Cloud Crowding Corp.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 11, 2018

No. 86191213 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 11, 2018)

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: April 11, 2018

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re Cloud Crowding Corp.
_____

Serial No. 86191213
_____

Cloud Crowding Corp., pro se.

Roselle M. Herrera, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 124,
Lydia Belzer, Managing Attorney.
_____

Before Bergsman, Shaw, and Larkin,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Larkin, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Cloud Crowding Corp. (“Applicant”) seeks registration on the Principal Register
of the mark DATA ATOM (“DATA” disclaimed) in standard characters for:
Cloud computing featuring software for use management,
storage, protection, movement, preservation, replication,
delivery and streaming of any type of data, including, voice,
audio, audio/visual, video, text, images, mixed content and
transactional data; Computer services, namely, cloud
hosting provider services; Computer services, namely,
integration of private and public cloud computing
environments; Consulting services in the field of cloud
computing; Providing temporary use of on-line non-
downloadable cloud computing software for management,
storage, protection, movement, preservation, replication,
delivery and streaming of any type of data, including, voice,
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audio, audio/visual, video, text, images, mixed content and
transactional data; Providing virtual computer systems
and virtual computer environments through cloud
computing; Technical support services, namely, remote
and on-site infrastructure management services for
monitoring, administration and management of public and
private cloud computing IT and application systems;
Updating and maintaining cloud-based computer software
through on-line updates, enhancements, patches, self-
automated and autonomously updating software, virtual
machines, self-driven downloads, e-mail, CD, DVD, usb key
and initial installation, in International Class 42.1
The Trademark Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s mark
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that it
so resembles the mark ATOMIC DATA (“DATA” disclaimed) in standard characters
shown in Registration No. 4851636 for:
Computer services, namely, information technology
consulting services; information technology support
services, namely, technical oversight and administration of
computer systems and software for others and
troubleshooting in the nature of diagnosing and resolving
computer systems and software problems; design,
development and implementation of computer software for
others; computer software development services; remote
support services, namely, remote administration and
management of inhouse and hosted datacenter devices,
databases, and software applications, and remote database
administration services; remote service desk and helpdesk
services, remote monitoring of computer systems for
others; analysis and design of technical security and
firewall systems for computer networks; providing network
operations center services in the nature of computer
consulting services in the area of network infrastructure
systems and in analysis, assembly, integration and
monitoring of information technology infrastructure for

1 Application Serial No. 86191213 was filed on February 12, 2014 under Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b), on the basis of Applicant’s allegation of a bona fide
intention to use the mark in commerce.
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others; providing computer monitoring service to track
hardware and software performance and processes; remote
operation of advanced network management software for
others; Web site hosting services; computer hard drive data
backup and recovery services; e-mail migration and server
migration services; migration of datacenter, server and
database applications; database design and creation
services; information technology project management
services; remote backup of electronic data, in International
Class 42;2
and the composite word-and-design mark depicted below

shown in Registration No. 5083830 for the same services identified in Registration
No. 4851636, as well as other services in International Classes 35, 37, 39, and 42,3 as
to be likely, when used in connection with the services identified in the application,
to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive.
After the Examining Attorney made the refusal final, Applicant appealed and
requested reconsideration, 4 TTABVUE, which was denied. 5 TTABVUE. Following
the filing of the appeal, the Examining Attorney moved to remand the application in
order to cite Registration No. 5083830 as an additional ground for refusal of

