0120064541
03-05-2008
Clarice Jones, Complainant, v. Michael W. Wynne, Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.
Clarice Jones,
Complainant,
v.
Michael W. Wynne,
Secretary,
Department of the Air Force,
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120064541
Agency No. 4W1L06002L06
DECISION
Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final
decision by the agency dated July 5, 2006, rejecting complainant's
request to void the June 10, 2006 settlement agreement into which the
parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.402; 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(b);
and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
The settlement agreement provided, in pertinent part, that the agency
agrees to:
(1) Limit on-the-job scheduling of a [co-worker] and Clarice Jones
in the same work area.
(2) Provide additional sexual harassment training and training
regarding conduct in the workplace for employees.
By letter to the agency dated June 16, 2006, complainant requested that
she be permitted to "withdraw" from the settlement agreement because
the agreement's confidentiality clause restricted her from discussing
the agreement with co-workers, yet a co-worker was openly slandering
her name and reputation in the workplace regarding the agreement.
Complainant further alleged that she was subjected to further acts of
harassment and reprisal. In its July 5, 2006 response, the agency denied
complainant's request to withdraw from the agreement.
On appeal, complainant contends that she signed the agreement without
fully understanding it and was never informed by the agency that she had
the right to consult an attorney before signing it. Complainant further
contends that although sexual harassment training was conducted by the
agency, the co-worker who harassed her did not attend the training.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at
any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a
contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules of
contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996). The Commission has further
held that it is the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract,
not some unexpressed intention, that controls the contract's construction.
Eggleston v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795
(August 23, 1990). In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard
to the terms of a settlement agreement, the Commission has generally
relied on the plain meaning rule. See Hyon O v. United States Postal
Service, EEOC Request No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states
that if the writing appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face,
its meaning must be determined from the four corners of the instrument
without resort to extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery
Elevator Co. v. Building Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1984).
In the instant case, the agency agreed to "limit" complainant and a
co-worker from working in the same work area. In an affidavit dated
September 6, 2006, the Chief of the Family Member Programs at Dover Air
Force Base stated that since the execution of the settlement agreement,
she has ensured that complainant and the co-worker have not worked
directly together by assigning them to work in different buildings.
The agreement further states that the agency would provide sexual
harassment training for employees. In the affidavit, the Chief also
stated that sexual harassment training was provided on June 15, 2006,
but that a co-worker could not attend the training because he/she was on
medical leave on that date. Complainant contends that the agreement was
breached because a co-worker did not attend the training. However, we
note that while the settlement agreement generally states that training
will be provided to employees, it does state that a particular employee
must receive training. Thus, we find that the agency substantially
complied with the terms of the agreement.
Complainant contends that the agreement should be voided because the
agency deceived her about the terms of the agreement; the terms of the
agreement unfairly prevent her from responding to the slanderous actions
of a co-worker; and the agency deprived her of the right to consult an
attorney about the matter before signing the agreement. We note that
the settlement agreement states that the parties signed the "agreement,
after full consultation with their legal representatives," and that
complainant is advised to consult with an attorney before signing the
agreement, but complainant has the duty to consult legal representatives
on her own. Complainant signed the agreement, indicating that she read,
understood, and assented to its terms. Thus, we find that complainant
willfully and knowingly entered into the agreement with the agency,
and its terms are binding and enforceable.
To the extent that complainant contends that she has been subjected to
further harassment and discrimination, we have held that claims of further
discrimination and harassment should be processed as a new, separate
complaint, rather than as a breach claim. See Bindal v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900225 (August 9, 1990). Therefore,
complainant should raise claims of further harassment and discrimination
as a new, separate EEO complaint, if she has not already done so.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the
defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
_March 5, 2008_________________
Date
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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P. O. Box 19848
Washington, D.C. 20036
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