human Resources Director Fred Begle specifically
warned Akkari that he could be terminated if he did not sign the
form. Site Supervisor Duane Jerore similarly warned Calan-
drino that he could be disciplined or discharged if he did not
sign a dues-checkoff authorization form. See FOF, above,
section II(H). Those explicit (and uncontested) statements each
violated Section 8(a)(1), as the threat of losing employment or
being disciplined had a reasonable tendency to coerce Akkari
and Calandrino in the exercise of their protected Section 7
rights to choose whether or not to sign the dues-checkoff au-
thorization forms. Rochester Mfg. Co., supra at 262.42

42 As noted in the statement of facts, I do not give weight to the con-
tent of GC Exh. 6, a chain of emails apparently initiated by Jill Opasik
regarding employees who had not yet signed a dues-checkoff authoriza-
tion form. Among other things, the record does not establish Opasik’s
I also find that Begle’s statements to Calandrino (in a fol-
lowup conversation that Jerore joined), and Begle’s statements
to Jeffrey T. Brown violated Section 8(a)(1). In those exchang-
es, although Begle did not explicitly link the failure to sign the
dues-checkoff authorization form with possible discipline or
termination, Begle questioned the employees about their refusal
to sign the form, questioned the reliability of paying by other
means (such as cash), and (as to Calandrino) warned of conse-
quences that could result if he chose another method of pay-
ment and fell behind with his dues. See FOF, above, section
II(H). Viewing those statements as a whole, along with the
context of Begle taking the unusual step of having a shop floor
employee brought to a private office to speak with him (in per-
son as to Brown, and by phone as to Calandrino), I find that
Begle’s remarks to Calandrino and Jeffrey T. Brown had a
reasonable tendency to coerce those employees in exercising
their Section 7 rights.
b. CEA violations
The Acting General Counsel also presented evidence about
the role that two CEA committeemen (James Kayko and Fred
Lutz) played in asking employees to sign dues-checkoff author-
ization forms.
I recommend dismissing the allegations in paragraph 23(a)
of the complaint because the evidence that the Acting General
Counsel presented about James Kayko’s conduct falls short of
proving a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). Kayko did ask Ak-
kari to sign a dues-checkoff authorization form, but he did not
suggest that any adverse employment action would result when
Akkari refused. Kayko did mention that Akkari might be con-
tacted by Fred Begle about the matter, but he did not participate
in any ensuing conversations between Akkari and Begle, or
suggest that the possible contact with Begle would involve any
adverse consequences. See FOF, above, section II(H). View-
ing Kayko’s conduct as a whole, I find that his actions or
statements did not have a reasonable tendency to coerce Akkari
to sign the dues-checkoff authorization form.
As for Kayko’s interactions with Dave Baloga (also covered
by par. 23(a)), I find that both witnesses were equally credible
in their respective accounts of Kayko’s request that Baloga sign
a dues-checkoff authorization form. Since the Acting General
Counsel bears the burden of proving the allegations in its com-
plaint by a preponderance of the evidence, the tie between
Kayko’s and Baloga’s testimony leads me to find that the Act-
ing General Counsel did not demonstrate that the CEA (through
Kayko) violated the Act in its interactions with Baloga about
the dues-checkoff authorization form. See Central National
Gottesman, 303 NLRB 143, 145 (1991) (finding that General
Counsel did not meet its burden of proof because the testimony
that the allegation occurred was equally credible as the testimo-
ny that denied the allegation); Blue Flash Express, 109 NLRB
591, 591–592 (1954) (same), questioned on other grounds Alle-
gheny Ludlum Corp. v. NLRB, 104 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

role as a Comau supervisor or agent, and also does not establish with
sufficient reliability that her specific comments reached any bargaining
unit employees. See fn. 24, supra. In light of those shortcomings, the
exhibit does not demonstrate that Comau violated the Act.
COMAU, INC.