2 Registration No. 4851636 issued on November 10, 2015. The registration also covers various
services in International Classes 35, 37, 39, and 41, but the Examining Attorney does not
base the refusal to register on the services in those classes.
3 Registration No. 5083830 issued on November 15, 2016 to the owner of Registration No.
4851636. As discussed below, we confine our analysis of the refusal of registration to a
comparison of Applicant’s mark to the mark shown in Registration No. 4851636.
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registration, 10 TTABVUE, and the Board restored jurisdiction to the Examining
Attorney for that purpose. 11 TTABVUE. After the Examining Attorney cited
Registration No. 5083830,4 and Applicant responded to that citation,5 the Examining
Attorney again made the refusal to register final,6 and the appeal was resumed. 13
TTABVUE.
The case is fully briefed.7 We affirm the refusal to register.
I. Record on Appeal
The record on appeal consists of definitions of the words “data,” “atom,” and
“atomic” from THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (ahdictionary.com);8 and the
declaration of Applicant’s corporate secretary, Moshe B. Wilshinsky, and exhibits
thereto, comprising webpages regarding the meaning of the terms “atomic data” and
“source data” in connection with computing.9

4 February 15, 2017 Office Action at 1.
5 March 22, 2017 Response to Office Action.
6 April 12, 2017 Office Action.
7 Applicant filed its main appeal brief directed to the citation of Registration No. 4851636, 7
TTABVUE, before the application was remanded for citation of Registration No. 5083830. In
the Board’s order resuming the appeal, Applicant was granted permission to file a
supplemental brief “directed solely to the newly raised issue of Registration No. 5083830.” 16
TTABVUE 2. Applicant subsequently filed a Supplemental Brief directed in large part to that
registration. 17 TTABVUE.
8 February 22, 2016 Office Action at 5-6; March 15, 2016 Office Action at 2-3; February 15,
2017 Office Action at 9-11.
9 September 6, 2016 Request for Reconsideration at 5-17. On appeal, Applicant resubmitted
the Wilshinsky declaration as a separate document, 8 TTABVUE, when it filed its main
appeal brief. 7 TTABVUE. We discourage the resubmission on appeal of materials made of
record during prosecution. See generally In re Thor Tech Inc., 85 USPQ2d 1474, 1475 n.3
(TTAB 2007).
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II. Likelihood of Confusion Analysis
Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act prohibits the registration of a mark that so
resembles a registered mark as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the
goods or services of the applicant, to cause confusion, mistake, or deception. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(d). Our determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is based
upon an analysis of all probative facts in the record that are relevant to the likelihood
of confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357,
177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973). We consider each duPont factor that is relevant
and for which there is record evidence. See, e.g., M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns,
Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006); ProMark Brands Inc. v.
GFA Brands, Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1232, 1242 (TTAB 2015). Two key factors in every
Section 2(d) case are the similarity of the marks and the similarity of the goods or
services, because the “fundamental inquiry mandated by § 2(d) goes to the cumulative
effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and
differences in the marks.” Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d
1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976).
We will confine our duPont analysis to a comparison of Applicant’s standard
character mark to the standard character mark ATOMIC DATA, which we find to be
the more relevant of the two cited registered marks. If we find a likelihood of
confusion as to the cited standard character mark, we need not find it as to the cited
composite word-and-design mark; conversely, if we do not find a likelihood of
confusion as to the cited standard character mark, we would not find it as to the cited
Serial No. 86191213
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composite mark.10 See Fiserv, Inc. v. Elec. Transaction Sys. Corp., 113 USPQ2d 1913,
1917 (TTAB 2015); In re Max Capital Grp., Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1245 (TTAB 2010).
We turn first to the issue of the similarity of the services.
A. Similarity of the Services, Channels of Trade, and Classes of
Customers
The second duPont factor concerns the “similarity or dissimilarity and nature of
the goods or services as described in an application or registration . . . .” Stone Lion
Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1159
(Fed. Cir. 2014). The analysis of this factor is premised upon the identifications of
goods or services in the application and in the cited registration. Id. at 1161-63;
Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computs. Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783,
1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990). “[L]ikelihood of confusion can be found ‘if the respective
[services] are related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their
marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that they emanate
from the same source.’” Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356,
101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83
USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)).
Applicant “concedes there is some overlap in the services.” 7 TTABVUE 10. The
Examining Attorney notes this concession and that Applicant “has not argued that

