2019006158 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 22, 2020)

CMECH (GUANGZHOU) LTD.

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardJun 22, 2020

2019006158 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 22, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/681,002 08/18/2017 Ding Gou Kun P11877US01 6280 22885 7590 06/22/2020 MCKEE, VOORHEES & SEASE, P.L.C. 801 GRAND AVENUE SUITE 3200 DES MOINES, IA 50309-2721 EXAMINER RAMSEY, JEREMY C ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3634 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/22/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): michelle.woods@ipmvs.com patatty@ipmvs.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte DING GOU KUN Appeal 2019-006158 Application 15/681,002 Technology Center 3600 Before CHARLES N. GREENHUT, MICHAEL L. HOELTER, and ANNETTE R. REIMERS, Administrative Patent Judges. GREENHUT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–14 and 17–21. See Non-Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM IN PART. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as CMECH (GUANGZHOU) LTD. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2019-006158 Application 15/681,002 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claims are directed to a cupboard door balance system. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A cupboard, comprising: a box with an open front, a back, and opposite sides; a door mounted to the box for vertical movement between open and closed positions relative to the open front; pulley system mounted adjacent to the box back and connected to the door, wherein the pulley system comprises at least one pulley and at least one door belt extended substantially horizontally between the pull[e]y and the door, and wherein the door belt has a rear end secured to the pulley and a forward end secured to the door; and a weight connected to the pulley system at a location behind the door to counter-balance the door. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date MacNeil US 5,163,494 Nov. 17, 1992 Schenck US 5,216,782 June 8, 1993 Kun US 9,637,964 B1 May 2, 2017 DeCastro US 2008/0009234 A1 Jan. 10, 2008 Lamsfuss EP 0945575 A2 Sept. 9, 1999 REJECTIONS2 Claims 1–14 and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), as being indefinite. Non-Final Act. 3. This rejection is not contested (Appeal Br. 13) and is therefore summarily affirmed and not further discussed herein. In re Berger, 279 F.3d 975 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affirming the Board’s affirmance of 2 The Examiner withdrew the double patenting rejection. Ans. 11 (“statutory [sic non-statutory] double patenting rejection has been withdrawn”). Appeal 2019-006158 Application 15/681,002 3 an uncontested rejection, holding that the appellant had waived the right to contest the rejection by not presenting arguments on appeal to the Board); Hyatt v. Dudas, 551 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“the applicant can waive appeal of a ground of rejection”). Claims 1, 2, 6–11, 14, and 17–21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Schenck and Lamsfuss. Non-Final Act. 5. Claims 3–5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Schenck, Lamsfuss, and DeCastro. Non-Final Act. 10. Claims 12 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Schenck, Lamsfuss, and MacNeil. Non-Final Act. 11. OPINION In rejecting claims 1 and 18, the independent claims before us, based on Schenck and Lamsfuss, the Examiner begins by citing Schenck as disclosing a basic “cupboard” structure with a pulley-actuated door. Non-Final Act. 5. The Examiner then proposes to modify Schenck’s cables 53, 55 with belts, as taught by Lamsfuss, because “the flat belt will wind on top of itself, whereas, when using a cable, the cable must wind in a linear fashion along the drum, resulting in possible misalignment or tangles of the cable.” Non-Final Act. 6. Appellant takes issue with this reasoning, pointing out that Schenck’s cable, in its preferred embodiment, involves only a single wrap and is therefore unlikely to suffer from the problem the Examiner’s proposed modification purports to remedy. Appeal Br. 5. The Examiner also proposes a further modification to Schenck to have separate belts and pulleys. Non-Final Act. 6. The Examiner does not explain precisely why this further modification is proposed and this further modification does not appear to specifically address any of the elements the Examiner indicated Appeal 2019-006158 Application 15/681,002 4 Schenck was lacking in order to satisfy Appellant’s claim language. Non-Final Act. 5–6. We speculate that perhaps it is because the Examiner recognized that Schenck’s design requires cables 53, 55 to include at least a single wrap, wherein the cables pass beside themselves at least once on sheaves 80, 82 (see Schenck Fig. 2), and this would not appear to be possible if, as the Examiner proposes, flat belts that wind on top of themselves were used to replace Schenck’s cables. Thus, Schenck’s sheave system must undergo a substantial redesign to accommodate the Examiner’s proposed modification. That the Examiner cited Schenck seemingly only to redesign it is strong evidence that the Examiner improperly resorted to hindsight in the obviousness analysis. See MPEP § 2143.01(VI). Accordingly, we do not sustain the obviousness rejections on the grounds set forth by the Examiner. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s indefiniteness rejection is summarily AFFIRMED. The Examiner’s obviousness rejections are REVERSED. DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–14, 17 112(b) Indefiniteness 1–14, 17 1, 2, 6–11, 14, 17–21 103 Schenck, Lamsfuss 1, 2, 6–11, 14, 17–21 3–5 103 Schenck, Lamsfuss, DeCastro 3–5 12–13 103 Schenck, Lamsfuss, MacNeil 12–13 Overall Outcome 1–14, 17 18–21 Appeal 2019-006158 Application 15/681,002 5 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED IN PART3 3 “The affirmance of the rejection of a claim on any of the grounds specified constitutes a general affirmance of the decision of the examiner on that claim, except as to any ground specifically reversed. The Board may also remand an application to the examiner.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).