613
Lutz’ interactions with Jeffrey T. Brown are different in
character, and do establish that the CEA (through Lutz) violat-
ed Section 8(b)(1)(A). ( See GC Exh. 1(v), par. 23(b).) Lutz’
initial requests that Brown sign a dues-checkoff authorization
form were merely requests that were not linked to any threat of
adverse employment action. However, when Brown refused to
sign the form, Lutz escorted Brown to Begle’s office, and also
participated in Begle’s meeting with Brown. Lutz’ presence at
the meeting served as a CEA endorsement of Begle’s remarks
and of Begle’s treatment of Brown’s refusal to sign the dues-
checkoff authorization form as a point of concern. Further, like
Begle, Lutz questioned the reliability of paying dues by means
other than dues checkoff. Taking the totality of the circum-
stances into account, Lutz’ conduct and statements to Jeffrey T.
Brown had a reasonable tendency to coerce Brown to sign the
dues-checkoff authorization form, and thus violated the Act.
3. Comau did not cure its violations of the act regarding
dues-checkoff authorization forms
As part of its response to the allegations in the complaint re-
garding the dues-checkoff authorization forms, Comau con-
tends that any violation that Begle committed was cured by the
June 2010 memorandum that Comau posted in the workplace.
(RE. Br. at 25 (citing RE. Exh. 9(b).)43 In so arguing, Comau
invokes Passavant Memorial Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138
(1978), which explains that an employer may relieve itself of
liability for unlawful conduct in some circumstances by repudi-
ating the conduct. Id. at 138. To be effective, the repudiation
must be: timely; unambiguous; specific in nature to the coer-
cive conduct; adequately publicized to the employees involved;
free from other proscribed illegal conduct, and accompanied by
assurances that the employer will not interfere with employees’
Section 7 rights in the future. Id.; see also Cintas Corp., 353
NLRB 752, 753 fn. 8, 769 (2009). The employer also must not
engage in proscribed conduct after the repudiation. Id.
Comau’s effort at repudiation (sent by Begle) read as fol-
lows:

The ASW has charged that our employees have been coerced
into signing dues authorization forms. We have investigated
this allegation and do not believe it to be factually accurate.
Just to be sure that everyone understands their rights, howev-
er, we want to confirm the following:

While the contract contains a requirement that employees be-
come dues paying members, the contract does not require that
dues be paid through a payroll deduction authorization, with
dues to be withheld by the Company from your paycheck. It
is up to you whether you wish to authorize payment of your
dues in that manner.

43 The CEA did not address the substantive issues concerning the
dues-checkoff authorization forms in its posttrial brief. It did, however,
deny the allegations in its answer to the complaint. The record does not
show that the CEA repudiated (or attempted to repudiate) any viola-
tions associated with the dues-checkoff authorization forms. The CEA
did issue a letter of understanding (that authorized payment by cashier’s
check under certain parameters), but the letter of understanding did not
address or repudiate any previous violations of Sec. 7 rights.
In the event anyone signed a dues deduction authorization
form under the mistaken assumption that the Company re-
quired this, you should feel free to rescind the authorization
and deal with the CEA directly. In that event, please so indi-
cate to me in writing.

(RE. Exh. 9(b).) The repudiation does not satisfy the standard
set forth in Passavant because (among other things) it was not
specific to the nature of the misconduct. The memo makes no
reference to the threats of termination that Comau communicat-
ed to employees, nor does it address the other actions and
statements that Comau took that had a reasonable tendency to
coerce employees to sign the dues-checkoff authorization forms
in the first instance. The attempted repudiation was therefore
incomplete.44 Accordingly, my finding that Comau violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act remains unchanged.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By withdrawing recognition from the ASW/MRCC on
December 22, 2009, as the bargaining unit’s exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative, Comau violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.
2. By extending recognition to the CEA as the bargaining
unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining representative on De-
cember 22, 2009, when the CEA did not represent an uncoerced
majority of employees in the bargaining unit, Comau violated
Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.
3. By entering into a collective-bargaining agreement with
the CEA (effective December 22, 2009) when the CEA did not
represent an uncoerced majority of employees in the bargaining
unit, Comau violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.
4. By giving effect to the union-security clause in its collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with the CEA (effective December
22, 2009) at a time when the CEA did not represent an unco-
erced majority of employees in the bargaining unit, Comau
encouraged membership in a labor organization and discrimi-
nated against employees regarding hiring and the terms and
conditions of employment, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act.
5. By telling employees at the Novi and Jefferson North fa-
cilities in May 2010 that they could be disciplined or dis-
charged if they did not sign dues-checkoff authorization forms,
Comau interfered with, restrained, or coerced employees in the
exercise of Section 7 rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
6. By making statements to employees and engaging in con-
duct in May 2010 that had a reasonable tendency to coerce
employees at the Southfield and Jefferson North facilities to
sign dues-checkoff authorization forms, Comau interfered with,