10 We note that the identifications of services in the registrations of the standard character
mark and the composite mark are identical with respect to the services that are most closely
related to those identified in the application.
Serial No. 86191213
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the services are unrelated,” 19 TTABVUE 14,11 and further argues that “the
identifications set forth in the application and registration(s) are closely related or
nearly identical and have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or
classes of purchasers.” Id. The Examining Attorney points to several places in the
respective identifications where the services overlap, or one set of services
encompasses another. Id. at 14-15.
The registrant’s broadly identified “Computer services, namely, information
technology consulting services” encompass Applicant’s narrower, field-specific
“Consulting services in the field of cloud computing.”12 Similarly, the registrant’s
broadly identified “remote support services, namely, remote administration and
management of in-house and hosted datacenter devices, databases, and software
applications, and remote database administration services” encompass Applicant’s
narrower, field-specific “technical support services, namely, remote and on-site

11 Other than conceding that the services overlap, Applicant does not address this duPont
factor in its briefs. It argues instead that the marks “are as different as night and day and
there is not the slightest possibility of confusion.” 7 TTABVUE 10.
12 The Board may take judicial notice of dictionary definitions, Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac
v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co., 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), aff’d, 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ
505 (Fed. Cir. 1983), including online dictionaries that exist in printed form or regular fixed
editions. In re Red Bull GmbH, 78 USPQ2d 1375, 1377 (TTAB 2006). We take judicial notice
that “information technology” means “the development, implementation, and maintenance of
computer hardware and software systems to organize and communicate information
electronically,” DICTIONARY.COM (Dictionary.com Unabridged Random House, Inc., accessed
on April 3, 2018), and that “cloud computing” means “Internet based computing in which
large groups of remote servers are networked so as to allow sharing of data-processing tasks,
centralized data storage, and online access to computer services or resources.”
DICTIONARY.COM (Dictionary.com Unabridged Random House, Inc., accessed on April 3,
2018).
Serial No. 86191213
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infrastructure management services for monitoring, administration and
management of public and private cloud computing IT and application system.”
Because the general consulting and support services identified in the registration
encompass the specific consulting and support services identified in the application,
the services are legally identical. In re RiseSmart Inc., 104 USPQ2d 1931, 1934-35
(TTAB 2012); In re Jump Designs LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1370, 1374 (TTAB 2006). “It is
therefore unnecessary to rule as to whether each of the other items set forth in the
involved application are so related to those in the cited registration that confusion
would be likely.” Id.13 This duPont factor supports a finding of a likelihood of
confusion.
Given the legal identity of the services in part, and the absence of any restrictions
on the services in their identifications, they are “‘presumed to travel in the same
channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.’” In re Viterra, Inc., 671 F.3d 1358,
101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard
Press Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also Stone
Lion, 110 USPQ2d at 1161-62 (legal identity of services in part justified Board’s
conclusion, without resort to extrinsic evidence, that they “covered the same potential
purchasers and channels of trade.”). This duPont factor also supports a finding of a
likelihood of confusion.

13 Likelihood of confusion may be found, and the refusal to register may be affirmed, “if there
is a likelihood of confusion involving any item that comes within the identification of
[services] in the involved application.” Jump Designs, 80 USPQ2d at 1374 (citing Tuxedo
Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981)).
Serial No. 86191213
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B. Similarity of the Marks
This duPont factor focuses on “‘the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their
entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.’” Palm
Bay Imps. Inc. v. Veuve Cliquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369,
73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting duPont, 177 USPQ at 567).
“Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks
confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re
White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)). “The proper test is not a side-
by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently
similar in terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the
marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Coach Servs., 101
USPQ2d at 1721. The legal identity of certain of the identified services reduces the
degree of similarity between the marks that is necessary for confusion to be likely.
See, e.g., Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1912; In re Mighty Tea Leaf, 601 F.3d 1342, 94
USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of
Am., 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Applicant argues that the marks are not similar in sound and appearance, in part
because “the words are reversed in the two marks . . . .” 7 TTABVUE 14. The
Examining Attorney concedes that the marks are “slightly different in appearance or
sound . . . .” 19 TTABVUE 12, but argues that “[c]onsumer confusion has even been
held likely for marks that do not physically sound or look alike but that convey the
Serial No. 86191213
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same idea, stimulate the same mental reaction, or may have the same overall
meaning.” Id. at 11.
We find that the marks are slightly different in appearance and sound. For
purposes of these means of comparison, it is significant that the two marks are not
mere transpositions of exactly the same two elements (i.e., they are not ATOM DATA
and DATA ATOM). The marks begin and end with different words and contain the
different words ATOMIC and ATOM, and Applicant’s mark is shorter in length and
more compact visually than the cited mark. With respect to sound, the cited mark
begins with the three-syllable word ATOMIC and contains a total of five syllables,
while Applicant’s mark begins with the two-syllable word DATA and contains a total
of four. The marks have different cadences when spoken due to the presence of the
three-syllable word ATOMIC at the start of the cited mark, and the presence of two
two-syllable words in Applicant’s mark.
As noted above, both Applicant and the Examining Attorney acknowledge these
differences in appearance and sound, and they devote almost all of their respective
arguments on the similarity of the marks to the comparison of them in connotation
and commercial impression. We turn now to that issue.
Applicant argues that “the commercial impressions of the subject marks are so
radically different that persons who encounter these marks are not likely at all to
assume any connection between the parties.” 7 TTABVUE 11. Applicant bases this
argument on two primary grounds: (1) the cited mark ATOMIC DATA “is at best a
weak mark and is not entitled to a broad scope of protection,” id.; and (2) “the
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reversing of the words in the respective marks is significant and creates a very
different commercial impression.” Id. at 17.
In support of its first argument, Applicant cites Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur
Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 116
USPQ2d 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2015), Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d
1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and other Federal Circuit and Board
authorities discussing the sixth duPont factor (the number and nature of similar
marks in use on similar goods or services), claiming that “[b]ased on third party
usage, the term ‘atomic data’ is perceived as a generic, or at least a highly descriptive,
term, and it is not perceived as a trademark.” Id. at 12. According to Applicant,
“Atomic Data is a widely recognized generic/descriptive term, widely used in this
industry to refer to ‘data elements that represent the lowest level of detail,” which
renders the cited mark “exceptionally weak,” id. at 14, and “it probably was error for
a registration to even have issued.” Id. at 16.
Applicant’s second argument for dissimilarity in meaning is as follows:
Regarding ATOMIC DATA, the word “data” is the noun or
subject and the modifier or adjective is “atom.” Thus the
meaning is data that is atomic. Regarding applicant’s mark
DATA ATOM, the word “atom” is the noun or subject and
the modifier or adjective is “data.” Hence the meaning is an
atom that has data. Therefore, the meanings and
perceptions of the marks are quite distinct from each other.
Id. at 17.
In response to Applicant’s first argument that the cited mark is weak, the
Examining Attorney argues that “one cannot presume that the registrant’s marks are
merely descriptive or weak” because they are not on the Supplemental Register and
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did not register on the basis of acquired distinctiveness. 19 TTABVUE 12. The
Examining Attorney further argues that Applicant has failed to provide “any evidence
of third party registrations of the terms ATOMIC or DATA for similar services, which
would be probative in showing the weakness of the mark,” and that Applicant’s
Internet evidence “does not show wide spread use of the term ‘atomic data’ to prove
that it is highly descriptive of the applied for services.” Id. at 12-13.
With respect to the significance of the word orders in the marks, the Examining
Attorney argues that the words ATOM and ATOMIC are the dominant features of
the marks because DATA is disclaimed in both. 19 TTABVUE 8-9. According to the
Examining Attorney, the “root word for ATOMIC is ATOM. Both words connote the
idea of something very small. In this case, the . . . average purchaser will remember
the idea or commercial impression of the words DATA, ATOM or ATOMIC” and “may
not specifically remember if the wording was ATOM or ATOMIC.” Id. at 9. She argues
“[m]ore specifically [that] the applicant has merely transposed the words of the
registrant’s marks and slightly altered the wording ATOMIC to ATOM.” Id. Citing
In re Wine Soc’y. of Am. Inc., 12 USPQ2d 1139 (TTAB 1989) and In re Nationwide
Indus. Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1882 (TTAB 1988), she contends that “[c]onfusion is likely
between two marks consisting of reverse combinations of the same elements if they
convey the same meaning or create substantially similar commercial impressions.”
Id. She concludes that the marks “create a confusingly similar commercial
impression, convey the same idea, stimulate the same mental reaction, and have the
same overall meaning.” Id. at 12.
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We first consider Applicant’s argument that the cited mark ATOMIC DATA “is at
best a weak mark and is not entitled to a broad scope of protection.” 7 TTABVUE 11.
Because the mark is registered on the Principal Register, we cannot entertain
Applicant’s claim that “the term ‘atomic data’ is perceived as a generic, or at least a
highly descriptive, term, and it is not perceived as a trademark,” id. at 12, or that “it
probably was error for a registration even to have issued.” Id. at 16.14 “To do so would
fail to accord the registration and the mark the validity to which they are entitled
under Sections 7(b) and 33(a)” of the Trademark Act. In re Fat Boys Water Sports
LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1517 (TTAB 2016).
We can consider, however, whether Applicant’s evidence shows that the mark
ATOMIC DATA, “while presumptively distinctive, is nevertheless weak as a source
indicator,” id. at 1517-18, or that the words “atomic data” have a particular meaning,
in the context of the relevant services, that imbues the cited mark with a different
connotation and commercial impression from Applicant’s mark. Cf. Juice Generation,
115 USPQ2d at 1674-75 (third-party uses and registrations may be probative of
whether a term is weak or has a suggestive or descriptive connotation in a particular
industry).