44 Comau’s memorandum was also ambiguous because it did not ad-
dress restrictions that the CEA placed (with Comau’s tacit consent) on
other forms of payment. In a letter of understanding, the CEA advised
the unit that any employee who elected not to use dues checkoff was
required to pay dues by hand delivering a certified cashiers check to
Harry Yale, Fred Lutz, or Jeffrey H. Brown. Comau was aware of the
restrictions that the CEA imposed (since Yale presented the letter of
understanding to Begle for review), and essentially acquiesced to the
restrictions by allowing them to persist even after Comau issued its
June 2010 memo. See FOF, above, sec. II(I).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

614
restrained, or coerced employees in the exercise of Section 7
rights, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
7. By accepting recognition from Comau on December 22,
2009, as the bargaining unit’s exclusive collective-bargaining
representative when it did not have the uncoerced support of a
majority of employees in the bargaining unit, the CEA violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
8. By entering into a collective-bargaining agreement effec-
tive December 22, 2009, with Comau when it did not have the
uncoerced support of a majority of employees in the bargaining
unit, the CEA violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
9. By maintaining a union-security clause in its collective-
bargaining agreement with Comau (effective December 22,
2009) at a time when the CEA did not represent an uncoerced
majority of employees in the bargaining unit, the CEA caused
and attempted to cause Comau to violate Section 8(a)(3) by
encouraging membership in a labor organization and discrimi-
nating against employees regarding hiring and the terms and
conditions of employment. Through these actions, the CEA
violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act.
10. By making statements to employees and engaging in
conduct in May 2010 that had a reasonable tendency to coerce
employees at Comau’s Southfield complex to sign dues-
checkoff authorization forms, the CEA restrained or coerced
employees in the exercise of Section 7 rights, in violation of
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
11. The unfair labor practices stated in conclusions 1–10
above are unfair labor practices that affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and(7) of the Act.
12. I recommend dismissing the allegations stated in para-
graph 23(a) of the complaint.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act. While most of the remedies that I
will require will be set forth in the Order attached to my deci-
sion,45 the Acting General Counsel’s request for an affirmative
bargaining order requires specific attention.
The Board consistently has held that an affirmative bargain-
ing order is the traditional, appropriate remedy for an 8(a)(5)
refusal to bargain with the lawful collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of an appropriate unit of employees. Caterair Inter-
national, 322 NLRB 64, 68 (1996). Applying that principle,
the Board recently ruled that an affirmative bargaining order

45 To the extent that I will require Comau and the CEA to reimburse
bargaining unit members for the CEA fees and dues that were collected
unlawfully on or after December 22, 2009, that remedy is required
because the CEA collective-bargaining agreement and union-security
clause were unlawful. I will also require Comau and the CEA to reim-
burse bargaining unit members for daily compound interest on any such
reimbursement amounts as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Cen-
ter, 356 NLRB 6 (2010). I will not require any reimbursement of CEA
dues based on the violations associated with coercion in obtaining dues-
checkoff authorization forms. See Rochester Mfg., 323 NLRB at 263
(no reimbursement required if affected employees were subject to a
lawful union-security clause obligating them to pay dues).
was warranted as a remedy for an employer’s unlawful with-
drawal of recognition from a union. Vincent/Metro Trucking,
355 NLRB 289 (2010). In so ruling, the Board examined the
facts of the case under District of Columbia Circuit precedent
that states that an affirmative bargaining order must be justified
by reasoned analysis that includes an explicit balancing of three
considerations: (1) the employees’ Section 7 rights; (2) whether
other purposes of the Act override the rights of employees to
choose their bargaining representative; and (3) whether alterna-
tive remedies are adequate to remedy the violations of the Act.
Id. (citing Vincent Industrial Plastics v. NLRB, 209 F.3d 727,
738 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
Adhering to the Board’s approach, I have analyzed the facts
of this case under the three-factor balancing test outlined by the
District of Columbia Circuit.