14 These arguments constitute a collateral attack on the registration, which we cannot
entertain on this ex parte appeal because of the statutory presumptions that we must accord
the registration under Section 7(b) of the Trademark Act. In re Dixie Rests. Inc., 105 F.3d
1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534-35 (Fed. Cir. 1997). An appeal “is not the proper forum for such
a challenge,” id. at 1534, which would properly be made in an inter partes proceeding for
cancellation of the registration.
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Applicant relies entirely upon the declaration of a corporate officer, Moshe B.
Wilshinsky, 8 TTABVUE, made of record during prosecution.15 Mr. Wilshinsky states
that “Atomic Data is a commonly used generic/descriptive term and does not serve to
identify the source of any goods or services,” that even “assuming that it is entitled
to registration as a trademark, it would be a very weak trademark and would be
entitled to a very limited scope of protection,” and that Atomic Data “is a widely
recognized generic term, widely used in this industry to refer to ‘data elements that
represent the lowest level of detail.’” 8 TTABVUE 2-3 (Wilshinsky Decl. ¶¶ 4, 12). His
declaration does not establish that he is qualified as an expert to opine about the
meaning or trademark significance of the term in the computer services industry, or
that he has personal knowledge about its use in the industry sufficient to permit him
to testify as a lay witness to those matters. Accordingly, we give no weight to his
opinions and statements on those issues, or to his opinions regarding the dissimilarity
of the marks. 8 TTABVUE 3 (Wilshinsky Decl. ¶ 13).
His declaration, however, also authenticates excerpts from several webpages
regarding the meaning of the term “atomic data,” 8 TTABVUE 2-3 ((Wilshinsky Decl.
¶¶ 5-10; Exs. 1-6), and we will consider those pages for whatever probative value they
may have on the meaning of the term in the context of the services identified in the
application and in the cited registration.16

15 September 6, 2016 Request for Reconsideration at 5-17.
16 Mr. Wilshinsky refers to exhibit numbers in the body of his declaration, but he does not
designate the attachments by those numbers. We have identified the putative exhibits by
reference to Mr. Wilshinsky’s descriptions of them.
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A page from whatis.com states that “[i]n a data warehouse, atomic data is the
lowest level of detail. Atomic data provides the base data for all data
transformations.” 8 TTABVUE 5 (Wilshinsky Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. 1).17 A page from
learn.geekinterview.com states that “[a]tomic data are data elements that represent
the lowest level of detail. For example, in a daily sales report, the individual items
sold would be atomic data, while rollups such as invoice and summary totals from
invoices are aggregate data.” 8 TTABVUE 6 (Wilshinsky Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. 2). According
to this page, “atomic data is the smallest data that has details that come up with a
complete meaning.” Id. The page provides an example of the concept in computer
programming, “a data type whether it is an action or an object that can no longer be
broken down into smaller unites [sic].”
A page from businessdictionary.com defines “atomic data” as the “[l]owest level of
detail (such as number of goods sold) from which the aggregate data (such as daily
sales summary) is computed.” 8 TTABVUE 8 (Wilshinsky Decl. ¶ 7; Ex. 3). A page
from businessintelligence.com defines “atomic data,” as used in computing, as “the
most basic piece of information among all levels of information. Large data sets, from
which analyses are conducted and business intelligence conclusions are drawn, are
constructed from many piece of atomic data.” 8 TTABVUE 9 (Wilshinsky Decl. ¶ 8;
Ex. 4). A page from Wikipedia entitled “Source data” states that such source data,
defined as raw data “that has not been processed for meaningful use to become
Information,” is sometimes called atomic data. 8 TTABVUE 11 (Wilshinsky Decl. ¶ 9;

17 The meaning of the term “data warehouse” is not set forth on this webpage.
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Ex. 5).18 Finally, pages from the website at cs.cmu.edu discuss various “Atomic Data
Types,” but do not define the term. 8 TTABVUE 13-14 (Wilshinsky Decl. ¶ 10; Ex.
6).19
Applicant argues that widespread use of “atomic data” in the computing industry
is evidenced by these webpages and “a myriad of other Internet websites.” 7
TTABVUE 15. The referenced “other Internet websites” are not in the record, and we
agree with the Examining Attorney that Mr. Wilshinsky’s declaration and
attachments do “not show wide spread use of the term ‘atomic data’ to prove that it
is highly descriptive of the applied for services.”20 19 TTABVUE 13. Applicant’s
evidence is in the nature of dictionary definitions of the term “atomic data,” and the
record is devoid of evidence of third-party uses or registrations of marks comprising
or containing the words “atomic data” for the services identified in the application
and in the cited registration. While Applicant’s evidence suffices to show that the