(1) An affirmative bargaining order in this case will vindicate
the Section 7 rights of the employees who supported the
ASW/MRCC and were denied the benefits of that union’s
collective-bargaining by Comau’s unlawful decision to with-
draw recognition. To the extent that some employees may
still oppose the ASW,46 an affirmative bargaining order will
not unduly prejudice their Section 7 rights because the affirm-
ative bargaining order is temporary. In addition, it bears re-
peating that Comau committed an unfair labor practice that
had a causal relationship to ASW/MRCC’s loss of employee
support, and thus to the December 2009 disaffection petition
that served as the springboard for Comau to withdraw recog-
nition.47 Under those circumstances, it is only by restoring the
status quo ante and requiring Comau to bargain with the ASW
for a reasonable period of time that employees will be able to
fairly decide for themselves whether they wish to continue to
be represented by the ASW.

(2) The affirmative bargaining order also serves the policies
of the Act by fostering meaningful collective bargaining and
industrial peace. It removes Comau’s incentive to delay bar-
gaining in the hope of further discouraging support for the
ASW. It also ensures that the ASW will not be pressured, by
the possibility of another decertification or disaffection peti-
tion, to achieve immediate results at the bargaining table fol-
lowing the Board’s resolution of its unfair labor practice and
the issuance of a cease-and-desist order.

(3) A cease-and-desist order, without a temporary decertifica-
tion bar, would be inadequate to remedy Comau’s and the
CEA’s violations, because it would permit a decertification
petition to be filed before Comau had afforded the employees
a reasonable time to regroup and bargain through the ASW in
an effort to reach a collective-bargaining agreement. Such a
result would be particularly unfair in circumstances such as
those here, where the nature of Comau’s unfair labor practice

46 After Comau withdrew recognition, the ASW changed its affilia-
tion (in March 2010) from the MRCC to the CIC. Both entities are part
of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters.
47 The Board’s decision concerning this unfair labor practice (the
March 1, 2009 unilateral implementation of a new health care plan for
employees) also contains an affirmative bargaining order. Comau, 356
NLRB at 87.
COMAU, INC.

615
likely created a lasting negative impression of the ASW in the
bargaining unit, and where Comau immediately recognized a
replacement union (the CEA) that has been able to develop re-
lationships with bargaining unit employees while the ASW
litigated its charges. I find that those circumstances outweigh
the temporary impact the affirmative bargaining order will
have on the rights of employees who oppose ASW’s contin-
ued union representation.

See Vincent/Metro Trucking, supra at 1–2 (citing similar issues
that weighed in favor of an affirmative bargaining order); Spec-
trum Health-Kent Community Campus, 353 NLRB 996, 996–
997 (2009) (same); AT Systems West, 341 NLRB at 63 (same).
Based on my analysis under the three-factor balancing test ap-
plied by the Board, I find that an affirmative bargaining order
with a temporary decertification bar for a reasonable period of
time is necessary in this case to fully remedy Comau’s unlawful
withdrawal of recognition of the ASW.48
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]

48 I have considered the fact that after Comau withdrew recognition
from the ASW/MRCC, the ASW subsequently (in March 2010)
changed its affiliation from the MRCC to the CIC (still within the Unit-
ed Brotherhood of Carpenters). The CEA suggests that the bargaining
unit should not be forced to accept the ASW/CIC as its bargaining
representative, since the unit did not vote to affiliate with the CIC.
While the CEA’s argument has some superficial appeal, I find that as
an equitable matter, the ASW should not be penalized for continuing to
conduct its operations while this litigation was pending. It should come
as no surprise that the ASW made various decisions (including the
decision to affiliate with the CIC) since December 22, 2009, the date
that Comau withdrew recognition. To the extent that the bargaining
unit may be unfamiliar with (or skeptical of) some of the changes that
the ASW has made, it will be up to the ASW to persuade the unit
(while the affirmative bargaining order is in effect, and beyond) that the
changes are beneficial.