18 “Wikipedia is an Internet source whose contents are continuously subject to change via
collaborative user input.” In re Jimmy Moore LLC, 119 USPQ2d 1764, 1768 (TTAB 2016).
The Board “permit[s] evidence from Wikipedia and similar such sources to be made of record
when timely introduced, so that the examining attorney has an opportunity to submit
rebuttal evidence . . . .” Id. “Our consideration of Wikipedia evidence is with the recognition
of the limitations inherent in Wikipedia (e.g., that anyone can edit it and submit intentionally
false or erroneous information).” In re IP Carrier Consulting Grp., 84 USPQ2d 1028, 1032
(TTAB 2007).
19 The URL for these webpages contains the top level domain “.edu,” which indicates that the
pages are from the website of an educational institution, see In re Reed Elsevier Props. Inc.,
77 USPQ2d 1649, 1652 (TTAB 2005), but their exact source is not clear on the face of the
pages. During prosecution, however, the Examining Attorney stated that the pages were from
the website of Carnegie Mellon University, October 3, 2016 Denial of Request for
Reconsideration at 1, so we have considered them.
20 “If an applicant has relevant information, it is incumbent on applicant to make this
information of record. A mere reference to a website does not make the information of record.
In order to review the facts in this case, there should be evidence in the record.” In re
Planalytics Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457 (TTAB 2004) (footnote omitted).
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phrase “atomic data” has a particular meaning as the lowest or most elemental level
of information, we cannot find, on this record, that the cited mark ATOMIC DATA is
weak “and would be entitled to a very limited scope of protection.” 7 TTABVUE 12.
With respect to Applicant’s second argument regarding the significance of the
word order in the DATA ATOM and ATOMIC DATA marks, the Examining Attorney
invokes the principle that “the reversal in one mark of the essential elements of
another mark may serve as a basis for a finding of no likelihood of confusion only if
the transposed marks create distinctly different commercial impressions.”
Nationwide Indus., 6 USPQ2d at 1884 (RUST BUSTER for rust-penetrating spray
lubricant found to be confusingly similar to BUST RUST for penetrating oil because
both marks were “likely to be perceived by purchasers as signifying that the product
sold thereunder busts through, or breaks up, rust.”); see generally TRADEMARK
MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE Section 1207.01(b)(vii) (Oct. 2017). The
Examining Attorney argues that based upon the dictionary definitions of the words
“atom” and “data,” “the commercial impression of the term DATA ATOM would be
the smallest form of data available” and Applicant “also defines ATOMIC DATA as
the smallest form of data available.” 19 TTABVUE 10. According to the Examining
Attorney, “both marks convey the commercial impression that the data is very small
in size. Hence, the commercial impressions would be confusingly similar if not
identical despite the transposition of the terms.” Id.
We find that the transposed marks do not create “distinctly different commercial
impressions.” Nationwide Indus., 6 USPQ2d at 1884. Applicant’s argument that in
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the mark ATOMIC DATA, “the word ‘data’ is the noun or subject and the modifier or
adjective is ‘atom,’” while in the mark DATA ATOM, “the word ‘atom’ is the noun or
subject and the modifier or adjective is ‘data,’” 7 TTABVUE 17, is correct as a
grammatical matter, but it relies upon a level of attention to the marks that is
unsupported by any record evidence,21 and inconsistent with the recollection of the
average purchaser, whom Applicant acknowledges “normally retains general rather
than a specific impression of trademarks.” Id. at 11 (quoting Mini Melts, Inc. v. Reckitt
Benckiser LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1464, 1470 (TTAB 2016)). From the standpoint of the
average purchaser of the legally identical computer-related consulting and support
services, DATA ATOM and ATOMIC DATA both connote data at the elemental level.
Applicant cites several precedential and non-precedential cases in support of its
argument that the marks have different meanings. 7 TTABVUE 16-18.22 Only one,
In re Best Prods. Co., 231 USPQ 988 (TTAB 1986), deals with transposed elements,
and all are readily distinguishable on their facts. Three of the cases involved evidence
of third-party uses of elements of the subject marks, which is absent from the record
here. In Nazon, the Board found that “voluminous third-party use of ‘sexstrology’”
rendered the opposer’s claimed SEXSTROLOGY mark unprotectable. 119 USPQ2d
at 1186.23 In In re SDI Petroleum, LLC, Serial No. 86011946 (TTAB November 30,

21 Applicant does not argue that the consumers of its services are sophisticated or purchase
the services with any heightened degree of care.
22 Applicant cites the TTABVUE versions of the Mini Melts decision and the decision in Nazon
v. Ghiorse, 119 USPQ2d 1178 (TTAB 2016), both of which are precedential decisions reported
in the United States Patents Quarterly. We will cite to the reported decisions.
23 The Board analyzed the dissimilarity of the marks in Nazon solely for the purpose of
rendering a complete opinion on opposer’s claim under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act. Id.
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2015), a non-precedential decision, the Board reversed a refusal to register DASH
NEIGHBORHOOD for retail store services featuring gasoline over registrations of
DASH IN and D DASH IN and design for identical services, where the applicant had
“submitted examples of at least 17 uses of ‘DASH’ in connection with convenience
store services around the country . . .” 14 TTABVUE 11 (Serial No. 86011946). The
Board found that “this evidence indicates that consumers are accustomed to
encountering the term ‘DASH’ in relation to convenience store services” and that
“consumers will look to slight differences in the marks and although their commercial
impressions are somewhat similar, the differences in sight and sound are sufficient,
given the weakness of DASH for these services” to make confusion unlikely. Id. at 12.
In In re Zen Mktg., LLC, Serial No. 86487195 (TTAB September 29, 2016), a non-
precedential decision, the Board found that the mark ZEN TEA TRADERS and
design for tea was not confusingly similar to the marks ZEN TEA EXPERIENCE
THE ZEN OF TEA and design and MY ZEN TEA for tea, against the backdrop of
record evidence of a third-party registration of NINE LIVES TEA HOUSE FIND
YOUR ZEN and design for tea and “advertisements submitted by Applicant for
various teas sold by other third-parties that include the term ZEN as a source
identifier for the goods,” which the Board found “tend[ed] to show that the term ZEN
is relatively weak as a source indicator for tea.” 8 TTABVUE 11 (Serial No.
86487195). The Board concluded that “[i]n light of the relative weakness of the term

at 1187. In its analysis of that claim, the Board found that the opposer had failed to establish
proprietary rights in its claimed mark, id. at 1182-87, but the Board then assumed that the
opposer had done so for purposes of completing the analysis under § 2(d). Id. at 1187.
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ZEN in connection with ‘tea,’ we find that the differences between Applicant’s mark
and the marks in the cited registrations are sufficient to distinguish them.” Id.
In Best Prods., the Board found that the mark BEST JEWELRY and design for
retail jewelry store services was dissimilar to the mark JEWELERS’ BEST for
bracelets because the cited mark was “a purely laudatory expression” and the
applicant’s mark involved a surname and was presented in a unique manner that
reinforced the “house mark impression” of BEST JEWELRY. 231 USPQ at 990. The
marks here do not share those characteristics.
Finally, in In re Allegiance Staffing, Serial No. 85663950 (TTAB July 9, 2015), a
non-precedential decision, the Board reversed a refusal to register ALLEGIANCE
STAFFING for temporary employment agency services over eight cited registrations
of ALLEGIS-formative marks for legally identical services. The Board found that
“ALLEGIANCE has a clear meaning, while ALLEGIS is a coined term which has no
meaning, 14 TTABVUE 11 (Serial No. 85663950), that the services, “by their nature,
do not fall in the category of impulse purchasing,” but rather would be purchased
with “a heightened level of care,” id. at 12-13, and that the case was “one of the rare
cases in which the thirteenth du Pont factor, ‘any other established fact probative of
the effect of use,’ play[ed] a role.” Id. at 7. The “fact probative of the effect of use” was
that all of the eight cited registrations had issued over a registration of the applied-
for mark ALLEGIANCE STAFFING for temporary employment agency services that
the applicant had previously owned, but had inadvertently allowed to expire. None of
the circumstances present in Allegiance Staffing are present here.
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We find that the DATA ATOM and ATOMIC DATA marks are similar in
connotation and commercial impression when used for legally identical computing
consulting and support services, and that this similarity in meaning is more
significant than, and outweighs, the modest dissimilarities in sound and appearance.
Davia, 110 USPQ2d at 1812. This duPont factor supports a finding of a likelihood of
confusion.
Conclusion
All of the relevant duPont factors support a finding of a likelihood of confusion.
The identified services, channels of trade, and classes of customers are legally
identical in part. Taking into account the evidence on those duPont factors and the
absence of evidence of any third-party use or registration of similar marks for the
identified services, DATA ATOM and ATOMIC DATA “are sufficiently similar in
terms of their commercial impression such that persons who encounter the marks
would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Coach Servs., 101
USPQ2d at 1721. Confusion as to the source or sponsorship of Applicant’s computer
consulting and support services is likely.
Decision: The refusal to register is affirmed.